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Chapter  1
Introduction
1.1 The research question: pharmaceuticals and sleeping 
sickness control in the Belgian Congo
This study is about pharmaceuticals, in particular the science-based, mass-produced 
therapeutic agents that rose to prominence during the so-called therapeutic revolution 
of the long twentieth century. More specifically, it examines to what extent and how 
pharmaceuticals became central to the control of sleeping sickness in the Belgian Congo 
during the first decades of the twentieth century, and what this tells us about colonial 
public health.1 Sleeping sickness or human African trypanosomiasis is a lethal disease 
endemic in large parts of Africa, caused by protozoa called ‘trypanosomes’ that are 
transmitted by tsetse flies. Taking on epidemic proportions in the early twentieth 
century, it became the main public health priority for the Belgian colonial 
administration. Moreover, the latter definitely resorted to pharmaceutical strategies to 
curb the spread of the disease. Especially during the interwar period, many efforts 
centred on what has been called a ‘chimiothérapie sur une grande échelle’: the mass 
treatment of sleeping sickness victims with chemical drugs.2
Focusing specifically on the pharmaceuticalisation of epidemic disease control in 
colonial Africa, this dissertation hopes to break new ground in the history of sleeping 
sickness control and twentieth-century therapeutics. In 1962, famous medical historian 
Erwin Ackerknecht argued that the history of therapeutics had long been neglected 
because it constituted, until recent times, ‘the weakest spot in medicine.’ Ackerknecht 
did not reject this portrayal of ‘premodern’ therapeutics, but instead stressed the 
educational benefits of studying previous therapeutic failures.3 Such condemnations of 
1 I took inspiration for this question from Joao Biehl’s analysis of the pharmaceuticalisation of public health in 
Brazil through the case of AIDS. See J. Biehl, ‘Pharmaceutical governance’ in A. Petryna, A. Lakoff and A. 
Kleinman (eds.), Global Pharmaceuticals: Ethics, Markets, Practices (Durham, 2006), pp. 206-239.
2 J. Van Riel et P.-G. Janssens, ‘Lutte contre les endémo-épidémies’ dans Apport Scientifique de la Belgique au 
développement de l’Afrique Centrale (Bruxelles, 1962), p. 919.
3 E. H. Ackerknecht, ‘Aspects of the history of therapeutics’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 36 (1962), 389-390.
2historical backwardness, based on an appreciation of the treatment standards of his own 
time, have since then been criticised as ‘Whiggish’ narratives.4 But most historians 
would agree that the (long) twentieth century represents a crucial phase of 
transformation in the history of therapeutics. At the same time, there is a growing 
consensus that we are only beginning to understand the complexities and multiple 
dimensions of what has been termed ‘the therapeutic revolution’.5 
Significant contributions to a more nuanced therapeutic history of the twentieth 
century stem from a recent move to promote pharmaceuticals as objects of historical 
study ‘in their own right’, paralleling a fascination with medical drugs in other 
humanities and social science disciplines.6 Among the revisions prompted so far by this 
historiographical development is a reconsideration of the ‘chemical model’ of 
therapeutic transformation. Whereas the latter attributes the major changes in the 
history of medical drugs to applied chemistry and the involvement of the (German) 
chemical industry since the late 1800s, Jean-Paul Gaudillière argues that before World 
War Two chemical drugs actually represented only a modest fraction of industrially 
manufactured medicines on the market in comparison with drugs of biological 
provenance.7 Other historical overviews equally suggest that chemotherapy did not 
exactly become a dominant feature of biomedicine’s therapeutic arsenal until after the 
war.8
While such claims add an important qualification to the dominant story by pointing 
to the necessary inclusion of biological drugs, the picture they paint is in fact no less 
partial.9 More specifically, they reflect a rather Eurocentric reading of our 
pharmaceutical past in overlooking how the non-western world participated in and 
4 For a criticism of Ackerknechtian versions of therapeutic history, see G. B. Risse, ‘The history of therapeutics’ 
in V. Nutton and W. F. Bynum (eds.), Essays in the History of Therapeutics, Clio Medica 22 (Amsterdam, 1991), pp. 
3-11.
5 Jean-Paul Gaudillière suggests that ‘(…) the therapeutic revolution remains to be revisited in a manner similar 
to what historians of science did to the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century.’ See J. P. Gaudillière, 
‘Introduction: drug trajectories’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2005), 
604. Patrice Bourdelais calls for reflection on what it is that sets the period since the late nineteenth century 
apart as a ‘rupture’ in the long-term history of medical drugs. P. Bourdelais, ‘Conclusion. Le médicament, une 
histoire plurielle’ dans C. Bonah et A. Rasmussen (dir.), Histoire et médicament aux XIXe et XXe siècles (Paris, 2005), 
pp. 217-218.
6 European Science Foundation, Research Networking Programme. Standard Drugs and Drug Standards A Comparative 
Historical Study of Pharmaceuticals in the 20th Century (Strasbourg, 2008), p. 2. See also S. J. Williams, J. Gabe and P. 
Davis, ‘The sociology of pharmaceuticals: progress and prospects’ (2008), University of Warwick Institutional 
Repository, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk (Last accessed 17 March 2014); J. Collin, M. Otero et L. Monnais (dir.), Le 
médicament au coeur de la socialité contemporaine: regards croisés sur un objet complexe, Collection Problèmes sociaux et 
interventions sociales 23 ( Sainte-Foy, 2006).
7 Gaudillière, ‘Introduction: drug trajectories’, 604-606.
8 This seems the case, for example, in C. Bonah et S. Massat-Bourrat, ‘Les “agents thérapeutiques”. Paradoxes et 
ambiguïtés d’une histoire des remèdes aux XIXe et XXe siècles’ dans Bonah et Rasmussen (dir.), Histoire et 
médicament, p. 39.
9 On the inclusion of biologicals, see for example European Science Foundation, Standard Drugs, p. 5.
3contributed to it. Chemically synthesised drugs, for example, played a central role in 
colonial therapeutics during the interwar period, as highlighted by Laurence Monnais’ 
recent study on sulfa drugs in French Vietnam.10 Moreover, before the Second World 
War there were significant developments in tropical chemotherapy, which targeted 
protozoan and parasitic diseases rather than the bacterial infections associated with 
temperate climates. But this, Helen Power contends, is often ignored because it does not 
fit ‘history read as Euro-centric progress’.11 Not that much seems to have changed, 
therefore, since Iago Galdston identified the period between the development of the 
chemical antisyphilitic drug Salvarsan in 1910 and the introduction of the antibacterial 
sulfa drugs in the mid 1930s as the ‘doldrum years’.12
In spite of such historiographic blind spots, the prewar histories of modern 
chemotherapy and the colonial tropics were intimately connected, and this is especially 
evident in the case of sleeping sickness. The disease now features on the World Health 
Organisation’s list of neglected tropical diseases, meaning that it presents very few 
incentives for pharmaceutical investment, given that the majority of the people affected 
belong to some of the poorest communities in the world.13 Ironically, however, sleeping 
sickness and trypanosomes were crucial in the development of specific chemotherapy, 
the targeting of infectious disease pathogens with chemical compounds, in the early 
twentieth century.14 Three of the five synthetic chemicals currently used to treat 
sleeping sickness - in spite of their shortcomings - were developed roughly between 
1916 and 1950, at a time when European colonialism coincided with critical transitions 
in the forms and concepts of medical drugs.15 
Although it has an intricate past that far predates the period of European colonialism 
starting in the late nineteenth-century, African trypanosomiasis indeed played a key 
role in the colonial history of the continent.16 Besides the actual demographic impact of 
10 L. Monnais, ‘From colonial medicines to global pharmaceuticals? The introduction of sulfa drugs in French 
Vietnam’, East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal 3 (2009), 257-285.
11 H. J. Power, Tropical Medicine in the Twentieth Century: A History of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, 
1899-1990 (London, 1999), p. 85.
12 Quoted in Ackerknecht, ‘History of therapeutics’, 399.
13 ‘The 17 neglected tropical diseases’, World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/
diseases/en/ (Last accessed 21 April 2014); H. Veeken and B. Pécoul, ‘Editorial: drugs for “neglected diseases”: a 
bitter pill’, Tropical Medicine and International Health 5 (2000), 309-310.
14 On the link between sleeping sickness and Paul Ehrlich’s chemotherapy, see D. Neill, ‘Paul Ehrlich’s colonial 
connections: scientific networks and sleeping sickness drug therapy research, 1900-1914’, Social History of 
Medicine 22 (2009), 61-77.
15 Namely Suramin (Bayer 205), Pentamidine and Melarsoprol. The fourth drug, Eflornithine was developed in 
1990 and has been used in combination with Nifurtimox since 2009. See ‘Trypanosomiasis, human African 
(sleeping sickness). Fact sheet N° 259’, World Health Organization, Media centre, http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs259/en/ (Last accessed 21 April 2014); Veeken and Pécoul, ‘“Neglected diseases”’, 
309-310.
16 M. Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness)’ in K. F. Kiple (ed.), The Cambridge Historical Dictionary of 
Disease (Cambridge, 1993), p. 555-556.
4the early twentieth-century sleeping sickness epidemics, the disease also derived 
particular significance from its contemporaneous construction as one of the most 
serious threats to African labour populations and their livestock, and therefore to 
colonial regimes and economies. It quickly became a public health priority of colonial 
governments, dominated the research agenda of the newly established field of tropical 
medicine and contributed to the formation of medical services in African territories, 
notably in the Belgian Congo.17 
The importance of trypanosomiasis to Africa’s colonial history, grounded in 
epidemiological reality as well as political construction, is also reflected in 
historiography. Trypanosomiasis and the public health campaigns it gave rise to occupy 
a prominent place in medical histories of colonial sub-Saharan Africa, and constitute the 
subject of several monographs.18 A great deal of these works contribute significantly to 
our understanding of the control strategies in various colonial contexts targeting 
trypanosomes, their human and animal hosts, or fly vectors, and elucidate how such 
policies reflected and attempted to advance the immediate political and economic 
interests of colonialism. 
While large-scale treatment with chemotherapeutic agents has been discussed as a 
component of the public health campaigns in certain colonies, the pharmaceutical 
intricacies of this history do not often figure centrally in this scholarship, which is 
primarily interested in demonstrating the problematic, political nature of colonial 
medical interventions.19 Analyses of sleeping sickness control do not always particularly 
focus on pharmaceuticals in themselves and can somewhat take their use for granted, 
leaving the impression that the mere availability of sleeping sickness drugs or at best 
the policy choices of colonial administrations sufficiently explain their presence 
overseas. In that way, they largely overlook the range of processes and forces that 
shaped pharmaceuticals’ introduction and further spread, to a greater or lesser extent, 
in colonial African territories. Although some studies illuminate interesting aspects of 
this more complex story, such as the importation of sleeping sickness drugs as 
experimental medicines or the efforts of (certain) colonial doctors to sustain their use in 
17 M. Malowany, ‘Unfinished agendas: writing the history of medicine of Sub-Saharan Africa’, African Affairs 99 
(2000), 330-333; M. Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire 
(Cambridge, 1992), p. 102; K. A. Hoppe, Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British Uganda (Westport, 
2003), p. 11.
18 For example M. Lyons, Colonial Disease; Hoppe, Lords of the Fly; M. Worboys, ‘The comparative history of 
sleeping sickness in East and Central Africa, 1900-1914’, History of Science 32 (1994), 89-102; R. Headrick, 
Colonialism, Health and Illness in French Equatorial Africa (Atlanta, 1994); J.-P. Bado, Médecine coloniale et grandes 
endémies en Afrique (Paris, 1996); W. Eckart, Medizin und Kolonialimperialismus - Deutschland 1884-1945 (Paderborn, 
1997); I. Hiroyuki, Medizin und Kolonialgesellschaft. Die Bekämpfung der Schlafkrankheit in den deutschen 
“Schutzgebieten” vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Münster, 2009).
19 Perhaps symptomatic of this situation are the small factual inaccuracies about sleeping sickness drugs in 
these studies. See for example Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, p. 559; Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 145, 149.
5the wake of political opposition, a fuller picture of this pharmaceuticalisation is still 
lacking.20 
In placing sleeping sickness medicines and their dissemination explicitly at the heart 
of the enquiry, this dissertation offers a different perspective on the colonial history of 
human trypanosomiasis control. The focus is on the Belgian Congo before the Second 
World War as a suitable vantage point from which to study the intertwined histories of 
colonial Africa, public health and therapeutics. As highlighted notably by Maryinez 
Lyons, medical drugs - especially arsenic compounds - were a key component of the 
interwar efforts to tackle sleeping sickness in the colony. However, this dissertation 
starts from the premise that the presence of these pharmaceuticals should be properly 
problematised, and their development, introduction and distribution examined as 
central and integral components of historical analysis. In other words, it posits the 
apparent interwar pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping sickness control in the Belgian 
Congo as the explanandum. Moreover, it approaches this subject from the perspective of 
drug ‘careers’ or ‘trajectories’: it charts the beginnings and further fates of sleeping 
sickness drugs in the Congo, and examines how social and geographic boundaries were 
crossed in the course of their life journeys.21 In so doing, I hope to underscore that 
public health in colonial Africa was not simply ‘colonial’, but took shape at the 
intersection of different social spheres, localities and spatial scales. How this perspective 
fits in with relevant historiographic developments, notably in the field of 
pharmaceutical and colonial medical history, will be discussed next. 
20 For example Neill, ‘Ehrlich’s colonial connections’; G. Lachenal, ‘Chemoprophylaxis against sleeping sickness 
in late colonial Africa’, Wellcome History 38 (2008), 4-5; N. Tousignant, ‘Trypanosomes, toxicity and resistance: 
the politics of mass therapy in French colonial Africa’, Social History of Medicine 25 (2012), 625-643. There 
generally seems to be more detailed attention for sleeping sickness drugs in the historiography of sleeping 
sickness control in French Africa. See for example Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness, pp. 67-94, 311-344.
21 Gaudillière, ‘Introduction: drug trajectories’, 603-611; S. Snelders, C. Kaplan and T. Pieters, ‘On cannabis, 
chloral hydrate and career cycles of psychotropic drugs in medicine’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 80 
(2006), 95-110.
61.2 Historiographical context: pharmaceutical history and the 
history of medicine in colonial settings
1.2.1 A ‘new’ pharmaceutical history
The recent surge of historical interest in pharmaceuticals marks an important shift from 
older-style histories of therapy and pharmacy. Building on a therapeutic history that 
replaced initial surveys of heroic scientists and their treatment strategies with broader 
social histories of therapeutics, it represents a still further move, towards a ‘history of 
remedies’ focusing on the ‘concrete objects of healing’ in their cultural, social, political 
and economic dimensions.22 The ‘new pharmaceutical history’ is also a far cry from an 
older historiography confined to the fortunes of pharmacists and pharmacies: it draws 
attention to a much wider array of actors and forces involved in the 
pharmaceuticalisation of societies, through which pharmaceutical companies turned 
into powerful players and medical drugs became omnipresent as solutions to medical 
and even social problems.23 Previously neglected themes such as industrialisation, 
marketing, regulation, consumption are now readily included as pertinent aspects of 
pharmaceutical history. 
Moreover, a particularly prominent trend in this new historiography is the adoption 
of a ‘biographical approach’ to pharmaceuticals, a perspective developed by medical 
anthropologists who by the 1980s had become interested in the apparent global spread 
of biomedical drugs rather than in the more conventional and ‘exotic’ ethnographic 
subjects of indigenous remedies and ethnopharmacology.24 Inspired, among other 
things, by Igor Kopytoff and Arjun Appadurai’s idea that objects can have biographies, 
their pharmaceutical anthropology conceives of medicines as ‘material things’ that have 
‘social lives’ beyond their inherent pharmacological properties and physiological 
2 2  G. B. Risse, ‘History of therapeutics’, pp. 3-11; G. Van Heteren, M. Gijswijt-Hofstra and T. Tansey, 
‘Introduction’ in M. Gijswijt-Hofstra, G. Van Heteren and T. Tansey (eds.), Biographies of Remedies: Drugs, 
Medicines and Contraceptives in Dutch and Anglo-American Healing Cultures, Clio Medica 66 (Amsterdam, 2002), pp. 
2-3.
2 3  E. Siegel Watkins, ‘From history of pharmacy to pharmaceutical history’, Pharmacy in History 51 (2009), 3-13. 
For the idea of a novel pharmaceutical history, see also V. Hess, ‘Psychochemicals crossing the wall. Die 
Einführung der Psychopharmaka in der DDR aus der Perspektive der neueren Arzneimittelgeschichte’, 
Medizinhistorisches Journal 42 (2007), 61-84.
2 4  S. van der Geest, S. Reynolds Whyte and A. Hardon, ‘The anthropology of pharmaceuticals: a biographical 
approach’, Annual Review of Anthropology 25 (1996), 153-178.
7effects.25 This means that pharmaceuticals can be followed as they move through 
different life stages, such as production, prescription, distribution and consumption, 
and between the particular settings and actors associated with each of these phases. 
Bringing medicines to ‘life’ in this way also implies the attribution of a certain agency to 
objects, although the degree to which researchers want to do so can vary. Few would 
argue that pharmaceuticals have a life or act of their own accord without the 
intervention of people, but some view them as non-human agents in the sense of actor-
network theory.26 
The notion that medicines have social lives is reflected in recent historical 
scholarship implicitly, but increasingly also through the explicit adoption of biography-
related vocabularies. With their respective monographs on penicillin and the 
sulfonamides for example, Robert Bud and John Lesch write pharmaceutical histories 
that are in fact conceived as the life stories of specific drugs or drug families.27 Some 
historians employ the terms ‘biography’ or ‘life (cycle)’ in connection with medicines in 
a fashion that does little to conceal their anthropological sources of inspiration.28 
Talking about cyclical ‘career paths’ to describe the alternation of highs and lows in the 
medical and public appreciation and use of certain drugs, Toine Pieters, Stephen 
Snelders and Charles Kaplan offer an intriguing variation on the familiar theme.29 Or, 
calling for a historiography that examines twentieth-century therapeutics through the 
‘trajectories’ or ‘circulation’ of drugs within and between the different social realms of 
medicine, science and industry, Jean-Paul Gaudillière, Christian Bonah and Anne 
Rasmussen have clearly embarked upon a similar endeavour.30 
Unsurprisingly, a common thread in such historical works is the commitment to the 
analytical strategy of following medicines around as they journey through life, an 
approach evidently shared with pharmaceutical anthropologists. But more so than the 
2 5  Appadurai extended economic analyses of commodities by including cultural perspectives. A. Appadurai 
(ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge, 1986); I. Kopytoff, ‘The cultural 
biography of things: commoditization as process’ in Appadurai, Social Life of Things, pp. 64-91; S. Reynolds 
Whyte, S. van der Geest and A. Hardon, Social Lives of Medicines (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 3-5.
2 6  Reynolds Whyte, van der Geest and Hardon, Social Lives of Medicines, pp. 13-14.
2 7  R. Bud, Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy (Oxford, 2007); J. Lesch, The First Miracle Drugs: How the Sulfa Drugs 
Transformed Medicine (New York, 2007).
2 8  For example V. Walsh and J. Goodman, ‘The billion dollar molecule: Taxol in historical and theoretical 
perspective’ in Gijswijt-Hofstra, Van Heteren and Tansey (eds.), Biographies of remedies, pp. 245-267; Gijswijt-
Hofstra, Van Heteren and Tansey (eds.), Biographies of remedies; J. Goodman and V. Walsh, The Story of Taxol. 
Nature and Politics in the Pursuit of an Anti-Cancer Drug (Cambridge, 2001).
2 9  T. Pieters, Interferon: The Science and Selling of a Miracle Drug (London, 2005); Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On 
cannabis’, 95-110.
3 0  Gaudillière, ‘Introduction: drug trajectories’, 603-611; J.-P. Gaudillière, ‘Une marchandise pas comme les 
autres. Historiographie du médicament et de l’industrie pharmaceutique en France au XXe siècle’ dans Bonah 
et Rasmussen (dir.), Histoire et médicament, pp. 115-119; C. Bonah et A. Rasmussen, ‘Introduction. Pour une 
nouvelle histoire des médicaments en France au XIXe et XXe siècles’ dans Bonah et Rasmussen (dir.), Histoire et 
médicament, pp. 9-13.
8latter, who – according to Vivien Walsh and Jordan Goodman - analyse ‘life cycles within 
prescribed stages’, they allow the inclusion of an element of ‘contingency’ in their 
reconstruction of medicinal biographies.31 In fact, pharmaceutical historians are 
particularly attentive to showing that nothing is inevitable or self-evident about the 
fates of medical drugs. They point out, for example, that for various reasons therapeutic 
agents did not always end up as successful drugs and could thus have ‘eclipsed 
trajectories’.32 Or they argue that the successes and failures of medicines were not 
straightforward but subject to cyclical patterns, illustrate how ‘(re)-appropriations’ 
could change the original identities and intended uses of medicinal substances, and 
reveal how one and the same medicinal commodity could have various parallel lives.33 
How and why certain paths were followed while others were discarded or discontinued 
precisely constitutes the subject of historical investigations of this stance, including this 
dissertation. 
Above all, the main rationale behind historians’ empirical study of moving 
pharmaceuticals is to propose a circulatory understanding of pharmaceuticalisation as 
an alternative to linear models. The latter conceive the spread of medicines through 
society as a matter of scientific discoveries ‘rationally and automatically’ trickling down 
to the echelon of prescribers and consumers without any transformations, feedback or 
reversals in the process.34 Drug trajectories and related concepts, however, emphasise 
the interactions and multidirectional flows between a plurality of settings, actors and 
interests that are at work in the emergence, spread and use of therapeutic substances.35 
A benefit of following the movements of pharmaceuticals is therefore that it tells us 
something about the larger social structures in which pharmaceuticalisation processes 
take place. By circulating from one setting to the next, medicines reflect and constitute 
social relations, something anthropologists Adriana Petryna and Arthur Kleinman refer 
to as ‘the pharmaceutical nexus’.36 Similarly, historians have identified drugs and their 
trajectories as valuable analytical tools to probe the formation and workings of the 
3 1  Walsh and Goodman, ‘Billion dollar molecule’, pp. 246-247.
3 2  Bonah et Massat-Bourrat, ‘“Agents thérapeutiques”’, p. 41.
3 3  Pieters, Interferon; Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘Career cycles of psychotropic drugs’; Walsh and Goodman, 
‘Billion dollar molecule’, p. 246; Bonah et Massat-Bourrat, ‘“Agents thérapeutiques”’, p. 46; G. Attewell, 
‘Interweaving substance trajectories: tiryaq, circulation and transformation in the nineteenth century’ in W. 
Ernst, P. B. Mukharji and A. Digby (eds.), Crossing Colonial Historiographies: Histories of Colonial and Indigenous 
Medicines in Transnational Perspective (Newcastle, 2010), pp. 1-20.
3 4  Bonah et Massat-Bourrat, ‘“Agents thérapeutiques”’, p. 46; Gaudillière, ‘Marchandise pas comme les autres’, 
p. 119.
3 5  Gaudillière, ‘Marchandise pas comme les autres’, p. 118.
3 6  Appadurai writes in relation to other objects with biographies: ‘The path taken by these valuables is thus 
both reflective and constitutive of social partnerships and struggles for preeminence.’ A. Appadurai, 
‘Introduction: commodities and the politics of value’ in Appadurai (ed.), Social Life of Things, p. 19; A. Petryna 
and A. Kleinman, ‘The pharmaceutical nexus’ in Petryna, Lakoff and Kleinman (eds.), Global Pharmaceuticals, pp. 
20-22.
9broader networks implicated in historical instances of pharmaceuticalisation.37 This, in 
turn, can modify our perspective on (pharmaceuticalised) twentieth-century health care 
systems or ‘healing cultures’: involving complex configurations of circulating medicines, 
they can be seen to take shape and operate at the intersection of distinct social worlds, 
and the stakes and stakeholders associated with them.38 The view in this dissertation is 
that tracing the trajectories of sleeping sickness drugs can tell us something about 
public health in the Belgian Congo, and by extension, about the field of ‘colonial 
medicine’ more generally. 
1.2.2 Historicising pharmaceutical interconnections: colonialism, medicines 
and ‘colonial medicine’ 
As the previous section shows, historians are increasingly joining anthropologists in 
studying how medicines circulate between various social settings in the course of their 
lives. So far, however, much of this ‘new’ pharmaceutical history has been rather silent 
on the ways in which medicines not only transgressed the boundaries of distinct social 
spheres, but also crossed geographic and territorial borders. Self-contained territorial 
entities and spatial scales are often employed as the natural backgrounds against which 
to analyse drugs’ social mobilities. Moreover, attempts to place local experiences in a 
broader context have been largely confined to comparative approaches, which fail to 
take actual border-crossing into account.39
By contrast, pharmaceutical anthropologists have duly acknowledged that medicines 
also move in a geographic sense, and for that reason can tell us something about 
processes of globalisation, or at least about spatial interconnections.40 Yet historical 
instances of the formation and workings of such geographic interdependencies 
3 7  The idea of medical drugs as probing tools is formulated as ‘den Stoff quasi als Sonde nutzen, um weitere 
Zusammenhänge und ein Netz von Einflussgrössen zu erfassen’ in V. Balz, M. Bürgi, N. Eschenbruch und M. 
Hulverscheidt, ‘Magic bullets, chemische Knebel, beherrschte Risiken? Zum Arbeitsfeld des DFG-
Forschungsnetzwerks “Arzneistoffe im 20. Jahrhundert”’, Medizinhistorisches Journal 43 (2008), 187.
3 8  Bonah et Rasmussen, ‘Nouvelle histoire des médicaments’ p. 9-13. Godelieve Van Heteren also proposed 
something along those lines in calling for further studies of ‘remedies’ as ‘indicators’ of the multiple 
dimensions of modern ‘cultures of healing’. See G. Van Heteren, ‘Afterword: who cares? Remedies, care and 
cultures of healing in the twentieth century’ in Gijswijt-Hofstra, Van Heteren and Tansey (eds.), Biographies of 
Remedies, p. 270.
3 9  See for example, European Science Foundation, Standard Drugs. About the inadequacy of comparative 
approaches to capture ‘the global as an empirical reality in and of itself ’, see B. Zimmerman, ‘Histoire croisée 
and the making of global history’ (2008), p. 2, European University Institute, Department of History and 
Civilisation, http://www.iue.it/HEC//ResearchTeaching/20082009-Autumn/SS-reading-Zimmermann.pdf 
(Last accessed 16 November 2010) .
4 0  van der Geest, Reynolds Whyte and Hardon, ‘Anthropology of pharmaceuticals’; Reynolds Whyte, van der 
Geest and Hardon, Social Lives of Medicines, pp. 3-19; Petryna, Lakoff and Kleinman (eds.), Global Pharmaceuticals.
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constitute something of a blind spot in anthropological as much as in historical 
scholarship. Interestingly, a number of historians has now started to show how 
examining the link between modern colonialism and pharmaceuticals is an important 
way to address this gap in our understanding of the pharmaceutical past and present.
Laurence Monnais and Noémi Tousignant, for example, have recently argued that 
studying ‘the colonial life of pharmaceuticals’ can help clarify the historical roots of 
current patterns of pharmaceutical consumption in non-western settings.41 Since about 
the 1960s, serious concerns have been raised about the ‘“pharmaceutical invasion of the 
South”’, the growing presence of biomedical drugs in resource-poor contexts and the 
ensuing health hazards and financial costs.42 This situation not only triggered the 
promotion of essential drug policies by the World Health Organisation, but also sparked 
a scientific interest in anthropologists, who embarked upon investigations of the 
seemingly ever-increasing popularity of pharmaceuticals in the South.43 However, 
Monnais and Tousignant assert, this ‘pharmaceutical invasion’ and the associated ‘risky’ 
therapeutic behaviours have generally not been sufficiently examined from a historical 
perspective. Their analysis of Vietnamese responses to biomedical drugs during the first 
decades of the twentieth century therefore highlights the crucial role of European 
colonialism in the creation of ‘complex forms of medical pluralism’.44 
Although we should be wary of developing too simplistic assumptions about the 
reproduction of the colonial into the postcolonial period, this kind of work on medicines 
and colonialism usefully complements anthropological studies of pharmaceuticalisation 
in former colonies with historicising approaches.45 But in particular, it also breaks new 
historiographical ground in illuminating the often-neglected spatial logics of 
pharmaceutical history. Including the colonial dimension helps to highlight, for 
example, the ‘weight of locality’ on the (global) trajectories of drugs.46 Or it reveals the 
crucial contributions of the non-western world to pharmaceutical innovation and 
development, thus putting a finger on the unwarranted Eurocentric nature of common 
readings of the medicinal past that, if not completely ignoring the bearing of colonies 
4 1  L. Monnais and N. Tousignant, ‘The colonial life of pharmaceuticals: accessibility to health care, 
consumption of medicines and medical pluralism in French Vietnam, 1905-1945’, Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1 
(2006), 131-168.
4 2  Ibid., 132-133; Reynolds Whyte, van der Geest and Hardon, Social Lives of Medicines, p. 9.
4 3  Reynolds Whyte, van der Geest and Hardon, Social Lives of Medicines, pp. 9-11. See also, for example, N. 
Kanji, A. Hardon, J. W. Harnmeijer, M. Mamdani and G. Walt, Drugs Policy in Developing Countries (New Jersey, 
1992).
4 4  Monnais and Tousignant, ‘Colonial life of pharmaceuticals’, 155.
4 5  F. Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, 2005), pp. 12-22; J.-F. Bayart, ‘Les études 
post-coloniales, une invention politique de la tradition?’, Sociétés politiques comparées. Revue Européenne d’Analyse 
des Sociétés Politiques 14 (2009), 27-31.
4 6  Monnais, ‘Colonial medicines to global pharmaceuticals’, 281.
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on the history of ‘modern’ drugs, have at best silently assumed them to be passive 
recipients of the fruits of Europe’s technological progress.47 
Yet this burgeoning literature on colonialism and medical drugs not only makes a 
strong case for taking a ‘spatial turn’ in pharmaceutical history. Perhaps rather 
obviously, it also contributes to colonial history by pointing us towards its little-known 
pharmaceutical dimensions. Although the movements of materia medica by far predate 
the age of European colonial empires, it is, after all, through colonialism that 
pharmaceuticals can be expected to have circulated on a significant geographic scale in 
the first decades of the twentieth century. Monnais remarks, however, that while 
historians have long analysed the mutually constitutive relationship between 
biomedicine and colonial empire, the development of pharmaceuticals and emergence 
of a pharmaceutical industry that occurred around the same time have generally not 
been connected to this story.48 One could therefore reasonably argue for a revision of the 
history of medicine and health in colonial settings from a pharmaceutical point of view. 
Moreover, as will be explored in the following pages, tackling the subject through a 
pharmaceutical lens, as this dissertation seeks to do, can be a rewarding strategy to 
engage with some of the on-going debates in relation to the history of ‘colonial 
medicine’. 
The field of colonial medical history, it must be said, has grown considerably in 
sophistication and scope over the past few decades. Initially, the history of medicine in 
connection with the non-Western world to a significant extent consisted of 
(auto)biographic accounts of heroic European doctors in torrid climates, or it chronicled 
the scientific breakthroughs in the study of tropical diseases. Often such works were a 
vehicle for demonstrating the West’s supposed triumph over indigenous backwardness 
and tropical insalubrity, and indeed, for justifying Europe’s colonial projects altogether.49 
After decolonisation, they were joined by institutional histories charting the evolution 
of the national medical services of former colonies.50 In the 1980s, however, at a time of 
revived academic interest in the question of colonialism, the history of medicine, health 
and imperialism (especially its Western European version in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries) came under ever-closer scrutiny.51 Notably the simultaneous 
publication in 1988 of two edited volumes by David Arnold and by Roy MacLeod and 
4 7  For example, A. D. Osseo-Asare, ‘Bioprospecting and resistance: transforming poisoned arrows into 
Strophantin Pills in Colonial Gold Coast, 1885-1922’, Social History of Medicine 21 (2008), 269-290; Neill, ‘Ehrlich’s 
colonial connections’; Power, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, pp. 79-103; M. Hokkanen, ‘Imperial networks, 
colonial bioprospecting and Burroughs Wellcome & Co.: the case of Strophantus Kombe from Malawi 
(1859-1915)’, Social History of Medicine 25 (2012), 589-607. 
4 8  Monnais, ‘Colonial medicines to global pharmaceuticals’, 282.
4 9  For example, J. R. Cornet, Bwana Muganga (Hommes en blanc en Afrique Noire), Mémoires Académie Royales des 
Sciences d’Outre-Mer. Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques (Bruxelles, 1971), t. XLI.
5 0  For example: A. Beck, A History of the British Medical Administration of East Africa (Cambridge, 1970). 
5 1  For a description of the revival of colonial studies, see Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 33-55.
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Milton Lewis respectively, reflected the establishment of ‘colonial medicine’ as a 
legitimate and engaging subfield of medical and/or colonial history.52 
It was the beginning of a growing and diverse body of work that, rather than simply 
accepting previous assumptions about the spread of medicine as an unambiguously 
beneficial side effect of European colonialism, critically examined their intimate 
historical ties. A considerable number of historians have since showed how medicine 
served as a ‘tool of Empire’, but also reversely, how imperialism was instrumental in 
shaping biomedical developments.53 Some studies, for example, have analysed the 
establishment of the scientific specialty of tropical medicine in different European 
countries around 1900 in its connections with the ideologies and practices of 
imperialism.54 Inspired by developments in social and cultural history, scholars have also 
developed a range of specific approaches to the theme of medicine and colonialism as it 
played out in colonial settings. 
A notable example is the development of a ‘political economy of health’ perspective, 
which considers sickness and health in their wider social context rather than as mere 
medical problems. This extensive work, much of which focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, 
points to the immense health costs of colonialism and its modes of production. It also 
draws attention to the political and economic rationales behind colonial medical 
interventions, aimed principally at indigenous labour populations and those responsible 
for their reproduction. Illuminating how the boundaries between health promotion and 
colonial administration were often blurred, it reveals, moreover, the great potential in 
colonial contexts for social engineering through medical campaigns.55
5 2  D. Arnold (ed.), Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies (New York, 1988); R. MacLeod and M. Lewis (eds.), 
Disease Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Western Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion (London, 
1988).
5 3  The phrase ‘tool of Empire’ was coined by Daniel Headrick. See D. R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology 
and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1981). On this topic see also for example J. 
Comaroff, ‘The diseased heart of Africa: Medicine, colonialism and the black body’ in M. Lock and S. 
Lindenbaum (eds.), Knowledge, Power and Practice: The Anthropology of Medicine and Everyday Life (Berkeley, 1993), 
pp. 305-329; J. Farley, Bilharzia: A History of Imperial Tropical Medicine (Cambridge, 1991); Eckart, Medizin und 
Kolonialimperialismus. 
5 4  Michael Worboys was the first to insist on the role of the ‘external (…) factor(…)’ of European imperialism in 
the emergence of tropical medicine as a scientific specialty. See M. Worboys, ‘The emergence of tropical 
medicine: a study in the establishment of a scientific specialty’ in G. Lemaine, R. MacLeod, M. Mulkay and P. 
Weingart (eds.), Perspectives on the Emergence of Scientific Disciplines (Chicago, 1976), p. 75. On tropical medicine 
institutions in European metropoles, see also M. Worboys, ‘Manson, Ross, and colonial medical policy: tropical 
medicine in London and Liverpool, 1899-1914’ in MacLeod and Lewis (eds.), Disease, Medicine and Empire, pp. 
21-37; Power, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine; L. Wilkinson and A. Hardy, Prevention and Cure: The London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, a Twentieth-Century Quest for Global Public Health (London, 2001); L. van 
Bergen, Van koloniale geneeskunde tot internationale gezondheidszorg. een geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor Tropische Geneeskunde (Amsterdam, 2007); D. M. Haynes, Imperial Medicine: Patrick Manson and the Conquest of 
Tropical Disease (Philadelphia, 2001).
5 5  For example S. Feierman and J. Janzen (eds.), The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa (Berkeley, 1992); 
Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness; M. Turshen, The Political Ecology of Disease in Tanzania (New Brunswick, 
13
Another strand of influential scholarship takes its principal inspiration from Foucault 
and social constructionism in analysing the complicity between medicine and colonial 
power. It examines, for example, how biomedical discourses constructed indigenous 
population groups as ‘pathological’ on the basis of biological or even cultural factors, as 
Megan Vaughan has shown for the case of British Africa.56 Such pathologised 
representations of the colonised ‘other’ could then be easily invoked to justify, on 
sanitary grounds, measures of social control and policies solidifying colonial power 
relations, such as racial segregation.57 
The remarkable amount of critical works on the history of medicine and health in 
colonial settings has firmly uprooted the long-standing apologetic tradition in 
historiography, and for that deserves ample credit. Yet in focusing so intensely on the 
question of ‘what (was) colonial about colonial medicine’, this literature is not entirely 
unproblematic either, as Waltraud Ernst has recently reminded us.58 Because even if 
some might have greatly sophisticated and nuanced our understanding of colonialism 
itself, at the same time many studies still largely essentialise the history of medicine in 
colonial settings, by examining and emphasising its specifically ‘colonial’ character and 
thus proposing the ‘colonial’ as the most appropriate analytical category to grasp the 
object of their research. 
We can in fact discern three major, interrelated ways in which the insistence on the 
‘colonial’ label confines our reading of the medical past in relation to the colonial world. 
First, the notion of ‘colonial’ medicine suggests that it is distinct and disconnected from 
its metropolitan counterpart, as well as from ‘indigenous’ medicine.59 When European 
doctors employed the phrase ‘colonial’, they often did so to convey a sense of difference: 
on the one hand, it connoted subordination and dependency vis-à-vis a metropolitan 
centre, on the other, superiority with regard to ‘indigenous’ medical practices.60 The 
problem is that what was clearly a ‘normative category’ during the colonial period has 
been to a significant degree adopted as an ‘analytic category’ in medical historiography, 
resulting in a division of labour between historians of European, colonial and indigenous 
1984); R. M. Packard, White Plague, Black Labor: Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of Health and Disease in South 
Africa (Berkeley, 1989); L. Manderson, Sickness and the State: Health and Illness in Colonial Malaya, 1870-1940 (New 
York, 2002); M. Lyons, Colonial Disease.
5 6  M. Vaughan, Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Stanford, 1991).
5 7  For example, W. Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race and Hygiene in the Philippines 
(Durham, 2006); W. Anderson, ‘Immunities of Empire: race, disease and the new tropical medicine, 1900-1920’, 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 70 (1996), 94-118; Manderson, Sickness and the State.
5 8  According to Ernst, Roy Porter was the first to raise this question. See W. Ernst, ‘Beyond East and West. From 
the history of colonial medicine to a social history of medicine(s) in South Asia’, Social History of Medicine 20 
(2007), 508; Shula Marks later repeated it in S. Marks, ‘What is colonial about colonial medicine? And what has 
happened to the imperialism of health?’, Social History of Medicine 10 (1997), 205-219.
5 9  On colonial versus indigenous medicine, see Ernst, ‘Beyond East and West.
6 0  In fact, the notion of ‘tropical’ diseases itself was based on the conceptualisation of the tropics as the 
ultimate antipode of a temperate Europe. See D. Arnold, ‘The place of “the tropics” in Western medical ideas 
since 1750’, Tropical Medicine and International Health 2 (1997), 303-313.
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medicine and largely perpetuating the Eurocentric, binary logic of the world that many 
critics of colonialism sought to eradicate.61 
Secondly, the classification of medicine in colonial settings as ‘colonial’ tends to 
restrict the pertinent social dynamics involved to the asymmetric relations between 
colonisers and colonised.62 Even with a more nuanced understanding of the ‘colonial 
encounter’ that moves beyond simple paradigms of coercion and acknowledges the 
limits of colonial power, the reciprocal, negotiated and mediated nature of the 
relationship, the fluid and constructed character of the categories of coloniser and 
colonised and so on, the initiatives of both Europeans and indigenous populations are 
still primarily viewed through the prism of, and thus reduced to, this one interaction.63 
Finally, the ‘colonial’ label identifies single colonies as the natural spatial frameworks 
through which the overseas practice of medicine should be analysed. Heather Bell, for 
example, argues for the use of the term ‘colonial’ rather than ‘imperial’ or ‘tropical’ 
medicine, because it points to the particularities of medical developments in different 
colonial regimes.64 While this emphasis on local specificities and contingencies helps 
underscore that there was neither a ‘generic colonialism’ nor a universal and stable 
‘western’ medicine, promoting the colony as the only relevant unit of analysis masks 
how medicine in colonial settings also took shape within a much wider context.65 
The historiography of sleeping sickness in particular has done much to highlight the 
‘colonial’ nature of medicine in European colonial empires. Several historians have 
indeed sought to validate this analytical category by examining the various 
trypanosomiasis control strategies enacted within specific colonial contexts and by 
connecting these schemes to the nature and outlook of particular colonial regimes. 
Hence the prevalence of the ‘political economy’ paradigm in this literature, as Maureen 
6 1  I borrow the idea of a confusion between normative and analytic categories from Cooper, Colonialism in 
Question, pp. 7-8.
6 2  Also in Ernst, ‘Beyond East and West’. Similarly, the concern to highlight the mutual constitution of tropical 
medicine and Empire has, as Douglas Haynes argues, amounted to a general neglect of other ‘social processes’ 
that were an integral part of its history. See D. M. Haynes, ‘Social status and imperial service: tropical medicine 
and the British medical profession in the nineteenth century’, in D. Arnold (ed.), Warm Climates and Western 
Medicine: The Emergence of Tropical Medicine, 1500-1900, Clio Medica 35 (Amsterdam; Atlanta 1996), pp. 208.
6 3  A. L. Stoler and F. Cooper, ‘Between metropole and colony. Rethinking a research agenda’ in F. Cooper and A. 
L. Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1997), 
pp. 6-9; Bayart, ‘Etudes post-coloniales’, 25; J. Vansina, ‘Koloniale geschiedenis en Congo’ in V. Viaene, D. Van 
Reybrouck en B. Ceuppens (red.), Congo in België. Koloniale cultuur in de metropool (Leuven, 2009), pp. 31-36. 
Examples of such more complex understandings of colonialism in the field of medical history are Hoppe, Lords 
of the Fly; Vaughan, Curing their ills; N. R. Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization and Mobility in the 
Congo (Durham, 1999); H. Tilley, ‘Africa as a living laboratory: the African research survey and the British 
colonial empire: consolidating environmental, medical, and anthropological debates, 1920-1940’, unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Oxford (2001).
6 4  H. Bell, Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940 (Oxford, 1999), p. 1.
65 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 13.
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Malowany notes.66 Lyons, for example, sketches the interplay between the interests of 
colonialism in Congo and what she sees as the core of its public health policies: the 
control of African mobility and ‘vertical’ treatment campaigns so as to avoid addressing 
the broader social causes of disease.67 Or Kirk Hoppe argues how in British Africa control 
measures ‘within specific British-controlled territories depended on different colonial 
economies, environments, and political relationships’.68 Comparative analyses of 
sleeping sickness policies may transcend the framework of a single colonial territory, 
but in the end only confirm the colony as the relevant point of reference.69 
In spite of this predominant focus on the ‘colonial’ in the history of medicine in 
colonial settings, debates about its analytical value have in fact been part and parcel of 
the field since its inception. Some historians wondered, for example, whether there 
really was anything specifically ‘colonial’ about medicine in the colonies, and whether 
we should not trace parallels with metropolitan contexts given that all medicine entails 
some forms of ‘colonizing (sic)’.70 In other words, the ‘“colonial” as an analytic category’ 
category should perhaps not, according to this point of view, be reserved for colonial 
settings as it is just as well present in the medical history of Europe.71 Extending its 
application in this way, however, is not without risk. Equating the experience of colonies 
too readily with that of metropoles presents an ethical problem in that it downplays the 
very real ‘structural differences’ that without any doubt existed, to the extent of almost 
providing colonialism with apologetic arguments.72 Moreover, the problem of employing 
the phrase ‘colonial’ to describe an ever-wider variety of situations and historical 
contexts is that it can become increasingly unclear what we actually mean by it.73 
A growing number of studies, however, challenges the categorisation of medicine in 
colonial settings as ‘colonial’ in more persuasive ways, not by promoting an expanded 
use of the label, but by showing how it fails to capture significant dimensions of this 
past. One important trend, to which this dissertation hopes to contribute, is the 
attention for other interactions than just those between colonisers and colonised. For 
example, examinations of the plurality and fractures among Europeans, of their 
different and sometimes competing agendas help to render them ‘partially detached 
from, rather than collapsed into the immediate priorities of colonialism’, and indicates 
that a much wider range of social processes and dynamics was at work in the medical 
6 6  M. Malowany, ‘Unfinished agendas: writing the history of medicine of Sub-Saharan Africa’, African Affairs 99 
(2000), 333.
6 7  Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 199, 223-224.
6 8  Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, p. 15.
6 9  Worboys, ‘Comparative history of sleeping sickness’; Hiroyuki, Medizin und Kolonialgesellschaft.
7 0  Arnold, quoted in Marks, ‘What is colonial’, 206-207.
7 1  W. Anderson, ‘Postcolonial histories of medicine’, in F. Huisman and J. H. Warner (eds.), Locating Medical 
History. The Stories and Their Meanings (Baltimore; London, 2004), p. 288.
7 2  Ernst, ‘Beyond East and West’, 511.
7 3  See for example Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 3-32.
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history of the colonial world.74 The latter point is also brought home by analyses that 
include ‘indigenous’ medicine as an autonomous but fluid part of the medically plural 
environments that colonies in fact were.75 
Another significant way in which recent scholarship confronts the automatic 
‘colonial’ branding of medicine in colonial contexts, is by abandoning forms of 
‘methodological nationalism’ in favour of relational approaches - a concern shared with 
many other branches of historiography.76 Historians of medicine have indeed been 
calling for investigations of the ‘multidirectional flows’ of practices, ideas, objects and 
people across national, colonial and imperial borders in which overseas territories took 
part.77 By tracing how medical developments within specific colonies were also shaped 
through interactions with metropoles, with other colonies and even other empires, the 
‘colonial’ as a spatial ‘category of analysis’ is not altogether discarded, but de-
essentialised and ‘contextualized (sic)’.78 One major implication of tracing such actual 
exchanges is that it is not simply on the basis of deconstructing normative categories 
that ‘European’ and ‘colonial’ medicine cannot longer be viewed as having completely 
distinct and separate histories. Through evidence of circulation, their histories become 
intimately connected, although not in a diffusionist sense, but not without any notion of 
asymmetry either.79 
In light of these recent developments in particular, it appears that ‘colonial’ has to be 
used with such caution that it has become inadequate and even somewhat misleading as 
7 4  W. Beinart, K. Brown and D. Gilfoyle, ‘Experts and expertise in colonial Africa reconsidered: science and the 
interpenetration of knowledge’, African Affairs 108 (2009), 418-419. See also, for example, the conference 
‘Fracturing Colonial Medicine’ held at the Centre for the Social History of Health and Healthcare in Glasgow, 
April 23-24 2009. Nancy Hunt argues for a ‘more complicated’ colonial history that does ‘not leave (Belgian 
colonisers) intact as a single social category’ in N.R. Hunt, ‘Rewriting the soul in a Flemish Congo’, Past and 
Present 198 (2008), 214.
7 5  See for example, Ernst, ‘Beyond East and West, 512; L. Hesselink, Inheemse dokters en vroedvrouwen in 
Nederlands Oost-Indië, 1850-1915 (Amsterdam, 2009); Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon. 
7 6  On the abandonment of ‘methodological nationalism’ see P.-Y. Saunier, ‘Learning by doing: notes about the 
making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History’, Journal of Modern European History 6 (2008), 161.
7 7  S. Bhattacharya, ‘Medicine’, in A. Iriye and P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History 
(Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 708-711. See for example also B. Stuchtey, ‘Introduction: towards a comparative history 
of science and tropical medicine in imperial cultures since 1800’ in B. Stuchtey (ed.), Science across the European 
Empires, 1800-1950 (London, 2005), pp. 1-45; D. J. Neill, ‘Transnationalism in the colonies: cooperation, rivalry, 
and race in German and French tropical medicine, 1880-1930’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto 
(2005); W. Anderson, ‘Where is the post-colonial history of medicine?’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 72 
(1998), 522-530.
7 8  This argument is inspired by Eric Van der Vleuten’s view on transnational history as a way to 
‘contextualize’, rather than abandon the nation-state as a ‘category of analysis’. E. Van der Vleuten, ‘Toward a 
transnational history of technology: meanings, promises, pitfalls’, Technology and Culture 49 (2008), 983-984, 
989.
7 9  K. Raj, ‘Colonial encounter and the forging of new knowledge and national identities: Great Britain and India, 
1760-1850’, Osiris 15 (2000), 119-134; D. Arnold, Science, Technology, and Medicine in Colonial India (Cambridge; New 
York, 2000). 
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an overarching label to capture the medical past in colonial settings. This dissertation, 
therefore, prefers to think of this history in terms of multiple intersecting currents and 
dynamics, where issues of colonial power relations and the realities of colonial borders 
coexist and are intertwined with other social and spatial dimensions. More specifically, 
it focuses on the movements of medical drugs implicated in pharmaceuticalisation 
processes as one possible yet fruitful way to shed light on some of these intersections 
and contribute to a ‘crossed history’ of public health in the Belgian Congo. To write a 
history of public health as a history of social and spatial intersections from the point of 
view of pharmaceuticals, this dissertation adopts the research approach of ‘histoire 
croisée’, which will be explained in the next section. 
1.3 Approach and sources: towards a ‘crossed history’ of 
public health in colonial Congo
1.3.1 What is ‘histoire croisée’? 
‘Histoire croisée’ or ‘crossed history’ here refers to the specific research approach 
crafted by Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmerman and described, for example, in 
their ‘programmatic’ 2006 article.80 Its origins lie in the debates about the respective 
merits and limitations of comparative history and cultural transfer studies, to which it 
proposes an alternative framework, fit to capture the multidirectional interactions and 
complex ‘relational configurations’ through which historical change is effected, 
obviously in non-linear ways. ‘Histoire croisée’ is built up around the notion of 
‘intercrossings’ or ‘intersections’, which Werner and Zimmerman insist are multiple in 
kind, and exist or operate on both an empirical and an analytical level. The ‘histoire 
croisée’ approach is thus concerned with the interwoven intercrossings inherent in the 
research object itself (for example through the circulation of ideas, practices, material 
objects, people etcetera) and those produced by the researcher who actively crosses 
different viewpoints. A tool for examining research questions and problems beyond the 
reach of other approaches, ‘histoire croisée’s’ explicit consideration of the 
8 0  M. Werner and B. Zimmerman, ‘Beyond comparison: histoire croisée and the challenge of reflexivity’, History 
and Theory 45 (2006), 30-50.
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interrelationship between the empirical and the analytical, and of their ‘historicity’, also 
gives it a crucial reflexive dimension.81 
‘Histoire croisée’ is by no means unique in opening up uncharted territories of 
historical research by attending to cross-border interactions and their effects. As part of 
a much broader group of approaches bent on transcending single units of analysis, it 
shares many concerns with other and perhaps better-known relational perspectives like 
global and transnational history. As noted by Pierre-Yves Saunier, there exists in fact a 
wide array of similar ‘histories’ studying ‘connections and circulations’, albeit under 
different names and guided by diverse motivations.82 Some of these, notably ‘connected 
histories’ and ‘entangled history’ or ‘Verflechtungsgeschichte’ have even developed 
specifically in relation to the colonial question, aspiring, for instance, to uncover the 
interconnections between Europe and its (former) colonies.83 Although they are very 
closely related to the ‘histoire croisée’ approach, here I explicitly opt for the latter from 
the conviction that its particularities make it especially suited for the purposes of this 
dissertation. What sets ‘histoire croisée’ apart from other modes of writing relational 
histories - an insistent reflection on how research objects and perspectives affect each 
other as well as a great deal of flexibility in considering the sort of borders that can be 
crossed - is precisely what enhances an examination of the social and spatial 
circulations of medicines, and of the wider analytical implications of the empirical 
‘intercrossings’ thus produced.
1.3.2 ‘Histoire croisée’, pharmaceutical and colonial medical history
As a relatively new research perspective, ‘histoire croisée’s’ theoretical framework has 
yet to be fully translated into empirical studies. Of late, however, the ‘crossing’ 
metaphor has been gaining an ever-greater influence in the two historiographic 
domains of particular relevance to this dissertation, pharmaceutical and colonial 
medical history. Focusing on pharmaceutical trajectories across different social sectors, 
several recent histories of medical drugs have in fact already adopted notions and 
strategies of empirical ‘intersection’ and non-linearity without necessarily theorising 
‘histoire croisée’ as a specific research perspective. ‘New’ pharmaceutical historians are 
also aware of researchers’ active crossing of different points of view, perhaps even of 
different disciplinary subfields, as a corollary of tracing border-crossing medicinal 
biographies. Christian Bonah and Anne Rasmussen, for example, clearly express the 
close connection between the empirical and the analytical when they state: ‘the study of 
8 1  Ibid., 32.
8 2  Saunier, ‘Learning by doing’, 162-165.
8 3  W. Lepenies (ed.), Entangled Histories and Negotiated Universals. Centers and Peripheries in a Changing World 
(Frankfurt/Mein, 2003). On ‘Verflecthungsgeschicte’, see S. Conrad and S. Randeria (eds.), Jenseits des 
Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften (New York, 2002).
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the constitution, circulation and transformation of ‘therapeutic agents’ allows crossing 
the medical, scientific, economic, legal, regulatory, administrative and ethical practices 
and perspectives that make up contemporary health care systems’.84 Similar 
considerations have prompted Elizabeth Siegel Watkins to reflect upon conventional 
subdivisions in historiography. More specifically, she challenges the labelling of 
pharmaceutical history as a ‘sub-discipline of the history of medicine’ rather than as an 
autonomous field that investigates the central position of pharmaceuticals in modern 
societies from an interdisciplinary perspective.85 A specific focus on circulating 
pharmaceuticals and pharmaceuticalisation processes can thus help to expand our 
perspective on health care systems with themes and social realms less commonly 
studied in the field of medical history, as well as place the latter’s traditional subjects in 
a broader, relational context. 
An engagement with (processes of) ‘intercrossing’ as an alternative to a history and 
historiography centred on clearly circumscribed, pre-fixed and self-contained entities is 
also becoming increasingly apparent in recent writings of historians of medicine in 
colonial settings. References to Werner and Zimmerman’s specific research program are 
more explicit here, arguably because the use of essentialising categorisations, as we 
have seen, has been so salient in this field. Waltraud Ernst, for example, notes the 
newfound appeal of dynamic relational perspectives like ‘histoire croisée’ to medical 
historians of South Asia attempting to overcome – beyond adopting what she finds 
equally static notions of ‘hybridity’ – dichotomies of ‘colonial’ versus ‘indigenous’ 
medicine.86 In a similar vein, a recently published volume criticises the exaggerated 
‘compartmentalisation’ of the historiography of medicine in (former) colonial 
territories, notably along geographic and chronological lines, and calls for a ‘crossing 
(of) colonial historiographies’ that enables ‘conceptual and methodological interaction’ 
between largely distinct scholarly traditions as well as uncovering empirical ‘crossovers’ 
between different medical systems and practices. The advantage of such an endeavour, 
the editors suggest, is that the particular outlook resulting from one’s own 
historiographical positioning is thrown into sharp relief and its potential limitations are 
revealed.87 
This volume clearly has great merit in pointing to the rich possibilities offered by 
relational approaches and ‘histoire croisée’ in particular to escape ‘the pitfalls endemic 
in the genre of colonial medical history, whether of essentialism, reductionism, or 
dichotomizing (sic) paradigms (…)’.88 Applying the ‘histoire croisée’ toolbox to empirical 
8 4  Bonah and Rasmussen, ‘Pour une nouvelle histoire’, pp. 12-13.
8 5  Watkins, ‘Pharmacy to pharmaceutical history’, 4-5.
8 6  Ernst, ‘Beyond East and West’, 513-515. Zimmerman and Werner also note that ‘histoire croisée’, with its 
focus on historical processes, is not so much a history of ‘hybridization (sic)’. See Werner and Zimmerman, 
‘Beyond comparison’, 38.
8 7  A. Digby, W. Ernst and P. B. Mukharji, ‘Introduction. Crossing historiographies, connecting histories and their 
historians’ in Ernst, Mukharji and Digby (eds.), Crossing Colonial Historiographies, p. ix-xxii.
88Ibid., p. xx. It must be said, however, that the editors do not always seem to live up entirely to this agenda. 
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studies, however, is not an easy task given the inevitable limitations to what a single 
researcher can reasonably manage. If, like Waltraud Ernst remarks, one stays true to 
‘histoire croisée’’s principle that ‘there is no such thing in history as an isolated entity 
that does not involve entanglement (or croisement)’, one could endlessly go on looking 
for intercrossings and end up ‘linking everything with everything’, thus losing focus.89 
Studying the full extent of empirical intercrossings that in some way had a bearing on 
the history of medicine in colonial settings is therefore as good as impossible in the 
context of this research project, and as Werner and Zimmerman acknowledge 
themselves, in practice the researcher will have to select a ‘point of departure’ or a 
problematisation from which to ‘construct’ the object of research.90 
Keeping in mind that neither ‘biomedicine’ nor ‘indigenous medicine’ were static, 
homogenous and neatly separated entities, the main focus here will nonetheless be on 
the former rather than the latter. Bringing together the fields of pharmaceutical history 
and colonial medical history, the aim is to write a ‘crossed history’ of public health in 
colonial Congo by concentrating more specifically on the pharmaceuticalisation of 
sleeping sickness control.91 The ‘histoire croisée’ approach, as follows from the previous 
paragraphs, lends itself extremely well to a multidimensional study of 
pharmaceuticalisation processes pertaining to the colonial world. It allows one to follow 
the intertwined empirical circulations of pharmaceuticals, both socially and 
geographically, and accordingly approach the subject from different analytical 
viewpoints. From the vantage point of mobile medicines, in this case the chemical drugs 
that were at some point part of the pharmaceutical fight against sleeping sickness, this 
study wishes to demonstrate how public health in the Belgian Congo was shaped 
through the ‘intercrossing’ of different localities, social spheres and spatial scales. 
Ultimately, an emphasis on the intersections brought about by pharmaceuticals and 
on the networks and configurations that go into processes of pharmaceuticalisation 
should reveal how colonial dimensions, in terms of social relations and spatial 
frameworks, were intertwined with other elements in the history of public health in the 
Belgian Congo. Following the spatial trajectories of trypanocidal drugs, for example, 
One of the conclusions drawn from the dialogue between specialists in different fields is that ‘colonial’, as an 
analytical category, should not be restricted to the places and time period commonly associated with the term. 
The editors rather argue for its ‘extension (…) to a much wider range of societies’, so as to make it a ‘more 
heterogeneous’ category and present a ‘more multifaceted view of colonialism’ (p. xiii). While the spatial and 
temporal continuities and discontinuities of colonialism, and in particular the place of colonial empires in the 
much broader history of imperialism, are legitimate and valuable subjects of historical investigation, the 
question is whether simply applying the colonial label to a wider range of contexts does not generate new 
problems of essentialism.
8 9  Ernst, ‘Beyond East and West’, 515. 
9 0  Werner and Zimmerman, ‘Beyond comparison’, 39-40.
9 1  Interestingly, Guy Attewel also draws on ‘histoire croisée’ in his study of the parallel trajectories of the 
medicinal commodity known as ‘theriac’ and ‘tiryaq’ in the nineteenth century to highlight the ‘porosity’ and 
thus problematic nature of ‘self-evident analytical categories’ in (medical) historiography. See Attewel, 
‘Interweaving substance trajectories’, 2010, pp. 1-20.
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elucidates the multidirectional, cross-border exchanges of chemotherapeutic substances 
and knowledge in which the Belgian colony partook. Thus one can situate its medical 
practices within a broader relational geography while still taking into account how local 
circumstances affected and shaped the circulation of biomedical technologies. In 
addition, the notion of drug trajectories across social settings, and the networked 
conception of health care systems it implies, also make it possible to discern multiple 
but interlinked actors and interests at work in biomedicine in colonial settings, thus 
offering opportunities for considering a wider variety of social dynamics involved. More 
specifically, it allows for an integration of the social worlds, practices and sometimes 
diverging agendas of different actors as intertwined components of the medicinal 
sleeping sickness campaign in Congo through their association, in one way or another, 
with sleeping sickness drugs. 
1.3.3 ‘Histoire croisée’ in practice 
But how does one, in practical terms, embark upon a ‘histoire croisée’ of public health 
through an examination of pharmaceuticalisation? Werner and Zimmerman propose 
‘pragmatic induction’ as a general methodological guideline for conducting historical 
research that avoids using completely a priori circumscribed analytical frameworks. As 
they explain, it entails ‘starting from the object of study and the situations in which it is 
embedded, according to one or more points of view – previously defined, it is true, but 
subject to continual readjustments in the course of empirical investigation.’92 The 
underlying idea is that what are relevant analytical frames, units and scales is not 
simply for the researcher to decide, but also derives from, or is an intrinsic part of, the 
object under study itself. Importantly, empirical objects relate to different contexts, 
levels and scales at the same time, and this should be reflected in the researcher’s 
analysis, not as a ‘juxtaposition of situations’, but by clarifying how they operate 
together and interact with each other. As ‘histoire croisée’ combines micro and macro, 
action and structure in a consideration of their co-constitution and interdependence, 
pharmaceuticals are seen here as pertaining to both the ‘local’ and the ‘global’, and their 
movements as ‘structuring’ as well as ‘structured’.93 
In line with the principle of ‘pragmatic induction’, this study has taken as an 
empirical starting point the arsenical compounds that were the mainstay of 
pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control in the Belgian Congo before the Second World 
War. More specifically, the focus is on the trajectories of Atoxyl and Tryparsamide, 
although aspects of other drugs’ biographies have sometimes been included to better 
contextualise the former medicines’ life stories. Following the origins and fates of Atoxyl 
and Tryparsamide as tools of disease prevention in the Congo, this dissertation has not 
9 2  Werner and Zimmerman, ‘Beyond comparison’, 47.
9 3  Ibid., 47-48; Zimmerman, ‘Histoire croisée and the making of global history’, pp. 9-19.
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confined beforehand the relevant analytical framework to one pre-fixed locality, social 
scene and spatial scale, but allowed for adjustments and in particular considered 
intercrossings as indicated by the voyages of the pharmaceuticals themselves. To keep 
the research practically feasible, however, a certain selection of scenes and localities 
nevertheless imposed itself. Analytical choices were chiefly made on the basis of what in 
the course of my research appeared as the most relevant, representative, or influential 
sites in the pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping sickness control in the Congo that had 
hitherto been least studied and for which (sufficient) archival material was available. 
In any case, the emphasis in this study is not so much on a single, self-contained or 
monolithic unit or scale of analysis. Colonial doctors and the Belgian Congo naturally 
feature centrally in the story, but attention centres especially on the interactions within 
this pertinent group and geographic context, and on the exchanges with other social 
groups (such as scientists, political authorities, patients and the pharmaceutical 
industry) as well as other localities (including Belgium, the French Congo, and the 
United States) as important components and drivers of Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s 
trajectories in the colony. And just like the analytical framework has to a large extent 
been guided and shaped by the empirical realities of circulating pharmaceuticals, so has 
the temporal framework. The period under scrutiny falls roughly between 1905, when 
Atoxyl was introduced in the Congo as an experimental sleeping sickness drug, and 
1939, largely coinciding with a downturn in Tryparsamide’s career as a sleeping sickness 
control pharmaceutical in the colony. 
In terms of primary sources, this dissertation draws on a wide range of materials 
documenting relations between the pertinent contexts and actors implicated in Atoxyl 
and Tryparsamide’s trajectories in the Belgian Congo. For this study I have used written 
material, both published and unpublished documents, found in European and American 
archives and libraries. The main sources consulted are those produced (in abundance!) 
by different levels of the Free State/Belgian colonial administration. In the form of 
(annual) reports, correspondence, legislation books, monographs and so on, they 
provide a wealth of information about sleeping sickness and the organisation, activities 
and internal as well as external relations of the colonial medical service and its agents, 
both in Brussels and in the Congo. I have fruitfully drawn upon this heterogeneous 
collection to examine relevant issues such as drug development and evaluation, the 
formulation of pharmaceutical policies, and drug distribution. To complement these 
administrative sources, I have also consulted archival and/or published materials 
pertaining to and produced by other individuals and institutions, most notably medical 
institutes and researchers (e.g. the Prince Leopold Institute of Tropical Medicine, the 
Pasteur Institutes, the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research…) and missionaries 
(more specifically Jesuits). Medical and pharmaceutical industry press, and colonial-
interest journals or publications should also be mentioned among the sources employed. 
Some of the archival funds and publications described above have been used before in 
other studies, but I have generally read them in a different light, by taking on a 
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specifically pharmaceutical perspective or focusing on connections with the Belgian 
Congo. Other (parts of) source collections, such as the ‘Fonds Gouvernement Général’ 
within the colonial administration’s papers or the archives of the tropical medicine 
institute in Antwerp have not, or less extensively, been tapped by historians so far. 
Based on the primary source material used, I have tried as much as possible to 
integrate and link different viewpoints in connection with the problem of 
pharmaceuticalisation in the Congo. The focus, therefore, is more on the intercrossing 
of different worlds than on in-depth descriptions of single sites and spheres in 
themselves (leaving room for more fine-grained analyses in the future).94 The choices 
made and available sources used, however, amount to certain limitations that need to be 
taken into account. For example, the local implementation of pharmaceutical sleeping 
sickness control has been studied in rural rather than urban environments. This does 
not mean that pharmaceuticals were not distributed and consumed in cities during the 
period under scrutiny, quite on the contrary, but rural populations were particularly 
exposed to human trypanosomiasis and for that reason constituted the primary targets 
of mass treatment campaigns after the First World War. Moreover, the specific focus is 
on the Kwango district in the southwest of Congo. It played an important role in the 
formulation of sleeping sickness policy and constituted an important focus of 
pharmaceutical control efforts in the interwar period, but did not necessarily reflect the 
experiences throughout the whole Belgian colony. More fundamentally, this dissertation 
focuses on the interactions and tensions regarding pharmaceutical treatment between 
Europeans in colony and metropole as a less studied component of public health in the 
Belgian Congo, rather than on Africans and coloniser-colonised interactions.95 As 
sleeping sickness victims, experimental subjects and medical auxiliaries, Africans of 
course played a key role in shaping drug trajectories. Their responses - as described in 
colonisers’ written accounts - are included in as far they influenced European 
protagonists’ views and actions concerning drugs, but a detailed analysis of indigenous 
receptions and (shifting) perceptions of sleeping sickness medicines, their 
determinants, and the socio-cultural processes involved are beyond the scope of this 
study.96 
9 4  Gaudillière talks about ‘boundary investigations’ in the case of research into drug trajectories. See 
Gaudillière, ‘Introduction: drug trajectories’, 605.
9 5  On African responses to the sleeping sickness campaign, see for example Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp 162-198. 
According to Tousignant (2012), Lyons’ ‘discussion of drug treatment does not explore the political context of 
representations or modulations of their effects beyond Africans’ perception of drugs as entangled with the 
violence and transformation brought by colonialism’. See Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 627 (note 6). 
On African ‘meaning-making’ and the role of Congolese ‘middle figures’ in the medicalisation of childbirth, see 
Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon.
9 6  African voices did not make it onto paper with similar ease and in equally great number as those of 
European agents. Moreover, incorporating the perspectives of consumers of pharmaceuticals and of 
participants in clinical drug trials in general is recognised as a very challenging task for pharmaceutical 
historians. See for example H. M. Marks, The Progress of Experiment. Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United 
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1.4 Overview
The overall argument in this study is that the pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping sickness 
control in the Belgian Congo was not a linear and top-down process, but a much more 
contingent, interactive and fluctuating one. It did not involve a straight sequence of 
drug discovery, production, distribution, prescription and consumption, nor a simple 
transfer of biomedical technology from Western metropoles to colonial Africa. Instead, 
the process of pharmaceuticalisation in the Congo is viewed here primarily in terms of 
the ‘career cycles’ of two arsenical compounds, Atoxyl and Tryparsamide. As described 
by Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, a drug career cycle typically consists of three main 
phases: a first phase of ‘initial enthusiasm’ and ‘expanding use’, a second stage 
characterised by ‘rising criticism and disappointment’, and finally a period of 
‘contracting use’. Importantly, these phases ‘need not be sequential’, but can ‘overlap’ 
and thus temporarily coexist. Moreover, a drug can come back and begin a new cycle 
with a different application for its use.97 Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s careers as sleeping 
sickness drugs in the Congo followed this broadly common pattern of promise, 
disillusionment and decline. More specifically, we can distinguish three successive, but 
partially overlapping, cycles in the period roughly between 1905 and 1939, the first two 
of which involved Atoxyl and the other one Tryparsamide. Importantly, these cyclical 
trajectories at once reflected and constituted various interactions across social and 
geographic borders. Studied through the lens of moving pharmaceuticals, public health 
in the Belgian Congo thus appears as the outcome of ‘intercrossings’ between different 
localities, spatial scales and social spheres, and this in turn calls for reflection on the 
‘colonial’ as a defining category in the history of medicine in colonial settings. 
This dissertation is organised in four parts. The first three give a broadly 
chronological overview of Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s general career cycles in the 
Belgian Congo, with the different chapters describing one or more phases, while the 
fourth presents a case study of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control in the Kwango 
district to illustrate how developments at a more local level helped shape these 
trajectories. 
Part I discusses Atoxyl’s rise to prominence as a tool of sleeping sickness control 
before the First World War. It begins with a brief description of how the disease came to 
preoccupy the Congo Free State at the turn of the twentieth century, so as to 
contextualise the adoption of Atoxyl treatment in the official policy of the ‘Etat 
Indépendant du Congo’ (EIC) in 1906 (Chapter 2). Then it takes a step back to trace the 
beginnings of Atoxyl’s trajectory in the Congo. Before it truly came into view as a means 
of disease prevention, the drug lived through a short first career as a curative treatment 
States, 1900-1990 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 13; Bonah, ‘“Agents thérapeutiques”’, p. 30.
97 Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 95, 97.
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for sleeping sickness. German-manufactured Atoxyl was introduced as an experimental 
drug on a competitive Congolese market for sleeping sickness remedies in 1905. It soon 
spread as a compulsory curative treatment for African sleeping sickness victims isolated 
in lazarets, but almost immediately entered a phase of criticism as reports of serious 
adverse reactions and limited curative effects accumulated. It subsequently disappeared 
from the spotlight as a true sleeping sickness cure, but nevertheless remained in use 
(Chapter 3). Next, I discuss how Atoxyl started a new, second career cycle in the Congo 
when laboratory doctors in Leopoldville redefined Atoxyl therapy as a strategy of 
disease prevention rather than a curative act. After the Belgian takeover of the EIC, the 
drug gradually came to be viewed as the most realistic option for tackling sleeping 
sickness, but despite growing enthusiasm it was not yet applied on a large scale before 
the First World War (Chapter 4). 
Part II concerns the mass-scale drug treatment of African sleeping sickness victims 
undertaken in the 1920s to curb the disease’s spread and, more broadly, solve the 
colony’s demographic (i.e. labour force) crisis. It first describes the continuation of 
Atoxyl’s career as a tool of sleeping sickness control. After the war, optimism was 
translated into widespread use, especially of the French- and Belgian-manufactured 
versions of the drug. Yet once again, expansion soon overlapped with a wave of 
disenchantment as drug toxicity and limited curative powers diminished expectations of 
Atoxyl’s effectiveness in the everyday practice of sleeping sickness control. This 
amounted to an erosion of the drug’s use, in particular the French and Belgian brands 
(Chapter 5). The original German version was eventually also eclipsed by the arrival of 
the new and more powerful sleeping sickness drug Tryparsamide, whose initial career 
phase is discussed next. Introduced in the Belgian Congo in 1920, it was hailed as a 
medicine that could potentially eradicate sleeping sickness by 1925 (Chapter 6). This 
initial optimism led to a dramatic surge in consumption in the second half of the 1920s, 
especially when a Belgian-manufactured version of the compound was developed and 
marketed as ‘Tryponarsyl’ (Chapter 7). 
Part III deals with the gradual downturn of mass Tryponarsyl treatment in the 1930s. 
Administered on a vast scale since the late 1920s, the drug’s second career phase soon 
took off. It came to be associated with drug toxicity and especially drug resistance, 
which undermined initial enthusiasm about its effectiveness in the total eradication of 
sleeping sickness in the Belgian Congo. Although its mass deployment was initially 
sustained and even credited with significant reductions in sleeping sickness incidence 
and prevalence, by the second half of the 1930s Tryponarsyl and more generally 
Tryparsamide’s career in the Congo entered a final phase of decline as a tool of sleeping 
sickness eradication (Chapter 8). 
Finally, part IV presents a case study of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control in 
the Kwango district in the southwest of the colony. It discusses the local origins and 
implementation of mass Atoxyl (Chapter 9) and Tryponarsyl (Chapter 10) treatment, not 
as a self-contained level of events, but one connected to the broader developments in 
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the fates of these sleeping sickness drugs. It pays particular attention to the tensions 
generated by mass treatment, notably between public and private sector medical 
providers. 
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PART I. 
ATOXYL AND THE BEGINNINGS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL SLEEPING SICKNESS CONTROL 
BEFORE WORLD WAR I
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Chapter  2
Sleeping sickness control in the Congo Free State 
This introductory section briefly sketches the historical context in which sleeping 
sickness became a prominent preoccupation of the Congo Free State administration at 
the turn of the twentieth century. It describes what early control measures were taken 
under the influence of an emerging transnational elite of tropical medicine specialists, 
and how Atoxyl therapy made its first appearance in official sleeping sickness policy by 
the end of 1906. 
2.1 What is sleeping sickness? 
African trypanosomiasis is an infectious disease that affects both humans and animals. 
It is caused by the trypanosome, a ‘protozoan hemoflagellate parasite’, and transmitted 
through the bites of tsetse flies, which belong to the Glossina genus.98 Human African 
trypanosomiasis, with which this dissertation is concerned, is more commonly known as 
sleeping sickness. It is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa’s ‘tsetse belt’, an area of about 
eleven million square kilometres between approximately 20 degrees North and 20 
degrees South latitude where tsetse flies occur. The disease can take on epidemic 
proportions ‘for a variety of natural and sociopolitical reasons’.99 
There are two types of sleeping sickness: a chronic form occurring in western and 
central parts of sub-Saharan Africa (including in the former Belgian Congo), and the 
more virulent, acute form of east and south Africa. The former is caused by Trypanosoma 
brucei gambiense and transmitted by the ‘riverine’ or palpalis group of tsetse. Humans are 
the principal trypanosome ‘reservoir’ here, meaning that disease transmission typically 
occurs through flies previously infected by human carriers of the parasite. Trypanosoma 
brucei rhodesiense and glossina morsitans or ‘savanna’ tsetse are responsible for acute 
sleeping sickness, and in this case wild animals act as the main host.100 
98 Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, p. 552.
99 Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’ pp. 552, 554.
100 Ibid. p. 552-553; D. Steverding, ‘The history of African trypanosomiasis’, Parasites & Vectors 1 (2008), 1 
(available only online at http://www.parasitesandvectors.com/content/pdf/1756-3305-1-3.pdf); Hoppe, Lords 
of the Fly, p. 7.
30
Without treatment both Gambian and Rhodesian sleeping sickness are fatal, although 
the speed at which the disease runs its course differs significantly between them. In 
both varieties there are two distinct stages. In the ‘primary’ or ‘haemolymphatic’ phase, 
trypanosomes are present in the infected individual’s blood and lymph juice. The 
‘secondary’ or ‘meningoencephalitic’ phase includes the central nervous system as 
trypanosomes enter the victim’s cerebrospinal fluid.101 Sleeping sickness provokes a vast 
range of clinical symptoms, including fever, headache, and swollen lymph nodes (e.g. in 
the cervical area), as well as disorders reflecting the ‘neurological degeneration’ of the 
advanced stage, such as ‘irascibility’, ‘mental deterioration’ and the characteristic 
‘lethargy’ that gives the disease its name.102 Within six to eighteen weeks, sufferers of 
acute sleeping sickness die after falling into a coma or as a result of complications like 
pneumonia. In cases of chronic human trypanosomiasis, death occurs on average within 
two to three years.103 
As it entails parasites, fly vectors as well as human or animal hosts, sleeping sickness 
has an extremely complex epidemiology that requires a good understanding of the 
disease’s ecology.104 It also has a very long history in Africa, where it has had a significant 
demographic impact, notably shaping patterns of ‘human settlement’.105 Before the 
discovery of sleeping sickness aetiology in 1903, the endemic disease had been known 
and recognised for centuries, including by Arabic and European slave traders.106 Africans 
themselves had adapted to their ‘disease environment’ and developed a ‘balanced 
ecological relationship’ with parasites and insect vectors to deal with trypanosomiasis. 
By the late nineteenth century, however, European colonisers’ brutal interference in 
African lives and societies disrupted this equilibrium, which in turn resulted in the 
spread and epidemic flare-up of sleeping sickness in certain regions.107 In the Congo, for 
example, increases in the disease were ‘directly connected’ to demands for (rubber) tax 
and labour.108 The period of European colonialism in Africa starting in the late 
nineteenth century saw two major sleeping sickness epidemics. The first one occurred 
between 1899 and 1906 in Uganda’s Busoga region and the Congo basin, causing an 
estimated 250,000 and 500,000 deaths respectively. In several African territories, 
101 Steverding, ‘History of African trypanosomiasis’, 1; Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, p. 555; Hoppe, Lords of 
the Fly, p. 7.
102 Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’ p. 555; Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 43-43; Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, p. 7.
103 Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, p. 7; Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, pp. 553, 555.
104 Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, pp. 553, 555; Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 53.
105 Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, p. 555. Animal trypanosomiasis also hampered cattle rearing in the African 
tsetse belt, and thus had a significant impact on nutrition. See for example, Steverding, ‘History of African 
trypanosomiasis’, 1.
106 Steverding, ‘History of African trypanosomiasis’, 2-3 ; Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, p. 555; Malowany, 
‘Unfinished agendas’, 330.
107 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 48-51, 54-55, 65; Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, p. 558.
108 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 32-36.
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including the Belgian Congo, another spate of epidemics took place after the First World 
War.109 
2.2 ‘Sleeping sickness exceptionalism’ in the early twentieth 
century
Human African trypanosomiasis today features on the World Health Organization’s list 
of neglected tropical diseases. It is hard to imagine a sharper contrast with the disease’s 
status during the early decades of the twentieth century. This period was characterised 
by what Guillaume Lachenal has described as ‘the making of sleeping sickness 
exceptionalism’, involving its representation as an exceptional disease warranting 
exceptional attention.110 Maryinez Lyons as well has highlighted how in the wake of the 
Uganda epidemic, sleeping sickness immensely occupied colonial governments and 
scientists, in a manner not dissimilar to AIDS several decades later.111 As a mysterious 
and fatal disease it came to symbolise the ‘threat of tropical Africa’ at the turn of the 
twentieth century, and captivated broad audiences, not in the least the nascent tropical 
medicine community.112 
Tropical medicine emerged as a distinct and ‘recognized (sic) field of teaching, 
research and professional practice’ in the late nineteenth-century, in a context of 
European colonial expansion in Asia and Africa.113 Its scientific roots lay in the 
development of microbiology, which posited specific micro-organisms as the cause of 
infectious disease and entailed a laboratory-based approach to medicine, and 
parasitology, the study of parasites and vectors.114 Although tropical medicine’s first 
focus was malaria, sleeping sickness came to dominate the research agenda and, as 
Deborah Neill has demonstrated, was in fact key to consolidating the field’s stature and 
109 Steverding, ‘History of African trypanosomiasis’, 4-6; Lyons, ‘African trypanosomiasis’, pp. 556, 558; 
‘Trypanosomiasis, human African (sleeping sickness). Fact sheet N° 259’, World Health Organization, Media 
centre, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs259/en/ (Last accessed 21 April 2014).
110 G. Lachenal, ‘The Campaign against African Trypanosomiasis. Classic Lessons and Untold Stories’, Global 
Health Histories Seminar, Geneva, 5.5.2009, http://www.who.int/global_health_histories/seminars/
presentation31.pdf (Last accessed 21 April 2014).
111 Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 68.
112 Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, p. 38; D. J. Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine. Internationalism, Colonialism, and the Rise of 
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113 M. Worboys, ‘Emergence of tropical medicine’, p. 75.
114 The focus on pathogenic micro-organisms entailed a crucial shift away from an older ‘medical geography’, 
the notion that the physical and social environment affect disease. Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 
13-14, 15-16.
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power in the early 1900s: ‘more than any other disease’, Neill argues, ‘(it) cemented 
expert authority because crises lead to a great deal of uncertainty and cause a 
significant reliance on expert knowledge and advice’.115
Armed with microscopes and gripped by an ‘air of urgency and competition’, 
ambitious researchers set out to Africa to discover the disease’s causative agent and 
search for a means to control and treat it. The result was a ‘scientific scramble’ in the 
early twentieth century that saw multiple sleeping sickness expeditions, many of which 
were international in character, sent to East and Central Africa with the backing of the 
major colonial powers.116 The metropolitan press in turn eagerly reported on advances 
in the race to conquer colonial Africa’s ‘scourge’.117 The first big breakthrough came in 
1903, with the identification of the trypanosome as the cause and the tsetse fly as the 
vector of the disease by Aldo Castellani and David Bruce, sent on a Royal Society 
expedition to Uganda.118 The discovery of the aetiological chain stimulated further 
research into sleeping sickness epidemiology, therapy and other areas. Investigating this 
high-profile disease in tropical Africa provided young medical scientists with significant 
opportunities to establish an international reputation and boost their careers.119 As John 
L. Todd, a Canadian researcher at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, explained 
to his brother in July 1903 before embarking upon an expedition to the Congo Free State: 
‘tryps are a big thing and if we have luck, I may make a name yet’.120 
Confronted with an ‘unprecedented health crisis in Africa’, the colonial powers 
welcomed and actively supported research into sleeping sickness, even up to the point 
of facilitating scientific collaboration across imperial borders.121 Economic and political 
considerations spurred them into action against the disease, the significance of which 
was that it turned medical attention in the colonies to African populations.122 The events 
in Uganda and other territories raised the spectre of huge losses in the African labour 
force, thus threatening to seriously hamper economic development. Taking part in the 
international fight against the epidemic was also politically expedient in a context of 
115 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 9.
116 Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 69; Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, p. 28; M. Lyons, ‘Medicine and empire: the funding of 
sleeping sickness research in the Belgian Congo ’, in M. Twaddle (ed.), Imperialism, the State and the Third World 
(London; New York, 1992), pp. 143-147; M. Mertens and G. Lachenal, ‘The history of “Belgian’ tropical medicine 
from a cross-border perspective’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 90 (2012), 1254-1255.
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growing cooperation but also competition between European nation-states. It was a 
source of prestige and could boost colonial powers’ reputations. This was particularly 
evident in the case of the Congo Free State, whose king Leopold II keenly promoted 
sleeping sickness research to counter the ‘anti-Congo campaign’ accompanying the red 
rubber controversy.123 
2.3 Control measures in the Congo Free State: cordons 
sanitaires, isolation and the beginnings of Atoxyl 
treatment 
Sleeping sickness first became the subject of medical policy in the Congo in 1903, when 
it was listed as one of the Free State’s ‘contagious epidemic disease(s)’. In the absence of 
a clear understanding of its aetiology and epidemiology, early instructions focused on 
the isolation of infected individuals.124 Meanwhile, the Free State administration tried to 
get a better grasp of the problem and possible ways of tackling it. It actively supported 
local fact-gathering, notably by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine. King Leopold 
II, a personal connection of Alfred L. Jones, who financed the School and had important 
commercial interests in the Congo, funded its scientific expedition to the Free State 
between 1903 and 1905.125 Administrators in Brussels also sought advice from 
international parasitology experts such as Alphonse Laveran, discoverer of the malaria 
protozoal parasite, and were basically on the lookout for ‘any information that might 
place (them) on the path of discoveries allowing to fight sleeping sickness’.126 
Tropical medicine researchers’ elucidation of the disease’s aetiology put colonial 
authorities on the path of control measures focusing on either the human or the fly 
factor in the chain of causation. As administrators obtained information about the 
sleeping sickness situation in the Congo Free State, they introduced measures that 
123 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 104; Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 64, 68-71, 73-75; Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, 
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34
centred on halting the disease’s spread to territories deemed unaffected via the control 
of human trypanosome hosts. Most notably, they instituted ‘cordons sanitaires’, for 
example around the Uele district in the Congo’s northeast, to protect non-infected 
districts, and prescribed the isolation of infected individuals in lazarets.127 From 1905 
onwards, instructions were issued to doctors and other colonial agents to prevent 
sleeping sickness victims from contaminating areas that had not yet been afflicted. 
These orders included the erection of observation posts to screen travelling Africans for 
trypanosomiasis (and thus control their movements), and the detection of suspected 
cases, i.e. individuals with swollen lymph glands, within European stations. Doctors had 
to diagnose potential sufferers by looking for trypanosomes in blood and lymph juice 
samples, and if necessary send them to lazarets established outside of disease-free 
zones, where they were held in ‘forcible confinement’.128 Early sleeping sickness 
regulations also included measures to minimise the risk of infection by separating 
humans from tsetse flies, notably brush clearing (to destroy fly habitat) around and 
sanitation in villages and posts.129 
The main inspiration behind the Free State’s sleeping sickness policy, as Lyons has 
shown, were the findings of the Liverpool School expedition. Its members confirmed 
that human trypanosomiasis in the Congo was in fact a T. Gambiense problem, and 
offered an epidemiological understanding that, while reflecting metropolitan biases 
rather than local realities, proved highly influential in shaping early control measures. 
Based on the flawed view that epidemic sleeping sickness in the Free State had ‘spread 
from west to east’ through population movements, the Liverpool scientists 
recommended controlling African mobility and isolating suspected victims to contain its 
spread to the supposedly unaffected regions of the north.130 
The emphasis on controlling African mobility and isolating sleeping sickness victims 
in the Free State are a testament to the significant role played by an elite of tropical 
medicine professionals in shaping colonial public health strategies at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. As Deborah Neill has argued, these researchers and clinicians 
formed an ‘epistemic community’, a powerful transnational network whose collective 
views on infectious disease and African populations were highly influential in 
determining, or even limiting, the range of policy options open to colonial authorities. 
Based on ‘a shared European heritage, similar training, and common commitment to a 
global, scientific “civilising mission”’, they promoted an approach to sleeping sickness 
127 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 106-120, 125.
128 Ibid., pp. 108-109, 234-235; Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 125.
129 ‘Règlement coordonnant les mesures prises pour enrayer la maladie du sommeil’ dans Etat Indépendant du 
Congo. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, arrêtés, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service 
(Boma, 1906), pp. 239-240.
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control that reflected a reductionist and racialised view of epidemic disease.131 Dedicated 
to the application of a universally valid laboratory science to ‘save’ tropical Africa, these 
experts largely neglected the local natural and social environments (including the 
privations caused by colonial exploitation) in which trypanosomiasis epidemics took 
shape.132 Instead, they focused on sleeping sickness as a problem of microscopic 
parasites, hosted by African bodies, transmitted by insect vectors, and primarily spread 
via population movements.133 African sleeping sickness victims were thus reduced to 
human trypanosome carriers who constituted a public health threat and needed to be 
controlled to prevent further infection, whereas European sufferers were seen as 
individual patients in need of medical care. The result was a set of similar early sleeping 
sickness measures in Uganda, the Congo, and German East Africa that, while including 
some degree of tsetse fly control, emphasised targeting the African human factor, 
mostly via surveillance and the isolation of infected individuals in ‘segregation’ or 
‘concentration camps’.134 
As in other African colonies, medicines also featured in the Free State’s efforts to deal 
with sleeping sickness.135 In 1906, Leopold II launched a substantial monetary prize for 
the discovery of an effective cure.136 Moreover, by the end of the same year, State 
regulations included drug treatment of lazaret patients with Atoxyl, an arsenic 
compound first found effective in experimental trypanosomiasis by scientists at the 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine in 1905. In the Congo, early cases of sleeping 
sickness were to receive Atoxyl injections every four to five days, while victims in the 
advanced stages of the disease were to be treated with a regimen of Atoxyl injections, 
oral doses of strychnine sulphate, an alkaloid stimulant, and cold showers.137 Rather 
than constituting a means of disease prevention and control in itself, however, drug 
treatment was primarily a component of the Free State’s isolation strategy, geared 
towards keeping parasite carriers away from the rest of the population.138 Before the 
introduction of Atoxyl therapy in the Congo, African individuals found infected had 
faced an indefinite stay and almost certain death in the segregation camps. Now the 
administration expected that they would simply remain quarantined until they were 
cured in the course of ‘a few weeks or a few months’.139 
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Chapter  3
Atoxyl and the early twentieth-century Congolese 
market for sleeping sickness remedies
This chapter takes a step back to explore the beginnings of Atoxyl’s trajectory in the 
Congo. More specifically, it charts the drug’s short career as a curative treatment for 
human trypanosomiasis victims at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the 
context of a competitive Congolese market for sleeping sickness remedies. 
Before it came into view as a cure for sleeping sickness, Atoxyl had already started 
life as a pharmaceutical. An organic arsenic compound first synthesised in the 
nineteenth century, it was marketed by a German company in the early twentieth 
century as a medicinal chemical that was less toxic than the inorganic arsenicals 
traditionally used for a variety of conditions. When researchers at the Liverpool School 
of Tropical Medicine in 1905 discovered its ‘trypanocidal’ or trypanosome-killing 
properties in experimentally infected laboratory animals, Atoxyl was on its way to 
becoming the first scientific sleeping sickness drug. 
The pharmaceutical’s introduction and clinical use in the Congo was not the result, 
however, of colonial physicians simply adopting a metropolitan scientific discovery 
because of its inherent therapeutic efficacy. Rather, the drug’s fate as a sleeping sickness 
cure was characterised by (overlapping) phases of optimism and ‘expanding use’ on the 
one hand, and ‘criticism and disappointment’ on the other.140 Moreover, this career path 
was shaped by interactions between European laboratory scientists cum tropical 
medicine experts, drug manufacturers, the Congo administration, clinicians and African 
policy. In fact, Todd himself insisted in December 1906 that ‘even if atoxyl itself turned out to be an absolute 
specific remedy for Sleeping Sickness, still every effort must be used, through the institution of quarantine 
methods, to prevent the spread of the disease’. See Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 103; Sir Alfred Jones to Secrétaire 
Général Liebrechts, 27.12.1906, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.280.
140 On different phases in the career cycles of drugs and the idea that they ‘need not be sequential’, but ‘often 
overlap’ and can be ‘coexistent’, see Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 97, 102, 111.
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patients. In that way, it reflected and constituted social and spatial relations that were 
typically ‘colonial’ in important respects, but also included other dimensions. What 
stands out among the interactions feeding into Atoxyl’s cycle as a sleeping sickness cure 
in the Congo was the beginning of a new configuration of science, industry and 
medicine unfolding between metropole and colony, and across imperial borders. The 
administration of the Free State played a vital role in enabling the development of a new 
scientific medicine in the Congo, although some of its actions at the same time 
undermined it. In addition, its interventions in the area of sleeping sickness therapy 
clearly entailed asymmetries between metropolitan and colonial opinions, between 
colonisers and colonised, and between collective and individual interests, provoking 
opposition from some European doctors and African sleeping sickness victims alike. 
This chapter starts with a sketch of the early twentieth-century Congolese market for 
sleeping sickness remedies to highlight that nothing was self-evident about the 
adoption of a pharmaceutical commodity with laboratory-established efficacy to treat 
trypanosomiasis victims. When Atoxyl was introduced in the Free State, it did not land 
on ‘virgin’ territory, but entered a medical market, driven by state demand, where 
different medicines and therapeutic approaches were competing for ‘cultural authority 
and commercial success’.141 Rivalries between the colonial medical profession and the 
proprietary drug industry, as well as between remedies recommended on the basis of 
clinical observation and therapies grounded in laboratory evidence, constituted 
important areas of competition in this market. As the product of both the laboratory 
and the proprietary drug industry, Atoxyl therefore entered this arena in a remarkable 
capacity. The next section discusses how the drug was in fact part of a broader wave of 
competing trypanocidal chemical compounds emerging, before the First World War, 
from a crucial alliance between metropolitan laboratory researchers and a 
(predominantly German) segment of the pharmaceutical industry to produce and 
advance scientific medicines. The final section examines how Atoxyl was introduced and 
came to be used as a sleeping sickness cure in the Congo. As clinicians in colonial Africa 
had access to larger numbers of human trypanosomiasis victims, metropolitan drug 
developers sought their collaboration to establish the therapeutic value of new 
trypanocidal compounds, shape their application as sleeping sickness drugs and in the 
process create a market for them.142 The Free State administration facilitated this 
endeavour by enabling and stimulating its doctors to experiment with Atoxyl and other 
compounds on African sleeping sickness cases - thus participating in and contributing 
to inter-imperial networks of trypanocidal drug development - and by quickly 
incorporating, in its official sleeping sickness measures, an Atoxyl-based regimen as a 
141F. Huisman, ‘Struggling for the market: strategies of Dutch pharmaceutical companies, 1880-1940’, in V. 
Quirke and J. Slinn (eds.), Perspectives on Twentieth-Century Pharmaceuticals (Frankfurt, 2010), p. 65.
142 On the co-constitution of therapeutic knowledge, drugs and drug markets, see N. Oudshoorn, ‘“United we 
stand”: the pharmaceutical industry, laboratory and clinic in the development of sex hormones into scientific 
drugs, 1920-1940’, Science, Technology and Human Values 18 (1993), 5-24.
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compulsory curative treatment for African trypanosome carriers isolated in lazarets. 
The administration’s optimism and instructions to expand Atoxyl’s (experimental) use, 
however, coexisted with more critical views from colonial clinicians who pointed to 
limited curative powers and toxic side-effects contributing to African resistance to the 
lazaret regime. Brussels eventually also grew more disappointed with Atoxyl as a 
sleeping sickness cure, but sustained its use while encouraging further experimentation 
with a wide range of potential remedies in the hope of finding a better alternative. 
3.1 Competing remedies and therapeutic approaches 
Atoxyl was not the first nor the only drug that came into view as a treatment for 
sleeping sickness in the Congo at the beginning of the twentieth century, but 
represented one therapeutic possibility in what was in fact a much wider market. The 
concept of the ‘medical market’ was introduced in the 1980s by historians of medicine in 
early modern England to describe health care as a ‘(metaphorical) marketplace’ where 
suppliers of medical goods and services competed for the custom of purchasers who 
could freely choose from a variety of treatment options.143 Understood not just in a 
‘limited economic’, but in a broader socio-cultural sense, the notion of the medical 
market has since been applied to a wide range of contexts, often to challenge the notion 
of a linear progress of professional medicine.144 Importantly, historians have argued that 
the granting of a state-sanctioned monopoly to the regular medical profession in (late) 
nineteenth-century Europe, which marginalised unorthodox practitioners, did not so 
much terminate the medical market as transform it.145 In England, for example, state 
regulation ‘exclude(d) the practice of medicine from the operation of market forces’, but 
the same could not be said of the selling and use of medicines. This was evident in the 
substantial growth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of a proprietary medicines 
business working outside, and in competition with, the regular medical profession. It 
entailed a ‘hardening of the boundaries’ between the ‘professional’ and the ‘commercial’ 
143 Huisman, ‘Struggling for the market’, p. 64; M. S. R. Jenner and P. Wallis, ‘The medical marketplace’, in M. S. 
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within modern health care.146 Importantly, progress in medical science did not simply 
make the medical market disappear in the modern era either.147 
This becomes evident when we look at the Congolese sleeping sickness therapy 
market in the early twentieth century. To meet their demand for a sleeping sickness 
remedy, the Free State and later Belgian Congo authorities received a wide spectrum of 
treatment proposals. Suggestions came from a remarkable variety of providers in the 
Congo, Belgium and much further beyond - a testament to the disease’s high profile 
across the globe.148 Several were issued directly in response to the royal call for a cure 
and the associated reputational and monetary rewards for ‘solving’ the captivating 
puzzle of trypanosomiasis.149 The treatment options put forward reflected a broad 
‘therapeutic field’, from surgical procedures to drug, electro- and radiotherapy, and 
originated from both within and outside the sphere of regular medicine, i.e. from 
members of the medical profession, proponents of alternative, ‘folk’ medicine such as 
homeopathy, as well as lay individuals.150 The majority of the cures contemplated, 
however, involved some form of drug therapy, including indigenous herbal remedies 
picked up by European observers, biological drugs such as antisera and vaccines, or 
medicinal chemicals.151
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While the popularity and use of medical drugs varied throughout the history of 
therapeutics, they had become particularly salient in Western medicine by the late 
nineteenth century.152 This situation was linked to a number of important evolutions in 
the history of medical therapy. First of all, the second half of the nineteenth century saw 
European laboratory scientists develop a multitude of innovative and powerful 
therapeutic agents, beginning first with synthetic chemical drugs such as antipyretics, 
and later also comprising biologicals like antisera and vaccines.153 Alongside this 
‘pharmacological fever’ came an acceleration in the ‘commercialization (sic) and 
industrialization (sic) of pharmacy’, which saw the small-scale drug compounding and 
dispensing of apothecaries replaced with the large-scale trade and manufacture of 
ready-made, standardised and cheaper medicinal preparations by commercial drug 
firms.154 This drug industry operated inside and outside of regular medicine, 
manufacturing ‘legal’ medicines described in official pharmacopeias as well as secret 
remedies, and prescription as well as over-the-counter drugs directly advertised to the 
public, often as panacea.155 Their products comprised both traditional materia medica 
and therapeutic novelties, and could be sold as generic drugs or as proprietary 
medicines, which became known as ‘pharmaceutical specialties’.156 In fact, a growing 
segment of the drug trade consisted of proprietary medicines protected by trade secrets, 
trademarks or patents - although only ‘preparation processes’, and not pharmaceuticals 
themselves, could be patented in European countries before the Second World War 
(unlike in the United States, where medical drugs as such were patentable).157 
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Finally, intertwined with the trends above was a therapeutic ‘paradigm shift’ in the 
late nineteenth century.158 Earlier, regular therapeutic practice had been dominated by 
the principle of ‘patient specificity’. It meant that physicians devised medical 
treatments that were uniquely adapted to the specific situation of their patients, which 
amounted to ‘extremely complex therapeutic strategies’.159 However, a change in 
aetiological theory, replacing the notion of illness as a state of humoral imbalance 
provoked by ‘general destabilizing (sic) forces’ with a concept of diseases as distinct 
clinical entities with specific causes, supported a shift towards ‘disease-specific 
treatment’.160 This entailed the ‘match(ing) (of treatment) to a specific disease or even to 
its cause’, with all patients suffering from the same disease being prescribed the same 
medicines.161 Drugs became ‘specifics’ and therapeutics came to reflect a universalist 
ideal, focusing on ‘reproducible’, uniform treatments that were no longer (entirely) 
patient- and context-specific.162 This universalism was linked to the rise of laboratory 
medicine, but was also echoed in the standardisation of industrial drug production and 
the ‘lay’ concept of self-medication panacea.163 
As a result of these therapeutic transformations, at the turn of the twentieth century 
there was an ever-expanding, but increasingly disorganised supply of standard 
preparations and medicinal novelties targeting specific diseases and competing for a 
share of the drug market.164 On the early twentieth-century Congolese market for 
sleeping sickness remedies, the drug treatments proposed reflected two important areas 
of competition. The first one involved rivalries between the medical profession and the 
proprietary drug industry, which largely stemmed from the fact that the practice of 
medicine in the Congo was regulated since the late nineteenth-century, while no 
legislation controlling the import and selling of medicines existed until after the First 
World War.165 
The Congo authorities were thus often targeted by manufacturers of branded 
panacea of unknown composition who had no first-hand knowledge of sleeping 
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sickness, but nonetheless added the disease to their cure-alls’ list of indications.166 For 
example, between 1910 and 1911 the Johannesburg Maningo company promoted its 
drug ‘Maningo’ as a sleeping sickness remedy in capsule form to the Belgian Colonial 
Minister. The drug was marketed as a ‘specific for the prevention and cure of insect-
borne diseases’ such as malaria, and a cure for ‘leprosy, exczema (sic), rheumatism and 
all other diseases due to Impure blood’. To protect its commercial interests, Maningo 
wanted to keep the formula secret.167 However, because many such concoctions were 
intended for self-medication and directly advertised to consumers (or in this case to the 
colonial state as a source of medicinal demand), they circumvented physicians as the 
‘only legitimate prescriber(s) of treatment’ and thus constituted a threat to the medical 
profession’s authority.168 State doctors in the Congo therefore tended to be dismissive of 
such secret remedies.169 For example, the colony’s chief medical officer, who had 
apparently found out that Maningo’s active ingredient was quinine, did not want to try 
out the drug in the treatment of sleeping sickness cases as he anticipated negative 
results, and suggested that it was better to use generic quinine for malaria.170 Or, 
confronted with a Colombian-manufactured panacea branded ‘Curarina’, several 
physicians found it as good as impossible to give a scientific assessment of a drug the 
contents of which they did not know, and Alphonse Broden of the Leopoldville medical 
laboratory concluded that ‘every serious doctor’ would ‘attach no other value to this so-
called panacea than that of a well-made publicity’.171 
This is not to say that regular physicians in the Congo (as elsewhere) refrained from 
prescribing pharmaceutical specialties.172 In fact, most prescription drugs were imported 
there as ready-made medicinal preparations, and these also came in branded versions. 
The problem, however, was that not all general practitioners were deemed equally 
scientifically competent to assess the therapeutic claims made in pharmaceutical 
advertisements.173 Moreover, some clinicians in the Congo tended to base their 
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therapeutic knowledge and practices regarding sleeping sickness on the ‘empiricism’ of 
clinical observations rather than on the ‘rationalism’ of a scientific medicine that sought 
to establish drugs’ pharmacological effects in laboratory experiments before 
introducing them to clinical practice.174 For example, state doctor Gaston Daniel 
proposed an iodine-based sleeping sickness treatment after ‘expériences pratiques’ in a 
military camp in Bas-Congo between 1910 and 1912, and suggested to have it tried out 
on a larger number of trypanosomiasis victims. When in 1913 he was asked to have his 
empirical remedy examined by a laboratory doctor first, he protested that no laboratory 
consideration could ‘prevail’ against his own ‘experimental method’ pursued for more 
than three years.175 Despite the historically close ties between tropical medicine and 
microbiology, therefore, there was a certain ambiguity towards laboratory medicine 
among at least some clinicians practicing in the colony, especially since tropical 
medicine diplomas were not a formal requirement for state doctors until 1910.176 In that 
sense, the tension between clinical and laboratory medicine, or between empirical and 
rational therapeutics, constituted a second area of ‘competition’ on the early twentieth-
century Congolese market for sleeping sickness remedies. 
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3.2 A marriage of laboratory science and industry: Atoxyl and 
the ‘birth’ of trypanocidal compounds
On this Congolese market of competing sleeping sickness remedies and therapeutic 
approaches, Atoxyl started its journey as the product of a remarkable alliance between 
laboratory science and (a segment of the) pharmaceutical industry.177 Both shared an 
interest in enhancing the scientific character of therapeutics, and at the beginning of 
the twentieth century found an important target in sleeping sickness to pursue this 
agenda. The result was a range of industrially manufactured chemical compounds that 
were ‘trypanocidal’, i.e. lethal for the trypanosomes of experimentally infected 
laboratory animals. 
The discovery of the trypanosome in 1903 established disease-specific treatment 
acting against this particular micro-organism as ‘scientific’ sleeping sickness therapy. 
The move towards disease-specific therapy rooted in experimental laboratory science 
had been initiated in the second half of the nineteenth century. Under the influence of 
experimental physiology, therapeutic practice shifted its focus from restoring the 
individual body’s humoral imbalance to ‘altering specific (abnormal) physiological 
processes’.178 With the rise of the branch of laboratory medicine known as bacteriology, 
disease-specific therapy gained an even greater momentum by the 1870s-1880s. Building 
on the germ theory of infectious disease, which established ‘specific micro-organisms’ 
as the cause of infections, bacteriology provided an enormous boost to the notion of 
‘etiological (sic) specificity’ and its therapeutic corollary: the treatment of infectious 
diseases by destroying their specific pathogenic agents.179 
The prominence of the germ theory and the development of procedures for isolating 
and growing pathogenic micro-organisms through the rise of bacteriology in the late 
nineteenth century naturally stimulated experimental therapeutic research on 
infectious diseases.180 The first therapies resulting from laboratory investigations into 
the actions of medicinal substances on experimentally infected animals were biological 
remedies, which were especially successful in bacterial infections. With the discovery of 
protozoal trypanosomes as the causative agents of African trypanosomiasis, the disease 
soon enough became the object of this ‘experimental therapeutics’, and thus 
contributed to a widening of the search for specific therapies beyond antibacterial 
177 On the development of an alliance between science and the ‘ethical’ segment of the drug industry, see for 
example Huisman, ‘Bedreiging tot bondgenoot’, 463.
178 Warner, Therapeutic Perspective, p. 101. 
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drugs.181 Not only was sleeping sickness a high-profile disease at the centre of the new 
field of tropical medicine, itself closely linked with laboratory medicine, but 
trypanosomes proved ideal study objects because - unlike many other human diseases - 
trypanosome infections could be easily reproduced in experiment animals.182 
Although some laboratory researchers explored biological cures (without much 
success), the search for a specific drug against trypanosomes turned overwhelmingly to 
chemical substances.183 Natural chemicals had been used empirically for centuries in 
therapeutic practice. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, chemistry 
began to be exploited for drug development with the ‘extraction of active principles 
from plants’, leading to drugs like morphine (from opium) and quinine (from cinchona 
bark).184 Subsequent attempts to synthesise rather than isolate these natural products 
had remarkable consequences for pharmaceutical history. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, the search for a synthetic version of quinine that would be cheaper and easier 
to supply led to the accidental discovery of synthetic dyes derived from coal tar, a ‘waste 
industrial by-product’. This gave rise to a synthetic dyestuffs industry, notably in 
Germany, which by the 1880s also turned to pharmaceutical research. It resulted in new 
synthetic chemical drugs, most notably analgesics and antipyretics, including Aspirin.185 
With these first synthetic pharmaceuticals treating disease symptoms rather than 
causes, the next step was the ‘rational, systematic search for specific chemotherapeutic 
agents against various infectious diseases’.186 
The founder of specific chemotherapy, or at least the coiner of the term, was Paul 
Ehrlich, a German medical scientist whose research on histological staining with 
synthetic dyes led him to pursue ‘pharmacotherapeutic investigations’. The 
experimental treatment of two human malaria cases with methylene blue in 1891 
marked the beginning of his search for synthetic chemicals that could cure infectious 
diseases.187 After a stint in immunological therapy research at the Robert Koch Institute 
for Infectious Diseases in Berlin - for which he received a Nobel Prize in 1909 - Ehrlich 
resumed his chemotherapeutic work in 1898. By 1906, he was able set up an extensive 
research program at the Georg-Speyer Haus for Chemotherapy, built next to the 
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Frankfurt Institute for Experimental Therapy to support his studies.188 Together with his 
co-workers, Ehrlich investigated the activity of dyes against trypanosomes in 
experimentally infected animals, and found that Trypan Red was effective in mice, 
although not in larger animals.189 
Besides synthetic dyes, the group also focused on arsenic compounds given their 
long-standing empirical use in medical practice, including in trypanosome infections 
before the discovery of sleeping sickness aetiology.190 In 1903, Ehrlich conducted in vitro 
tests with an organic arsenic compound synthesised by the French pharmacist Antoine 
Béchamp in 1863 and introduced as a medicine for conditions in which arsenic was 
indicated by the Berlin chemical manufacturer ‘Vereinigte Chemische Werke 
Charlottenburg’ in 1901. The latter had named the drug ‘Atoxyl’ because of its low 
toxicity compared with the inorganic arsenicals commonly used in therapeutics.191 The 
German scientist initially rejected the drug as it showed no trypanocidal effect in the 
test tube. However, medical researchers Wolferstan Thomas and Anton Breinl from the 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine found in 1905 that Atoxyl killed trypanosomes in 
the blood of experimentally infected laboratory animals.192 This discovery further 
tweaked Ehrlich and other scientists’ interest in the trypanocidal action of arsenicals 
and other chemical compounds.
Among other notable sleeping sickness chemotherapy researchers were the French 
Pastorians Alphonse Laveran, Félix Mesnil and Maurice Nicolle. In 1902, the 
parasitologist Laveran had managed to experimentally infect mice with trypanosomes, 
thus enabling the development of specific chemotherapy research, and together with 
Mesnil tried treating them with arsenious acid at the Paris Pasteur Institute, albeit 
without much success.193 Laveran subsequently studied ‘associations médicamenteuses’, 
for example of Trypan Red and arsenious acid, and by 1907 proposed treatment with 
orpiment, another inorganic arsenical.194 Mesnil and Nicolle between 1906 and 1907 
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experimented with various dyes, and found Trypan Blue and Afridol Violet most 
effective in mice.195 Around the same time, they played a role in introducing antimony, 
another element with a long medical history, to chemotherapeutic trypanosomiasis 
research. Together with his collaborator E. Brimont, Mesnil in 1907-1908 discovered the 
trypanocidal qualities of the antimony compound tartar emetic (potassium antimony 
tartrate) in experimental infections, a finding that was also reported independently by 
Henry Plimmer and John Thomson at the British Lister Institute of Preventive 
Medicine.196 
This empirical search for effective trypanocidal drugs in the early twentieth century 
was not only important from a practical point of view, but also because it helped Ehrlich 
develop the principles of specific chemotherapy that would come to shape much of the 
research on trypanocides and other synthetic drugs.197 Ehrlich was essentially looking 
for ‘magic bullets’: chemical medicines that were highly ‘parasitotropic’ but not 
‘organotropic’, i.e. compounds that destroyed pathogenic micro-organisms without 
damaging their host.198 Suitable chemotherapeutic agents had an acceptable 
‘chemotherapeutic index’, with as large a difference as possible between their toxic and 
therapeutic dose.199 They ideally allowed for a treatment strategy called ‘therapia 
sterilisans magna’, the destruction of all the body’s pathogens with a single dose. Another 
possible strategy highlighted by Ehrlich was ‘combination therapy’, the use of multiple 
compounds to treat a single disease so as to enhance therapeutic efficacy without 
increasing drug toxicity, and avoid the emergence of drug-resistant pathogens.200 
Ehrlich had long been interested in the relation between the ‘chemical structure’ and 
‘pharmacological activity’ of compounds. In his search for magic bullets, he began 
altering the structure of Atoxyl after the discovery of its trypanocidal action to improve 
the drug’s chemotherapeutic index. It resulted in the creation of hundreds of new 
organic arsenicals that were tested in vivo at the Georg-Speyer Haus in the treatment of 
experimental trypanosomiasis, and from 1909 onwards also syphilis (caused by 
spirochetes, bacteria that were assumed to be similar to trypanosomes at the time).201 
Compound number 418 (arsenophenylglycin) showed great promise as a trypanocide, 
while number 306 (acetylatoxyl) and number 606 (arsphenamine) appeared effective in 
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(some) trypanosome infections as well as against spirochetes. The team made a ‘water-
soluble variant’ of the latter compound called ‘neoarsphenamine’ in 1912.202
Crucial to the development of Ehrlich’s specific chemotherapy and the making of 
anti-infective chemical drugs was the presence of a ‘hugely successful fine chemicals 
industry based on synthetic organic chemistry’ in Germany. As mentioned above, 
synthetic dyestuff companies in particular had taken advantage of favourable German 
patent laws and connections with academic chemists to launch into industrial research 
and pharmaceutical innovation.203 Ehrlich’s chemotherapeutic research program 
presented them with exciting new opportunities in the field of antimicrobial therapy. In 
Frankfurt, the medical scientist had developed close ties with local dyestuff 
manufacturers such as Hoechst and Leopold Cassella and Company, who supplied him 
with synthetic dye samples for therapeutic experimentation.204 In addition, these 
chemical firms took on the mass-production and commercial distribution of new 
compounds synthesised in Ehrlich’s lab. For example, Hoechst marketed acetylatoxyl as 
Arsacetin.205 Moreover, when the Georg-Speyer Haus could not handle the enormous 
demand for the anti-syphilitic arsphenamine, Ehrlich reached an agreement with the 
company, which in 1910 went on to manufacture and market the compound and later 
also its derivative as Salvarsan and Neosalvarsan respectively.206 
The German chemical industry was also linked to prewar trypanocide research and 
development outside of Germany. For example, the Elberfeld firm Friedrich Bayer and 
Company, set up in 1863 to ‘exploit (…) the potential of (…) synthetic aniline dyes’ and 
manufacturer of the drug Aspirin, delivered dyes to the Pasteurian tropical medicine 
experts Mesnil and Nicolle.207 And the ‘Vereinigte Chemische Werke Charlottenburg’ of 
course benefitted from the sleeping sickness therapy research with Atoxyl by the 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, which was crucial in shaping the arsenical drug 
into a trypanocidal compound. In Britain itself, where no comparable, research-oriented 
dyestuff industry existed, the drug firm Burroughs Wellcome & Co. nevertheless soon 
launched a cheaper version of Atoxyl, with a ‘closely related’ chemical formula, under 
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the trade name of Soamin.208 Established by two US-born pharmacists in 1880 to sell 
American proprietary medicines, the company gradually developed a manufacturing 
and research infrastructure, thus becoming Britain’s ‘first science-based drug company’. 
Building on a tradition of product diversification that included analysing rival firms’ 
drugs, Burroughs Wellcome & Co.’s production plant in Dartford became involved in 
experimental research into arsenicals in the early twentieth century.209 
For German chemical manufacturers, who dominated the international synthetic dye 
market, taking advantage of specific chemotherapy research was part of an ongoing 
strategy to diversify into synthetic pharmaceuticals in the wake of a double price crisis 
affecting dyes and raw materials. Relying on innovation helped them secure competitive 
advantage over established German firms trading in standard medicinal chemicals, and 
was also linked to an internationalisation strategy.210 The ‘practical success’ of Salvarsan 
and Neosalvarsan in particular demonstrated that chemical synthesis could yield 
profitable drugs for the specific treatment of infectious diseases. It encouraged the 
search for other therapeutic chemicals on the basis of Ehrlich’s methods and 
principles.211 Tellingly, in 1910 the Bayer company established a chemotherapy 
laboratory to ‘exploit (this) new science’.212 As John Lesch has argued, this amounted to 
an incorporation of Ehrlich’s chemotherapy research program into the German 
chemical industry’s ‘own pharmaceutical research effort’, and formed part of a 
historical process of ‘industrialization (sic) of pharmaceutical invention’ underlying 
German dominance in synthetic chemical drugs R&D in the first half of the twentieth 
century.213 
For Bayer and other companies capitalising on specific chemotherapy research - 
externally or in-house - at the beginning of the twentieth century, science did not 
simply drive innovation, however, but also served another purpose. The association with 
science allowed these firms to distinguish themselves and their prescription 
pharmaceuticals from the ‘unethical’ manufacturers of proprietary medicines, who 
made up a significant segment of the drug industry and whose secret remedies and 
over-the-counter panacea betrayed exclusively commercial motives.214 The rise of 
businesses profiling themselves, by contrast, as ‘ethical’ was part of a ‘qualitative(…)’ 
208 Greenwood Antimicrobial Drugs, pp. 270, 277; J. Slinn, ‘Research and development in the UK pharmaceutical 
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transformation in drug manufacturing that accompanied the ‘quantitative(…)’ move 
towards industrial-scale production since the nineteenth century. Starting with the 
cultivation of a scientific image as a ‘strategy of (…) demarcation’, it culminated in the 
emergence of an increasingly science-based pharmaceutical industry in the twentieth 
century, developing and mass-producing quality-controlled, standardised prescription 
drugs that were the fruits of medical laboratory science, and thus appealed to the 
proponents of a rational therapeutics.215 
3.3 Making (a market for) Atoxyl: clinical investigators and 
the Congo administration216
By the early twentieth-century, scientific medicines, including synthetic chemicals like 
Atoxyl, were of course not simply ‘ready-made laboratory products’ manufactured on an 
industrial scale, but ‘artefacts created in networks of different groups of actors’. As Nelly 
Oudshoorn has argued, the medical profession constituted a crucial node in these webs 
of drug development.217 To evaluate the safety and efficacy of new compounds in the 
treatment of human diseases, clinicians were needed to experiment them on patients. In 
this way, some physicians went beyond their traditional role as therapists and became 
involved in therapeutic knowledge production and the making of ‘rational’ remedies, 
grounded in experimental science.218 It was on this clinical determination of drugs’ 
therapeutic value that their market launch by ethical pharmaceutical companies 
depended. At the same time, clinical trials could be very much ‘part of the marketing 
process’, according to Oudshoorn, as they ‘linked (prescription) drugs to their 
audiences’, the profession of medical prescribers, thus creating a market for them. 
Moreover, the development and testing of medical drugs sometimes continued after 
their commercialisation.219 Atoxyl was a case in point, as researchers in Liverpool helped 
find a new application for a drug that was already distributed by its German 
manufacturer as a remedy for ‘all complaints for which arsenic is indicated’.220 In that 
sense, drug development should not be viewed as a neatly linear sequence of research, 
215 Liebenau, Medical Science and Medical Industry, pp. 5-8; Huisman, ‘Struggling for the market’, pp. 66, 81; Quirke 
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testing and marketing, but as the ‘collective(…) creation’ of medicines and markets for 
these medicines through interactions between relevant actors from the worlds of 
science, medicine and industry.221 As will be described below, in the case of Atoxyl, the 
Congo administration played a most vital role in making a colonial drug market. 
Because of a dearth of sleeping sickness victims in Europe, metropolitan 
chemotherapy researchers and pharmaceutical companies naturally had to rely on 
clinical investigators in African colonies to establish whether the trypanocidal 
compounds coming out of their laboratories were efficacious and safe to use in the 
treatment of human trypanosomiasis. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
‘larger patient base’ of territories such as Uganda, German East Africa, Togo, Cameroon 
and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) generated important cross-border, even inter-
imperial, networks of trypanocide development.222 With drug experimentation taking off 
in the Free State as well, the Congo became a crucial participant in this web of 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
Before the introduction of laboratory-made trypanocidal compounds, sleeping 
sickness therapy in the Congo - as elsewhere - was a generally empirical affair, based on 
clinicians’ own observations and experience. Faced with a mysterious, fatal disease, 
colonial isolation and a lack of therapeutic guidance, many doctors were left to devise 
their own sleeping sickness treatments on a trial-and-error basis. Several resorted to the 
small-scale experimentation of empirical remedies, mostly involving existing medicinal 
chemicals. Within the medical profession this sort of ‘therapeutic experimentation’ was 
typically seen as an acceptable part of the art of medicine, undertaken in individual 
patients’ own interests. In the case of sleeping sickness, not attempting to 
therapeutically intervene amounted to certain death, and could in that sense be 
considered a less ethical option.223 Although some claimed a certain degree of success in 
the treatment of a few isolated cases, the flip side of physicians’ considerable clinical 
freedom was an overwhelming feeling of therapeutic ‘powerless(ness) against the 
trypanosome’.224 
When information regarding the laboratory breakthroughs with trypanocidal 
chemicals reached the Congo, some clinicians grew more ambitious and wanted to try 
221 Oudshoorn, ‘“United we stand”’, 5-6, 20-21.
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out these specifics in a more ‘serious and persistent’ way.225 Moreover, it seems that the 
rationale of experimentation started to shift from trying to effect a cure in individual 
patients to producing therapeutic knowledge, which was not necessarily of direct 
benefit or even harmful to the trypanosomiasis victims under observation, but could be 
helpful to others.226 The question of sleeping sickness therapy presented doctors in the 
tropics with exciting research opportunities, and many appeared keen to establish the 
efficacy of new remedies in human cases first. In addition, colonial practitioners 
increasingly understood that extended experimentation could provide them with 
therapeutic guidance, at least if information about individual doctors’ trials was 
exchanged.227 The result was that some embarked upon therapeutic investigations 
involving larger numbers of sleeping sickness victims. However, as therapeutic practice 
in the Congo was transitioning from its empirical roots to an undertaking more firmly 
grounded in experimental science, the boundaries between ‘therapeutic 
experimentation’ to help infected individuals and ‘scientific experimentation’ to 
advance collective knowledge were sometimes blurred.228 Also, clinicians did not always 
distinguish between empirical and rational remedies in their search for a sleeping 
sickness cure (although most were less willing to experiment remedies of unknown 
composition).229 In addition to pursuing the discoveries of metropolitan laboratories, 
many continued trying out their own empirical remedies.230 
Medical experiments that constituted ‘research rather than treatment’, aimed at 
developing appropriate therapeutic protocols rather than ensuring the well-being of 
individual participants, can of course be considered highly problematic. Wolfgang 
Eckart has described how German Africa, as the moral and legal periphery of the 
‘Kaiserreich’, constituted an ideal territory for medical experiments that were 
unacceptable in the metropole, namely pharmacological trials with dangerous sleeping 
sickness drugs on African subjects who were forcibly confined and certainly did not 
consent.231 In that sense, German colonies were a ‘literal, and not just metaphorical 
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laboratory’.232 However, as Neill remarks, such questionable experiments were not 
confined to German territories in Africa, nor even to colonial contexts, in a period 
without ‘more specific international ethical codes’ on the subject.233 What foremost 
determined their occurrence in colonial Africa, including in the Congo, was the pivotal 
influence of a transnational tropical medicine elite and its racialised medical discourse 
constructing African trypanosomiasis victims as public health hazards rather than as 
individuals in need of medical care. 
In the Free State, the infectious disease control measures recommended by the 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine contributed to the sort of systematic, larger-scale 
therapeutic trials that were aimed at the production of (policy-relevant) knowledge and 
helped turn the Congo into ‘a vast field of experimentation’ for sleeping sickness 
remedies.234 As described in the previous chapter, these measures instituted case 
detection and the forced admission of trypanosome-infected Africans into ‘native 
hospitals’, or more often, their isolation in lazarets. As elsewhere, the 
institutionalisation of ill people significantly boosted scientific experimentation by 
creating readily accessible ‘research populations’.235 Just like their colleagues in 
neighbouring colonies, doctors in charge of these prison-like segregation camps in the 
Congo came to consider them not only as a component of the state’s public health 
policy, but also as prime experimental sites for sleeping sickness therapy research. In 
1911, the director of Coquilhatville’s lazaret, for example, declared that it was ‘a very 
good instrument for studies and research for doctors’.236 
In addition to issuing decrees that aided the creation of ideal settings for 
experimentation, the Congo administration also played a more direct role in stimulating 
and facilitating drug trials to advance therapeutic knowledge and inform medical policy. 
Faced with an epidemic disease that showed little consideration for colonial borders and 
a dearth of tropical medicine experience in Belgium, the Free State relied heavily on 
foreign medical expertise and informal inter-imperial cooperation to tackle the sleeping 
sickness problem. These cross-border exchanges, and especially the Free State’s special 
relation with the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, helped initiate a ‘pattern of 
state-instructed medical inquiry’ in the Congo that soon included the issue of sleeping 
sickness therapy. 
To gain a deeper understanding of sleeping sickness aetiology, pathology and 
epidemiology, researchers from the Liverpool School’s Congo expedition had relied 
heavily on governmental efforts to collect information and specimens for them from 
territorial and medical staff as well as from missionaries. Even after the expedition had 
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left the Congo, Todd continued to do so to advance his scientific agenda.237 When 
Liverpool scientists found Atoxyl to be effective in the treatment of trypanosome-
infected lab animals, he recommended attempting Atoxyl treatment on human 
trypanosomiasis cases as part of the School’s broader collaboration with the Free 
State.238 By early 1906, Brussels shipped samples of the drug to the Congo, and in return 
requested periodic reports from experimenters to get a sense of its therapeutic value.239 
A similar scenario followed an appeal made by Laveran around the same time to trial his 
combination therapy of arsenious acid and Trypan Red: metropolitan administrators 
soon secured a quantity of the synthetic dye and dispatched it to doctors in possession 
of a microscope to start experimentation in Africa.240 A circular from the vice-Governor 
General later that year again instructed lazaret doctors to record and report treatment 
outcomes with arsenicals, Trypan red and Atoxyl in each patient.241 
Soon enough, it was Atoxyl that drew most attention, albeit not exactly as a miracle 
cure for human trypanosomiasis. State doctor Umberto Zerbini, for example, reported 
that Atoxyl injections improved the general condition of his patients at Boma’s hospital 
for ‘blacks’ and produced a ‘temporary disappearance of trypanosomes’ from their 
blood. In his view, however, this did not mean that they were really cured. Moreover, he 
signalled that the arsenical did not have any effect in advanced cases of sleeping 
sickness.242 In Brussels, military physician Jean Emile Van Campenhout confirmed that 
Atoxyl alone was not enough to cure victims in the secondary phase.243 In the summer of 
1906, he nevertheless claimed to have devised a course of Atoxyl treatment that solved 
this problem. Van Campenhout had left for the Congo in 1890, shortly after obtaining his 
medical diploma from the Free University of Brussels, and spent much of the next ten 
years there, devoting most of his time to ‘various administrative or military tasks’.244 
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During a final term starting in May 1899, he was charged with founding and directing a 
medical laboratory in Leopoldville and began studying sleeping sickness, but military 
obligations and illness hampered and prematurely ended these efforts.245 In 1906, he 
became the first director of the ‘Ecole de Médecine Tropicale’ (EMT), an educational 
institution established in Brussels by Leopold II to prepare physicians aspiring to a 
medical career in the Free State.246 Affiliated with the School and also directed by Van 
Campenhout was the ‘Villa Coloniale de Watermael’, which hospitalised diseased 
colonial agents.247 Among the patients that year was a European employee of the 
Compagnie du Kasai, whom the director claimed to have cured from 
meningoencephalitic sleeping sickness with a month-long regimen of subcutaneous 
Atoxyl injections, oral doses of strychnine sulphate (a highly poisonous alkaloid used as 
a stimulant by clinicians) and cold showers.248 
Van Campenhout promptly informed the Free State’s Interior Department in Brussels 
about his remarkable therapeutic success, so that practitioners in the Congo could apply 
the remedy to advanced cases of sleeping sickness.249 Needing little convincing, the 
administration quickly distributed the scheme’s details to its doctors, along with an 
invitation to communicate any ensuing treatment results.250 When the EMT director 
announced favourable results in a second European patient not long afterwards, new 
instructions to apply the treatment on African late-stage victims were issued to State 
doctors, together with a shipment of Atoxyl and strychnine sulphate.251 Among those 
reporting back was lazaret doctor Coronisio, who from Kasongo informed the Governor 
General that four previously lethargic Africans ‘almost did not sleep anymore’ after just 
twenty days of Atoxyl-strychnine treatment.252 
Brussels hardly waited for feedback from the Congo, however, to include Van 
Campenhout’s regimen in official policy. In December 1906, despite the relapse of one of 
the Watermael cases a month earlier, a new Free State regulation coordinating the 
measures to control sleeping sickness prescribed Atoxyl injections, combined with 
strychnine sulphate and showers in advanced cases, for the lazaret treatment of 
mon troisième séjour, mes occupations n’étaient pas exclusivement médicales; celles-ci n’étaient souvent 
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trypanosome-infected Africans.253 Van Campenhout would later claim that ‘it (was) by 
the EIC in the first place that (Atoxyl) ha(d) been prescribed on a large scale since the 
year 1906’.254 By enabling and stimulating clinicians to trial trypanocidal compounds and 
especially by adopting mandatory Atoxyl treatment in public health policy, the Free 
State administration not only helped shape this chemical’s application as a sleeping 
sickness drug, but also aided the early creation of a Congolese market for it. 
It soon became clear, however, that some found the EIC’s therapeutic decision-making 
a little premature. Reviewing the new sleeping sickness regulations soon after they were 
issued, Todd remarked that the prescribed doses of Atoxyl were too large. Moreover, 
seemingly unconvinced by claims of quick, definitive recoveries, he advocated larger-
scale human experimentation to study the long-term effects of Atoxyl, and in particular 
investigate whether the drug could produce a ‘permanent cure’ given ‘past experience’ 
of relapses.255 Todd’s comments were largely inspired, it seems, by his doubts regarding 
the standards of drug therapy research supported by the Free State. Having previously 
expressed some concern that the Congo’s doctors were not ‘making their observations 
on the effect of (Atoxyl) carefully and continuously’, the Liverpool scientist identified 
Boma’s hospital for Africans as the preferred setting for such research.256 ‘The conditions 
at Boma (were) extremely favourable’, he explained, as it had a ‘large’ hospital, 
surrounded by a ‘wall’ that allowed keeping patients ‘in perfect control’ during 
treatment. In addition, apparently cured cases could be ‘enrolled as labourers’ so that 
they could be ‘kept under constant observation at Boma for long periods’.257 
As more observations on the effects on Atoxyl therapy surfaced from the Congo in 
the following months, further doubts were raised about its (longer-term) safety and 
efficacy. It turned out that several patients had not recovered, but eventually died after 
treatment with Van Campenhout’s regimen. Moreover, there were reports of drug-
induced ocular problems, notably impaired vision and even blindness.258 Such poor 
therapeutic results certainly did little to increase the popularity of the prison-style 
isolation centres among the Congolese population. They fuelled perceptions that 
lazarets were nothing but ‘death camps’, places ‘from which the only exit was the 
grave’.259 As Zerbini explained, ‘in (the African people’s) limited mind, the measure of 
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being imprisoned in a lazaret mean(t) being condemned to death’.260 Especially those 
who had not been infected for a long time generally suffered few clinical symptoms and 
therefore very much resented being ‘interned’ and subjected to unfamiliar and 
potentially dangerous medical procedures. In other colonies as well, ineffective and 
toxic drug treatments provoked substantial African resistance to sleeping sickness 
segregation camps.261 
This situation led some practitioners in the Congo, including Zerbini, to question the 
ethics of the EIC’s lazaret treatment policy. He wondered, for example, whether public 
health considerations justified the forced confinement and treatment of Africans who, 
while having been found to carry trypanosomes, did not display clinical symptoms of 
sleeping sickness and thus were in his view not truly ill yet. As a doctor, he objected to 
hospitalising and subjecting such individuals against their will to a treatment that did 
not cure and potentially even harmed them. Significantly, - and contrary to the 
racialised views of many tropical medicine experts - their being ‘black’ did not make 
undermining their ‘individual liberty’ any more acceptable in his eyes. In sum, as far as 
early-stage cases were concerned and given the shortcomings of Atoxyl, the risks of 
mandatory lazaret treatment outweighed the public health benefits for Zerbini.262 
The Boma hospital doctor was not the only person hesitating to impose Atoxyl 
treatment on unwilling trypanosome carriers, indicating that even in a colonial African 
context, the boundaries of what was morally acceptable in the name of epidemic disease 
control were not a given, but open to debate.263 It seems that at least to some extent, 
objections to EIC sleeping sickness policy reflected tensions about the transition from an 
individualistic, ‘liberal medicine’ to the ‘collective orientation’ of ‘social’ or ‘state 
medicine’ in a public health campaign, coinciding with frictions between a reductionist 
laboratory model of epidemiology and a more holistic clinical medicine.264 Zerbini was 
clearly worried about the ‘conflicts of interest (…) pitting the health of the individual 
against the well-being of the population as a whole’.265 Moreover, for him indigenous 
patients were more than human trypanosome carriers, and their health status was 
determined by more than the mere presence or absence of protozoal parasites.266 In legal 
circles as well, the issue of Atoxyl therapy appeared to be anything but clear-cut. An 
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indication of this can be found in the reply of Robert de Meulemeester, director of 
Justice in Boma, to a medical practitioner’s concerns. He defended the Free State 
government’s right in principle - as was the case for metropolitan administrations - to 
prescribe measures contravening individual freedom, including the compulsory 
treatment of infected persons with a disease-specific cure, in order to protect public 
health. The proviso, however, was that medical professionals recognised such measures 
as ‘at least useful’. Moreover, imposing a treatment that invariably exposed all patients 
to the risk of blindness was another matter, de Meulemeester argued. In that case, 
patients needed to be informed about the dangers they were exposed to, and give their 
consent.267 
While at least some Free State doctors posited that mandatory Atoxyl therapy for all 
trypanosome-infected Africans was not ‘useful’ and excessively dangerous, in Brussels 
its risks and benefits were clearly weighed differently. In the absence of a designated 
medical department within the Free State’s metropolitan administration, EMT director 
Van Campenhout acted as a close adviser on health-related matters pertaining to the 
Congo, and in that position carried significant weight in medical decision-making - 
more so than doctors in the Congo. He argued in favour of continuing the use of Atoxyl, 
given that the trypanocide had produced the best results yet in the treatment of human 
trypanosomiasis. Although not denying that the drug could cause blindness, he judged 
that the risk was much less significant than some feared, in that it only occurred in 
advanced cases who were beyond curing anyway.268 
Thus in Van Campenhout’s view, Atoxyl’s drawbacks were real but not enough to 
warrant a withdrawal from the EIC’s sleeping sickness control measures. Most likely, his 
opinions were much informed and reinforced by the tropical medicine community in 
Europe. In June 1907 and early 1908, for example, the EMT director attended the 
International Conference on Sleeping Sickness in London, where metropolitan experts 
such as Laveran and Ehrlich insisted on the ‘value of Atoxyl treatment and drug therapy 
research’, which of course suited their scientific agenda.269 Not surprisingly, Van 
Campenhout advocated a sustained use of Atoxyl, while also encouraging further 
experimentation on Congolese trypanosomiasis victims to overcome its drawbacks and 
search for a better alternative. To minimise the risk of blindness, for example, he 
suggested more dose-ranging research on Atoxyl to establish what dose was least 
harmful. In addition, he supported research in the hope of finding a truly powerful cure 
and from the conviction that ‘every doctor ha(d) the right to try out every treatment 
267 Director of Justice Demeulemeester, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Directeur du Service Médical’, 24.10.1907, 
MAEAA, GG, 15181 (GG).
268 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note sur la lettre de M. le Gouverneur Général du 2 Novembre N° SP 1798 et annexes’, 
29.11.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
269 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 121-123, 168.
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that would seem useful to him’.270 In a context where medicine was still transitioning 
from being an ‘art’ based on clinical observation to a ‘science’ governed by the 
laboratory, Van Campenhout presided over a climate of therapeutic investigation in the 
Congo that was unstructured in the sense that it was open to any physician and almost 
any remedy - except perhaps for secret panacea.271 ‘Before the real failures of all 
medicines employed (…) nothing in my opinion stands in the way of trying out the 
medication’, he argued in response to a new empirical remedy proposed in 1910.272 
When deaths followed the administration of experimental treatments, they were often 
attributed to the fact that the patients in question had been advanced cases.273 
 Under his guidance, the Free State and - by 1908 - Belgian colonial administrators 
ordered the ‘scientific’ experimentation of many other purported sleeping sickness 
drugs and treatment schemes after Atoxyl’s incorporation in sleeping sickness policy 
and the growing recognition of its limitations, thus further instigating doctors to take 
up more systematic research into trypanosomiasis therapy.274 Among the substances 
they wanted to see trialled were not only those recommended by foreign metropolitan 
experts on the basis of laboratory experiments, such as orpiment and tartar emetic, but 
also the remedies proposed by clinicians themselves, including doctor Cammermeyer’s 
‘Satoxyl’ cure, a ‘solution’ of Atoxyl, mercury and iodide, or even a missionary’s arsenic- 
and quinine-based therapy.275 Therefore, no clear distinction was made between rational 
and empirical remedies, nor did the colonial government - although it tended to favour 
doctors in possession of a microscope - necessarily discriminate between laboratory-
orientated doctors and more clinically-minded practitioners. Therefore, although it 
supported experiments that in some instances met the emerging scientific standards of 
the time - trials based on prior laboratory investigations of drug actions and conducted 
in controlled clinical settings by competent physicians - it would be wrong to regard the 
270 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note sur la lettre de M. le Gouverneur Général du 2 Novembre N° SP 1798 et annexes’, 
29.11.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
271 On medicine’s transition from art to science at the turn of the twentieth century, see for example Bonah, 
L’experiméntation humaine, p. 31.
272 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note concernant le procédé du R.P. Cambier’, 3.2.1910.2.3, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.288.
273 For example in the case of Satoxyl: Dr Cammermeyer, ‘Rapport sur les différents traitements essayés pour 
combattre la maladie du sommeil’, 17.7.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.287.
274 For example: Secretary of State to Governor General, 1907.9.7, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
275 Dr Grossule, ‘Rapport sur les résultats obtenus dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase par la méthode 
préconisée par le Professeur Laveran’, 7.11.1908, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.285; Minister of Colonies to Governor 
General, 14.2.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.285; Dr Cammermeyer, ‘Rapport sur le traitement de la maladie du 
sommeil, pendant l’année 1908, par la méthode: atoxyl-mercure-iodure’, 3.2.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.285; 
Secretary of State to Governor General, 17.10.1905, MAEAA, Hygiène 846.277; Circular to state doctors from 
vice-Governor General Lantonnois, 23.8.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène 848.287; Père Cambier to Minister of Colonies, 
29.1.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène 848.288; Minister of Colonies Renkin to Governor General, 2.9.1910, MAEAA, GG, 
15128 (GG); Minister of Colonies to Père Cambier, 8.12.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.288.
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Congo’s administration as an outright champion of what was then considered a 
‘rational’ therapeutics.276 
3.4 In summary
Before it became a tool of disease prevention, Atoxyl lived through a short career cycle 
as a sleeping sickness cure in the Congo. The drug’s clinical use there cannot simply be 
explained by its pharmacological effects, however, but should be viewed in light of the 
growing convergence, since the late nineteenth century, between laboratory science, 
ethical pharmaceutical industry and western medicine in which colonial Africa partook. 
The compound was introduced as an experimental drug in the Congo by a metropolitan 
administration taking advice from Europe’s tropical medicine community, and thus 
creating opportunities for an industrially manufactured laboratory discovery on what 
was a competitive market for sleeping sickness remedies. Despite a lack of conclusive 
scientific evidence, however, Brussels quickly imposed its use as part of a compulsory 
therapeutic regimen with the expectation that it would heal Africans forcibly isolated in 
sleeping sickness lazarets. Atoxyl almost immediately entered a second phase of 
growing criticism and disappointment as colonial physicians reported severe adverse 
reactions and limited curative powers. A context of colonial domination where 
collective interests were valued over individual African well-being, reductionist 
approaches over more holistic solutions, and metropolitan views over colonial opinions, 
in combination with a certain trypanocidal action nevertheless ensured that Atoxyl 
remained in use in the Congo - despite losing its status as a veritable cure for sleeping 
sickness, as evidenced by the climate of experimentation to discover a better remedy. 
How the drug soon started a new career cycle as a tool of disease prevention will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
276 Marks, Progress of Experiment, pp. 17-41.
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Chapter  4
Atoxyl as a tool of sleeping sickness control277 
The previous chapter discussed how Atoxyl began its life in the Congo as an 
experimental drug and was quickly pushed as a curative treatment for African lazaret 
patients by the Free State administration. As the trypanocide’s limitations became 
increasingly apparent and attention shifted to finding a better remedy, it ‘disappeared 
from the spotlight’ as a true sleeping sickness cure, although official sleeping sickness 
policy sustained its use in the Congo.278 Atoxyl soon made what can be considered a 
comeback, however, garnering fresh enthusiasm as a different rationale for its 
application was found. This chapter examines the start of the first phase of this new 
cycle in the drug’s career in the Congo, which involved a redefinition of trypanocide 
treatment as a ‘form of prophylactic (i.e. preventive) action’ and saw Atoxyl rise to 
prominence as a promising tool of sleeping sickness control before the First World 
War.279 
The novel twist in Atoxyl’s trajectory was once again shaped by interactions between 
different groups, notably medical scientists, doctors, administrators and African 
trypanosome carriers, in Belgium and the Congo as well as other metropoles and 
colonies. It also reflected an interplay between global circulation and local 
appropriation. Crucial in the process was the role of Belgian laboratory doctors in more 
closely aligning laboratory science, the ethical pharmaceutical industry and medicine in 
the Congo. In a bid to advance public health as well as their own professional interests, 
they sought to promote scientific medicine in the Congo - something they felt the 
metropolitan administration fell well short of. Their agenda comprised a regulation of 
the Congolese sleeping sickness remedy market via well-controlled clinical trials, and 
the organising of sleeping sickness control on a sound scientific basis, rooted in 
‘“modern” (i.e. microbiological) epidemiology’ and proper clinical research, but also 
adapted to local realities, including African resistance to lazarets.280 Their embeddedness 
in the transnational tropical medicine community and especially in cross-border 
networks of chemotherapeutic exchange informed and bolstered their own clinical 
investigations, which amounted to Atoxyl’s appropriation as a locally useful preventive 
277 Parts of this chapter have been published before in Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical 
medicine’. 
278 Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 103.
279 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 628.
280 J. A. Mendelsohn,‘From eradication to equilibrium: how epidemics became complex after World War I’ in C. 
Lawrence and G. Weisz (eds.), Greater than the Parts: Holism in Biomedicine, 1920-1950 (London, 1998), p. 306.
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agent. It also helped them and their views gain recognition and consideration from a 
Belgian colonial administration keen on boosting its reputation by supporting medical 
reform, a process that was reinforced by the Leopoldville laboratory director’s move to 
the Brussels school of tropical medicine. Further research in Leopoldville pointing to 
Atoxyl’s value as a prophylactic instrument in ambulatory medical practice, and 
clinicians’ struggle to implement other measures of sleeping sickness control ensured 
increasing support for itinerant treatment with the trypanocide as a strategy of disease 
prevention by the First World War.
This chapter starts with outlining how the Leopoldville laboratory doctors came to be 
involved in ‘scientific’ drug evaluations, and how this informed their opposition to a 
top-down sleeping sickness policy that overlooked local scientific expertise and medical 
experience. It then describes how they were able to capitalise on inter-imperial 
scientific connections to distinguish themselves as the Congo’s foremost sleeping 
sickness drug therapy researchers. As the Belgian doctors started positioning the 
Leopoldville laboratory as the colony’s therapeutic arbiter, the next section shows, they 
came to play an increasingly important role in shaping local trypanocide trajectories. 
They began to act as pharmaceutical gatekeepers, influencing which circulating 
sleeping sickness remedies could be included in the Congo’s therapeutic arsenal, and 
shaping trypanocides, especially Atoxyl, into tools of disease prevention rather than 
medical cures. Finally, this chapter examines how the Leopoldville laboratory’s views on 
trypanocides and epidemic disease control gained greater influence on and prominence 
in sleeping sickness policy after the Belgian take-over of the Congo Free State, although 
they were not yet applied on a large scale before the First World War. 
4.1 Opposing metropolitan medical decision-making 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the mandatory, Atoxyl-based lazaret treatment 
instituted by the EIC authorities met with opposition from at least some clinicians in the 
Congo who felt uneasy about subjecting reluctant Africans in the early stages of sleeping 
sickness to a drug treatment, the individual risks of which appeared to outweigh the 
public health benefits. Among the most vocal opponents of Free State and later Belgian 
sleeping sickness policy, however, were two laboratory doctors in Leopoldville who were 
heavily engaged in sleeping sickness drug therapy research. Significantly, they did not 
so much question the ethics of imposing treatments of little benefit to individual 
patients as challenge the top-down nature of medical decision-making regarding the 
Congo. This resulted from an apparent metropolitan failure to recognise the authority 
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they felt entitled to, as champions of scientific medicine with significant overseas 
experience, over sleeping sickness matters. 
The Leopoldville medical laboratory had been established by Van Campenhout in 
1899 at the instigation of the Société Belge d’Etudes Coloniales with mainly private 
funds.281 The Société grouped Belgian scientific and other elites with an interest in 
Leopold’s imperial endeavour and showed an early concern for tropical pathology.282 
Whereas the Free State and its medical staff were not specifically or exclusively Belgian 
in character, the Leopoldville laboratory was clearly conceived to strengthen and 
showcase Belgian medical science and colonialism, and was as such steeped in 
nationalistic discourse.283 Its African location presented great scientific and professional 
opportunities to Belgian medical elites, especially (Louvain) bacteriologists, who would 
come to play a dominant role in Belgian tropical medicine. 
In 1900, promising young doctor Alphonse Broden was sent to replace Van 
Campenhout as the laboratory’s director. Broden had been working as an assistant of 
Louvain professor Joseph Denys, one of Belgium’s most distinguished bacteriologists and 
member of the Société’s medical subcommittee.284 Ostensibly eager to refute the idea of 
Belgian backwardness in the inter-imperial competition to unlock the mystery of 
sleeping sickness, Broden soon turned to the laboratory study of African 
trypanosomiasis in Leopoldville.285 Investigating the possibilities of (biological) sleeping 
sickness treatment as early as 1903, Broden began to focus more clearly on 
(chemo)therapy research from 1907 onwards, when Jérôme Rodhain, another former 
pupil of Denys who had completed a first term as a Free State doctor, joined the 
laboratory as his assistant.286 As Rodhain was at the same time appointed director of the 
‘native’ hospital and lazaret of Leopoldville, he could supply ample human ‘material’ for 
scientific drug experimentation.287 
281 Général A. Donny, ‘Introduction’ dans E. Van Campenhout et G. Dryepondt, Rapport sur les travaux du 
laboratoire médical de Léopoldville en 1899-1900 (Bruxelles, 1901), pp. vi-ix. However, the Free State and the Belgian 
government also contributed financially to the laboratory’s operation. L. Pierquin, Historique du laboratoire 
médical et de l’Institut de médecine tropicale Princesse Astrid à Léopoldville (Léopoldville, 1958), p. 8.
282 As evidenced by the establishment of a subcommittee for the study of Congolese diseases. Général A. Donny, 
‘Introduction’, p. viii. See also M. Poncelet, L’invention des sciences coloniales belges (Paris, 2008), pp. 69, 76.
283 An example of this discourse can be found in Général A. Donny, ‘Préface’ dans A. Broden et J. Rodhain, 
Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire de la Société Belge d’Etudes Coloniales, à l’Hôpital des Noirs et au Lazaret pour 
Trypanosomiés à Léopoldville 1907-1908 (Bruxelles, 1908), pp. vi-vii: ‘L’annexion du Congo à la Belgique doit donner 
au Laboratoire de Léopoldville un renouveau d’activité. Successivement tous les pays qui possèdent des 
colonies africaines créent et dotent largement des établissements semblables. Notre patrie, où l’humanité 
comme la science furent toujours en honneur, se doit de continuer à soutenir le sien, de le mettre à même de 
marcher au premier rang dans la luttre contre les maladies tropicales.’
284 Général A. Donny, ‘Introduction’, p. viii.
285 A. Broden et J. Rodhain, ‘La lutte contre la trypanosomiase humaine dans l’État Indépendant du Congo’, 
Bulletin de la Société Belge d’Etudes Coloniales, 15 (1908), 393-405.
286 A. Broden to Governor General, 4.4.1903, MAEAA, Hygiène, 846.275.
287 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908, p. 1.
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The laboratory’s close association with the lazaret in fact allowed the Belgian 
researchers to promote Leopoldville as an ideal place for well-conducted clinical trials. 
As many African recruits for the Force Publique, members of the colonial state service 
and steamer personnel passed through Leopoldville, and measures were put in place to 
screen these groups for trypanosomiasis, Broden and Rodhain had access to a large pool 
of trypanosome carriers.288 Their control over this research population was of course far 
from absolute, and many trypanosome-infected Africans ‘refus(ed) to submit to 
treatment or hospitalisation’ in Leopoldville’s lazaret.289 There were frequent 
‘desertions’, and the close proximity of Bakongo patients’ home grounds and of 
Brazzaville was thought to encourage and facilitate those who wanted to escape.290 Such 
responses were hardly surprising in a setting where disease and patients were 
objectified and experimental drug therapy was meant to advance scientific knowledge 
rather than help individuals get better.291 Many suffered severe side effects and 
intoxication, or even died at the hands of ineffective medicines.292 Yet despite frequent 
escapes, sufficient numbers of trypanosome carriers at the Leopoldville lazaret could be 
kept under observation for long enough to allow the kind of systematic drug 
experimentation Todd had earlier aspired to in Boma. 
The proximity of the laboratory stimulated trials that by contemporary standards 
could be presented as ‘well-controlled’ in another way as well.293 As proponents of 
laboratory medicine, Broden and Rodhain aimed to raise the scientific standards of drug 
evaluation in the Congo by only considering treatments recommended by ‘observateurs 
autorisés’ (i.e. rational remedies with pre-clinically established effects) and by pursuing 
a ‘methodical experimentation’ that included the meticulous recording of developments 
288 J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement de l’hôpital des noirs pendant l’année 1908’, ITG, FD26; J. 
Rodhain, ‘Lazaret de Léopoldville. Rapport sur le fonctionnement du Lazaret pendant le troisième Trimestre 
1908’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162; J. Rodhain, ‘Station de Léopoldville. Rapport sur le fonctionnement du lazaret 
pendant le 1er semestre 1908’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162.
289 A. Broden, ‘Rapport sur le Fonctionnement du Lazaret pour Trypanosés de Léopoldville durant le 1er 
Semestre 1910’, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.1.1.
290 In 1909, for example, Alphonse Broden estimated that 10% of patients deserted the Leopoldville lazaret, 
despite the fact that they reportedly enjoyed ‘great freedom’ and an ‘excellent alimentary regime’ there. A. 
Broden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du Lazaret des trypanosés à Léopoldville durant le 1er semestre 1909’, 
22.9.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162; A. Broden, ‘Rapport sur le Fonctionnement du Lazaret pour Trypanosés de 
Léopoldville durant le 1er Semestre 1910’, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.1.1; A. Dubois et R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur le 
fonctionnement du lazaret pour trypanosés de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1911’, 19.1.1912, MAEAA, RA-CB, 
80.3; District Commissioner Moulaert to Governor General, 2.11.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162; E. Van 
Campenhout, ‘Résumé du rapport du Docteur Broden’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162.
291 Bonah, L’expérimentation humaine, p. 81.
292 Broden signalled many deaths due to ineffective drugs. For example: A. Broden, ‘Rapport sur le 
Fonctionnement du Lazaret pour Trypanosés de Léopoldville durant le 1er Semestre 1910’, ITG, Onderzoek, 
5.1.1.
293 On the ‘rhetoric of control’ in the history of clinical trials in early twentieth-century Britain, see M. 
Edwards, Control and the Therapeutic Trial: Rhetoric and Experimentation in Britain, 1918-1948, Clio Medica 82 
(Amsterdam, 2007).
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in all cases under scrutiny and the use of laboratory procedures (notably the 
microscopic analysis of blood, lymph juice and cerebrospinal fluid) to establish (the 
stage of) subjects’ trypanosome infections and assess treatment outcomes. For those 
reasons the Leo lab’s drug trials, Rodhain would later argue, ‘constitute(d) models of 
observation of a rigorous scientific precision’.294 
The Leopoldville laboratory doctors’ ‘rational’ take on sleeping sickness therapy was 
behind much of their objections to the Free State’s lazaret policy. For them, the issue 
was not that compulsory isolation and treatment were intrinsically problematic from a 
moral point of view. In fact, Broden argued that ‘according to the Congolese code and 
recent decrees’, one had the right to isolate African trypanosome carriers. Moreover, 
such measures, he felt, were comparable to those taken in Europe at times of pest or 
cholera epidemics.295 However, he and Rodhain judged that the prescribed Atoxyl (and 
strychnine) regimen was misguided and created practical problems for lazaret doctors 
that undermined the whole isolation policy. Their research indicated that the 
administration’s assumptions regarding the therapeutic efficacy of Van Campenhout’s 
proposed scheme were unfounded. Strychnine and cold showers had no effect 
whatsoever on the course of sleeping sickness and constituted ‘a useless 
complication’.296 Atoxyl could not cure advanced cases interned in lazarets, which 
consequently continued to suffer high rates of mortality.297 Furthermore, relapses 
among victims in the early stages of the disease proved that even they were not as easily 
susceptible to a (definitive) cure as anticipated, and certainly not after the short course 
of treatment advocated by the Free State’s administrators.298 
As a result, Brussels’ policy of quarantining all infected individuals in lazarets ‘in the 
hope of (curing them) after a treatment of a few weeks or a few months’ was 
‘premature’, costly and of little benefit, according to Broden and Rodhain.299 With cures 
being difficult and protracted to obtain, patients were only reluctantly confined, and 
lazarets such as the one in Leopoldville quickly became too small to accommodate all 
cases from a specified catchment area.300 Overcrowding worsened conditions that were 
already poor and increased the state’s costs of providing for patients separated from 
their families, especially since those interned who were previously in state employment 
294 Rodhain quoted in ‘In memoriam Prof. Dr A. Broden’, Revue de Thérapeutique ‘Meurice’ 10 (1937), ix.
295 A. Broden to Governor General, 29.10.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
296 A. Broden to Governor General, 1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
297 A. Broden to Governor General, 29.10.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283; A. Broden, ‘Rapport sur le 
fonctionnement du lazaret pour trypanosés de Léopoldville durant le 2e semestre 1910’, 7.1.1911, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 844.162.
298 A. Broden to Governor General, 1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283; A. Broden et J. Rodhain, ‘La luttre contre la 
trypanose humaine (maladie du sommeil)’, 1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.602.
299 A. Broden to Governor General, 1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
300 A. Broden et J. Rodhain, ‘La luttre contre la trypanose humaine (maladie du sommeil)’, 1909, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4419.602; J. Rodhain, ‘Station de Léopoldville. Rapport sur le fonctionnement du lazaret pendant le 
1er Semestre 1908’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162; J. Rodhain to District Commissioner Moulaert, 17.3.1908, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162.
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did not want to perform lazaret works without receiving a salary.301 By 1908, Rodhain 
had come to consider systematic isolation as an impractical measure imposed by 
administrators in Brussels who failed to appreciate the obstacles encountered by those 
who had to implement it in Africa.302 
Moreover, it bothered Broden that the EIC authorities had been led astray by stories 
of ‘so-called recoveries’, and ended up decreeing a ‘therapeutic method that ha(d) 
proven incapable of effecting a cure’.303 The Leopoldville laboratory’s relationship with 
the administration in fact became rather strained, as Broden felt increasingly 
overlooked in the formulation of colonial medical policy, and especially in the 
evaluation of drug therapy. The Free State authorities, although they consulted him 
from time to time on sleeping sickness matters, relied more on the advice of Liverpool 
and Van Campenhout, and in ordering therapeutic research did not necessarily 
distinguish between laboratory doctors and clinicians, of whose treatment proposals 
Broden was typically quite critical.304 After the Congo became a Belgian colony in 1908, 
the laboratory fell under the authority of the colonial government and its director was 
incorporated in the colonial medical staff, but his position did not improve. On the 
contrary, Broden had to give up some of his scientific autonomy and the absence of a 
colonial medical hierarchy put him on a par with the rest of medical practitioners in the 
Belgian Congo. 
When Broden and Rodhain criticised the Congo administration’s therapeutic 
decision-making, they therefore did so on scientific grounds (as they aspired to 
rationalise therapeutic practice in the colony), but also because of their perceived 
inferior social position and lack of power in the Congo. Broden condemned the Free 
State’s premature and unfounded therapeutic choices, and soon after Belgian 
annexation complained that Brussels systematically ignored the observations made by 
the Leopoldville laboratory.305 He particularly disliked receiving government 
instructions to test therapeutic agents or treatment schemes that his and Rodhain’s 
research had already discarded.306 By 1909, Rodhain openly disapproved of the dearth of 
African medical experience among those making colonial medical policy in Brussels.307
301 This was the case in Leopoldville. District Commissioner Moulaert to Governor General, 18.3.1908, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 844.162. See also Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 140.
302 J. Rodhain to District Commissioner Moulaert, 17.3.1908, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162.
303 A. Broden to Governor General, 1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
304 For example: A. Broden to Governor General, 29.10.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283; A. Broden to Governor 
General, 1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283; A. Broden, ‘Le Satoxyl du Docteur Cammermeyer’, 23.3.1910, ITG, 
FD26.
305 A. Broden to Governor General, 1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283; A. Broden to Governor General, 7.4.1909, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.284.
306 A. Broden, ‘Le Satoxyl du Docteur Cammermeyer’, 23.3.1910, ITG, FD26.
307 J. Rodhain, ‘Note sur l’organisation du service medical au Congo Belge’, 1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.602.
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4.2 The inter-imperial construction of local tropical medicine 
expertise
The Belgian laboratory doctors’ efforts to conduct ‘scientific’ experiments in 
Leopoldville, however, helped them forge bonds with sleeping sickness researchers in 
other colonies and metropoles that inserted the Congo in important cross-border 
networks of trypanocide development. Crucially, Broden and Rodhain managed to 
capitalise on these inter-imperial scientific connections to assert themselves as local 
tropical medicine and sleeping sickness drug therapy experts who were increasingly 
hard for the Belgian colonial administration to ignore. 
The cooperation between medical laboratory and lazaret in Leopoldville prompted 
admiring gazes from AEF. Immediately across the Congo river, in Brazzaville, a Pasteur 
Institute had been erected in 1908 as part of a sleeping sickness expedition to the French 
colony. Doctor Leboeuf, one of the mission members, complained in 1908 that it was 
hard to follow up Africans undergoing experimental treatment in Brazzaville as long as 
there was no lazaret attached to the Institute where, like in the Congo Free State, 
sleeping sickness patients could be forced to reside.308 The Leopoldville medical 
scientists nevertheless came to benefit significantly from the close proximity to their 
French colleagues (who eventually also came to manage a sleeping sickness camp). Soon 
multiple exchanges started to take place between the adjacent laboratories, through 
short mutual research visits and the reading of each other’s publications. Belgian and 
French researchers thus compared treatment schemes, trial results and techniques, 
consulted each other on medical infrastructure and equipment, and stimulated each 
other’s (competing) chemotherapeutic investigations.309 
A number of factors facilitated these border-crossing medico-scientific interactions. 
While Broden and Rodhain were committed to strengthening Belgian science, as 
bacteriologists they were also part of a much wider community of elite laboratory 
doctors. Moreover, as Deborah Neill has argued, European tropical medicine specialists 
shared a ‘transnational professional identity’, largely because the common overseas 
308 Dr Leboeuf to F. Mesnil, 30.9.1908, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.3, Leboeuf. Leopoldville’s district commissioner 
Moulaert commented in 1908 that Brazzaville’s existing lazaret, which was part of the local medical service, 
‘only (held) 40 to 50 ill people’, was rather basic and ‘comprise(d) but a very small part of the natives affected 
by trypanosomiasis and residing in Brazzaville’. District Commissioner Moulaert to Governor General, 
28.10.1908, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.285.
309 For example: Dr Leboeuf to F. Mesnil, 11.11.1908, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.3, Leboeuf; Dr Leboeuf to F. 
Mesnil, 2.2.1909, AIP, Fonds Mesnil, MES.3, Leboeuf; G. Martin to F. Mesnil, 19.5.1909, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, 
MES.4, Martin; G. Martin to F. Mesnil, 11.8.1909, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.4, Martin; Dr Blanchard to F. Mesnil, 
17.6.1913, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.6, Blanchard; Dr Heckenroth to F. Mesnil, 25.1.1913, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, 
MES.6, Heckenroth; District Commissioner Moulaert to Governor General, 28.10.1908, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
848.285.
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experience led them to define identity on the basis of biological rather than national 
categories and to conceive of their roles in similar ways.310 Broden and Rodhain’s 
membership of French-speaking socio-cultural elites in Flanders probably increased 
their cultural affinities with the French doctors in Brazzaville even more. In addition, 
both laboratories were extremely close to each other and were confronted with the 
same epidemic in similar ecological conditions.311 The movements of local populations 
across the Congo river – sometimes to benefit from or to avoid medical campaigns – also 
were a clear sign of the need for coordination. 
The ‘horizontal’ connections, moreover, were complemented by ‘vertical’ Franco-
Belgian connections. Paris Pasteurian and trypanosome expert Félix Mesnil, a driving 
force behind the erection of the Brazzaville Institute, played a significant mediating 
role. As colonial laboratories, both Brazzaville and Leopoldville depended on the 
‘intellectual and practical support of colleagues at home’, who in turn needed colonial 
researchers to study the tropics.312 In the absence of a comprehensive tropical medicine 
expertise in Belgium, it was Mesnil who acted as a critical scientific soundboard for 
Broden and Rodhain. They provided him with trypanosome samples and regularly 
presented their findings on sleeping sickness (therapy).313 Much of these found their way 
to the bulletin of the ‘Société de Pathologie Exotique’, the tropical medicine society 
founded by Laveran in 1907 for which Mesnil acted as the secretary-general. The latter 
often sent journal articles by Broden and Rodhain to the researchers in Brazzaville.314 He 
controlled much of the medical knowledge production pertaining to both Congos and 
contributed greatly to the circulation of therapeutic information between France, 
Leopoldville and Brazzaville. The logic of scientific patronage thus gave an inter-
imperial shape to Belgian doctors’ connections. 
Besides the crucial visits to and from Brazzaville and the correspondence with 
Mesnil, the Leopoldville laboratory was connected to the international medical 
community in other ways as well. Broden and Rodhain’s furloughs in Europe, for 
example, were instrumental in building and maintaining scientific contacts across 
imperial borders. It enabled them to attend international conferences and visit famous 
medical institutions such as the Paris Pasteur Institute or the ‘Institut für Schiffs-und 
310 Neill, ‘Transnationalism in the colonies’.
311 Especially along the Congo river in the ‘Chenal’ area.
312 M. A. Osborne, ‘A Collaborative dimension of the European empires: Australian and French acclimatization 
societies and intercolonial scientific co-operation’ in R. W. Home and S. G. Kohlstedt (eds.), International Science 
and National Scientific Identity: Australia between Britain and America (Dordrecht, 1991), p. 2.
313 For example: A. Broden to F. Mesnil, 24.11.1906, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.9, Correspondants étrangers. 
Belgique; A. Broden to F. Mesnil, 7.12.1906, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.9, Correspondants étrangers. Belgique; Dr 
I. Heiberg to F. Mesnil, 9.10.1915, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.9, Correspondants étrangers. Belgique.
314 Dr Leboeuf to F. Mesnil, 2.10.1908, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.3, Leboeuf; G. Martin to F. Mesnil, 7.6.1909, AIP, 
Fonds Mesnil, MES.4, Martin.
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Tropenhygiene’ in Hamburg.315 In Congo they were kept informed of scientific 
developments in metropoles and colonies through specialised medical journals to which 
they contributed themselves. The Leopoldville laboratory from time to time also 
welcomed foreign researchers, such as Claus Schilling, a German colonial doctor from 
Togo who in 1907 undertook chemotherapeutic experiments with Paul Ehrlich’s 
dyestuffs in the Congo Free State.316 
Importantly, the Leopoldville laboratory was eventually included in what Neill has 
unearthed as the colonial medical network of Paul Ehrlich, the father of specific 
chemotherapy.317 Broden and Rodhain were ‘graciously and abundantly’ provided with 
drug samples from Germany, systematically experimented them on Congolese patients 
and in return reported back to the director of the Frankfurt Institute for Experimental 
Therapy for publication.318 Together with their Pasteurian connections, the association 
with the world-renowned German scientist certainly advanced the laboratory’s profile 
and reputation as a centre for chemotherapeutic sleeping sickness research within the 
international medical community.319 In addition, these cross-border exchanges 
contributed to Broden and Rodhain’s recognition as specific chemotherapy experts, and 
as tropical medicine authorities more generally, by the Congo’s colonial administration.
In fact, the laboratory’s inter-imperial chemotherapeutic exchanges eventually made 
it very hard for the colonial government to by-pass Broden and Rodhain’s work. 
Through their interaction with Ehrlich, for example, the Belgian researchers had 
privileged access to promising new trypanocidal drugs that were not commercially 
available yet but only handed out to a selection of skilful clinical investigators.320 Other 
colonial physicians wanted to experiment with these substances as well, but apparently 
315 A. Broden to F. Mesnil, 7.12.1906, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.9, Correspondants étrangers. Belgique; A. Broden 
to F. Mesnil, 10.3.1913, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.9, Correspondants étrangers. Belgique.
316 C. Schilling to Secrétaire Général, 18.1.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 857.367; G. Martin to F. Mesnil, 17.9.1907, AIP, 
Fonds F. Mesnil, Maladie du sommeil: Correspondance privée. Other examples are the Liverpool School’s Congo 
expedition, which made use of the laboratory facilities in Leopoldville and consulted with Broden, or the head 
of the Cameroon medical services, Philalethes Kuhn, who toured the French Congo and visited the Brazzaville 
and Leopoldville installations in 1912 with the aim of organising a similar research centre in the German 
territory. See ‘Expedition Diary – Congo, 4 september 1903- 1 July 1904’, Wellcome Library, Archives and 
Manuscripts, Dutton, Joseph Everett and Todd, John Lancelot papers, Ms. 2262; Brussels, Secrétaire Général to 
Governor General, 19.8.1903, MAEAA, GG, 15221 (GG); J. L. Dutton to Governor General, 10.4.1904, MAEAA, GG, 
15221 (GG); P. Kuhn, ‘Die Schlafkrankheit in Kamerun’, Medizinische Klinik 27 (1914), 1131-1135.
317 Neill, ‘Ehrlich’s colonial connections’.
318 A. Broden, ‘Rapport sur le Fonctionnement du Lazaret pour Trypanosés de Léopoldville Durant le 1er 
Semestre 1910’, s.d., ITG, Onderzoek, 5.1.1.
319 Researchers at the Brazzaville medical laboratory in the French Congo also hoped to advance the reputation 
of their institute by collaborating with Ehrlich. See Neill, ‘Ehrlich’s colonial connections’, 69.
320 Such as arsenophenylglycin and arsphenamine.
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lacked the scientific credentials and connections to obtain them.321 The Colonial 
Ministry was not able to acquire the drugs either, however eager it was to learn of 
Ehrlich’s new chemotherapeutic discoveries.322 In 1910, the Leopoldville scientists’ 
strategic advantage was more conspicuous than ever when Van Campenhout heard 
Ehrlich appreciate Broden’s results with arsenophenylglycin in Berlin.323 
Broden and Rodhain thus distinguished themselves from other members of the 
colonial medical staff through specific chemotherapy and their embeddedness in 
international medical science. They claimed the leadership of sleeping sickness research 
in the Congo for their laboratory, and wanted to concentrate the evaluation of new 
trypanocidal drugs in Leopoldville. After all, Rodhain argued, there was no better place 
than Leopoldville for the ‘systematic experimentation’ of sleeping sickness treatments 
via ‘new procedures that one could find in Europe’s laboratories’. Other lazaret doctors, 
he continued, had to focus on sleeping sickness prophylaxis, and asking them all to 
conduct therapy research would only detract from this goal, bring unnecessary costs 
and require pointless efforts to try out useless remedies.324 The Leo lab’s drug 
assessments could generate guidelines for ‘routine (sleeping sickness) treatment’, in 
other words, serve to rationalise and standardise therapeutic practice in the colony.325
4.3 The Leopoldville laboratory as therapeutic ‘arbiter’
Under Broden and Rodhain, the Leopoldville medical laboratory started to position itself 
as the ‘proper arbiter(…) of therapeutic efficacy’ in the Belgian Congo.326 This initiated a 
321 Like doctor Cammermeyer from Boma or doctor Polidori from Katanga. Dr Cammermeyer to Governor 
General, 10.10.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, R146.591; Dr Polidori to Governor General, 9.10.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
R146.591.
322 Minister of Colonies to Governor General, 18.11.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, R146.591; Note concerning 
arsenophenylglycin, 27.2.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.285.
323 Van Campenhout was sent to Berlin in 1910 to attend a medical conference and talk to Ehrlich. Minister to 
Dr Van Campenhout, 30.9.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 849.291; Note concerning P. Ehrlich, 19.9.1910, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 849.291; E. Van Campenhout, ‘Conversation avec le docteur Ehrlich’, 1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 849.291; 
E. Van Campenhout, ‘4e Congrès International de l’assistance des aliénés’, 1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 849.291.
324 J. Rodhain, ‘Le service medical à Leopoldville (suite à la note du Dr Broden)’, 1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4419.602; A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 25.6.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.602.
325 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits aux laboratoire 1907-1908, p. 79; A. Broden to Minister of 
Colonies, 25.6.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.602; Broden and Rodhain give an overview of ‘les médicaments dont 
l’efficacité est actuellement reconnue’ for sleeping sickness in A. Broden et J. Rodhain, ‘La luttre contre la 
trypanose humaine (maladie du sommeil)’, 1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.602. 
326 Martin Edwards traces the strategies of the Medical Research Council to ‘establish itself and its 
methodologies as the proper arbiters of therapeutic efficacy’ in Edwards, Control and the Therapeutic Trial, p. 18. 
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process of social hierarchisation within the colonial medical profession that privileged 
laboratory physicians as pharmaceutical gatekeepers controlling access to the 
Congolese market for sleeping sickness medicines. Their work evaluating the many 
trypanocidal compounds circulating to the colony thus not only contributed to cross-
border pharmaceutical development and knowledge production, but was also crucial in 
shaping local trypanocide trajectories. Assessments of drug safety and efficacy through 
clinical trials in Leopoldville increasingly determined what sleeping sickness medicines 
were rejected from or added to the colony’s therapeutic arsenal. Broden and Rodhain, in 
other words, started acting as what Harry Marks has called ‘therapeutic reformers’, 
seeking to firmly ground therapeutics in experimental science.327 They shared an 
interest in ‘rational’ therapeutics with metropolitan specific chemotherapy researchers 
and science-based pharmaceutical companies. Critical of panacea businesses and less 
scientifically sophisticated practitioners, they wanted to keep sleeping sickness 
remedies out of general therapeutic practice that had not had their pharmacological 
effects established in prior laboratory investigations and well-controlled clinical 
experiments.328 Moreover, Broden and Rodhain’s research helped ‘ground’ circulating 
pharmaceuticals and locally adapt and appropriate them as useful tools of disease 
prevention rather than curative means, which would have a significant impact on 
sleeping sickness control in the Congo.329 
Whilst criticising the Free State’s lazaret policy, the Leopoldville laboratory doctors 
were considering alternative strategies of sleeping sickness control. Like the Liverpool 
scientists, Broden and Rodhain’s laboratory perspective on human African 
trypanosomiasis led them to largely neglect the broader social and natural environment 
in which the Congo’s sleeping sickness epidemic took shape, and focus exclusively on 
the chain of infection (trypanosome, insect vector and human host) instead. One of the 
options they suggested was eliminating tsetse flies as a way to curb the progress of 
sleeping sickness, notably via habitat destruction, because more ‘immediate’ means of 
vector control were not deemed available.330 Their involvement in specific 
chemotherapy research, however, brought them to particularly emphasise the targeting 
By 1910, the findings of the Leopoldville laboratory were being distributed to other state doctors at the 
instigation of the administration in Brussels, and Broden was increasingly consulted on trypanocide therapy 
by the colonial authorities. See for example, Minister of Colonies to Governor General, 7.4.1910, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 848.289; vice-Governor General Fuchs to Minister of Colonies, 24.6.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 849.290.
327 Marks, Progress of Experiment, p. 2.
328 For example: A. Broden, ‘Note concernant “Anti-hématurie tea”’, 10.9.1913, MAEAA, Hygiène, R147.597; A. 
Broden to Governor General, 29.4.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 830.39.
329 On the local ‘grounding’ of globally circulating ‘objects, skills, ideas, and practices’ of knowledge, see K. Raj, 
Relocating Modern Science. Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650-1900 
(Basingstoke, 2007), p. 21. Similarly, Lisa Roberts discusses ‘local settings’ as ‘contexts of local appropriation 
and adaptation’ in a ‘circulatory process of knowledge production’. L. Roberts, ‘Situating Science in Global 
History. Local Exchanges and Networks of Circulation’, Itinerario 33 (2009), 24.
330 A. Broden et J. Rodhain, ‘La luttre contre la trypanose humaine (maladie du sommeil)’, 1909, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4419.602.
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of the trypanosome factor, and this in a way that promoted an explicitly pharmaceutical 
approach to infectious disease control. 
Broden and Rodhain’s assessment of Atoxyl was key in this respect. As stated 
previously, they played a key role in dampening the authorities’ initial enthusiasm 
regarding the drug. Broden had initiated experimental treatment with Atoxyl in 1905, 
when he administered it to a missionary with encouraging results.331 The arrival of 
Rodhain in 1907 enabled him to proceed with larger-scale trials on African trypanosome 
carriers and establish the safety and efficacy of Atoxyl by monitoring their clinical 
symptoms, and especially by microscopically examining their bodily fluids, notably the 
cerebrospinal fluid. Although the Leo lab doctors had no fixed protocol for their 
therapeutic trials in terms of e.g. sample sizes, duration, or the selection of 
experimental subjects, they carefully observed and compared the untoward effects and 
trypanocidal action (i.c. the speed and duration of trypanosome elimination) of varying 
doses of the drug, administered either hypodermically, intravenously or orally to early 
and advanced trypanosomiasis cases at the Leopoldville lazaret. They concluded that 
hypodermic injections of 0,5g doses of Atoxyl worked best to clear the peripheral blood 
flow of trypanosomes, but that the compound was not a miracle cure or ‘heroic remedy’. 
A ‘long-haul treatment’ of repeated doses was a requirement for, but no absolute 
guarantee of a ‘definitive sterilisation’. Moreover, Atoxyl frequently proved toxic, 
causing blindness and paralysis of the lower limbs, especially in patients in the advanced 
stages of the disease, and there was no hope whatsoever of curing the latter.332 
Significantly, despite the compound’s obvious shortcomings as a sleeping sickness 
cure, Broden and Rodhain did not discard it, but instead redefined Atoxyl treatment as a 
‘form of prophylactic action’.333 Because of its trypanosome-killing properties, the drug 
could be part, they argued, of a practitioner’s ‘routine treatment, which, if it (did) not 
allow him to obtain the cure of the largest number of his patients, nevertheless (made) 
him succeed in the disinfection of all his trypanosome-carrying subjects’.334 What they in 
fact proposed was targeting human trypanosome ‘reservoirs’ with an ‘appropriate 
(drug) treatment’ as a strategy of sleeping sickness control. Their aim was to ‘disinfect’ 
or ‘sterilis(e)’ victims, i.e. clear their peripheral blood flow of trypanosomes in as 
durable a way as possible, so as to eliminate them as sources of contamination for tsetse 
flies and thus ‘contain(…) disease at the population level without concern for individual 
331 A. Broden, Rapport sur les travaux du laboratoire médical de Léopoldville de 1900 à 1905 (Bruxelles, 1906), p. 139.
332 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908, pp. 30, 46, 69, 80-81; A. Broden et J. 
Rodhain, ‘La lutte contre la trypanosomiase humaine dans l’Etat Indépendant du Congo’, Bulletin de la Société 
d’Etudes Coloniales 15 (1908), 403; A. Broden to Governor General, 29.10.1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283; A. 
Broden, ‘La thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines et animales’, Bulletin de la Société Royale des Sciences 
Médicales et Naturelles de Bruxelles 2-3 (1923), 34.
333 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 628.
334 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908, p. 79.
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prognosis’.335 This was in line with the preventive use of Atoxyl advocated in the London 
sleeping sickness conference’s policy recommendations drawn up under Laveran’s 
direction.336 
Broden and Rodhain’s role in giving Atoxyl treatment a prophylactic or preventive 
rather than curative rationale reflected their ‘participat(ion) in the racialisation of 
medical discourse’, a flip side to their membership of the European tropical medicine 
community at the time.337 The collectivisation and construction of Africans as ‘virus 
reservoirs’ and thus as sources of infection - whereas European cases were perceived as 
individual victims - gave rise to the ‘ethical variability’ that characterised much of the 
research and public health practices regarding sleeping sickness in the Congo as well as 
other African colonies.338 As far as Africans were concerned, the collective goal of 
preventing further infection was more important than producing a cure in individual 
sufferers. (Experimental) drug treatments were also administered to infected Europeans, 
but the latter were approached as individuals in need of a cure rather than as public 
health hazards, and were asked to give their consent.339 
Turning pharmaceuticals into tools of infectious disease control - at least as far as 
indigenous people were concerned - not only implied a shift in therapeutic rationale, 
but also entailed that trypanocide treatment could be taken outside of its traditional 
lazaret context. In line with the notion of prophylactic treatment, Broden and Rodhain 
advocated abandoning the ‘systematic isolation’ of all infected individuals in favour of a 
more open regime: rather than prisons, lazarets were to become open ‘villages’ where 
advanced, disabled sleeping sickness patients were hospitalised in the company of their 
kin. Early cases could undergo outpatient, ‘sterilising’ treatment; there was no reason to 
keep them confined against their will.340
In addition to Atoxyl, Broden and Rodhain also had the opportunity to experiment 
many other potential trypanocides at the request of the colonial administration and 
335 A. Broden et J. Rodhain, ‘La luttre contre la trypanose humaine (maladie du sommeil)’, 1909, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4419.602; Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 631.
336 Neill, Networks of Tropical Medicine, p. 121.
337 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
338 On Africans as ‘foyers d’infection’ and ‘réservoir de virus’, see for example: A. Broden to Governor General, 
1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283; R. Mouchet and A. Dubois, Annual Report of the Leopoldville lazaret, 10.1.1913, 
ITG, FD34. On ‘ethical variability’ in the context of clinical trials, see A. Petryna, ‘Ethical variability: Drug 
development and globalizing clinical trials’, American Ethnologist 32 (2005), 183-197. Also, M. Lock and V.-K. 
Nguyen, An Anthropology of Biomedicine (Chichester, 2010), pp. 188-192. On the ‘distinctive calculus of 
therapeutic risk in collective as opposed to individual medicine’ in sleeping sickness control efforts in French 
colonial Africa, see Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 633.
339 For example: J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport sur la maladie et les derniers moments du Révérend Père Meyers de la 
Mission de Lulonga’, 9.9.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 857.368.
340 J. Rodhain, ‘Station de Léopoldville. Rapport sur le fonctionnement du lazaret pendant le 1er Semestre 1908’, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162; A. Broden, ‘Organisation des Lazarets pour Trypanosés’, 25.6.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4419.602; Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 125-126.
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metropolitan scientists like Ehrlich, as well as of their own accord.341 They conducted 
trials on smaller or larger numbers of African trypanosome carriers with, among other 
things, synthetic dyes, antimony compounds, familiar medicinal substances like 
mercury, strychnine and orpiment, other synthetic organic arsenic compounds such as 
acetylatoxyl, arsenophenylglycin and arsphenamine, and various combinations of the 
above (including some with Atoxyl).342 The guiding principle in the laboratory doctors’ 
endeavour was the search for ‘the best treatment suitable for African practice’.343 It 
meant that new remedies were consistently compared with Atoxyl therapy not only as 
far as toxicity and trypanocidal action were concerned, but also in terms of their 
practicality in the local context of prophylactic sleeping sickness treatment, where 
trypanocides might have to be administered by injectors with varying degrees of 
medical training. In 1907, for example, Broden declared that his and Rodhain’s research 
focused on finding a ‘gentle treatment that could be applied by any agent not initiated 
in the art of medicine’.344 Their therapeutic comparisons, which were made post hoc 
rather than incorporated into the actual trial designs, generally found that Atoxyl was 
the best option available to ‘every intelligent and prudent man’ to at least disinfect as 
many trypanosome carriers for as long as possible, even if it was a far cry from Ehrlich’s 
ideal of a ‘therapia sterilisans magna’ producing a ‘definitive sterilisation’ with a single 
dose.345 
Many potential remedies tested by Broden and Rodhain, such as orpiment, 
arsenophenylglycin and most synthetic dyes, were eventually rejected on the basis of 
inferior safety or efficacy results, a fact that highlighted the difficulties of translating 
experimental results in laboratory animals to human therapy.346 Others, including 
arsphenamine, proved to have a trypanocidal and toxic action not worse or dissimilar to 
that of Atoxyl, but presented disadvantages or at least no clear practical benefits for 
routine sleeping sickness treatment, for example because they were not cheaper, not 
easier to administer, or needlessly complicated treatment.347 Yet the Leopoldville trials 
341 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908, pp. 71, 77; A. Broden et J. Rodhain, 
‘L’arsénophénylglycine et son succédané dans les trypanoses humaine et animales’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 1 (1920), 71-124.
342 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908; Broden et Rodhain, 
‘L’arsénophénylglycine et son succédané’; Broden, ‘La thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines’; A. Broden, 
‘Rapport sur le Fonctionnement du Lazaret pour Trypanosés de Léopoldville durant le 1er Semestre 1910’, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.1.1; J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du Lazaret de Léopoldville pendant le 4me 
Trimestre 1908’, 1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162.
343 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908, p. 79.
344 A. Broden to Governor General, 1907, MAEAA, Hygiène, 847.283.
345 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908, pp. 79-80; Broden, ‘La thérapeutique 
des trypanoses humaines’, 36.
346 Broden, ‘La thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines’, 33-34, 38; Broden et Rodhain, ‘L’arsénophénylglycine et 
son succédané’, 121-122.
347 Broden et Rodhain, Rapport sur les travaux faits au laboratoire 1907-1908, pp. 79-80; Van Hoof, ‘Thérapeutique de 
la maladie du sommeil, 106; Broden, ‘La thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines’, 34, 39; A. Broden, ‘Rapport 
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also yielded some additions to the Congo’s trypanocidal arsenal. Soamin, the British 
firm Burroughs Wellcome & Co.’s closely related version of Atoxyl, was accepted as a 
cheaper substitution for the German-manufactured drug, and acetylatoxyl (marketed by 
Hoechst as Arsacetin) was initially also seen as a possible, more economical alternative 
for Atoxyl.348 In addition, Broden and Rodhain introduced the antimony compound 
tartar emetic to human sleeping sickness therapy: they found the trypanocide a useful 
complement of Atoxyl, with the combination proving to be the ‘most energetic routine 
treatment of human trypanosomiasis’. Or, used alone, tartar emetic was considered a 
cheap prophylactic for advanced cases of human trypanosomiasis who could not be 
cured anyway.349 
4.4 Policy reforms and the pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping 
sickness control
By 1910, Broden and Rodhain’s views regarding the prophylactic potential of 
trypanocides contributed significantly to sleeping sickness policy reforms introduced in 
the wake of continued problems with the Congo’s lazarets, in particular African 
resistance to the system. Lyons has described how serious riots at the Ibembo lazaret in 
Uele between 1909 and 1910 notably helped trigger reform.350 In 1910 the closed lazaret 
sur le fonctionnement du lazaret pour trypanosés de Léopoldville durant le 2e Semestre 1910’, 7.1.1911, 
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Broden, ‘La thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines’, 34.
349 A. Broden, ‘Rapport sur le Fonctionnement du Lazaret pour trypanosés de Léopoldville durant le 2me 
Semestre 1909’, 6.1.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162; J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du Lazaret de 
Léopoldville pendant le 4me Trimestre 1908’, 1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 844.162; vice-Governor General Fuchs to 
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system was finally turned into a more open regime to reduce overcrowding and 
maintenance costs, and accommodate persisting indigenous objections.351 As a result, 
the total isolation of both early and advanced cases in prison-like institutions to reduce 
the risk of infection was replaced with a policy of inpatient treatment for secondary-
stage cases, often disabled and incurable, in village-style lazarets where they lived with 
their kin, and outpatient treatment for victims in the early stages who were still 
physically capable of work.352 In addition, mission societies and private companies were 
expected - in return for free medic(in)al supplies and on the condition of following a 
theoretical and practical tropical medicine course - to cooperate in the fight against 
sleeping sickness by providing treatment in such restyled lazarets, something Rodhain 
had advocated in 1909.353 
These reforms fit within what Neill has described as a broader shift in sleeping 
sickness control strategies in African territories, roughly between 1908 and 1914, in 
response to local circumstances, ‘intercolonial contacts’ and the ‘broader influence of 
the transnational (tropical medicine) community’. In British Uganda and German East 
Africa, for example, attention increasingly shifted away from segregation camps to 
alternative strategies of curbing sleeping sickness, notably vector control and the 
relocation of populations to less tsetse-infested areas.354 The policy reforms in the 
Belgian Congo promoted similar measures as they took into account the suggestions of 
local doctors and other colonial powers. In 1910, for example, German colonial officials 
were urging Brussels to leave the Free State’s isolation strategy behind and replicate 
German East Africa’s more effective fly habitat destruction efforts on the Congolese side 
of the border.355 It contributed to new sleeping sickness regulations and instructions 
that, while still emphasising the control of African mobility via the introduction of a 
medical passport system and the ‘standardisation of observation posts’, also increasingly 
351 Minister of Colonies to Governor General, 30.6.1911, MAEAA, Hygiène, 842.142; Minister of Colonies Renkin 
to Governor General, 17.1.1910, MAEAA, GG, 16862 (GG). Creating lazaret-villages and instituting outpatient 
and ambulatory treatment was expected to appease the indigenous population while reducing hospitalisation 
costs.
352 ‘Note. Mesures complémentaires prises en 1910, pour enrayer le développement de la maladie du sommeil’, 
10.6.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 850, 299-300; Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 125-126.
353 Minister of Colonies Renkin to Governor General, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.288; J. Rodhain, ‘Rôle et 
organisation des lazarets pour trypanosés. Suite à la note du Docteur Broden’, 1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4419.602; ‘Ordonnance d’administration générale du 8 Septembre 1910, n° 47/5, mettant en vigueur le nouveau 
règlement coordonnant les mesures prises pour enrayer la maladie du sommeil et comminant (sic) des peines 
contre les contrevenants au dit règlements’ dans Congo belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des 
ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 1910), pp. 304-305; Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 129.
354 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 124-135, 163.
355 Letter from Dr Steudel, 20.6.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 849.290; E. Van Campenhout, ‘Congrès colonial 
allemand’, 13.10.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 849.291.
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introduced measures to separate humans from fly vectors such as ordering brush 
clearing and the regrouping and relocating of indigenous communities.356 
As Lyons has suggested, the 1910 sleeping sickness policy reforms in the Belgian 
Congo were also ‘linked to the wider changes occurring in the administration of the new 
colony’. On the one hand, the Belgian government sought to shake off the Leopoldian 
past by cultivating a ‘more humane’ reputation.357 Abandoning the Free State’s harsh 
lazaret regime was one way to achieve this goal, as were the concurrent initiatives taken 
to showcase a ‘growing preoccupation with colonial health and medicine’ as doctors 
were seen as ‘represent(ing) a “friendlier” colonialism’.358 In this context, colonial 
Minister Jules Renkin expressed commitment to fight sleeping sickness ‘more 
energetically than in the past’.359 Tellingly, in 1910 he sent Rodhain on an expedition to 
Katanga to study trypanosomiasis and possible control strategies as he saw fit.360 
Moreover, during Renkin’s mandate the beginnings of a (highly centralised) colonial 
medical service took shape, with the establishment of a dedicated medical department 
in Brussels in 1910.361 Van Campenhout, who in 1909 had been calling for the creation of 
a ‘bureau’ within the Colonial Ministry that would be competent for medicine and public 
health, and collect and process all relevant reports from Africa, became its first head.362 
Royal decrees in 1910 also officially established the Brussels School of Tropical Medicine, 
making its diploma a requirement for practicing medicine in the colony.363 
On the other hand, the Belgians were at the same time trying to expand and 
consolidate state power in their colony. In 1910, they were in the process of re-ordering 
and re-organising the Congo’s peoples in territorial-administrative units called 
‘chefferies’ and ‘sous-chefferies’, to which they appointed official African leaders called 
‘chefs médaillés’.364 Apart from the Belgian administration’s desire to improve its image, 
the new sleeping sickness measures were therefore also adopted because they were 
convenient from a political-economic point of view. For example, the introduction of 
‘mandatory medical passports’ helped control African mobility, whereas 
‘agglomerat(ing)’dispersed groups of Africans and relocating them to more favourable 
356 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 126-128, 134; ‘Ordonnance d’administration générale du 8 Septembre 1910’, pp. 
294-306.
357 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 125-126, 136.
358 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 18; 42.
359 Minister of Colonies Renkin to Governor General, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.288.
360 ‘Note concernant la mission scientifique confiée au Docteur Rodhain’, 1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 858.370.
361 Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 122.
362 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note concernant les rapports médicaux annuels’, 3.4.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.285; 
Notes concerning the printing of doctors’ research results, 16.3.1909 and 18.3.1909, MAEAA, Hygiène, 848.285.; 
Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 160.
363 Trolli, Van Hove et Marquet, ‘Exposé de la législation sanitaire’, p. 570.
364 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 164-165.
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sites in the name of epidemic disease control also facilitated administration and 
evangelisation.365 
Within the range of new measures, however, it was Atoxyl-based sleeping sickness 
control in particular that would rise to ever-greater prominence by the First World War 
through a number of intertwined events and developments. These were related to the 
evolution of drug therapy research in Leopoldville, Broden’s growing influence on 
metropolitan decision-making, and colonial doctors’ struggles to implement many 
public health measures. 
One of the consequences of Minister Renkin’s initiatives to step up the fight against 
sleeping sickness was the termination of Rodhain’s drug evaluation role in Leopoldville. 
By the end of 1910, his collaborative chemotherapy research with Broden was disrupted 
when the colonial government sent him on a scientific mission to Katanga to study 
tropical diseases, in particular human and animal trypanosomiasis.366 By way of 
compensation, two young Belgian physicians were subsequently appointed to join the 
laboratory: Albert Dubois and René Mouchet.367 Like Broden and Rodhain, Dubois had 
studied medicine in Louvain and trained in bacteriology at Joseph Denys’ lab. Mouchet, 
on the other hand, was a Liège University alumnus and former assistant of the 
anatomical pathologist Charles Firket, who not only taught ‘pathologie exotique’ in 
Liège and at the EMT, but was one of the founders of the Brussels School and, like Denys, 
a member of the medical subcommittee of the ‘Société Belge d’Etudes Coloniales’.368 In 
the end, Broden himself did not benefit much from the assistance provided by these 
extra hands, as illness forced him to retire prematurely from the Congo in 1911.369 
The name he had made for himself in Leopoldville, however, first secured him a 
faculty position at the Brussels School of Tropical Medicine, and soon afterwards the 
directorship of the educational institution.370 In this capacity, Broden was able to pursue 
his efforts to rationalise sleeping sickness therapeutics and advocate the Leopoldville 
laboratory’s clinical trial monopoly. His move to Belgium signalled an important shift in 
the locus of sleeping sickness expertise from colony to metropole. It helped root colonial 
365 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 126-129, 134-135.
366 ‘Note concernant la mission scientifique confiée au Docteur Rodhain’, 1910, MAEAA, Hygiène 858.370; 
Minister of Colonies to Governor General, 29.7.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, 858.371; ‘In memoriam Prof. Dr A. 
Broden’, p. iv.
367 ‘In memoriam Prof. Dr A. Broden’, p. iv; A. Broden, ‘Note sur la situation actuelle au Laboratoire de 
Léopoldville’, 18.8.1911, ITG, FD26. 
368 A. Broden, ‘Note sur la situation actuelle au Laboratoire de Léopoldville’, 18.8.1911, ITG, FD26; Biographic 
note on Dr Walraevens and Dr Mouchet, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4448.778; ‘Commission chargée d’étudier 
l’organisation d’un Institut ou Ecole de médecine et hygiène exotiques. Rapport de la sous-commission.’, 1909, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4450.796; ‘Note au sujet de l’Ecole de Médecine Tropicale’, 22.8.1933, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4441; 
J. B. Jadin, ‘Albert Louis Marie DUBOIS’ dans Académie Royale des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, Biographie Belge d’Outre-
Mer (Bruxelles, 1989), t.VII-C, col. 120; Donny, ‘Introduction’, p. viii.
369 ‘In memoriam Prof. Dr A. Broden’, p. v; ‘Note biographique sur le Dr Broden’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4444.731.
370 Director General (4e DG) to 2e DG, 6.2.1912, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4444.731 ; ‘Note biographique sur le Dr 
Broden’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4444.731. 
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medical decision-making more firmly in laboratory medicine, as Broden could take 
advantage in Brussels of the School’s close association with the Colonial Ministry and its 
medical department to exert greater influence over colonial medical research, policy 
and practice. This helped spread his and the Leopoldville laboratory’s views on 
trypanocides. Moreover, the EMT director capitalised on his position to manage 
therapeutic access to the Congo by seeking to oversee what drugs and treatments were 
sent to the colony, and to whom, for testing.371
In fact, not long before Broden’s arrival in Brussels, Van Campenhout had already 
taken some first steps towards pharmaceutical gatekeeping in Brussels by raising 
concerns about the advertising practices of the drug trade. In 1910, for example, he 
complained about ‘inventors’ who frequently sent him and the Ministry all sorts of 
supposedly ‘heroic’ medicines that were generally not effective and not worth sending 
to the colony for experimentation.372 As the new head of the EMT, Broden would take 
over and further develop this role. He soon started advising the Ministry on colonial 
doctors’ requests for medicinal substances, as well as drug developers’ pharmaceutical 
promotions and appeals for therapeutic trials.373 Moreover, he tried to restrict the 
circulation of new experimental drugs among colonial practitioners and secure the 
Leopoldville laboratory’s position as the proper channel for clinical testing, by repeating 
Rodhain’s earlier hints that only the Congo’s laboratory doctors had the right 
qualifications and capacities to conduct ‘serious trials’.374 
Meanwhile, back in Leopoldville, chemotherapeutic investigations into human 
trypanosomiasis were continued by Mouchet and Dubois, who had been left in charge 
after Broden’s departure.375 They not only experimented in the well-controlled setting of 
the lab cum lazaret, however. In 1911, to ease the burden on the Leopoldville lazaret, 
they also started examining the prophylactic effects of Ehrlich’s arsenicals 
arsenophenylglycin and Salvarsan administered to African workers on the spot during 
several ‘sanitary tours’ of riverine posts in the district.376 This had the distinct 
371 A. Broden, ‘Note concernant “Anti-hématurie tea”’, 10.9.1913, MAEAA, Hygiène, R147.597; A. Broden to 2e 
DG, 29.10.1913, MAEAA, Hygiène, R147.598; Chef de division (2e DG),‘Remarques concernant la note de M. le 
docteur Broden du 14 janvier, relative aux réquisitions médicales’, 21.3.1914, MAEAA, Hygiène, R147.599.
372 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note concernant l’envoi proposé d’Asporozoïne pour expérimentation au Congo’, 
26.10.1910, MAEAA, Hygiène, R146.591.
373 For example: Note from Chef de Division délégué (5e DG) 27.7.1912, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.2; A. Broden to 2e DG, 
1912.12.3, MAEAA, Hygiène, R147.596; Director General (2e DG) to Minister of Colonies’ cabinet, 30.12.1913, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.297; A. Broden, ‘Note concernant “Anti-hématurie tea”’, 10.9.1913, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
R147.597; A. Broden to 2e DG, 29.10.1913, MAEAA, Hygiène, R147.598.
374 A. Broden to 2e DG, 3.12.1912, ITG, FD11.
375 A. Broden, ‘Note sur la situation actuelle au Laboratoire de Léopoldville’, 18.8.1911, ITG, FD26; Dr Mouchet et 
Dr Dubois, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du lazaret pour trypanosés de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1912’, 
1.1913, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.4; R. Mouchet et A. Dubois, ‘Essais thérapeutiques dans la trypanosomiase humaine’, 
Beihefte zum Archiv für Schiffs und Tropenhygiene 18 (1914), 83-116.
376 Dr Mouchet et Dr Dubois, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du lazaret pour trypanosés de Léopoldville 
pendant l’année 1912’, 1.1913, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.4; A. Dubois to Chef du service médical de Léopoldville 
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advantage, Dubois argued, of allowing the individuals in question to continue labouring, 
so that they would not have to sit idly in a lazaret, where the state would have to 
provide for them.377 Although Mouchet and Dubois tested fewer new trypanocides 
overall than their predecessors, their tours were highly significant in that they involved 
administering trypanocides in what can be viewed as a sort of field trials. They 
examined the drugs’ effectiveness in preventing disease outside of controlled lazaret or 
hospital environments, and thus played a crucial role in shaping pharmaceuticals into 
prophylactic instruments for ambulatory use.378 
Obstacles in reaching early sleeping sickness victims in the wake of the sleeping 
sickness policy reforms made other lazaret doctors resort to ambulatory treatment as 
well. This category of patients was expected to show up at set dates and times to 
undergo regular treatment, but directors soon found that this could be quite hard to 
enforce.379 As doctor Errera from the Aba lazaret complained: ‘one cannot trust the 
punctuality of external patients at doctors’ appointments’.380 In 1911, doctor Emile 
Lejeune of the Kiambi lazaret in Katanga instituted a system to reach as many ‘natives’ 
as possible. He introduced the systematic surveying of a given region’s indigenous 
population to detect infected individuals, and their ambulatory treatment by Congolese 
nurses.381 Some local authorities supported this practice, which was also adopted in 
other colonies.382 For example, in the wake of Dubois and Mouchet’s experiences, 
Leopoldville’s General Commissioner Georges Moulaert invoked the example of 
‘indigenous medical assistance’ in AEF to argue for the general adoption of ambulatory 
treatment in the Congo.383 
As far as the sleeping sickness control measures besides prophylactic treatment were 
concerned, local doctors in the Congo faced even greater obstacles. Despite the inclusion 
of sanctions for those neglecting regulations and greater powers for physicians to 
enforce them, their implementation often proved problematic.384 Doctors remarked that 
neither Africans nor territorial authorities were much inclined to observe prescribed 
Houssiau, 18.12.1911, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3; A. Dubois et R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du lazaret 
pour trypanosés de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1911’, 19.1.1912, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3; ‘Extrait de la lettre de 
M. le G.G. en date du 16 juillet 1912. N°242c’, 16.7.1912, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3.
377 A. Dubois to Chef du service médical de Léopoldville Houssiau, 18.12.1911, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3.
378 Dubois explained that his and Mouchet’s tours in 1911 sought to ‘rechercher si les traitements employés 
avaient des résultats suffisants au point de vue prophylactique et également de rechercher le degré d’intensité 
de l’infection pendant les trois mois qui ont séparé ces deux visites.’ A. Dubois to Chef du service médical de 
Léopoldville Houssiau, 18.12.1911, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3. 
379 For example: A. Dubois et R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du lazaret pour trypanosés de 
Léopoldville pendant l’année 1911’, 19.1.1912, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3.
380 Dr Errera, ‘Rapport du lazaret d’Aba pour le 2e semestre 1910’, 31.12.1910, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.2.
381 Royaume de Belgique. Colonie du Congo belge. Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925 (Bruxelles, 1927), 
p. 10.
382 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 133, 141, 143.
383 Commissaire Général Moulaert to Governor General, 21.12.1911, ITG, FD26.
384 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 128-129, 135-136, 237; Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 130.
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measures like brush clearing. Rodhain argued that persuasion alone was not enough to 
ensure indigenous compliance, and Broden complained that doctors lacked sufficient 
powers and that it was in fact the ‘mentality of the official that one need(ed) to 
change’.385 The result was a spate of circulars urging for more cooperation in the fight 
against the disease and a more rigorous execution of relevant instructions.386 Medical 
practitioners also remarked that certain measures, such as brush clearing and 
controlling African mobility, perhaps made perfect sense from a theoretical point of 
view, but turned out to be rather unfeasible in practice.387 
A large part of the problem appeared to be that there was not only a shortage of 
medical staff, but, as Broden suggested, that it lacked the means to locally implement 
public health measures in the absence of territorial administrators’ cooperation.388 This 
situation was not unique to the Belgian Congo, but also characterised sleeping sickness 
control in AEF, for instance, where conflicts between ‘different European interests 
groups’ seriously hampered the execution of preventive measures.389 Unlike other 
professional groups including engineers and magistrates, state doctors in the Congo fell 
under the authority of district commissioners, i.e. the territorial service. Together with 
limited options for career progression (as there were but two grades in the official 
medical hierarchy) and the fact that physicians received no pension, it made for what 
Rodhain described as a ‘deeply humiliating situation’ that belied their status as medical 
professionals.390 That the colonial administration encountered many difficulties to 
recruit Belgian doctors was often taken as proof by practitioners that a medical career in 
the Congo was far from an attractive option.391 
385 F. Vandenbranden, ‘Notes de voyage d’études dans les chefferies Nkolo et Banzamakuta (Bas-Congo)’, 
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387 J. Schwetz, Evolution de la médecine, pp. 22, 86-87, 96; Dr G. Daniel to Governor General, 9.9.1911, MAEAA, GG, 
16796 (GG). 
388 According to Lyons, territorial administrators did not always agree with doctors on the regrouping and 
resiting of local populations, and ‘many were loathe to involve themselves in this particular form of 
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Minister Renkin was sympathetic to these concerns. After the Belgian annexation of 
the Congo, attempts were made to redress grievances through legislation introducing a 
medical service in the colony led by a chief medical officer residing in Boma, and made 
up of five grades of doctors.392 Inge Heiberg, former director of the Ibembo lazaret, 
became the first ‘médecin en chef ’ in 1911.393 He was responsible for collating annual 
medical reports and advising the colonial government on health matters. However, to 
Heiberg’s dismay, implementing the reforms proved difficult before 1914: staff shortages 
hampered the functioning of the new medical hierarchy, and the creation of a truly 
independent medical service in the colony failed to materialise, leaving district doctors 
subjected to the orders of territorial service staff, for whom public health measures 
might not be the highest priority.394
Under these circumstances, Mouchet and Dubois from the Leopoldville laboratory 
concluded by 1913 that ambulatory treatment was the most realistic and effective 
strategy to control sleeping sickness.395 While they found arsenophenylglycin and 
Salvarsan to exert a long ‘sterilising action’ suitable for this purpose, they concluded 
that, as the former was not commercialised and the latter too expensive, an intensive 
combination treatment of Atoxyl and tartar emetic produced lengthy enough 
‘sterilisations’ and therefore could be recommended for the treatment of as many 
victims as possible in their own villages.396 Together with Broden and Rodhain’s 
research, the result of their investigations was that by the First World War, Atoxyl and 
tartar emetic came to be seen in the Belgian Congo not just as effective trypanocides, 
but as appropriate tools for itinerant prophylactic treatment and thus for sleeping 
sickness control more generally.397 In that sense, chemotherapeutic research in 
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Leopoldville was vital in expanding the Congolese market for these science-based 
sleeping sickness medicines. 
The central colonial authorities as well proved keen to generalise the pharmaceutical 
strategy of prophylaxis.398 Policy-makers in Brussels encouraged it, for example by 
planning to assign second doctors to lazarets, charged with touring the surrounding 
areas and treating victims on the spot.399 It was expected that, like the creation of lazaret 
villages and the institution of outpatient treatment, ambulatory treatment would 
appease the ‘natives’ while reducing hospitalisation costs.400 Such an undertaking 
required much more doctors than were available in the Congo, however. Chief medical 
officer Heiberg therefore proposed to ‘vulgarise’ ambulatory treatment, i.e. involve 
African staff and European agents in administering prophylactic Atoxyl injections to 
individuals with swollen cervical lymph nodes. He reasoned that with a short training 
‘these injections (were) within everyone’s reach’, and that, while they would sterilise 
rather than cure, they could not cause much ‘harm’ as long as injectors refrained from 
‘experimentation’ and followed simple instructions.401 
In 1914, Heiberg reported that 18000 people had been screened for sleeping sickness 
and 1100 had received ambulatory treatment during the previous year. He found the 
numbers ‘insignificant’ compared to what he had expected, and blamed a shortage of 
staff.402 On the eve of the First World War, therefore, pharmaceutical disease control had 
undoubtedly gained a prominent position within the Belgian Congo’s sleeping sickness 
policy, but failed to really take off on the ground on a significant scale. Combined with 
inaction as far as other trypanosomiasis measures were concerned, this led some 
contemporaries to label the colony’s prewar sleeping sickness campaign as a ‘paper 
war’.403 
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4.5 In summary 
As it disappeared from view as a true cure for sleeping sickness, laboratory doctors in 
Leopoldville gave Atoxyl a new lease of life, thus initiating a second cycle in the drug’s 
colonial career. Seeking to both regulate the Congolese sleeping sickness remedy market 
and ground human trypanosomiasis control in modern epidemiology via well-controlled 
clinical trials, they were crucial in strengthening the alliance between laboratory 
science, ethical pharmaceutical industry and collective medicine, a process initiated but 
not entirely seen through by the Congo’s administration. The laboratory doctors’ efforts 
were fed by inter-imperial chemotherapeutic exchanges, a perpetuation of colonial 
domination via the collectivising and pathologising of Africans as trypanosome 
reservoirs, as well as a concern to overcome the practical difficulties of African 
resistance to the lazaret regime. In the process, they refashioned trypanocides into 
preventive agents that could be administered to African trypanosome carriers outside of 
prison-style camps, and identified Atoxyl as the best pharmaceutical for curbing the 
spread of sleeping sickness. The Leopoldville laboratory’s views on pharmaceutical 
disease control gained prominence and met with increasing enthusiasm after the 
Belgian take-over of the Congo Free State, as the influence of Belgian tropical medicine 
specialists on the metropolitan administration grew and state doctors struggled to 
implement alternative preventive measures on the ground. Staff shortages prevented 
that prophylactic Atoxyl treatment was applied on a large scale before the First World 
War, however. How this changed after 1918 will be covered in the next chapter. 
PART II. 
MASS TRYPANOCIDE TREATMENT IN THE 1920s
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Chapter  5
Itinerant medicinal prophylaxis and the postwar 
mass market for Atoxyl 
This chapter charts Atoxyl’s career in the Belgian Congo after the First World War. It 
examines how in a continued first phase, expectations about its potential and suitability 
as a tool of sleeping sickness control, which had been building since before 1914, grew 
even stronger. In the early 1920s, this translated into a large-scale use of in particular 
the French- and Belgian-manufactured versions of the drug. The chapter also explores 
how Atoxyl’s postwar spread became intertwined with a second phase of more ‘negative 
appraisals’ in a context of considerable opposition to the powers of itinerant doctors 
involved in prophylactic trypanocide treatment.404 This eventually amounted to a 
decline in consumption of the French and Belgian brands, although not immediately of 
the original German product. 
Atoxyl’s postwar career in the Congo reflected and contributed to an ever-closer 
alliance between laboratory science, ethical drug industry and collective medicine, as 
the active promotion of pharmaceutical strategies of sleeping sickness control combined 
with the adoption of ‘rational’ drug policies and practices to ‘ensure the regular supply 
and rational use’ of ‘essential’ trypanocides.405 This configuration evolved through an 
interplay between different actors in metropole and colony, as well as between 
nationalism and inter-imperial exchanges. It crucially entailed a consolidation of the 
(Belgian) tropical medicine profession’s growing influence on the administration of the 
Congo, evident for example in the postwar organisation of an independent medical 
service in the colony. More specifically, it indicated a further advance of scientific 
medicine, as (bacteriology-trained) laboratory doctors occupied powerful positions in 
the colonial medical hierarchy as well as in the metropole, and their views on 
epidemiology and therapeutics became increasingly prominent.
Atoxyl use in the Congo received a major boost after the war when colonial field 
doctors, medical and political authorities converged on the expediency of mass 
treatment to control sleeping sickness - and thus halt population decline - under the 
influence of local circumstances and inter-imperial interactions. As a result, the focus of 
404 Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 95. In French colonial Africa, where similar pharmaceutical 
strategies of disease control were deployed, there was a long ‘history of contests over the powers, ethics and 
value of the French model of sleeping sickness medicine’, Noémi Tousignant points out. Tousignant, ‘Politics of 
mass therapy’, 635.
405 Najmi Kanji, ‘Action at country level: the international and national influences’ in Kanji, Hardon, 
Harnmeijer, Mamdani and Walt, Drugs Policy in Developing Countries, p. 65.
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indigenous health policy and practice shifted towards a mobile, pharmaceuticalised and 
specialised form of social medicine that enlisted state doctors, but also European and 
African medical auxiliaries as well as private sector medical providers in a medicinal 
fight against sleeping sickness. The associated increase in trypanocide needs spurred 
actions to rationalise the colonial administration’s drug supply efforts, and created 
opportunities for European ethical manufacturers keen on exploiting the disruption in 
German medicine imports and accompanying patriotic sentiments since the war. The 
French synthetic pharmaceuticals industry thus obtained an important share of the 
Congolese Atoxyl market, as did, and increasingly so, its nascent Belgian counterpart 
with the help of the EMT. State doctors in the Congo, however, were confronted with 
considerable African and European opposition to mass sleeping sickness treatment, 
which posed a threat to their newly acquired independence. As instances of (abnormal) 
drug toxicity and limited curative power made it hard to instil more favourable views of 
the campaign, they grew increasingly disappointed with Atoxyl’s effectiveness as a 
preventive tool. Nevertheless, rather than abandoning pharmaceutical sleeping sickness 
control, the Congo’s medical leaders resorted to a tightening of pharmaceutical 
regulation to prevent intoxication, while sustaining the large-scale use of the 
trypanocide. More stringent quality control procedures unfolding between metropole 
and colony eventually led to the market exclusion of French- and Belgian-manufactured 
Atoxyl, while treatment guidelines and increased hierarchical oversight within the 
colonial medical service were deployed to keep the clinical use (of the German product) 
under control.406 
This chapter starts with a brief sketch of the Congo administration’s growing focus on 
curbing sleeping sickness to redress postwar depopulation in a context of inter-imperial 
interactions in the field of African health. It then charts how medical authorities in 
colony and metropole came to prioritise a pharmaceutical control strategy labelled 
‘itinerant medicinal prophylaxis’. This was largely the result of an interplay between 
local circumstances perceived to make alternative preventive measures unfeasible - as 
highlighted by a veteran sleeping sickness doctor advocating systematic and 
comprehensive Atoxyl treatment by mobile medical teams in the Congo’s Kwilu area - , a 
desire to advance the interests of the colonial medical profession and the associated 
creation of an independent medical service headed by a former Leopoldville laboratory 
doctor, as well as cross-border exchanges, notably with French Pastorians proposing 
similar solutions to tackle human trypanosomiasis in colonial Africa. The chapter 
proceeds with a discussion of how central political authorities, convinced of its political-
economic benefits, backed an expansion of itinerant medicinal prophylaxis in the 
Congo. As this entailed an involvement of growing numbers of state and private sector 
406 Tousignant describes how directors of the French West African autonomous sleeping sickness service 
between 1939 and 1944 also resorted to ‘self-regulation’ via therapeutic standardisation to prevent drug 
toxicity and its political recuperation by opponents of the service. Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 630, 
636-639.
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doctors and medical auxiliaries in the pharmaceutical sleeping sickness campaign, it 
substantially widened the Congolese Atoxyl market. The next section examines the 
colonial administration’s efforts to ensure a regular and sufficient supply of approved 
trypanocides while trying to limit both drug expenditure and dependence on German 
manufacturers. This not only augmented the role of pharmacists in the Congo’s public 
health efforts, but also boosted the synthetic pharmaceuticals industry in France and 
especially also in Belgium, where a young company had embarked on Atoxyl production 
with the help of the EMT. Finally, this chapter discusses the growing disappointment 
with (certain brands of) the drug and the pharmaceutical regulation efforts underlying 
the sustained use of (German) Atoxyl in a context of opposition to mass treatment.
5.1 Postwar demographic anxieties and the primacy of 
sleeping sickness control
Before the First World War, public health policies aimed at Africans in the Congo mostly 
affected soldiers and those who were part of the colonial state service. As previously 
mentioned, there was only limited progress in extending ambulatory treatment to the 
wider population to keep sleeping sickness in check, for example. The war itself further 
disrupted efforts at disease control. Many doctors from the already limited cadre of 
medical staff were called away to join the troops.407 The colony’s annual medical report 
for 1917 warned that personnel shortages prevented an ‘energetic’ sleeping sickness 
campaign, with several regions, including the Kwango district, reported as ‘particularly 
afflicted by trypanosomiasis’.408 The conflict also severely hampered the supply of 
German-manufactured medicines, including trypanocides, and more generally had a 
detrimental impact on Congolese health, notably because of intensified demands for 
African labour to sustain the war effort.409 
Reports about an upsurge of sleeping sickness in the wake of the war specifically 
contributed to a broader climate of demographic anxieties in the interwar period. 
Colonial administrators believed that the poor health situation in the Belgian Congo was 
407 Including, for example Jérôme Rodhain and Giovanni Trolli, a veteran state doctor with much sleeping 
sickness experience. Biographical note on J. Rodhain, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4444.736; Giovanni Trolli: P. Gérard, 
‘Giovanni Battista TROLLI’ dans Institut Royal Colonial Belge, Biographie Coloniale Belge (Bruxelles, 1955), t. IV, 
col. 885.
408 ‘Rapport annuel 1917. Service de l’Hygiène’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.6.
409 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 137-139. In addition to the effects of the military campaign, notably on members 
of the ‘Force Publique’, David Van Reybrouck also points, for example, to the institution of ‘cultures 
obligatoires’ to sustain the war effort and the general ‘pause’ in the embryonic efforts to ‘improve the native’s 
fate’. Van Reybrouck, Congo: een geschiedenis (Amsterdam, 2010) pp. 151, 153.
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causing a population decline, resulting in a labour force crisis that threatened the 
colony’s economic exploitation or ‘mise en valeur’, and Belgium’s ‘civilising mission’.410 
As a result, attention turned more decidedly to African health by the 1920s, and 
significant steps were taken to increase medical provision in the Congo’s rural areas.411 
The Belgian colonial administration was not alone in doing so, and operated in what 
Samuel Coghe has described as an interwar context of cross-border interactions in the 
field of African health.412 In fact, far from signalling a complete end to medical 
internationalism, the interwar years saw plenty of occasions for inter-imperial 
exchanges pertaining to health and medicine in colonial Africa. ‘Informal relationships 
among medical scientists, notably between Belgian doctors and French Pasteurians 
(sic)’, for example, continued throughout the period.413 Other significant initiatives were 
the new attempts at more formal collaboration, evident, for example, in the 
organisation of a West African tropical medicine conference in Luanda in July 1923 at 
the instigation of the Angolan health services, but with the cooperation of medical 
directors in the Belgian Congo and AEF.414 In Luanda, over seventy Portuguese, Belgian, 
French, and British colonial and metropolitan experts gathered to discuss health care 
for indigenous peoples.415
In the case of Angola, Coghe argues, such exchanges between colonial health services 
were part of a ‘processes of inter-imperial borrowing’ that shaped the creation of a more 
comprehensive public health scheme in the Portuguese colony.416 In the Belgian Congo 
as well, attention turned to the development of what was labelled ‘Assistance Médicale 
aux Indigènes’ (AMI) as part of the postwar extension of colonial medical provision. The 
aim was to strengthen the ‘medical grip on the natives at home’, notably in the colony’s 
rural interior. A key component was the creation of a network of medical providers 
associated with ‘fixed’ health centres such as hospitals, dispensaries, rural clinics etc. 
African auxiliaries and private sector providers were to play a major role in this 
endeavour.417 In 1920, for example, colonial authorities decided to establish six state 
schools for ‘indigenous medical assistants’. These were to receive a higher-level medical 
education than the Congolese nurses at the existing school for ‘infirmiers’ in Boma, so 
410 Vice-Governor General Moulaert, ‘Problème (sic) coloniaux. Le Service d’Hygiène’, 23.11.1918, MAEAA, GG, 
16862 (GG); Lyons 1992, Colonial Disease, p. 25.
411 Hunt, Colonial Lexicon, p. 176.
412 S. Coghe, ‘Inter-imperial learning and the establishment of Assistência Médica aos Indigenas in Angola in 
the interwar period’, paper presented at the workshop Colonial Careers: Transnational Scholarship Overseas in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries, European University Institute (2012).
413 Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical medicine’, 1263.
414 Coghe, ‘Inter-imperial learning’, p. 3.
415 Ibid., pp. 3-4; Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical medicine’, 1268.
416 Coghe, ‘Inter-imperial learning’, pp. 1-2.
417 J. Rodhain, ‘Les grands problèmes de l’hygiène et l’organisation du service médicale au Congo belge’, Congo. 
Revue générale de la Colonie belge 2 (1926), 1, 20; A. Dubois et A. Duren, ‘Soixante ans d’organisation médicale 
au Congo belge’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale, 27 (1947), 8, 10; A. Cornet, Politiques de 
santé et contrôle social au Rwanda, 1920-1940 (Paris, 2011), p. 26.
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that they could provide basic health care in remote villages and in the process 
counteract the influence of indigenous healers.418 1920 also saw the establishment of an 
‘auxiliary’ AMI service, called ‘Assistance Médicale aux Indigènes Bénévole’ (AMIB), to 
stimulate and expand the medical provision of mission societies, with their lazarets and 
dispensaries, under the state’s guidance.419 Finally, assistance was also increasingly 
sought from private companies with medical services to look after the wider indigenous 
population within their concessions, and from philanthropic medical organisations such 
as the Red Cross and the ‘Fondation Médical de l’Université de Louvain au Congo’.420
Amid the renewed concerns for indigenous health, however, the Belgian Congo’s 
medical authorities - just like the Pastorians in French Africa - in particular ‘sold 
sleeping sickness control as a remedy to depopulation and as a means of exercising 
responsible colonial rule’.421 In his annual report for 1920, chief medical officer Rodhain 
declared it ‘the most widespread and most serious of general affections from which the 
indigenous population suffers’.422 His successor Giovanni Trolli confirmed in his 1925 
report that ‘trypanosomiasis certainly (was) the gravest of all diseases decimating the 
Congo’s populations’.423 
This view was further reinforced through inter-imperial interactions, notably those 
under League of Nations Health Organisation (LNHO) auspices, which constructed 
sleeping sickness as a major African health issue and even a particularly ‘Congolese’ 
problem. Reflecting a new form of medical internationalism after the First World war, 
the LNHO started taking significant steps to improve coordination between colonial 
powers in the fight against African trypanosomiasis. In 1922, it set up a tropical diseases 
expert committee to collect information about tuberculosis and sleeping sickness in 
Equatorial Africa and the measures adopted to control them. In addition to the French 
and British sleeping sickness specialists Gustave Martin and Andrew Balfour (later 
joined by Arthur Bagshawe, director of the London Tropical Diseases Bureau), the expert 
committee counted Emile Van Campenhout, head of the colonial medical department in 
Brussels, among its members.424 The committee’s meetings resulted in two major League 
418 ‘Congo Belge. Rapport Annuel 1920’, 1922, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9; E. Van Campenhout, ‘Programme Hygiénique 
et Sanitaire dans la Colonie du Congo Belge’, 22.11.1921, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.604; Rapport sur l’Hygiène 
Publique pendant l’Année 1925, p. 20.
419 ‘Congo Belge. Rapport Annuel 1920’, 1922, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9; G. Trolli, ‘Rapport Annuel 1920. Service 
d’Hygiène’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9.
420 ‘Congo Belge. Rapport Annuel 1920’, 1922, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9; Lyons, M. ‘Public health in colonial Africa’, p. 
367, 371. At the least, a 1921 labour law ‘made employers responsible for their workers’ health’. Hunt, Colonial 
Lexicon, p. 162. 
421 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 627.
422 ‘Congo Belge. Rapport Annuel 1920’, 1922, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9.
423 Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, p. 10.
424 I. Borowy, Coming to Terms with World Health. The League of Nations Health Organisation 1921-1946 (Frankfurt, 
2009), pp. 109-110; ‘League of Nations. Tropical Diseases. Committee of Experts. Meeting Friday, November 10, 
1922, at 11am’, 1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.912; ‘Société des Nations. Section d’Information. Maladies 
tropicales en Afrique’, 1922.11, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.912; E. Van Campenhout, ‘Résumé des travaux de la 
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of Nations (LN) conferences on sleeping sickness, one in London in 1925 and the other in 
Paris in 1928, attended by French, British, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish and Belgian 
delegates (the latter including Van Campenhout and Rodhain). They also gave rise to an 
international, LN-backed sleeping sickness expedition in 1926-1927, based at Entebbe in 
Uganda and comprised of British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and German scientists.425 
These initiatives contributed significantly to a comparing of sleeping sickness situations 
in different African territories. Tellingly, during the opening address of the 1925 London 
conference, the British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies argued that ‘there 
(was) probably no part of Africa where the problem (was) more serious than in the 
Belgian and French Congo’, and further cross-border comparisons in the context of the 
LNHO’s trypanosomiasis initiatives strengthened this view.426 As a result, ‘indigenous 
medical assistance’ in the Belgian Congo was largely reduced to sleeping sickness 
control in the 1920s. 
5.2 Prioritising ‘itinerant medicinal prophylaxis’
As the Congolese authorities once again turned their attention to sleeping sickness after 
the First World War, the issue of how best to tackle it soon resurfaced. The campaign as 
it had been conducted before the war was hardly deemed a success. The colony’s vice-
Governor General Moulaert complained in 1918 that the administration had focused on 
fighting the disease with ‘texts instead of personnel and a budget’.427 Among the most 
outspoken critics was the Russian-born state doctor Jacques Schwetz, who had started 
his career in the Congo in 1909, after medical and malariology studies in Lausanne and 
commission de médecins spécialistes convoqués à Londres par la Société des Nations, du 10 au 13 novembre 
1922’, 15.11.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.912.
425 ‘Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. L’Etude de la maladie du sommeil et de la tuberculose dans 
l’Afrique Equatoriale’, 4.5.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.914; Lyndhurst Duke, ‘League of Nations. Paper No I. 
General Review of the activities of the commission. Interim report of the League of Nations International 
Commission on Human Trypanosomiasis’, 12.1926, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.11; ‘Société des Nations. Organisation 
d’Hygiène. Rapport de la séance du Comité d’Experts de la Maladie du Sommeil en Afrique Equatoriale, tenu à 
Londres, le 15 décembre 1927’, 26.3.1928, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525; ‘Société des Nations. Section 
d’Information. 12 novembre. Deuxième Conférence de la Maladie du Sommeil’, ITG, Onderzoek 5.2.11.
426 ‘Opening Address to the League of Nations Conference on Sleeping Sickness in Africa. By the Chairman, the 
Honourable W.G. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., F.R.G.S., Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies’, 19.5.1925, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4461.914. See also, for example: ‘Société des Nations. Seconde conférence internationale sur la 
maladie du sommeil. Sous-commission d’administration. Première séance tenue à Paris, le mardi 6 novembre 
1928 à 10 heures’, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525.
427 Vice-Governor General Moulaert, ‘Problème (sic) coloniaux. Le Service d’Hygiène’, 23.11.1918, MAEAA, GG, 
16862 (GG). 
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Paris.428 After a stint as director of the Tanganyika lazaret, a system he found no more 
than a ‘palliative’, with ‘no influence whatsoever on the course of the disease’, he had 
spent much time studying trypanosomiasis and in particular tsetse flies in Katanga’s 
Lomami district since late 1912.429 By 1918, he concluded that sleeping sickness control 
in the Congo was a ‘fiasco’. The prescribed measures were difficult to apply in practice, 
he argued, and did not take varying local circumstances into account.430 In fact, Schwetz 
found that sleeping sickness epidemiology was still so poorly understood that attempts 
at prophylaxis remained unsuccessful. Now that the war was over, he reasoned, the first 
course of action required was to revive the study of aetiology and epidemiology.431 
The plan to devote himself to further scientific enquiries in the field was quickly 
thwarted, however. In 1918, Schwetz was called to the Kwango district in the southwest 
of the Belgian Congo to gauge the reportedly alarming sleeping sickness situation in the 
Kwilu area, and draw up an immediate plan of action.432 After an exploratory tour, he 
proposed establishing a special medical mission, dedicated entirely to systematically 
screening Kwilu’s population for sleeping sickness and treating all trypanosome-
carrying individuals with trypanocides. According to Schwetz, such a mission, 
autonomous from the territorial service and also independent from the chief medical 
officer, and composed of mobile teams of doctors and auxiliaries, was ‘the last remedy to 
try’, and the ‘least impossible option’ in a range of sleeping sickness control measures 
that had in his view all failed miserably so far.433 
Schwetz’s medical mission program entailed a prioritisation of pharmaceutical 
sleeping sickness control, and thus continued the approach favoured by the Leopoldville 
laboratory doctors before the war. He would later refer to this ‘prophylaxie 
médicamenteuse’ as an ‘offensive’ form of sleeping sickness control because it sought to 
‘active(ly)’ destroy trypanosomes, in contrast to the more ‘defensive’ and ‘passive’ 
428 Schwetz, Evolution de la médecine, p. 5.
429 Ibid., pp. 16, 93; J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Nord-Katanga (Congo belge) en 1913-1918’, 
10.1919.10, MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG).
430 J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Nord-Katanga (Congo belge) en 1913-1918’, 10.1919, MAEAA, GG, 
15712 (GG); J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, 
en 1920 (février 1920-février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu). 
431 J. Schwetz, ‘Un voyage entomologique de Kabinda dans la région de Kisenga (7 mai - 12 juillet 1918). 
Douzième rapport (suite au dixième) sur la répartition des glossines dans le Nord-Katanga’, 25.7.1918, MAEAA, 
GG, 15712 (GG); J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Nord-Katanga (Congo belge) en 1913-1918’, 10.1919, 
MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG).
432 J. Schwetz to Chief Medical Officer, 27.7.1918, MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG); J. Schwetz to District Commissioner, 
6.9.1918, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332. 
433 J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); J. 
Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Moyen Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, 
MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG); J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du 
Kwilu-Kwango, en 1920 (février 1920-février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, 
Kwilu).
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measures focused on avoiding infection through monitoring population movement.434 
His proposal for Kwilu soon met with approval from the authorities in Brussels. Emile 
Van Campenhout from the colonial medical department concurred with the strategy, as 
he considered it to be in line with his department’s vision of a campaign based on 
‘prophylactic and curative treatment’.435 Towards the end of 1919, Minister Louis Franck 
appointed Schwetz as director of the autonomous medical mission to be set up in 
Kwilu.436 Although somewhat reluctant to take on this task, the Russian doctor 
subsequently embarked upon a sleeping sickness mission in Kikwit territory in 1920, 
together with a team of doctors, ‘agents sanitaires’, and African nurses.437 As will be 
described in more detail in chapter 9, the mission’s target zone was divided among the 
team members, and activities focused on ‘curative work and (…) medicinal prophylaxis 
on the spot’ with Atoxyl.438 
Soon enough, central medical authorities in both colony and metropole endorsed 
Schwetz’s approach to sleeping sickness control, predicated on the mass drug treatment 
of trypanosome carriers by special medical missions composed of itinerant staff. They 
were impressed with the sheer number of people Schwetz and his small team - backed 
by new sleeping sickness regulations introduced in 1920 and prescribing compulsory 
screening and treatment of all infected individuals - managed to examine and treat.439 
The Congo’s annual medical report for 1920 found that the special sleeping sickness 
mission delivered an ‘energetic’ effort in the face of chronic medical staff shortages.440 In 
an overview of the colony’s public health program in 1921, Van Campenhout promoted 
the ‘methodical sterilisation’ of all cases of sleeping sickness by itinerant ‘prophylactic 
missions’ composed of doctors and European and African auxiliaries as the favoured, 
‘most practical’ strategy of human trypanosomiasis control.441 
Rodhain, appointed chief medical officer in 1920, initially did not want to go as far as 
Schwetz in condemning other prophylactic measures and appeared keen to adjust the 
sleeping sickness doctor’s independent stance on therapeutic and diagnostic 
434 Schwetz, Evolution de la médecine, p. 86.
435 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil au Kwilu. Rapport du Dr Schwetz’, 10.6.1919, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
436 Minister of Colonies Louis Franck to Governor General, 9.12.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
437 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
438 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, en 1920 
(février 1920-février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
439 G. Trolli, ‘Rapport Annuel 1920. Service d’Hygiène’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9; ‘Ordonnance du 8 Juillet 1920, n
°57/7, déterminant les mesures à prendre pour combattre la maladie du sommeil’ dans Bulletin administratif et 
commercial du Congo belge (Boma, 1920), pp. 690-697. Africans found infected were prohibited from traveling 
before completing an adequate course of treatment.
440 ‘Congo Belge. Rapport Annuel 1920’, 1922, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9.
441 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Programme Hygiénique et Sanitaire dans la Colonie du Congo Belge’, 22.11.1921, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.604.
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procedures.442 Nevertheless, a few years into the Kwango medical mission, he confirmed 
and advocated ‘itinerant medicinal prophylaxis’, as the most ‘active’ method of sleeping 
sickness control, relegating other strategies to the rank of ‘adjuvants précieux’.443 In a 
number of circulars issued in 1923, Rodhain highlighted the many practical obstacles 
associated with ‘mechanical’ or ‘biological’ prophylaxis, aimed primarily at separating 
human hosts from fly vectors.444 While this was at least a theoretical option in the 
Belgian Congo, in practice it was unfeasible, he argued. The long-distance relocation of 
indigenous communities to tsetse-free areas made little sense given the scarcity of such 
zones in the Congo. Moreover, just like the lazaret hospitalisation of all infected 
individuals, it was too disruptive to indigenous life. ‘Radical’ controls on African 
mobility, especially the restriction of traffic between infected and non-infected regions, 
hampered the colonial economy, and the destruction of tsetse habitat through brush 
clearing had to be done on too large a scale to be both effective and practical.445 
 The solution, Rodhain continued, was ‘medicinal’ or ‘chemical’ prophylaxis, i.e. the 
‘therapeutic suppression of virus reservoirs’. It required a systematic detection and 
periodic treatment of trypanosome carriers to at least obtain a ‘durable sterilisation of 
the blood circulation’, and Atoxyl and tartar emetic constituted the basis of therapy.446 
The goal of mass treatment in the Belgian Congo was in his view primarily, although not 
exclusively, prophylactic. According to Rodhain, the more intensive and regular the 
treatment, the more chances of obtaining a ‘durable cure’, at least in early cases, so 
wherever possible, prophylaxis had to be organised in such a way as to give the largest 
number of patients the best chances of a cure.447 
Rodhain’s support for pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control after the First World 
War perhaps hardly came as a surprise given his history of drug therapy research at the 
Leopoldville laboratory. In addition, medicinal prophylaxis presented an opportunity in 
his longstanding quest to improve the number and social position of physicians in 
colonial state service. In the aftermath of the First World War, calls from the Congo to 
address this issue had resumed and grew ever louder. Rodhain, for example, advocated 
more medical autonomy from territorial authorities, an improved hierarchical 
442 J. Rodhain to J. Schwetz, 21.4.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
443 Maladie du Sommeil au Congo - Missions médicales, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.333.
444 ‘Biological’ in the sense that it required substantial knowledge of tsetse fly biology.
445 J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Considérations pratiques sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 
20.11.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7, pp. 3-4.
446 Rodhain found that Bayer 205 constituted ‘important progress’ in sleeping sickness therapy, but that its use 
was premature given the delay in its commercial release. See J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Considérations 
pratiques sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 20.11.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7; J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-
circulaire “Suite aux considérations sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 30.3.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 
5.2.7, pp. 5-7.
447 J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Considérations pratiques sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 
20.11.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7, p. 7.
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organisation, and better financial rewards.448 Others joined in the pleas for an overhaul 
of the colony’s medical organisation, which was explicitly linked to (solving) its medical 
recruitment problems.449 The sense of urgency to act on these matters increased 
substantially when itinerant medicinal prophylaxis was promoted as the most viable 
option of sleeping sickness control, and more broadly, as the solution to Congo’s 
depopulation and labour force crisis. Schwetz himself was highly critical of the 
miserable ‘material’ and ‘moral’ situation colonial doctors found themselves in. He 
especially loathed their subjection to the authority of district commissioners, a state of 
affairs he blamed on the absence of an autonomous medical service in the colony. He 
had therefore proposed a medical mission operating independently from local 
administrators to institute mass treatment in Kwilu in 1919.450 Medicinal prophylaxis 
reinforced the message that the sleeping sickness campaign and in fact the colony as a 
whole above all else required coordinated medical action by a sufficient and sufficiently 
powerful cadre of qualified health providers. Sleeping sickness control, in other words, 
could not simply be left to and was increasingly beyond the remit of the territorial 
service. 
In this way, and although the Schwetz mission itself did initially not fall under the 
chief medical officer’s orders, pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control helped make the 
case for an autonomous medical service in the colony, with a proper hierarchical 
structure that allowed for satisfactory career progression. In December 1922, the 
reorganisation finally took off with a royal decree and subsequent legislation 
establishing an independent medical service, headed by the chief medical officer and 
directly placed under the Governor General’s authority rather than conceived as a mere 
branch of the territorial service.451 A new administrative level was also created, with 
provincial health services directed by ‘médecins provinciaux’ (assisted by a few 
‘médecins inspecteurs’) making up the colony’s official medical organisation.452 
Provincial doctors answered to the ‘médecin en chef ’ and his team, and supervised staff 
448 J. Rodhain to Chief Medical Officer Heiberg, 23.7.1917, MAEAA, GG, 16862 (GG); J. Rodhain to Minister of 
Colonies, 11.9.1918, MAEAA, GG, 16862 (GG). 
449 Vice-Governor General Moulaert, ‘Problème (sic) coloniaux. Le Service d’Hygiène’, 23.11.1918, MAEAA, GG, 
16862 (GG); A. Broden and vice-Governor General Moulaert, Note concerning colonial medical service, 
30.11.1919, ITG, FD26; ‘Rapport annuel 1921’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.10; Professor Malvoz to Minister of 
Colonies, 21.3.1921, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4442.723.
450 J. Schwetz, ‘Note sur la situation des médecins au Congo’, 26.7.1919, ITG, FD7. 
451 J. Rodhain, ‘Service de l’hygiène. Rapport annuel 1922’, 31.8.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.604; Trolli, Vanhove 
et Marquet, ‘Exposé de la legislation sanitaire’, p. 578; Dubois et Duren, ‘Soixante ans d’organisation médicale’, 
6; ‘Ordonnance du 15 Décembre 1922, n°8/7, réglant l’organisation générale et le fonctionnement du service de 
l’Hygiène’ dans Bulletin administratif et commercial du Congo belge (Boma, 1923), p. 63; ‘Arrêté Royal du 4 
Décembre 1922, réorganisant le service de l’Hygiène de la Colonie et déterminant ses attributions’ dans Bulletin 
administratif et commercial du Congo belge (Boma, 1923), pp. 55-61.
452 ‘Ordonnance du 15 Décembre 1922’, p. 64; J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport général sur le fonctionnement du service de 
l’Hygiène durant l’exercice 1924’, 2.9.1925, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.12; Trolli, Vanhove et Marquet, ‘Exposé de la 
legislation sanitaire’, p. 578.
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working for one of the three divisions within their provincial health service: hygiene, 
territorial medical practice, and research. Depending on their function and place within 
the medical organisation, state doctors in the interwar period were classified into three 
major categories, each of which comprised several hierarchical grades: ‘médecins 
dirigeants’ (responsible for the administration and inspection of the medical service), 
‘médecins hygiénistes et de laboratoire’ (dealing with sanitation and hygiene, laboratory 
analysis and research), and ‘médecins territoriaux’ (‘itinerant’ and ‘resident’ doctors 
delivering ambulatory services and practicing in fixed health centres respectively).453 
Hygienists, laboratory and territorial doctors were assisted by and supervised different 
categories of European and African medical auxiliaries, such as ‘agents sanitaires’, and 
Congolese medical assistants and nurses.454 
For the colony’s medical authorities, the notion that pharmaceutical treatment 
constituted an appropriate means of sleeping sickness control was further reinforced 
through cross-border interactions, notably with French Pastorians. Formal and informal 
exchanges led to inter-imperial comparisons of prophylactic strategies that informed 
and confirmed the approach adopted in the Belgian Congo as pioneered by the Schwetz 
special mission. In 1920, for example, Van Campenhout saw many similarities between 
the course of action followed in the Congo and the control method based on 
prophylactic treatment described by French doctor Eugène Jamot in an article in the 
‘Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique’. As director of the Brazzaville Pasteur 
Institute, Jamot had initiated a new method of sleeping sickness control in AEF in 1916, 
entailing a comprehensive screening and treatment of all trypanosome carriers in 
defined ‘target sectors’ by mobile teams of doctors as well as European and African 
nurses.455 In ‘la Jamotique’, Belgian colonial authorities clearly found confirmation to 
pursue itinerant medicinal prophylaxis in their own colony.456 The Luanda conference 
provided further validation of pharmaceutical control strategies. It included a session on 
sleeping sickness, which was chaired by Rodhain and dominated by representatives from 
French, Portuguese and Belgian colonies presenting on trypanocide therapy and 
medicinal prophylaxis.457 Among the speakers were French pioneer Jamot and his 
counterparts in the Belgian Congo: Emile Lejeune, who had advocated ambulatory 
treatment before the war and now headed the medical service of Congo-Kasai Province, 
and Jacques Schwetz, director of the special sleeping sickness mission in the same 
province. Although he did not acknowledge any French sources of inspiration, Schwetz 
conceded that his Kwilu mission resembled the ‘prophylactic sectors’ toured by mobile 
453 ‘Ordonnance du 15 Décembre 1922’, 65-66; ‘Arrêté Royal du 4 Décembre 1922’, pp. 55-56; ‘Trolli, Vanhove et 
Marquet, ‘Exposé de la legislation sanitaire’, p. 579; Dubois et Duren, ‘Soixante ans d’organisation médicale’, 6.
454 Trolli, Vanhove et Marquet, ‘Exposé de la legislation sanitaire’, p. 579.
455 Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness, p. 346-351; Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 627-628.
456 E. Van Campenhout to Secrétaire Général, 13.7.1920, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; Minister of Colonies to 
Governor Général, 17.7.1920, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301. Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 627.
457 P. Walravens, ‘Compte-rendu du Congrès de médecine tropicale en Afrique occidentale (St-Paul de Luanda)’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 3 (1923), 193-196.
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teams screening and treating trypanosome carriers in the French Congo.458 Lejeune as 
well referred to both AEF and the Belgian Congo in a contribution endorsing ‘la 
prophylaxie médicamenteuse’ as the most viable option.459 
Cross-border comparisons pointed to obvious similarities in French and Belgian 
Africa, but at the same time also highlighted local specificities. For example, AEF doctors 
in 1924 reported diverging organisational principles as well as therapeutic and 
diagnostic procedures in their prophylactic sectors and Schwetz’s prophylactic mission, 
leading them to designate the latter as the ‘Belgian method’.460 In contrast to their own 
approach, it entailed the use of clinical rather than microscopic diagnostic procedures, 
prolonged courses of treatment that reflected a more ambitious combination of 
prophylactic and curative goals, and an intensive focus on a small sphere of action from 
which activity could be gradually expanded to avoid overstretching.461 
5.3 Scaling up the campaign: official special missions and 
private sector assistance
In the wake of Schwetz’s results in Kwilu, the Belgian colony’s medical leaders were very 
eager to expand the number of prophylactic sleeping sickness missions in the Congo. In 
an effort to mobilise further political support and resources, Van Campenhout, for 
example, tried to convince the Colonial Minister that special missions like the one 
headed by Schwetz not only produced ‘purely medical and humanitarian results’, but 
also provided great ‘political and fiscal benefits’.462 It appears that central political 
authorities were not deaf to such pleas. In the course of the (early) 1920s, the sleeping 
sickness campaign was scaled up, and several new special missions, directed by state 
458 J. Schwetz, ‘Compte-rendu succinct des travaux de la mission médicale du Kwango Kasai en 1920-1923’, 
Revista Médica dé Angola 4 (1923), 152. Later historical overviews traced the origins of the Schwetz mission to 
the prewar ambulatory treatment initiatives of Belgian colonial doctors such as Lejeune, Mouchet and Dubois. 
See Dubois et Duren, ‘Soixante ans d’organisation médicale’, 8.
459 E. Lejeune, ‘La prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil; son organisation au Congo belge’, Revista Médica dé 
Angola 4 (1923), 179, 186, 188; P. G. Janssens, ‘Eugène Jamot et Emile Lejeune. Pages d’histoire’, Annales de la 
Société Belge de médecine Tropicale 75 (1995), 4-5.
460 ‘La maladie du sommeil en Afrique Equatoriale Française par le Dr Brau - médecin principal de 1ère classe’, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.915.
461 M. Blanchard et J. Laigret, ‘Sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil; à propos de la Mission Schwetz au 
Congo belge’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique et de sa Filiale de l’Ouest Africain 17 (1924), 485-496.
462 E. Van Campenhout to Minister of Colonies, 18.12.1922, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.10.
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doctors and incorporated into the colonial medical service, were established throughout 
the Congo, including in Uele, Bangala, Mayumbe and Dibaya.463 
For central political authorities, relying on prophylactic sleeping sickness missions 
and thus on pharmaceuticals to tackle the Congo’s principal disease presented a few 
immediate benefits from a political-economic perspective. It allowed a ‘magic-bullet 
approach’ to public health, whereby the latter was defined as a medical, and more 
specifically a medicinal, problem. Dealing with the broader ecology of sleeping sickness 
and the social roots of ill health could thus be avoided.464 Moreover, entrusting medicinal 
prophylaxis to itinerant teams enabled the colonial state to protect public health in the 
colony’s rural interior through a simple ‘delivery of technology’, without (first) having 
to attend to the nonexistent or at best embryonic medical infrastructure in remote 
areas.465 Preventing disease via the distribution of medical drugs seemed cheaper in the 
short term than promoting more comprehensive health measures. In that sense, one 
could argue that pharmaceuticalisation was an important condition for the ‘ruralisation’ 
of medical provision in the Congo after the First World War.466 
Furthermore, as Rodhain had argued, prioritising medicinal over mechanical 
prophylaxis greatly reduced the need for isolation, large-scale relocations and cordons 
sanitaires that hampered tax collection and labour recruitment at a time of accelerating 
economic development (which was geared to the production of export commodities), 
and provoked hostility.467 In fact, the itinerant medicinal prophylaxis program was 
deemed to better suit the ‘indigenous mentality’.468 At the same time, as Van 
Campenhout had pointed out, the medicinal campaign could help the Belgians to 
tighten their grip on rural African communities. The sleeping sickness missions 
performed administratively and fiscally useful work in surveying and documenting 
colonial subjects in areas where state control had so far been rather limited.469 Schwetz 
463 ‘Congo Belge. Service de l’hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1923’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.11; J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport 
général sur le fonctionnement du service de l’Hygiène durant l’exercice 1924’, 2.9.1925, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.12; 
Médecin en Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2; G. 
Trolli, ‘Colonie du Congo Belge. Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1929’, 1931, MAEAA, RA-CB, 
83.2; Lyons, Colonial Disease, 141-142.
464 Biehl, ‘Pharmaceutical governance’, p. 222; Lyons, Colonial Disease, 102, 223, 228-229.
465 Biehl, ‘Pharmaceutical governance’, p. 222; Monnais, ‘Colonial medicines to global pharmaceuticals’, 261; 
Médecin en Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2.
466 Monnais, ‘Colonial medicines to global pharmaceuticals’, 261.
467 On the contradiction between cordons sanitaires and rubber tax collection, see Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 35.
468 Médecin en Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2.
469 Through the preparatory work of population surveys and regrouping, they facilitated political 
administration and taxation in rural areas. E. Van Campenhout to Minister of Colonies, 18.12.1922, MAEAA, RA-
CB, 81.10. Jamot’s model of sleeping sickness control also ‘counted, numbered, tracked and documented’ the 
inhabitants of the prophylactic sectors. Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 628.
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himself had labelled his endeavour in Kwilu a ‘medical-administrative mission’, thus 
revealing that it was in fact far from politically neutral.470 
Finally, distributing trypanocides via dedicated mobile teams helped the colonial 
administration to be seen to the outside world as doing something about the revived 
sleeping sickness epidemic and thus providing indigenous health.471 This was not 
unimportant in an interwar context of increased inter-imperial scrutiny of colonies’ 
African trypanosomiasis record, especially in the context of the LNHO initiatives. That 
the disease quickly became the subject of comparisons among colonial powers after the 
war is illustrated, for example, by the response of the Congo’s vice-Governor General in 
Boma to Jamot’s article on sleeping sickness control in 1920. He claimed that his doctors 
had nothing to learn from Jamot, as they had been thinking about ‘systematic 
atoxylisation’ just as much as the French.472 It seems that by 1925, the Belgians - together 
with the French - had largely established an international reputation for pharmaceutical 
disease control. What became clear in the cross-border comparisons made during the LN 
conferences, for example, was that different (epidemiological) circumstances prevailed 
in different African territories, so that it was unfeasible to apply the same prophylactic 
measures everywhere. In the 1920s, sleeping sickness was increasingly constructed as a 
problem of French and Belgian colonies tackled with pharmaceuticals, whereas British 
delegates highlighted the importance of animal trypanosomiasis and tsetse fly 
control.473 
However, despite notable support from central political authorities for medicinal 
prophylaxis via special medical missions, official staff and monetary resources were not 
even remotely sufficient to at once extend it to all infected areas within the Belgian 
colony’s vast territory.474 To deal with the colonial medical service’s perennial shortage 
of European doctors, the administration was already to a large extent counting on 
auxiliaries in state service.475 Of particular significance were the European ‘agents 
470 J. Schwetz, Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923 (Bruxelles, 
1924), pp. 1-2.
471 Reynolds Whyte, van der Geest and Hardon, Social Lives of Medicines, pp. 88-89.
472 Vice-Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 29.9.1920.9.29, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
473 ‘Opening Address to the League of Nations Conference on Sleeping Sickness in Africa. By the Chairman, the 
Honourable W.G. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., F.R.G.S., Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies’, 19.5.1925, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4461.914; ‘Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. Deuxième conférence internationale de la 
maladie du sommeil. Première séance, tenue à Paris, le lundi 5 novembre 1928, à 10h’, 12.1928, MAEAA, Affaires 
Etrangères, 2934.525; ‘Société des Nations. Seconde conférence internationale sur la maladie du sommeil. Sous-
commission d’administration. Première séance tenue à Paris, le mardi 6 novembre 1928 à 10 heures’, MAEAA, 
Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525; ‘Société des Nations. Seconde conférence internationale sur la maladie du 
sommeil. Sous-commission d’Administration. 2e séance, tenue à Paris le mardi 6 novembre 1928 à 15 heures’, 
MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525; ‘Société des Nations. Section d’Information. 12 novembre. Deuxième 
Conférence de la Maladie du Sommeil’, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.11.
474 Note on the Schwetz mission and the Rockefeller Institute’s collaboration in the sleeping sickness campaign, 
1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; ‘League of Nations. Health Organisation’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4410.378.
475 ‘Chambre des Représentants. Session de 1920-1921. Rapport sur l’Administration du Congo belge pendant 
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sanitaires’. This category of medical staff had been created in 1919, and several 
participated in the Schwetz mission.476 In addition, medical authorities planned to 
extend the mass treatment campaign by recruiting rudimentarily trained African 
injectors.477 Dissatisfied with the quantity and quality of certified Congolese nurses, 
Schwetz had started training indigenous helpers on the spot to perform routine tasks in 
the framework of his special mission.478 The practice was endorsed by for instance 
Rodhain, as medical authorities recognised that due to infrastructural problems and 
difficulties with student recruitment at the schools for ‘indigenous medical assistants’, 
progress with the development of a cadre of formally trained African medical staff was 
rather slow.479 
To reach even more trypanosome carriers, the colonial administration also 
increasingly appealed to the private sector, especially missionary AMI providers, to 
cooperate in the pharmaceutical fight against sleeping sickness.480 Several Catholic and 
Protestant mission societies had of course been involved in providing sleeping sickness 
treatment since at least 1910. The creation of the AMIB after the war provided a useful 
channel to more efficiently harness their participation in medicinal prophylaxis. In 
return for free trypanocides and subsidies, AMIB members were expected to assist with 
the systematic detection and treatment of trypanosome-infected individuals under the 
guidance of the special medical missions.481 In addition, the government called on 
private companies, whose labour recruitment was thought to contribute to the spread of 
human trypanosomiasis because it increased African mobility, to tackle the disease 
within their concessions.482 One of the most active enterprises in this respect was the 
Forminière mining company: in 1923 it set up an autonomous sleeping sickness mission 
in Kasai, modelled on the one Schwetz had established in Kwango. Like other companies 
whose medical staff provided trypanocide treatment, Forminière was supplied with free 
l’année 1919’, 1920, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.8; ‘Congo Belge. Rapport Annuel 1920’, 1922, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9; G. 
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30.3.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7; ‘Rapport annuel 1921’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.10; ‘Congo Belge. Service de 
l’hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1923’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.11; J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport général sur le fonctionnement 
du service de l’Hygiène durant l’exercice 1924’, 1925.9.2, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.12; Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique 
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drugs by the administration.483 In that way, much of the AMI resources were centred on 
sleeping sickness control in the 1920s.
5.4 Drug supply challenges: ‘rationalisation’ and the 
emergence of a Belgian synthetic pharmaceuticals 
industry 
The postwar widening of the trypanocide market as a result of the expansion of mass 
treatment by official and private AMI providers posed its own challenges to Brussels. 
Central authorities had to ensure a regular and adequate supply of effective 
trypanocides to be administered to Congolese trypanosome carriers free of cost. These 
pharmaceuticals were not produced locally but had to be imported, something that had 
hardly proved possible during the First World War. In the 1920s, efforts were made to 
‘rationalise’ drug procurement and distribution, in order to ensure and optimise the 
provision of trypanocides to medical staff in the colony while keeping the costs down.484 
The interwar period, in other words, saw the Belgian colonial administration adopt 
measures aimed at balancing the needs of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control with 
a desire to limit drug expenditure and dependence on German trypanocide 
manufacturers. 
By the 1920s, trypanocides for the colonial market were procured centrally by the 
Colonial Ministry in Brussels, which charged the pharmaceutical service of the Belgian 
Army in Antwerp with purchasing prescription drugs in bulk.485 Assessing local drug 
needs was of course key to this undertaking. Before the First World War, a standard 
selection of medicines was automatically sent to all state doctors in the Congo at regular 
intervals. However, the shortcomings of these automatic dispatches (i.e. the fact that 
483 Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, pp. 11-12; G. Trolli, Royaume de Belgique. Colonie du Congo 
belge. Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927 (Gand, 1928), pp. 9, 11; Governor General to Director of 
Forminière Mr. Cayen, 7.7.1926, MAEAA, GG, 16835 (Congo-Kasai); Director of Forminière Mr. Cayen to 
Governor of Congo-Kasai, 5.6.1926, MAEAA, GG, 16835 (Congo-Kasai).
484 On drug procurement and distribution as ‘components of a rational drugs policy’, cf. Najmi Kanji, ‘Action at 
country level’, p. 65.
485 See for example: Minister of Colonies to A. Broden, 31.10.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; Director of the 
Pharmacie Centrale de l’Armée, ‘Ministère de la Défence Nationale. Expédition des Marchandises de la 
Pharmacie Centrale de l’Armée pour la Colonie du Congo Belge’, 1927, MAEAA, GG, 16802 (Congo-Kasai, 
Léopoldville); Minister of Colonies to Governor General, 8.10.1936, MAEAA, GG, 16754 (GG). On ‘bulk 
purchasing’ and ‘centralized (sic) procurement system(s)’ as elements of the rational drug policies adopted in 
developing countries since the 1970s, see: M. Mamdani, ‘Early initiatives in essential drugs policy’ in Kanji, 
Hardon, Harnmeijer, Mamdani and Walt, Drugs Policy in Developing Countries, pp. 8-9.
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they were not attuned to local needs) led to their replacement with a system that 
required medical practitioners to periodically submit formal drug ‘requisitions’ in 
1911.486 This, in turn, led to complaints in Brussels about the exaggerated quantities and 
the nature of the medicines (i.e. too many commercial specialties) requested.487 
Subsequently, in a sign that Broden’s therapeutic reform agenda was increasingly taking 
hold, official formularies containing a more limited list of approved drugs that could be 
prescribed at the state’s expense were introduced in the 1920s to curb costly demands 
for innumerable branded specialties.488 The forms indicating the requested drug 
quantities were centralised per province, examined by the head of the medical service to 
weed out excessive or unauthorised demands, and subsequently transmitted to Brussels, 
where the Colonial Ministry’s medical department purchased and dispatched the drugs 
with the assistance of the ‘Pharmacie Centrale de l’Armée’ (PCA).489 
As far as trypanocides were concerned, the postwar lists included Atoxyl, tartar 
emetic, and Soamin.490 This choice of approved sleeping sickness drugs naturally 
reflected the findings of the Leopoldville laboratory researchers. By 1911, they had 
already identified these chemicals as the most effective agents for ambulatory 
prophylactic treatment. Continued drug therapy research by Dubois and in particular 
Jan Frans Van den Branden shortly before and during the war had not altered this view. 
Van den Branden was another Louvain medical graduate and bacteriologist from the lab 
of Denys who had accompanied Rodhain on his scientific mission to Katanga in 1910. 
After a furlough in Europe, he arrived at the Leopoldville laboratory in 1913, the same 
year Mouchet left.491 He soon began to publish the results of clinical trials with Ehrlich’s 
Salvarsan and derivatives such as Neosalvarsan in the ‘Archiv für Schiffs- und 
Tropenhygiene’ and the ‘Bulletin de la Société de Pathologique Exotique’, first with 
486 R. Piton, ‘Le ravitaillement de la colonie en produits pharmaceutiques et matériel médical’, Congo. Revue 
générale de la Colonie belge 10 (1929), 494; E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note concernant l’envoi proposé d’Asporozoïne 
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221-222.
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Léopoldville).
491 A. Dubois, ‘Nécrologie. J.-F.-F. Van den Branden’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 22 (1942), 
87-88; Biographic note on Dr Walraevens and Dr Mouchet, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4448.778; Biographical note on J. F. 
F. Van den Branden, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4444.740.
106
Dubois, and from 1915 onwards as the lab’s single director.492 But these research efforts 
did not result in new additions to the Congo’s therapeutic arsenal for routine sleeping 
sickness treatment.493 
Although at the start of the postwar period no useful new trypanocides had emerged, 
the Congo’s central authorities did have a wider choice of suppliers for existing sleeping 
sickness drugs than before, which gave them opportunities to shop around. The reason 
was that pharmaceutical companies outside of Germany became much more involved in 
the manufacture of synthetic chemicals, especially arsenicals, copied from German drug 
firms. The First World War accelerated this evolution. 
Before 1914, German chemical manufacturers clearly controlled the international 
market for new arsenic-based drugs, which found their main application in the 
treatment of syphilis and human African trypanosomiasis. This is not to say that 
research into analogues and derivatives of Ehrlich’s arsenicals was not slowly taking off 
in other countries as well. A most notable example, besides Wellcome Burroughs & Co.’s 
work on arsenicals, were the efforts of the French company ‘Poulenc Frères’. Having 
started out as a ‘purely commercial’ Parisian pharmacy business, the firm was steadily 
growing into a research-based ‘industrial enterprise’ at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Ernest Fourneau, one of Poulenc’s research chemists, had set up an organic 
chemistry laboratory there, modelled on those he had encountered during a stay in 
Germany between 1898 and 1901. The lab took advantage of the non-patentability of 
pharmaceuticals in France to carefully study published German patents and copy their 
drugs. In 1911, Fourneau’s activities earned him the directorship of the newly 
established Therapeutic Chemistry Laboratory at the Paris Pasteur Institute, from where 
he continued close collaborations with Poulenc. Meanwhile, Fourneau’s colleague at 
Poulenc’s lab, François Billon, succeeded in developing French versions of Salvarsan and 
Neosalvarsan. Named Arsenobenzol and Novarsenobenzol respectively, these new drugs 
further underscored that the French pharmaceutical company was building up expertise 
in the specific chemotherapy of infectious disease.494
The interruption of pharmaceutical supplies from Germany because of World War I 
significantly boosted the development and production of synthetic drugs elsewhere, 
492 Dubois, ‘Nécrologie. J.-F.-F. Van den Branden’, 87. Dubois left for Uele after his position at the Leopoldville 
lab: Jadin, ‘Albert Louis Marie DUBOIS’, col. 120. For example: F. Van den Branden et A. Dubois, ‘Notes 
préliminaires sur l’emploi du Néosalvarsan dans diverses affections tropicales’, Archiv für Schiffs- und 
Tropenhygiene 18 (1914), 375-385; F. Van den Branden, ‘Seconde note préliminaire sur le traitement de la 
trypanose humaine par Salvarsankupfer’, Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene 18 (1914), 743-758; F. Van den 
Branden, ‘Le sel sodique du Salvarsan cuprique dans le traitement de la trypanose humaine, du pian et de la 
syphilis’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique 8 (1915), 582-586; F. Van den Branden, ‘Valeur moyenne de la 
durée de stérilisation sanguine chez les trypanosés par une dose de salvarsan, néosalvarsan, salvarsan 
cuprique et sel sodique du salvarsan cuprique’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique 9 (1916), 13-15.
493 Broden, ‘Thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines’, 34; Van Hoof, ‘Thérapeutique de la maladie du sommeil’, 
104. 
494 Administrateur Etablissements Poulenc Frères to E. Van Campenhout, 18.2.1914, MAEAA, Hygiène, R147.598; 
Quirke, ‘Foreign influences’, 135-136; Baverey-Massat-Bourrat, ‘De la copie au nouveau médicament’, 50-54.
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notably in enemy countries.495 Wellcome Burroughs & Co., for example, started 
manufacturing its own (Neo)salvarsan analogues (Kharsivan and Neokharsivan) 
alongside substitutes for other former German imports like Aspirin.496 Poulenc as well 
took full advantage of the ‘new market opportunities’ created by the armed conflict. It 
not only ‘supplie(d) drugs and other chemicals for the French war effort’, but also 
gained access to British markets for its anti-syphilitic arsenicals via a license from the 
British Board of Trade. To sell its (Nov)arsenobenzol there, Poulenc liaised with the 
manufacturing chemists May & Baker, which by 1916 also took on manufacture.497 In 
addition, in a further sign of Poulenc’s increasingly ‘international outlook’, the firm 
produced a French version of Atoxyl under the tradename ‘Trypoxyl’, with which it also 
started targeting the Congolese market for trypanocides during the war.498
After the Armistice, the Congo became even more interesting for manufacturers of 
synthetic pharmaceuticals. With the postwar designation of human trypanosomiasis as 
the Belgian colony’s foremost public health problem and the inter-imperial validation of 
mass treatment as a viable and specifically Franco-Belgian strategy of sleeping sickness 
control, a vast overseas market for trypanocides took shape.499 It was not a ‘consumer-
driven market’, but one propelled by the colonial state as a source of demand given its 
role as a health ‘provider’ through the medicinal prophylaxis of sleeping sickness in the 
Congo.500 While Belgian administrators had turned to Soamin and French imitator drugs 
to find an alternative for German-manufactured Atoxyl since the war, the immediate 
postwar period saw yet another competitor emerge on the horizon. 
Largely overlooked in the historiography of sleeping sickness (drugs) so far, a Belgian 
company in Forest also started competing for a share of the Congolese Atoxyl market. 
The firm ‘Société Anonyme des Produits Chimiques et Pharmaceutiques “Meurice”’ was 
established in 1920 by Albert Meurice, an agricultural engineer who had directed his 
father’s artificial fertiliser company in Charleroi and founded the ‘Institut Meurice’, an 
educational institution devoted to applied chemistry that also had a research laboratory 
for the analysis of agricultural and food products.501 In 1915, the Institute’s lab had taken 
on the production of synthetic chemical drugs that were typically supplied by German 
495 Quirke and Slinn, ‘Perspectives on twentieth-century pharmaceuticals’, p. 10.
496 Quirke, ‘Foreign influences’, 141.
497 Ibid., 137.
498 Quirke, ‘Foreign influences’, 137; Dr Cammermeyer to Governor General, 26.2.1917, MAEAA, GG, 16793 
(Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); A. Broden to 9e Direction, 24.8.1920, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; ‘Les Etablissements Poulenc 
Frères, La maladie du sommeil’ (Paris, 1927).
499 Biehl describes how, in the case of contemporary Brazil, ‘once a government designates a disease like AIDS 
“the country’s disease”, a market takes shape - a captive market.’ Biehl, ‘Pharmaceutical governance’, p. 222.
500 Applbaum describes the current Japanese healthcare system as a ‘provider- rather than consumer-driven 
system’, with the provider effectively being the ‘government’. K. Applbaum, ‘Educating for global mental 
health: the adoption of SSRIs in Japan’ in Petryna, Lakoff and Kleinman, Global Pharmaceuticals, p. 93. 
501 ‘In memoriam Albert Meurice’, Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice” (1939), 1811-1812; H. Deelstra ‘Albert 
MEURICE’, p. 2, Koninklijke Vlaamse Chemische Maatschappij, Galerij van Belgische Scheikundigen, http://
www.kvcv.be/images/documenten/historiek/galerij/Meurice_Albert_FR.pdf (Last accessed 22 April 2014).
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manufacturers, including acetylsalicylic acid. The absence of a Belgian dyestuff industry 
and the wartime conditions made it a particularly challenging task: there was no 
industrial tradition of chemical drug synthesis to build on, raw materials were hard to 
come by, equipment and knowhow were limited, and Meurice himself was imprisoned 
by the Germans in 1917. Nevertheless, released again in 1918, the engineer pursued his 
plans to end Belgium’s dependence on German drug imports, and after the war 
transformed the modest beginnings of the ‘Institut Meurice’ into a synthetic 
pharmaceuticals company, in all probability the first of its kind in the country.502 
To compete with the increasingly science-based industries of Belgium’s neighbours, 
Meurice’s focus soon turned to specific chemotherapy and tropical diseases, notably 
sleeping sickness. As in the case of Poulenc, the Belgian company’s first efforts rested on 
manufacturing existing trypanocides, and thus on imitation rather than innovation. It 
quickly managed to synthesise sodium arsanilate (Atoxyl).503 Significantly, to get its 
drugs tested, the young firm developed close ties with the Brussels School of Tropical 
Medicine and Alphonse Broden. At the EMT, Broden experimented Meurice’s Atoxyl on 
experimentally infected lab animals, found it therapeutically equivalent to foreign 
brands of the trypanocide, and suggested dispatching it to the Leopoldville medical 
laboratory for clinical trials.504 
The collaboration between Meurice and Belgian tropical medicine was somewhat 
remarkable. To become a viable enterprise, the Belgian drug company needed to 
overcome the opposition of a medical profession traditionally suspicious of commercial 
influences in therapeutics. Meurice recounted how initially, Belgian practitioners 
collaborating with drug manufacturers through clinical research were ‘suspect’ in the 
eyes of their colleagues.505 Tellingly, in the first issue of the ‘Revue de Thérapeutique 
Meurice’, set up by the firm in 1922 as an outlet for the publication of clinical drug 
studies and a marketing medium aimed at prescribing practitioners, the editorial 
focused on appeasing fears that an endorsement of pharmaceutical specialities through 
clinical research violated the profession’s ethical code. To morally justify industry-
clinician collaborations, Meurice focused on distinguishing itself from ‘unethical’ drug 
manufacturers selling secret remedies, and tried to align itself with the medical 
profession by downplaying commercial interests and placing itself firmly behind the 
movement for scientific medicine. Experiments were the only way to assess the 
therapeutic value of new scientific medicines, it was argued, and the ‘Revue’ was simply 
a medium to publish such evaluations, so that they could inform rational medical 
502 ‘In memoriam Albert Meurice’, 1812; M. Pottier, ‘L’industrie belge des produits pharmaceutiques utilisés 
dans la thérapeutique coloniale’, Congo. Revue générale de la Colonie belge 1 (1930), 345-346; C. Darmstadter, ‘La 
contribution de l’industrie belge à l’exercice et au progrès de la médecine tropicale ’, La Revue Coloniale Belge 20 
(1946), 72.
503 Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie belge’, 72-73; Pottier, ‘L’industrie belge’, 347.
504 A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 11.1.1919, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5.
505 Union Chimique Belge. Division Produits Pharmaceutiques “Meurice”, ‘A nos lecteurs - Aan onze lezers’, 
Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice”. Therapeutisch tijdschrift (1935), 4.
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practice. Publishing trial results of pharmaceutical specialties also served the company’s 
commercial interests of course, but this was no reason for concern since clinical studies 
were impartial, Meurice claimed, and targeted at audiences of medical professionals 
only. Finally, the editorial also appealed to postwar patriotic feelings and anti-German 
sentiments: it equated support for Meurice with support for the Belgian pharmaceutical 
industry, which was crucial to end the prewar dependency on Germany, who owed its 
pharmaceutical dominance precisely to industry-clinician collaborations.506 
As a therapeutic reformer, Broden naturally wanted to raise the standards of clinical 
research and must have welcomed the drug firm reaching out to tropical medicine 
experts for the experimentation of its chemical compounds.507 It also seems that the 
EMT director was not insensitive to the ‘ethical’ manufacturer’s nationalistic rhetoric: 
he claimed testing Meurice’s Atoxyl at the EMT, for example, with the aim of having 
Belgian-manufactured drugs replace ‘foreign products’.508 In addition, the Brussels 
School lacked adequate funds and infrastructure for research in general, let alone had 
the capacity to set up its own laboratory for the synthesis of chemical compounds, as for 
example Fourneau had done at the Paris Pasteur Institute.509 Collaborating with the 
pharmaceutical industry, which provided him with compounds to test, at least enabled 
Broden to continue to some extent the sleeping sickness drug therapy research he had 
devoted himself to in Leopoldville. 
For Meurice, the collaboration with the EMT also provided clear benefits. On a 
practical level, it gave the firm vital access to trypanosome-infected laboratory animals 
and scientific expertise for preclinical tests. Moreover, seeking tropical medicine 
specialists’ assistance in the development of trypanocidal drugs strengthened the 
company’s profile as a Belgian manufacturer of scientific medicines, which enhanced 
the cultural status of its products more generally. Via Broden, who largely determined 
what experimental drugs were sent to Leopoldville, Meurice was also able to reach 
clinical investigators in the Congo, crucial for establishing drug safety and efficacy and 
creating a market. The young pharmaceutical company’s tactics soon paid off: by 1920, 
its brand of Atoxyl - ‘Atoxyl Meurice’ - was purchased by the Congo administration for 
Schwetz’s sleeping sickness mission, for example.510 It seems, therefore, that aside from 
506 ‘Notre but. Une question de déontologie’, Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice” (1922), 3-6.
507 With respect to the American interwar context, Nicolas Rasmussen notes how therapeutic reformers 
welcomed drug firms’ collaborations with academic clinicians ‘in a context where careful trials were still 
essentially voluntary’. N. Rasmussen, ‘The drug industry and clinical research in interwar America: Three 
types of physician collaborator’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 79 (2005), 79-80.
508 A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 11.1.1919, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5.
509 A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 19.12.1911, ITG, FD10; A. Duren, ‘Note sur l’Ecole de Médecine Tropicale’, 
12.1.1931, ITG, FD11; Director General a.i. (7e DG) Duren to Minister, 10.3.1931, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4441.712; 
Director General a.i. (7e DG) Duren, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Ministre sur l’Institut de Médecine Tropicale Prince 
Léopold’, 27.12.1931, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4447.777; ‘Note au sujet de l’Ecole de Médecine Tropicale’, 22.8.1933, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4441.
510 Minister of Colonies to Governeur General, 17.1.1920, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai). 
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considerations of price and therapeutic value, postwar pharmaceutical nationalism and 
anti-German sentiments were a major factor behind the emergence of Belgium’s nascent 
synthetic drug industry as a key trypanocide supplier for the colony, alongside Poulenc 
and Wellcome Burroughs & Co.
Once procured, sleeping sickness drugs of course still needed to be supplied to and 
distributed among the variety of medical prescribers in the Congo in a timely fashion 
and in sufficient quantities. In that way, the expansion of medicinal prophylaxis in the 
1920s contributed significantly to the development of a pharmaceutical service as part 
of the colony’s official medical service. Before the First World War, a state pharmacy 
existed in Boma, but it was set up to handle the medicinal requests of local colonial staff 
rather than as a pharmaceutical depot from which the rest of the colony was served.511 
State doctors and AMI providers outside of Boma normally received prescription drugs 
directly from the authorities in Brussels, but this system was far from ideal, as it often 
resulted in seriously delayed or inadequate drug supplies and forced physicians to 
address urgent requests to the Boma pharmacy.512 As the latter could not meet the many 
demands, by 1912 complaints about drug shortages soared and chief medical officers in 
the Congo began to call for the organisation of a state pharmaceutical service.513 
The colonial government’s difficulties to procure sufficient quantities of prescription 
drugs during the war exacerbated the problem, delaying the supply of trypanocides to 
missionary AMI providers, for example, and increasing pressures on the Boma 
pharmacy.514 By 1918, drug reserves in the Congo were depleted and the Armistice did 
not bring immediate relief.515 When more abundant drug supplies from Europe came 
into view again by 1920, the local administration decided to establish medicinal depots 
in the colony’s provinces, and proposals for the organisation of a pharmaceutical service 
gradually took shape.516 Crucially, the legislation transforming the colonial health 
511 ‘Circulaire rappelant aux fonctionnaires et agents de la Colonie que la pharmacie de Boma n’est pas un dépôt 
réserve de médicaments’ dans Congo Belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, 
instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 1914), p. 129.
512 Ibid., p. 129; G. Trolli, ‘Le service médical du Congo Belge depuis sa création jusqu’en 1925’, Congo. Revue 
générale de la Colonie belge, 1 (1927), 199.
513 Dr Cammermeyer, ‘Rapport du Médecin en Chef sur la Situation sanitaire au Congo Belge durant l’année 
1912’, 24.6.1913, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.4; U. Zerbini, ‘Rapport annuel sur les conditions générales hygiéniques et 
sanitaires du Congo’, 1913, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.4; Boma pharmacist Del Piano to Chief Medical Officer, 10.5.1913, 
MAEAA, GG, 16789 (Congo-Kasai, Boma). 
514 ‘Circulaire relative à l’établissement des réquisitions de médicaments, réactifs et accessoires de pharmacie et 
de laboratoire ainsi qu’à l’expédition par le personnel du service de santé de l’état modèle 10’ dans Congo 
Belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 
1920), p. 64; ‘Note pour Monsieur le Governor General’, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit).
515 ‘Circulaire relative à l’établissement des réquisitions de médicaments, réactifs’, pp. 64-65; Piton, 
‘Ravitaillement de la colonie, 495.
516 ‘Circulaire relative à l’établissement des réquisitions de médicaments, réactifs’, pp. 64-65; Médecin en Chef, 
‘A Messieurs les Médecins de l’Etat et Agréé’, 28.2.1920, MAEAA, GG, 16847 (GG); Pharmacien en Chef L. Piton, 
‘Note pour Monsieur le Médecin Directeur de l’Inspection Générale de l’Hygiène. Organisation du Service 
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service in 1922 stipulated the creation of provincial pharmacies, charged with managing 
pharmaceutical stocks, distributing medicines to state doctors, and drafting annual drug 
requisitions (based on physicians’ requests) for their respective provinces. Provincial 
pharmacists were supervised by the colony’s head pharmacist, who reviewed the 
requisitions, oversaw drug distribution, and inspected their pharmacies at the chief 
medical officer’s request.517
By 1925, a state pharmacy existed in every province, in addition to a central depot of 
pharmaceutical reserves set up in 1924 to prevent shortages in the provincial 
pharmacies and managed by the head pharmacist in Boma.518 Although the most 
commonly used drugs, including trypanocides, were sometimes directly sent from 
Europe to medical posts in the Congo to speed up the supply process and reduce 
transport costs, provincial pharmacies also stocked sleeping sickness medicines, which 
they supplied to state doctors as well as private (missionary) AMI providers.519 
5.5 Opposition to sleeping sickness missions and 
pharmaceutical regulation
Political support from central colonial authorities for the special sleeping sickness 
missions was predicated on the assumption that it better suited Congolese people’s 
‘mentality’, interfered less with economic development and allowed promoting 
indigenous health through a simple delivery of technology via public and private sector 
medical providers. In practice, however, things were not quite that straightforward. The 
implementation of Atoxyl-based itinerant medicinal prophylaxis in rural areas in the 
colony’s periphery encountered numerous obstacles and generated significant tensions 
with local agents. In fact, there were important similarities with the conflicts over the 
‘powers’ and ‘ethics’ of mass trypanocide treatment that took place in French Africa.520 
pharmaceutique’, 17.8.1920, MAEAA, GG, 16847 (GG); Pharmacien en Chef L. Piton, ‘Projet d’organisation du 
Service Pharmaceutique’, 9.11.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16847 (GG); ‘Congo Belge. Rapport Annuel 1920’, 1922, 
MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.9; Piton, ‘Ravitaillement de la colonie’, 496-497.
517 ‘Ordonnance du 15 Décembre 1922’, pp. 64-65. 
518 Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, pp. 22-23; J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport général sur le 
fonctionnement du service de l’Hygiène durant l’exercice 1924’, 2.9.1925, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.12. Provincial 
pharmacies were established in Leopoldville, Coquilhatville, Stanleyville and Elisabethville. Piton, 
‘Ravitaillement de la colonie’, 496.
519 Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, p. 23; Trolli, ‘Le service médical du Congo Belge’, 199-200; 
Piton, ‘Ravitaillement de la colonie’, 496-497; Chief Pharmacist Piton to all provincial pharmacists, 19.12.1927, 
MAEAA, GG, 16752 (GG).
520 As highlighted by Noémi Tousignant in Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 635.
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In Kwango, as will be described in more detail in chapter 9, Schwetz’s attempts at 
pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control met with considerable African resistance, but 
also with opposition from the private sector, especially Jesuit missionaries, who felt that 
the official medical mission unduly encroached upon their sphere of influence. 
Schwetz’s efforts to coerce the local population into complying with the requirements 
of mass screening and treatment soon led to formal complaints and judicial enquiries, 
and broader questions about the organisation of prophylactic sleeping sickness 
missions. In Catholic circles, his reliance on clinical diagnostic criteria - without 
microscopic confirmation - was taken as a symbol of excessive powers and questionable 
ethics, as it forced Africans merely suspected of carrying trypanosomes to undergo 
treatment with dangerous medicines on a massive scale. By 1924, their objections to the 
aggressive methods adopted in Kwango amounted to a discussion about the lawfulness 
of the Schwetz mission in the Belgian parliament, and Schwetz himself at one point 
started fearing for his colonial career. 
What exacerbated negative local perceptions of the official sleeping sickness missions 
was the accumulation of less favourable experiences with Atoxyl, in particular grave 
instances of drug toxicity. In 1920, for example, soon after the Schwetz mission members 
had started the large-scale treatment of trypanosome carriers in Kwango, reports began 
to emerge about serious adverse reactions to injections of Meurice-supplied Atoxyl, 
including even a number of fatalities.521 The same thing happened again in 1923.522 In 
Equateur Province, around fifty cases of drug-induced blindness were reported in the 
Bangala sleeping sickness mission’s Balobo region in 1924.523 Such accidents naturally 
did little to improve the popularity of the prophylactic sleeping sickness missions 
among the African communities they visited and threatened to seriously undermine 
indigenous compliance with infectious disease control.524 Moreover, drug toxicity could 
provide ammunition to those European agents critical of the special missions because 
they provoked indigenous hostility or because the regular screening and treatment 
demands interfered with local tax collection, commercial activities, evangelisation etc.525 
It also amounted to administrative investigations of medical affairs. Tellingly, in 
521 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai). 
522 Agent sanitaire Demaret, ‘Rapport sur le troisième examen des deux rives du Kwengo (Sud-Ouest du 
territoire de Kikwit). Décembre 1922 - Mai 1923’, 10.6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II); A. Broden to 9e 
Direction, 20.9.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Governor General to Secrétaire Général, 25.1.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 
5.2.10. 
523 Dr Simonini, ‘Rapport Annuel 1924. Mission maladie du sommeil Bangala’, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur).
524 Dr Vangoidtsnoven, for example, stated in response to the blindness cases in the Bangala medical mission: 
‘Des faits de l’espèce sont profondément regrettables, car loin de nous attirer la confiance de ces populations, 
encore et malgré une longue occupation fort arriérées, ils ne font que nous les aliéner et discréditer auprès 
d’elles l’action médicale dont elles ont tant besoin.’ Dr Vangoidtsnoven to Chef de la M.M.S.B. Médecin 
Principal, 26.1.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur).
525 For example: Dr Simonini, ‘Rapport Annuel 1924. Mission maladie du sommeil Bangala’, MAEAA, GG, 8824 
(Equateur). Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 628.
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response to the Bangala toxicity incidents, which prompted Nouvelle Anvers’s territorial 
administrator to open an official enquiry, the Congo’s Governor General Martin Rutten 
warned that ‘accidents that cannot but render our action on the indigenous populations 
more and more difficult should be avoided at all cost’, and ordered an inspection of the 
medical mission.526 
As incidents of drug toxicity threatened to fuel (political) opposition to the special 
sleeping sickness missions and place doctors under increased administrative scrutiny, 
they were highly annoying for the architects of the Congo’s medicinal prophylaxis 
campaign and the newly independent colonial medical service more generally. Yet 
rather than questioning and revising mass trypanocide treatment by special medical 
missions as a strategy of infectious disease control, the Belgian Congo’s medical 
authorities focused on countering and neutralising claims of excessive powers and 
unethical or dangerous procedures, just like the proponents of mass sleeping sickness 
therapy would do in French Africa.527 Reports of coercion mostly met with an insistence 
on the difficult working conditions for itinerant sleeping sickness staff in regions where 
state authority was limited. They were typically attributed to a lack of territorial 
organisation, resulting in ‘vaste(s) zone(s) insoumis’, and a dearth of administrative or 
private sector support.528 Tellingly, the head of Equateur’s medical service argued that ‘it 
would be more logical (…) to pursue those who showed indifference, who did not help, 
and especially those who obstructed the (Bangala medical) mission, than to hold (the 
latter) responsible and blame (it) for minor incidents and accidents that are always 
possible, even anticipated, when administering a drug like atoxyl to advanced 
patients’.529 Yet even if a certain degree of toxicity did not trouble the Congo’s doctors, 
most did in fact consider the gravity and levels encountered in Kwango and Bangala as 
‘abnormal’, and this contributed to disappointment with (certain brands of) the drug.530 
To prevent further accidents as well as mitigate (potential) criticisms of prophylactic 
sleeping sickness missions stemming from such incidents, the Congo’s medical leaders 
above all sought to step up pharmaceutical regulation, and thus defined Atoxyl toxicity 
as an issue of ‘control’, not only of their own health staff, but also of the pharmaceutical 
industry.531 
Schwetz himself blamed Atoxyl-induced deaths in Kwango on the poor quality of the 
product supplied by the inexperienced Meurice firm rather than on his mission’s 
526 Governor General, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Secrétaire Général’, 14.1.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); 
Governor General, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Secrétaire Général’, 17.1.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur). 
527 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 635-636.
528 For example: Dr Simonini, ‘Rapport Annuel 1924. Mission maladie du sommeil Bangala’, MAEAA, GG, 8824 
(Equateur); Médecin Provincial, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Gouverneur à propos des cas de cécité constatés parmi 
les indigènes qui auraient été traités pour la maladie du sommeil’, s.d., MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur).
529 Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville to Governor, 25.4.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur).
530 For example: Provincial Doctor of Equateur Province to Chief Medical Officer, 26.1.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 
(Equateur). 
531 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 630.
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aggressive methods. The colony’s laboratory elite followed this cue and contributed to 
new efforts to ensure that only trypanocides of assured safety circulated in the Congo. 
In this way, sleeping sickness doctors’ accounts of unintended Atoxyl effects put the 
regulation of industrially-manufactured pharmaceuticals firmly on the Belgian colonial 
agenda and helped expand the criteria of trypanocidal drug quality in the interwar 
period. 
In nineteenth-century Europe, guaranteeing the quality of medicines had 
traditionally been the responsibility of the pharmaceutical profession. The latter held a 
state-sanctioned monopoly over the sale and preparation of therapeutic agents listed in 
national pharmacopoeia drafted by elite pharmacists and physicians. Thus it was up to 
individual pharmacists to make sure that their preparations complied with national 
protocols and standards for drug compounding.532 This approach to quality control, 
however, became increasingly inadequate when the emergence of industrial 
pharmaceutical specialties abolished pharmacists’ traditional drug preparing role, 
turning them into dispensers responsible for the quality of medicines they had not put 
together themselves.533 Therefore, since the late nineteenth century new and 
complementary ‘ways of regulating’ emerged that saw the ‘ethical’ industry and the 
state gradually take on a much greater role in drug regulation, amounting, for example, 
to industrial standardisation and quality control practices, and legislation introducing 
formal drug approval procedures in the twentieth century.534 
Although the history of drug regulation in Belgium remains largely unexplored, it 
seems that as in France, the administrative regulation of drugs was rather weak in the 
interwar period.535 With the exception of biological drugs, marketing authorisations for 
pharmaceutical specialties were not required until the 1950s. Moreover, it was only in 
1964 that legislation included safety and efficacy, alongside chemical composition and 
purity, as criteria for assessing applications for market approval.536 However, the absence 
of formal drug approval procedures in interwar Belgium did not mean that the 
trypanocides procured by the colonial administration in Brussels were not subjected to 
any form of pre-marketing evaluation. As previously discussed, the ‘ethical’ firms 
manufacturing trypanocidal compounds took their own steps to establish proof of safety 
and efficacy via pre-clinical testing and clinical trials in order to market their products. 
Clinical investigators in the Congo and especially at the Leopoldville laboratory played a 
532 C. Gradmann and J. Simon, ‘Introduction: evaluating and standardizing therapeutic agents, 1890-1950’ in C. 
Gradmann and J. Simon (eds.), Evaluating and Standardizing Therapeutic Agents, 1890-1950 (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 
1-2; J.-P. Gaudillière and V. Hess, ‘Introduction “Ways of Regulating”’ in J.-P. Gaudillière and V. Hess (eds.), Ways 
of Regulating: Therapeutic Agents between Plants, Shops and Consulting Rooms (Berlin, 2008), pp. 9-11
533 J. Oslet, ‘Le contrôle des médicaments en Belgique. Les grands étapes de la réglementation des médicaments 
à usage humain’, Journal de Pharmacie de Belgique 62 (2007), 124.
534 Gaudillière and Hess, ‘Introduction “Ways of Regulating”’, pp. 11-12.
535 J.-P. Gaudillière, ‘Professional and industrial drug regulation in France and Germany: the trajectories of Plant 
and Gland Extracts before 1945’ in Gaudillière and Hess (eds.), Ways of Regulating, pp. 57-59, 62.
536 Oslet, ‘Contrôle des médicaments en Belgique’, 124-125.
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major role in these evaluations, and their assessments helped determine what 
compounds were accepted and selected by colonial medical authorities for mass 
treatment, which in turn shaped procurement in the metropole. In that sense, the 
colonial administration - through its medical service - guarded access to the Congolese 
trypanocide market on the basis of (local standards of) safety and efficacy. 
Limiting trypanocide imports to those pharmaceutical specialties that had proven 
safe and effective in clinical trials was not deemed enough to safeguard public health, 
however. Additional checks were performed to ensure that the trypanocides supplied 
and circulating in the Congo were of a consistently acceptable quality. After the war, the 
PCA, charged with procuring and dispatching trypanocides to the Congo, screened 
pharmaceuticals intended for the colonial prescription drug market. As pharmacists in 
Belgium remained responsible for the quality of the medicines they delivered, the PCA 
tested drug samples before their shipment overseas to ensure chemical composition and 
purity. This sometimes resulted in batches being rejected and returned to their 
manufacturers. The official pharmaceutical service in the colony itself was not involved 
much in trypanocide quality control, despite the first head pharmacist’s suggestion to 
create a local pharmacology laboratory to examine medicines and weed out ‘d’affreuses 
saletés’.537 When he raised the issue in 1924, Rodhain argued that such quality control 
should take place in Europe, i.e. before drugs were dispatched, and notably by the 
Belgian Army’s pharmaceutical service.538 
In the Belgian Congo, medical practitioners taking part in the sleeping sickness 
campaign helped identify potentially sub-standard products by reporting issues with 
drug stability - heat and humidity could sometimes visibly alter formulations - and 
adverse drug reactions to their superiors.539 In that way, the hierarchical organisation of 
the colony’s medical service contributed to the making of a sort of informal 
pharmacovigilance system. In the early 1920s, local doctors’ claims about trypanocides 
not preserving well in the tropical climate and causing abnormal toxicity alerted 
authorities to apparent problems with Belgian- and French-manufactured Atoxyl.540 
537 Pharmacien en Chef L. Piton, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Médecin Directeur de l’Inspection Générale de 
l’Hygiène. Organisation du Service pharmaceutique’, 17.8.1920, MAEAA, GG, 16847 (GG); Pharmacien en Chef L. 
Piton, ‘Projet d’organisation du Service Pharmaceutique’, 9.11.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16847 (GG). The ordinance 
instituting the colony’s pharmaceutical service in 1922 did not explicitly list quality control of drug supplies 
for the colonial health service among its tasks. See ‘Ordonnance du 15 Décembre 1922’, pp. 64-65.
538 J. Rodhain, ‘Avis et considérations du Médecin en chef au sujet de la note de Monsieur le Pharmacien en Chef 
relative à la création d’un laboratoire de pharmacologie’,1.10.1924, MAEAA, GG, 16847 (GG). 
539 A circular issued in 1914 by Chief Medical Officer Heiberg warned that chemically altered Atoxyl could cause 
dangerous ‘accidents’, and that the ‘slightest yellow coloration’ of Atoxyl solutions should lead one to reject 
them. See ‘Circulaire relative à la stérilisation des solutions d’atoxyl destinées à l’usage hypodermique’, Congo 
Belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 
1914), p. 230.
540 A. Broden to 9e Direction, 24.8.1920, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; Director (9e DG, 2e section) to A. Broden, 
13.8.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Governor General to Secrétaire Général, 25.1.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; 
Governor General to S.E.B., 25.4.1925, MAEAA, GG, 16769 (GG). 
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More specifically, such accounts pointed to the possibility that preliminary checks of 
chemical composition and purity did not guarantee entirely safe drug supplies, and 
eventually contributed to the adoption of biological as well as chemical standards of 
trypanocide quality. 
In the wake of drug-related accidents that local sleeping sickness doctors like 
Schwetz attributed to poor product quality, Broden at the EMT, the PCA and even the 
Leopoldville laboratory became involved in ‘biological’ or ‘physiological’ tests to prevent 
faulty Atoxyl batches from being dispatched overseas or recall those already circulating 
in the Congo.541 These tests entailed administering drug doses to guinea pigs to check for 
abnormal toxicity, and led to rejections, for example, of the French-manufactured 
product delivered by a Belgian pharmaceutical wholesaler, as well as Meurice’s Atoxyl.542 
However, as Broden himself admitted, the problem was that biological test results could 
differ from lab to lab depending on variations in the sensitivity of experimental animals. 
This situation often led trypanocide suppliers to dispute unfavourable reports by Broden 
or the ‘Pharmacie Centrale’.543 The EMT director found it difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions as to trypanocide quality because of the variability of lab animals and 
because good biological results in Europe were apparently not necessarily maintained in 
the Congo. Nevertheless, he felt that it was the responsibility of manufacturers to 
guarantee a sufficiently stable product for tropical climates, and by 1923 advised to 
recall the remaining Atoxyl supplied by Meurice to prevent further accidents.544 
While Broden somewhat struggled to assess drug quality, by 1925 the PCA’s director 
Vigneron initiated a different, comparative approach to the biological testing of Atoxyl 
supplies. It seems that he was inspired by the LNHO’s program of international 
biological standardisation. The latter continued Paul Ehrlich’s work on serum 
standardisation by establishing international reference preparations (mostly for 
biological drugs, but also for the arsenicals (neo)arsphenamine) that could be used in 
bioassays, i.e. assessments of therapeutic substances’ activity by comparing their effects 
on living organisms with those of standard substances. The LNHO pursued this agenda 
in a series of international conferences, as well as via a Permanent Commission on 
541 For example: EMT to 9e Direction, 3.8.1922, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Governor General to Secrétaire Général, 
25.1.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Secrétaire Général to A. Broden, 12.3.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Director of 
the Pharmacie Centrale Vigneron to Secrétaire Général, 24.10.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; Minister of Colonies 
to A. Broden, 31.10.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9.
542 For example: EMT to 9e Direction, 3.8.1922, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; A. Broden to 9e Direction, 20.9.1923, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
543 Pharmacie Centrale de Belgique to Ministry of Colonies (9e DG), 5.12.1922, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; A. Broden 
to 9e Direction, 21.2.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Secrétaire Général to Minister of the Interior and Hygiene, 
7.4.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; A. Broden to to 9e Direction, 20.9.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Director of the 
Pharmacie Centrale (1e section) François to A. Broden, 7.11.1924, ITG, Onderzoek 5.2.9; Minister of Colonies to 
A. Broden, 31.10.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; A. Broden to Director of the Pharmacie Centrale (1e section), 
2.12.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9.
544 Director 9e DG (2e section) to A. Broden, 13.8.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; A. Broden to 9e Direction, 
20.9.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
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Biological Standardisation, set up in 1924.545 Presumably referring to the latter event, 
Vigneron insisted that ‘the Geneva Conference’ had acknowledged the value of 
biological tests. He argued that they were necessary for potentially toxic medicines such 
as Atoxyl, even if chemical analysis yielded satisfactory results. Crucially, the pharmacist 
obtained a sample of German-manufactured Atoxyl, which he found in compliance with 
the chemical standards of the German pharmacopoeia, and sent it to Broden so that the 
EMT director could establish ‘the precise conditions that an atoxyl, irreproachable from 
a biological point of view, must fulfil’.546 It appears that Broden subsequently took up the 
suggestion of using the German drug as a point of comparison for biological tests, and 
found that samples of Meurice’s product performed badly.547 
Despite the Meurice company’s comfortable relationship with Belgian tropical 
medicine and the colonial administration’s support for Belgian-manufactured drugs, 
doubts about the firm’s capacity to produce an Atoxyl that fulfilled the evolving quality 
standards of the time dealt a serious blow to its position on the Congolese trypanocide 
market.548 Concerns regarding the abnormal toxicity and instability of both the French 
and Belgian brands presented the administration with significant Atoxyl supply 
problems, and led it to revert to the ‘Vereinigte Chemische Werke Charlottenburg’s’ 
superior original.549 An added bonus, Brussels explained, was that the latter turned out 
to be cheaper than the other possible alternative, i.e. Soamin, because the Belgian 
government could recuperate the sums spent on German drugs via war reparation 
payments.550 
Poor product quality was not the only reason proffered for toxicity incidents and 
local resistance to medicinal prophylaxis, however. In Bangala, for example, problems 
with Atoxyl supplies were ruled out as the cause of adverse drug reactions, and a failure 
to follow therapeutic guidelines was blamed instead.551 Colonial medical authorities thus 
linked the downsides of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control to clinicians’ own 
545 ‘Biological standardization’ in World Health Organization, The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization 
(Geneva, 1958), pp. 409, 415; I. Borowy, ‘Serological and biological standardisation at the League of Nations 
Health Organisation, 1921-1939’ in C. Bonah, C. Masutti, A. Rasmussen and J. Simon (eds.), Harmonizing Drugs. 
Standards in 20th-Century Pharmaceutical History (Paris, 2009), pp. 211-212; C.-R. Prüll, ‘Paul Ehrlich’s 
standardization of serum: Wertbestimmung and its meaning for twentieth-century biomedicine’, in Gradmann 
and Simon (eds.), Evaluating and Standardizing, p. 19.
546 Majeur Pharmacien Vigneron to Secrétaire Général, 30.4.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9.
547 A. Broden to Director of the Pharmacie Centrale de l’Armée, 18.5.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9.
548 For example: Governor General Tilkens to Secrétaire Général, 25.5.1928, MAEAA, GG, 15718 (GG). 
549 Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 25.4.1925, MAEAA, GG, 16769 (GG); Majeur Pharmacien Vigneron 
to A. Broden, 30.4.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; Secrétaire Général to A. Broden, 11.5.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; 
Majeur Pharmacien Vigneron to A. Broden, 16.5.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; A. Broden to Secrétaire Général, 
17.5.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; Secrétaire Général to Governor General, 30.5.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306.
550 Note to Minister of Colonies, 24.9.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Secrétaire Général to A. Broden, 19.10.1925, 
ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
551 Dr Simonini, ‘Rapport Annuel 1924. Mission maladie du sommeil Bangala’, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); J. 
Rodhain to Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 7.7.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur). 
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‘irrational’ therapeutic behaviour. As was the case in French West Africa, issues 
surrounding the large-scale use of dangerous medicines came to be defined as a matter 
of ‘self-regulation’ in the Congo: they required a ‘tightening (of) the chain of command 
within the (medical) service’ rather than an ‘external’ monitoring of the risks of mass 
treatment.552 Medical leaders therefore sought to prevent these problems by another 
form of pharmaceutical regulation, i.e. the controlling of trypanocides’ clinical use.553 
They did so by issuing and enforcing therapeutic and diagnostic guidelines and 
directives, typically based on the Leopoldville laboratory’s research, and calling for 
lower-ranking medical staff to be more closely supervised by their superiors.554 
After the First World War, the Congo’s laboratory-trained medical elite thus used the 
health service’s hierarchical organisation to shape, oversee and in fact standardise local 
treatment practices, reducing the extent to which physicians and auxiliaries could base 
sleeping sickness therapy on their own clinical judgement and experience rather than 
on the findings of laboratory science. Whereas in 1909 Broden and Rodhain had 
accepted that lazaret doctors were granted ‘a certain latitude’ to institute therapeutic 
strategies (as long as they produced a durable ‘disinfection’), by the early 1920s sleeping 
sickness staff was expected to adhere to centrally devised procedures.555 In 1923, for 
example, Rodhain issued a circular detailing appropriate diagnostic and treatment 
protocols. In response to criticisms of Schwetz’s procedures, he insisted that case 
detection could not be based on palpation of the cervical lymph nodes alone, but 
required microscopic analysis of lymph juice or blood samples. Moreover, an 
examination of cerebrospinal fluid was vital to establish the stage of disease, determine 
the right course of treatment and evaluate therapeutic outcomes. Routine drug 
treatment was to be based on Atoxyl, administered in ten to eighteen weekly doses of 1g 
for early, and doses of 0,5 to 0,6g for advanced cases, as well as tartar emetic, injected 
once a week in 0,10g doses and ideally in combination with Atoxyl therapy.556 In 
addition, after Schwetz’s departure from Kwango in 1923, his autonomous sleeping 
sickness mission was placed under the direct authority of the chief medical officer of 
Congo-Kasai Province. In other words, it was fully incorporated into the colonial medical 
552 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 638, 641.
553 On standardisation and ‘control(ling) the clinical uses of (…) drugs’, see Gaudillière, ‘Introduction: Drug 
Trajectories’, 606-607; C. Bonah, C. Masutti, A. Rasmussen and J. Simon, ‘Introduction’ in Bonah, Masutti, 
Rasmussen and Simon (eds.), Harmonizing Drugs, pp. 23, 38, 41.
554 Rodhain and Equateur’s provincial doctor Paul Vangoidtsnoven insisted that African auxiliaries had to be 
constantly supervised and monitored by sleeping sickness doctors. See J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Suite aux 
considérations sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 30.3.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7, p. 4; Dr 
Vangoidtsnoven to Chef de la M.M.S.B. Médecin Principal, 26.1.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur). Rodhain’s 
successor Giovanni Trolli called for ‘agents sanitaires’ to be placed under the direct supervision of doctors 
because of their tendency to ‘play doctor’. G. Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 5.
555 A. Broden et J. Rodhain, ‘La luttre contre la trypanose humaine (maladie du sommeil)’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4419.602.
556 J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Considérations pratiques sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’,
20.11.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7, pp. 1, 5-7, 9-10.
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hierarchy so as to increase compliance with therapeutic and diagnostic guidelines (cf. 
also chapter 10). In Bangala, Rodhain reprimanded an ‘agent sanitaire’ and his 
supervisor for ignoring his 1923 directives and thus provoking many cases of 
blindness.557 
Despite the efforts to curb ‘abnormal’ Atoxyl toxicity via pharmaceutical regulation 
so as to reduce the risk of accidents and minimise local resistance, doctors in the Congo 
in the end realised that the inherent limits of the trypanocide, especially as far as its 
healing power was concerned, would always make the special sleeping sickness missions 
broadly unpopular. In other words, even when poor-quality products were eliminated 
from the market, they became increasingly disillusioned with Atoxyl’s effectiveness in 
the real world of itinerant medicinal prophylaxis. Bangala mission director Simonini, for 
example, felt that the significance of his work remained poorly understood among both 
Africans and Europeans, because he did not have a ‘remedy that always amount(ed) to 
the definitive curing of recent victims’ and was ‘powerless to cure chronic trypanosome 
carriers’ who made up the majority of cases in heavily infected areas.558 Sleeping 
sickness missions were therefore likely to continue facing an arduous task. However, 
before Atoxyl’s limitations could fundamentally discredit the principle of itinerant 
medicinal prophylaxis, new and more powerful trypanocides emerged that by the 
mid-1920s generated a renewed optimism and raised colonial (medical) authorities’ 
hopes of a pharmaceutical eradication of sleeping sickness.
5.6 In summary
After the First World War, Atoxyl’s career as a sleeping sickness control drug in the 
Belgian Congo really took off. An initial phase of high expectations saw a dramatically 
expanded use, especially of the French- and Belgian manufactured versions of the drug. 
The postwar application of a microbiological model of sleeping sickness control, 
predicated on the medicinal targeting of trypanosomes, reflected and contributed to a 
further strengthening of ties between laboratory science, ethical drug industry and 
collective medicine. It united different actors and interests in metropole and colony and 
across imperial borders, including local state physicians advocating mass treatment as 
the most feasible option for prophylaxis given conditions in the field, a newly 
independent medical service headed by internationally connected doctors favouring a 
laboratory view of epidemiology, a colonial administration engaged in inter-imperial 
exchanges on African health and convinced of the political-economic benefits of a large-
557 J. Rodhain to Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 7.7.1925, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur). 
558 Dr Simonini, ‘Rapport Annuel 1924. Mission maladie du sommeil Bangala’, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur). 
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scale pharmaceutical campaign - yet trying to keep the associated drug supply costs 
under control, a burgeoning European industry of synthetic prescription 
pharmaceuticals keen on breaking German domination of the arsenicals trade, an EMT 
director supporting a Belgian drug firm’s trypanocide development, pharmacists taking 
on a public health role by participating in drug procurement, quality control and 
distribution, private sector health providers contributing to social medicine in return 
for free medicinal supplies, and African trypanosome carriers still primarily viewed as 
sources of infection. 
The phase of Belgian- and French-manufactured Atoxyl’s widespread dissemination 
in the Belgian Congo soon overlapped with a wave of diminishing enthusiasm, however. 
The implementation of mass treatment, especially by official mobile teams, entailed 
rather drastic interventions in rural areas and soon met with considerable local 
opposition, not just from the indigenous population but also from European colonial 
agents resenting the sleeping sickness missions’ interference. Such tensions fuelled 
criticisms of itinerant medicinal prophylaxis and especially of the considerable powers 
of sleeping sickness doctors, not only in the colony but also in the (Catholic) press, 
political and medical circles in Belgium (cf. also chapter 9). State doctors in the Congo 
felt that incidents of abnormal Atoxyl toxicity and the drug’s limited therapeutic 
efficacy rendered their task more arduous and threatened to undermine an already 
unpopular mass treatment campaign. 
The large-scale use of the Atoxyl compound was not immediately suspended, 
however. In a bid to prevent further drug toxicity and external meddling with their 
autonomous medical service, the main architects of the colony’s medicinal fight against 
sleeping sickness focused primarily on tightening pharmaceutical regulation, thus 
reinforcing the development of a laboratory-based and pharmaceuticalised collective 
medicine in the Congo. The adoption of more stringent quality control procedures 
through a collaboration between the EMT, the PCA and the colonial medical service, and 
medical authorities’ efforts to bring therapeutic practice in line with central laboratory 
guidelines signalled that Atoxyl intoxication was to be viewed as a problem of poor 
product quality and biomedical irrationality, in other words of ‘(self-)regulation’, rather 
than as evidence of an abusive public health campaign by a medical service with too 
much power.559 While this pharmaceutical regulation eventually eroded the use of the 
French and Belgian brands of Atoxyl, it contributed to the continuation of mass 
trypanocide treatment and temporarily boosted consumption of the German original. It 
did not change Atoxyl’s limited curative value, however. As the next chapter will show, 
by the mid-1920s a new, more powerful trypanocide would claim attention as a much 
better alternative and thus provide a new impetus to itinerant medicinal prophylaxis. 
559 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 638.
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Chapter  6
New players: Bayer 205, Tryparsamide and the 
promise of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness 
eradication
While Atoxyl’s limitations as an instrument of mass trypanocide therapy became 
increasingly apparent, the Belgian Congo was deeply involved in the making of new 
sleeping sickness drugs. In this process, one chemical compound in particular eventually 
drew attention as a better alternative: Tryparsamide. This chapter examines the 
beginning of this new drug’s career cycle in the Congo, exploring how, against a 
backdrop of other competing medicines, it came to raise the greatest hopes of a 
pharmaceutical eradication of sleeping sickness. 
Tryparsamide rose to therapeutic prominence in the Congo through an interplay of 
different actors within and beyond its borders, reflecting in particular the colony’s 
continued participation in inter-imperial networks of trypanocide (market) 
development. These networks were affected by the war, however: relations with German 
scientists and pharmaceutical companies continued, but became much more strained, 
whereas exchanges with European and American challengers of German 
chemotherapeutic dominance increased. Significantly, Tryparsamide was synthesised as 
part of a larger wave of new trypanocidal compounds emerging from German, 
American, French and British (industrial) laboratories looking for clinical testing sites 
and drug markets shortly after the war. Through the mediation of an EMT and 
administration in Brussels seeking to sustain the Leopoldville laboratory’s scientific 
activities, be seen to support international sleeping sickness research or acquire 
privileged access to promising new trypanocides, many of these chemicals were 
introduced in the Belgian Congo as experimental drugs in the early 1920s. Clinical and 
field trials by foreign-led expeditions, laboratory doctors in Leopoldville and later 
(itinerant) sleeping sickness doctors eventually resulted in an enthusiastic local 
response to Tryparsamide in particular. The compound was hailed as a most promising 
tool of sleeping sickness eradication because of superior curative effects that were not 
lost on African sleeping sickness victims either. 
This chapter first sketches how specific chemotherapy research in, but increasingly 
also outside of Germany resulted in the development of novel trypanocidal compounds 
during and shortly after the First World War. It then examines how these chemicals - in 
the case of Bayer 205 with some difficulty - ended up in the Belgian Congo for human 
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experimentation, and how clinical testing by foreign researchers and the Leopoldville 
laboratory eventually resulted in two new compounds - Bayer 205 and Tryparsamide - 
locally claiming attention as promising alternatives to Atoxyl because of superior 
prophylactic or curative effects. Soon enough this encouraged optimism regarding 
pharmaceutical strategies of sleeping sickness control in the colonial medical service. 
The final section discusses how larger-scale field trials in the Congo subsequently 
established in particular Tryparsamide’s effectiveness in local medicinal prophylaxis, 
boosting confidence in the possibility of a pharmaceutical victory over sleeping sickness 
and resulting in calls from both medical and political authorities in the Congo to expand 
the drug’s use. 
6.1 Dyes, arsenicals and antimonials: synthesising new 
trypanocidal compounds
When Ehrlich died in 1915, he had not managed to find a perfect magic bullet, capable of 
producing a ‘therapia sterilisans magna’. Salvarsan and Neosalvarsan had of course 
brought commercial success as anti-syphilitic medicines and raised high hopes for 
further drug discoveries. But clinicians pointed out that arsphenamine had its 
shortcomings: it required long courses of treatment and was hard to handle.560 
Moreover, experimental research failed to yield quick results in other bacterial 
infections, which in the early twentieth century were still responsible for high levels of 
morbidity and mortality in the western world. Many historical accounts of drug 
discovery point out how this diminished specific chemotherapy’s commercial appeal for 
drug firms and contributed to a certain disappointment with the antimicrobial potential 
of synthetic chemistry.561 John Lesch, however, has argued that there was ‘little evidence 
of genuine pessimism’ regarding bacterial chemotherapy in the interwar period.562 
German chemical manufacturers in particular, and especially Bayer, continued their 
pursuit of systematic chemotherapy research after Ehrlich’s death. In the 1930s, Bayer 
provided a major boost to the chemotherapy of infectious disease with the discovery of 
a synthetic antistreptococcal compound that would give rise to a new class of 
antibacterial ‘miracle drugs’ known as the sulfonamides.563 The company achieved its 
first chemotherapeutic breakthroughs, however, with antiprotozoal agents targeting 
560 See for example, Marks, Progress of Experiment, p. 57; Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 59.
561 Goodman, ‘Pharmaceutical industry’, p. 143; Parascandola, ‘Theoretical basis’, 41-42; M. Weatherall, In Search 
of a Cure: A History of Pharmaceutical Discovery (Oxford, 1990), p. 148.
562 Lesch, First Miracle Drugs, p. 35.
563 Goodman, ‘Pharmaceutical industry’, pp. 143-144; Lesch, First Miracle Drugs, pp. 51-70.
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tropical diseases.564 Before the First World War, the Bayer chemotherapy laboratory - 
directed by a former assistant of Ehrlich at the Georg Speyer Haus - had set up a 
program for the synthesis of new dye derivatives, which were tested in ‘animal models 
of syphilis, trypanosomiasis and malaria’. In 1916, a compound was synthesised that 
showed great promise as a trypanocide: Bayer 205.565 
Bayer 205 did not constitute Germany’s only major involvement with trypanocidal 
chemotherapy after 1915. In Dresden, the chemist Hans Schmidt of the Chemische 
Fabrik von Heyden synthesised a series of new antimony compounds during the war and 
in the 1920s, some of which had therapeutic potential. His work was part of an 
industrial-academic collaboration set up in 1912 to find a less toxic substitute for tartar 
emetic, previously identified as a trypanocide and also recognised as a treatment for 
leishmaniasis and schistosomiasis, two other parasitic tropical diseases, in 1912 and 1918 
respectively.566 Schmidt’s research partner was Paul Uhlenhuth, a Professor of Hygiene 
in Freiburg who had formerly been a bacteriologist at the German Imperial Health Office 
and contributed to the pioneering, extensive investigations of Atoxyl by Germany’s 
foremost medical microbiologist Robert Koch in East Africa in 1906-1907.567 In 1914, 
Uhlenhuth was joined by Philalethes Kuhn, former head of the Cameroon medical 
service who in 1912 had visited the Brazzaville and Leopoldville medical laboratories.568 
The team’s efforts resulted, for example, in the compounds Heyden 471 and Heyden 661, 
which were later commercialised by von Heyden as ‘Stibosan’ and ‘Antimosan’.569 
By virtue of the traditionally close links between science and chemical industry, 
Germany clearly remained at the forefront of chemotherapeutic developments in the 
interwar period.570 At the same time, efforts were made in other countries to ‘develop 
synthetic organic chemicals manufacturing and industrial, or industry-linked, 
pharmaceutical research’.571 On the one hand, this involved imitation of German 
originals. In 1921, for example, one of Schmidt’s antimonials was marketed as ‘Stibenyl’ 
by the British pharmaceutical manufacturer Allen & Hanburys, which belonged to a 
group of ‘reputable companies’ that could take advantage of Britain’s expanding 
564 Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 66; Weatherall, In Search of a Cure, pp. 64, 149-150; Goodman, 
‘Pharmaceutical industry’, p. 144.
565 Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 274
566 Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 307; Foye, ‘Origins of medical chemistry’, p. 8.
567 These were the first ‘large-scale drug tests in Africa’. Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 114.
568 Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 307; Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical medicine’, pp. 
1259-1260 (note 49).
569 F. Van den Branden, ‘Le Heyden “661” ou Antimosan dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, 
Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique et de sa Filiale de l’Ouest Africain 19 (1926), 688-691; F. Van den Branden, 
‘Le Stibosan “préparation Heyden no. 471” dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, Bulletin de la 
Société de Pathologie Exotique et de sa Filiale de l’Ouest Africain 19 (1926), 193-196. When Schmidt moved from von 
Heyden to the Bayer company by the end of 1926, the latter also ‘acquired the von Heyden antimonial 
compounds for their product range’. Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, pp. 307-308.
570 Quirke and Slinn, ‘Perspectives on twentieth-century pharmaceuticals’, p. 10.
571 Lesch, First Miracle Drugs, p. 5.
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postwar ‘network of academic and industrial laboratories’ to launch science-based 
drugs.572 However, scientists and drug companies outside of Germany also increasingly 
moved from the mere copying of German synthetic drugs to pharmaceutical innovation 
in its own right. Arsenicals, which had perhaps most of all symbolised German medicinal 
superiority at the outbreak of the First World War, constituted a major area of focus. In 
fact, according to William Foye, ‘thousands of arsenicals were synthesized (sic) in 
Europe and America during the 1920s and 1930s’.573 Given that before the war arsenic-
based drugs had found their main application in African trypanosomiasis besides 
syphilis, this was not without potential significance for the field of interwar tropical 
chemotherapy. 
One of the key players in this arsenic drug development was Ernest Fourneau, who 
continued his chemotherapeutic research at the Pasteur Institute’s Therapeutic 
Chemistry Laboratory with financial and material backing from Poulenc Frères. While 
such industrial support conflicted with the Pasteur Institute’s ideals of ‘science as a non-
profit activity’, it also greatly contributed to the chemotherapy lab’s visible success in 
the interwar period, which helped suppress possible objections.574 In the early 1920s, the 
happy collaboration resulted in the compound Fourneau 190, a new organic arsenic 
derivative for oral administration, eventually branded ‘Stovarsol’ in a pun on its 
discoverer’s last name (which translates as ‘stove’ in English).575 
Another major effort came from the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research 
(RIMR) in New York. Founded in 1901 by the philanthropist John D. Rockefeller Sr., this 
independent biomedical institution became - among other things - a prominent centre 
for the study of infectious disease. Its director Simon Flexner had set up a specific 
chemotherapy program there in 1912. By 1914, when German drug patents in the United 
States were temporarily abrogated, the lab turned to arsenicals in a bid to substitute and 
improve Salvarsan.576 A research team comprising chemical experts Walter Jacobs and 
Michael Heidelberger, as well as medical scientists Wade Brown and Louise Pearce, 
proceeded with synthesising and investigating hundreds of new compounds. In 1915, 
one of these was found efficacious in trypanosome-infected laboratory animals - 
especially rabbits - , while also showing promise as a treatment for neurosyphilis: A63, 
or the ‘sodium salt of phenylglycine amide-p-arsonic acid’.577 The four scientists 
572 Quirke, ‘Foreign influences’, 141.
573 Foye, ‘Origins of medical chemistry’, p. 8.
574 V. Quirke, Collaboration in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Changing Relationships in Britain and France, 1935-1965 (New 
York, 2007), p. 28.
575 Lesch, First Miracle Drugs, p. 124; Baverey-Massat-Bourrat, ‘De la copie au nouveau médicament’, p. 54. On the 
Pasteur Institute’s Therapeutic Chemistry Laboratory, see also Quirke, Collaboration in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, pp. 27-28;Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 280.
576 Liebenau, Medical Science and Medical Industry, p. 109; Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 278. 
577 Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 278. On the use of rabbits as experimental animals, Pearce writes: ‘If the 
therapeutic value of tryparsamide had been gauged on the basis of its therapeutic index as obtained in the 
smaller laboratory animals, it would not have been given serious consideration. It so happens, however, that 
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successfully applied for a US patent, which was granted in 1918, and named the 
pentavalent arsenical ‘Tryparsamide’.578 The patent application was a remarkable step in 
an American context where patent medicines had traditionally been associated with the 
questionable practices of ‘unethical’ pharmaceutical businesses.579 As Nicolas Rasmussen 
has argued, however, the interwar period saw US life scientists increasingly engage with 
the pharmaceutical industry via patenting. Licensing collaborating firms to produce 
patented pharmaceuticals gave the latter market control for new scientific drugs, while 
allowing researchers to restrict the distribution of their discoveries to manufacturers 
complying with high quality standards.580 In this way, public health protection could 
justify drug patents, and this was certainly on the mind of Rockefeller researchers, 
whose ‘ideals (…) were in keeping with the policies of therapeutic reformers’ in the 
United States.581 
6.2 The Belgian Congo in cross-border networks of 
trypanocide development 
The researchers who had synthesised new trypanocidal compounds during and after the 
war of course needed to conduct clinical trials to establish therapeutic value in human 
cases of trypanosomiasis. For those scientists active in countries without African 
possessions, access to sufficient numbers of such patients was more complicated, and 
required the cooperation of European powers present on the continent. While the RIMR 
sent most of its experimental Tryparsamide to carefully selected clinics studying 
neurosyphilis in North America and Europe, to investigate its action in sleeping sickness 
while therapeutic tests on mice and rats may give a fairly accurate indication of what may be termed potential 
trypanocidal activity, they convey little idea of actual curative value, since the disease in these animals differs 
significantly from that in man or in the larger domestic animals. The infected rabbit is, from this point of view, 
the animal of choice since it shows so many of the conditions, including involvement of the central nervous 
system, found in man.’ L. Pearce, The Treatment of Human Trypanosomiasis with Tryparsamide. A Critical Review, 
Monographs of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research (New York, 1930), p. 7.
578 United States Patent Office. Arsenical compound US 1280123 A, 24.9.1918, http://www.google.com/patents/
US1280123 (Last accessed 22 April 2014); Pearce, Treatment of Human Trypanosomiasis, p. 5.
579 Drug patents had been ‘taboo’ among ethical pharmaceutical companies before the First World War. 
Liebenau, Medical Science and Medical Industry, p. 109. 
580 N. Rasmussen, ‘The moral economy of the drug company - medical scientist collaboration in interwar 
America’, Social Studies of Science 34 (2004), 170-172.
581 Rasmussen, ‘Moral economy’, 172; Marks, Progress of Experiment, p. 49.
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it planned to initiate tests in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and by 1920 had made concrete 
arrangements with the British Colonial and Foreign Offices to that effect.582 
The postwar period was particularly challenging for German scientists and 
pharmaceutical companies. To their immense frustration, the Treaty of Versailles had 
resulted in the division and transfer of German Africa to the victorious imperial powers 
as colonies or LN mandate territories. This seriously reduced the scope of Germany’s 
pharmaceutical export markets and presented its tropical medicine experts with 
significant difficulties to gain access to overseas environments for medical research and 
practice.583 This naturally made conducting clinical trials there less straightforward, a 
serious obstacle for a company like Bayer, where chemotherapy research had yielded 
compounds that in the first place showed promise in the treatment of tropical diseases. 
If the firm wanted to exploit its new trypanocidal substance Bayer 205, finding a way 
into tropical Africa was absolutely vital. Negotiations between the German Foreign 
Office, which was keen on restoring Germany’s international scientific prestige and 
ultimately even its colonial role, and the British Government, interested in the 
trypanocide for health-policy reasons, enabled Bayer to send a research expedition to 
Northern Rhodesia in 1921. It was directed by Friedrich Karl Kleine, a military doctor 
who had participated in Koch’s sleeping sickness expedition in 1906-1907 and 
subsequently become involved in trypanosomiasis control in German East Africa.584 
Meanwhile in Belgium, Alphonse Broden at the EMT and the Colonial Ministry went 
to great lengths to advance the Congo as a location for clinical research into new 
trypanocidal compounds. Broden sought in particular to consolidate the position of the 
Leopoldville laboratory as a major centre for scientific drug trials after the war. While it 
had primarily been a research institution before then, the laboratory considerably 
expanded its activities by 1919, taking on responsibility for a whole range of routine 
public health duties (such as providing analysis services, screening the resident urban 
population and passers-by for endemic diseases, offering outpatient treatment, 
preparing vaccines, training European and African medical auxiliaries etcetera) in 
582 ‘Report of the Director of Laboratories to the Members of the Corporation of the RIMR’, 15.10.1920, 
Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Rockefeller University Archives, Record Group (RG) 439 (Scientific Reports of 
the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 8, 1920, pp. 176-177; ‘Report of the Director of 
Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors of the RIMR’, 17.4.1920, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 
RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 8, 1920, p. 6; W. H. 
Brown and L. Pearce, ‘Report on the Present Status of the Investigations being carried out with Tryparsamide’, 
1.6.1923. - 15.3.1924, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the 
Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 12, 1923-1924 pp. 179-180.
583 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 182; Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 275.
584 Eckart, Medizin und Kolonialimperialismus, p. 509-510; Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 115.
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addition to its scientific work.585 In 1919, Rodhain feared that it had ‘ceased to function 
as a scientific research institution’.586 In the following years, the extra tasks indeed 
somewhat strained the resources available in terms of (lower-level) staff and 
infrastructure, even if these gradually expanded.587 
In Brussels, Broden became a crucial intermediary between the pharmaceutical 
industry and clinical investigators in Leopoldville in the 1920s. He had already helped 
the Belgian Meurice company develop (a market for) its brand of Atoxyl, and remained 
actively on the lookout for new trypanocides. To this end, the EMT director liaised 
directly with foreign scientists and ‘ethical’ drug firms or their Belgian concessionaires 
so as to secure samples of promising compounds in return for clinical trial results from 
Africa.588 He made substantial efforts, for example, to obtain quantities of the 
experimental drug Bayer 205. Its manufacturer, however, showed great reluctance to 
hand out samples to experimenters from Africa’s colonial powers. Moreover, Bayer 
deliberately kept the dye derivative’s formula secret in a bid to control the market for 
the drug and thus protect company interests, but also national goals, i.e. Germany’s 
‘colonial revisionism’.589 In 1922, on a visit to the German firm funded by the Belgian 
colonial government, Broden nevertheless managed to acquire a small amount for tests 
in the Leopoldville laboratory, by insisting on the latter’s capacity for ‘systematic and 
scientific’ trials on large numbers of patients who could be kept under long-term 
observation.590 
As both sleeping sickness therapy expert and EMT director, Broden also acted as a 
consultant for the Colonial Ministry’s medical department. After the war, the latter 
continued to be targeted by drug firms sending prospectuses and trial samples, and 
585 ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville-Ouest et des services annexes pendant 
l’année 1929’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 10 (1930), 233-235; J. Rodhain, ‘Les laboratoires de 
recherches médicales et les fondations pour coloniaux ’, in F. Passelecq (dir.), L’essor économique belge - Expansion 
coloniale. Etude documentaire sur l’armature économique de la colonie belge du Congo (Bruxelles, 1932), p. 171.
586 Pierquin, Historique du laboratoire médical, p. 14.
587 J. Rodhain, ‘Note au sujet du fonctionnement général (travaux) des laboratoires de Léopoldville et 
d’Elisabethville’, 11.9.1918, MAEAA, GG, 16862 (GG); ‘Fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville durant 
l’année 1920’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 1 (1921), 271-274; F. Van den Branden et L. Van 
Hoof, ‘Fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1922’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 3 (1923), 158; F. Van den Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de 
Léopoldville durant l’année 1926’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 8 (1928), 189.
588 A. Broden to Director General (9e Direction), 29.12.1920, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; A. Broden to Director General 
(9e Direction), 3.5.1921, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; A. Broden to Félix Mesnil, 23.5.1923, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.9, 
Correspondants étrangers. Belgique; O. Lepage to A. Broden, 15.8.1920, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; Les 
Etablissements Poulenc Frères to A. Broden, 21.4.1926, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Produits Roche S.A. to A. Broden, 
3.2.1928, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8; A. Broden to Mr. Hofman, 2.3.1928, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8; Produits Roche S.A. to 
A. Broden, 6.4.1928, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8; Paul Van Buggenhoudt to A. Broden, 6.3.1926, ITG, Onderzoek, 
5.2.10.
589 Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs 2008, p. 276; Eckart, Medizin und Kolonialimperialismus, p. 509.
590 A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 1.3.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; Director 7e Direction to 6e Direction, 
1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 8.8.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
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practitioners asking for their (empirical) remedies to be experimented overseas.591 In 
1920, the director repeated that he wanted to end the prewar modus operandi that saw 
the administration immediately send drug sellers’ latest inventions to all clinicians in 
the Congo. Instead, Broden urged the department to consult with his EMT first, and only 
send trial samples of drugs that originated from ‘serious’ manufacturers and were found 
satisfactory to the colony’s medical laboratories.592 The colonial authorities in Brussels 
usually followed this request by referring pharmaceutical companies to the EMT to 
discuss the possibilities of clinical trials in the Congo, and shipping compounds to Africa 
once Broden had given his approval.593 By advising the department on the dispatching of 
suitable experimental medicines, Broden further strengthened the Leopoldville 
laboratory’s pharmaceutical gatekeeping role as well as his own.594 From his 
metropolitan position, he thus continued to contribute to therapeutic reform in the 
colony, while also involving the EMT in sleeping sickness drug therapy research. 
Sometimes the Ministry was more proactive, however. It contacted drug firms itself 
to obtain trial samples of new potential trypanocides, often at the request of colonial 
practitioners, and then later informed Broden about it.595 Moreover, the colonial 
administration also continued to play its role as a facilitator of therapeutic 
experimentation in another way. It actively encouraged the introduction of new 
experimental trypanocides in the Congo by supporting non-Belgian medical researchers 
in need of human subjects to conduct their trials in the Congo. At this time, sleeping 
sickness was still a high-profile disease. Authorising scientific expeditions in Belgian 
colonial territory would send a signal that serious efforts were being made to tackle the 
epidemic, and also constituted an attempt to gain access to promising new compounds 
that were hard to obtain because they were not yet commercially available. 
In May 1920, for example, Louise Pearce from the RIMR left New York and travelled to 
the Leopoldville laboratory with her assistant Elizabeth Bowen to experiment 
591 For example: Minister of Colonies to A. Broden, 1.3.1921, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; ‘Stibenyl. Composé organique 
d’antimoine. Préparé sur les indications de Philip H. Manson-Bahr, D.S.C., pour le traitement des 
trypanosomiases, Kala-azar, Leishmaniose, filariose, etc.’, s.d., ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; Administrateur délégué 
Meurice to Minister of Colonies, 25.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
592 A. Broden to 9e Direction, 13.2.1920, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5.
593 For example: Minister of Colonies to A. Broden, 12.3.1921, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5.; A. Broden to Director 
General (9e Direction), 11.4.1921, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.5; Secrétaire Général to A. Broden, 4.9.1925, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.2.10; A. Broden to Governor General, 17.3.1927, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8.
594 For example: A. Broden to Secrétaire Général, 22.1.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Director of EMT to Service de 
l’Hygiène Inspecteur Général, 14.12.1929, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8; A. Broden to 7e Direction, 26.10.1923, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4403.301.
595 For example: E. Fourneau to Secrétaire Général, 25.2.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8; Note from Director Koller 
(9e Direction, 2e section) 3.3.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8; Secrétaire Général to Professor Fourneau, 22.2.1924, 
ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8; Minister of Colonies to A. Broden, 30.5.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Director 7e Direction 
to Secrétaire Général, 14.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
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Tryparsamide in the treatment of human sleeping sickness victims for the first time.596 
The RIMR felt that Sudan had ‘better living and laboratory facilities’ - presumably in the 
form of the Wellcome Tropical Research Laboratories in Khartoum -, which was not 
insignificant given its concern to elevate the scientific standards of drug trials.597 
Nonetheless, the plan to go there had to be abandoned for ‘political’ reasons, which 
were possibly linked to Pearce’s gender.598 Negotiations between Wickliffe Rose, director 
of the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Board, and the Belgian 
Government, as well as lobbying from the Belgian Queen Elizabeth during a visit to the 
RIMR in New York, in the end ensured that the Tryparsamide expedition eventually 
ended up in the Belgian Congo.599 
A second therapeutic expedition supported by the Belgian authorities was that of 
Friedrich Karl Kleine, who had started his clinical research with Bayer 205 in Northern 
Rhodesia. Instigated by its own medical and administrative staff, who were aware of 
Kleine’s work in British territory, Brussels was very eager to get its hands on the 
reputable German company’s experimental sleeping sickness drug. However, the Belgian 
colonial administration encountered the greatest difficulties to obtain significant 
quantities for extensive trials in the Congo because of Bayer’s decision to exploit the 
invention as part of a strategy to restore Germany’s African colonies. To requests for 
trial samples the company typically responded that it wanted to await the results from 
the German expedition in Rhodesia before handing out a substantial amount of Bayer 
205 to the Belgians.600 The colonial medical department did not give up, however, and in 
addition to sending Broden on a visit to the Bayer firm, it took steps to get Kleine to 
596 Anonymous to Governor General, 26.5.1920, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG); J. Rodhain to Leopoldville Laboratory 
Director, 7.7.1920, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG). 
597 ‘Report of the Director of Laboratories to the Members of the Corporation of the RIMR’, 15.10.1920, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific 
Directors), vol. 8, 1920, p. 177; Marks, Progress of Experiment, p. 49. On the Wellcome Tropical Research 
Laboratories, see for example, Bell, Frontiers of Medicine, pp. 55-89.
598 ‘Report of the Director of Laboratories to the Members of the Corporation of the RIMR’, 15.10.1920, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific 
Directors), vol. 8 (1920), p. 177. During a discussion of the tropical diseases expert committee concerning 
Pearce’s participation in a LN sleeping sickness mission, it was mentioned that ‘il n’est pas certain que le 
Gouvernement du Soudan autoriserait une femme à pénétrer sur son territoire’. See ‘Société des Nations. 
Organisation d’Hygiène. Commission d’experts de la maladie du sommeil. Procès Verbal de la séance tenue à 
Londres le lundi 18 mai 1925 à 11 heures’, 18.5.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.914.
599 Anonymous to Governor General, 26.5.1920, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG); ‘Report of the Director of Laboratories 
to the Members of the Corporation of the RIMR’, 15.10.1920, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 
(Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 8, 1920, p. 177.
600 J. David, ‘Note concernant un nouveau Trypanocide le « 205 » BAYER’, 31.5.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; 
E. Van Campenhout to Minister of Colonies, 3.6.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; Minister of Colonies to 
Director of Bayer firm, 17.6.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; Bayer firm to Ministry of Colonies (7e Direction 
2e section), 23.6.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
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continue his mission in the Belgian Congo.601 The German tropical medicine expert 
gladly accepted the invitation, given that sleeping sickness prevalence in the colony 
gave him ‘ample opportunity’ for large-scale experimentation. In late 1922, Kleine and 
his collaborators crossed the border into the Belgian Congo to pursue their clinical 
investigations. They started work around Kiambi in Katanga Province, where they were 
assisted by doctor Paul Walravens of the Elisabethville laboratory.602 While Bayer delayed 
the commercial release of Bayer 205 and kept refusing to provide ample trial samples to 
the Congo’s medical service, the colonial government intensified its material support for 
the members of the Kleine mission, who were the Belgians’ best chance of securing 
larger quantities of the experimental trypanocide.603 
These foreign-led research expeditions to the Belgian Congo played an important role 
in postwar chemotherapeutic knowledge production and trypanocide development. 
Pearce’s stay in Leopoldville, for example, provided a first indication of Tryparsamide’s 
potential as a sleeping sickness drug. While feeling as if she had arrived ‘on another 
planet’, the American medical scientist found the laboratory ‘fairly equipped’ and 
reported that she could count on the ‘excellent cooperation’ of colonial staff, which 
included laboratory director Van den Branden.604 There was a lack of early cases to 
experiment on, as ‘keeping (them) within reach, so the treatment (was) not interrupted’ 
proved tricky. Moreover, as far as the ‘lazaret’-village was concerned, ‘it (was) not 
difficult for a patient to run away and be lost in the bush’, according to Pearce.605 
Nevertheless, in the course of her stay she managed to investigate the action of 
Tryparsamide in 77 cases of sleeping sickness from her basis at the Leopoldville 
laboratory. The investigations systematically compared the therapeutic and untoward 
effects of intravenous and intramuscular injections of varying single and repeated doses 
on patients in both the early and later stages of the disease. Based on observations of the 
601 Note from 7e Direction (2e section), 1.7.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; 7e Direction (2e section) to vice-
Governor General of Katanga, 26.6.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
602 F. K. Kleine, ‘On a recent expedition to Africa to investigate the action of Bayer 205 in trypanosomiasis’, 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 17 (1924), 446; P. Walravens, ‘La maladie du 
sommeil dans la région de la Luvua; traitement par le Bayer 205’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 
3 (1923), 223-231.
603 Minister of Colonies to Commissaire Royal in Usumbura, 27.3.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; A. Broden to 
Secrétaire Général, 17.4.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Chef de Cabinet Halewyck to E. Van Campenhout, 
5.10.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; Governor Heenen to Minister of Colonies, 12.10.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène 
4403.301; A. Broden to 9e Direction, 13.11.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
604 L. Pearce to Dr Heidelberger, 17.7.1920, National Library of Medicine, Profiles in Science. The Michael 
Heidelberg Papers, http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/ResourceMetadata/DHBBNQ (Last accessed 20 
April 2014); ‘Report of the Director of Laboratories to the Members of the Corporation of the RIMR’, 15.10.1920, 
RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific 
Directors), vol. 8, 1920, p. 178.
605 ‘Report of the Director of Laboratories to the Members of the Corporation of the RIMR’, 15.10.1920, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific 
Directors), vol. 8, 1920, p. 298.
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‘peripheral sterilization (sic) of lymph glands and blood’, clinical improvements, and 
reductions in the cell content of the spinal fluid (taken as a sign of normalisation in 
cases with cerebrospinal involvement), she concluded that Tryparsamide had a ‘marked 
trypanocidal activity’ in the Gambiense variety of human trypanosomiasis, while only 
causing occasional and mostly ‘transitory’ ocular problems in some advanced cases.606 
In Katanga Province, the therapeutic investigations of the Kleine mission in 
1922-1923 further confirmed the trypanocidal action of Bayer 205. The trials did not 
take place in a clinic connected to a laboratory, but involved the ambulatory treatment 
of some 150 early and advanced sleeping sickness cases in the Luvua region upstream of 
Kiambi. Administering repeated intravenous injections of 1g, the experimenters found 
that the drug cleared Congolese victims’ blood of trypanosomes for a much longer 
period than existing trypanocides, without significant toxic side-effects. Backed by these 
results, Kleine went on to label Bayer 205 the ‘best remedy for sleeping sickness’, and 
suggested it had a major part to play in the control of sleeping sickness.607 At the 
instigation of the German Foreign Office, the compound had in the mean time been 
branded ‘Germanin’. The new name further signalled how the pharmaceutical was 
meant to underscore the legitimacy of Germany’s colonial claims.608 Reflecting a certain 
British ‘sympathy’ for the German cause, a 1922 article in the ‘African World’ portrayed 
Bayer 205 as the ‘key to Tropical Africa’.609 
German claims notwithstanding, the (further) trajectories of Bayer 205, Tryparsamide 
and other new trypanocidal compounds in the Congo were ultimately shaped by the 
therapeutic arbiters of the Leopoldville laboratory. After a furlough in Europe in 1919, 
Van den Branden had taken up his position as director again in March 1920.610 In August 
of that same year, Lucien Van Hoof, yet another former assistant of the Louvain 
bacteriologist Joseph Denys, joined the lab as Van den Branden’s deputy until his 
detachment to Mayumbe in 1925 to study bacterial dysentery.611 Despite an increasing 
medical and administrative workload, both men were heavily involved in 
trypanosomiasis therapy research, which resulted in several co-authored publications.612 
606 L. Pearce, ‘Studies on the treatment of human trypanosomiasis with tryparsamide (the sodium salt of n-
phenylglycineamide-p-arsonic acid)’, Journal of Experimental Medicine 34 (1921), 28, 97-103.
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Luvua’, 223, 230.
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609 ‘Sleeping sickness and Tsetse Fly. The New German Cure’, 19.8.1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; Neill, 
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Tropicale 1 (1921), 271; Dubois, ‘Nécrologie. J.-F.-F. Van den Branden’, 87.
611 ‘Fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville durant l’année 1920’, p. 271; M. Kivits, ‘Lucien Marie Joseph 
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Their work continued to rest on the laboratory’s close links with the Leopoldville 
sleeping sickness ‘lazaret’, which Van den Branden referred to as a ‘veritable annex’ or 
an ‘indispensable subsidiary’ as far as trypanosomiasis research was concerned. There, 
advanced cases and all others kept ‘under constant observation’ for therapeutic 
experimentation were hospitalised, and increasingly so in stone pavilions rather than 
clay dwellings.613 In addition, the laboratory’s activities also remained firmly embedded 
in Franco-Belgian networks, as Van den Branden maintained close ties with French 
Pastorians. He interacted on a regular and reportedly ‘very cordial’ basis with colleagues 
at Brazzaville’s Pasteur Institute, such as Blanchard and Laigret, and exchanges of 
research results, drug samples and pathogen strains took place in the familiar context of 
scientific cooperation and competition.614 Moreover, the Leopoldville lab director 
continued publishing clinical studies as a single author or with his assistant-director 
Van Hoof in the ‘Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique’.615 
Initially, Van den Branden and Van Hoof ’s intensive experimentation of the new dye, 
antimonials and arsenicals sent their way did not amount to much. Most of the 
compounds, including Stovarsol and Stibenyl, were soon enough discarded because they 
were therapeutically inferior, or at least did not produce better results than the 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 2 (1922), 125-130; F. Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Le stibényl 
(acétyl-paminophényl stibiate de soude) dans la trypanosomiase humaine’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 2 (1922), 37-41; F. Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Trypanoléine Van Saceghem dans la 
trypanosomiase humaine’, Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances et Mémoires de la Société de Biologie 88 (1923), 
627-629; F. Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Résultats de l’observation de malades trypanosomés traités au 
Tryparsamide A63’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique et de sa Filiale de l’Ouest Africain 16 (1923), 606-665; F. 
Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Action du “Bayer 205” sur les trypanosomiases animales (note préliminaire)’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 3 (1923), 309-316; F. Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Le “Bayer 
205” dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 4 (1924), 
205-230. 
613 Van den Branden et Van Hoof, ‘Fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1922’, 159; F. 
Van den Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville en 1925’, Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale 6 (1926), 283-284; ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville 
pendant l’année 1924’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 5 (1925), 142; F. Van den Branden, ‘Rapport 
sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville durant l’année 1926’, 190; ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement 
du laboratoire de Léopoldville-Ouest et des services annexes pendant l’année 1928’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 9 (1929), 125.
614 For example: J. Laigret to Félix Mesnil, 20.11.1925, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.7, Laigret; A. Sicé to Félix Mesnil, 
6.10.1928, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.7, Sicé; A. Sicé to Félix Mesnil, 4.11.1928, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.7, Sicé; 
A. Sicé to Félix Mesnil, 14.1.1929, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.7, Sicé; Dr Blanchard to Félix Mesnil, 6.6.1922, AIP, 
Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.6, Blanchard; Dr Blanchard to Félix Mesnil, 11.12.1922, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, , MES.6, 
Blanchard; Dr Blanchard to Félix Mesnil, 14.5.1923, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.6, Blanchard.
615 For example: F. Van den Branden, ‘Essai de traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine par la collobiase 
d’antimoine’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique 13 (1920), 27; F. Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, 
‘Résultats de l’observation de malades trypanosomés traités au Tryparsamide A63’, Bulletin de la Société de 
Pathologie Exotique et de sa Filiale de l’Ouest Africain 16 (1923), 606-665.
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chemicals already available for sleeping sickness therapy.616 As far as Tryparsamide was 
concerned, Pearce had conceded that further research was required to determine its 
longer-term effects as well as the most appropriate treatment regimen. After her stay in 
Leopoldville, she made arrangements with Van den Branden to continue monitoring her 
patients.617 Upon her return to the United States, the RIMR sent additional supplies of 
Tryparsamide to the Congo for further experimentation.618 Via Broden at the EMT, Van 
den Branden kept Pearce informed about his findings, but neither Belgian doctors were 
particularly convinced that the American compound constituted a significant advance 
on Atoxyl.619 In 1922, the Leopoldville laboratory researchers also had a chance to 
experiment the German dye derivative Bayer 205, but they hesitated to draw definitive 
conclusions.620 Not surprisingly, therefore, in an overview of sleeping sickness therapy 
published in 1923, Broden still regarded the combination of Atoxyl and tartar emetic 
injections as the best available drugs for routine sleeping sickness treatment.621
As clinical trials in Leopoldville continued, still more compounds were excluded from 
the Congo’s trypanocidal arsenal. For example, Van den Branden tried Stibosan and 
Antimosan on a small number of second-stage sleeping sickness victims, but with a less 
marked trypanocidal action, he did not find them a suitable replacement for tartar 
emetic.622 However, as far as Tryparsamide and Bayer 205 were concerned, longer-term 
and larger-scale observations began to alter opinions in Leopoldville from the second 
half of 1923 onwards. By then, Van den Branden and Van Hoof ’s published reports on 
Tryparsamide were arguing that the drug produced far better results than any other 
616 Broden, ‘La thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines’, 37; F. Van den Branden, ‘Le stovarsol ou “acide 
acétyloxyaminophénylarsinique” dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, Annales de la Société Belge 
de Médecine Tropicale 5 (1925), 36; Van Hoof, ‘Thérapeutique de la maladie du sommeil’, 107-109, 115.
617 Pearce, ‘Studies on the treatment of human trypanosomiasis with tryparsamide’, 4, 59, 97, 100; L. Pearce, 
‘Tryparsamide treatment of African sleeping sickness’, Science 61 (1925), 91; ‘Report of Director of Laboratories 
to Corporation’, 21.10.1921, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the Laboratories 
to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 9, 1921, p. 261; L. Pearce to Minister of Colonies Franck, 6.1.1922, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; ‘Translation of portion of letter from Dr Van den Branden’, 28.2.1924, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 210.3 (Business Manager), Box 35, folder 13.
618 ‘Report of Director of Laboratories to Corporation’, 21.10.1921, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 
(Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 9, 1921, p. 261. 
619 ‘Report of Director of Laboratories to Corporation’, 21.10.1921, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 
(Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 9, 1921, p. 261; A. Broden, ‘Note 
concernant le mémoire de Miss L. Pearce’, 1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301. Neither was Rodhain, who in 
addition anticipated that Tryparsamide’s use would be more expensive than Atoxyl. J. Rodhain, ‘Note au sujet 
du travail de Melle L. Pearce’, 1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
620 J. Rodhain, ‘Service de l’hygiène. Rapport annuel 1922’, 31.8.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.604; Van den 
Branden et Van Hoof, ‘Fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1922’, 173.
621 Broden, ‘Thérapeutique des trypanoses humaines’, 39.
622 Van den Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville en 1925’, 302 ; Van den 
Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville durant l’année 1926’, 200-201; Van den 
Branden, ‘Le Stibosan “préparation Heyden no.471”’; Van den Branden, ‘Le Heyden “661” ou Antimosan’.
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trypanocide as far as curing advanced sleeping sickness cases was concerned.623 At the 
Luanda tropical medicine conference in July 1923, Van Hoof even hinted that 
Tryparsamide might at some point replace Atoxyl. He also presented unpublished 
results on the laboratory’s Bayer 205 trials: while moderating the initial enthusiasm of 
the Kleine mission members by suggesting that the compound was disappointing as a 
‘curative remedy’, they nevertheless highlighted its ‘remarkable’ preventive potential.624 
The Leopoldville assessments of Tryparsamide and Bayer 205 significantly boosted 
Belgian optimism about medicinal prophylaxis in the early 1920s. The promising 
findings regarding the new drugs’ curative and prophylactic properties soon enough 
convinced chief medical officer Rodhain that a pharmaceutical solution to the sleeping 
sickness problem was within reach. The observed therapeutic results ensured, he argued 
in his annual medical report for 1923, that eradication of the disease was now simply a 
matter of ‘organisation and credit’.625 
The Belgian Congo’s involvement in the making of the new trypanocides at the 
beginning of the decade also helped push the further evaluation of sleeping sickness 
drugs to the top of the international research agenda. In 1924, the LNHO’s tropical 
diseases expert committee identified the ‘comparative’ assessment of the ‘prophylactic 
and curative value’ of trypanocides as one of the priority areas for investigation by 
medical institutions in Africa dealing with trypanosomiasis.626 From the outset, Belgian 
colonial (medical) authorities had been putting forward the Congo as a specialist centre 
for such sleeping sickness therapy research. By virtue of ‘the energetic utilisation of (its) 
inexhaustible clinical material’, the colony - together with the French Congo - was by 
the mid-1920s also recognised as such by representatives of other colonial powers.627 It 
was of course the Leopoldville medical laboratory in particular that was considered the 
flagship of postwar trypanocide research in Belgian Africa.628
623 See for example: ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1924’, 
155-156; Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide treatment of African sleeping sickness’, 91. 
624 Van Hoof, ‘Thérapeutique de la maladie du sommeil’, 123, 126. Walravens’ follow-up observations had 
suggested very promising results from both a prophylactic and curative point of view, including in advanced 
cases. See ‘Telegram van Heenen’, 14.3.923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; Walravens, ‘Maladie du sommeil dans la 
région de la Luvua’, 228, 230. According to a French observer at the Brazzaville Pasteur Institute, Van den 
Branden and Van Hoof were not always on the best of terms after the latter published the collaborative work 
on Bayer 205 under his own name at the Luanda conference. Dr Blanchard to Félix Mesnil, 22.1.1924, AIP, Fonds 
F. Mesnil, MES.6, Blanchard.
625 ‘Congo Belge. Service de l’hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1923’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.11; J. Rodhain, ‘Service de 
l’hygiène. Rapport annuel 1922’, 31.8.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.604.
626 A. Balfour, E. Van Campenhout, G. Martin and A. G. Bagshawe, ‘Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. 
Commission des experts pour les maladies tropicales’, 12.9.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.913.
627 For example: L. Duke, ‘League of Nations. Paper No I. General Review of the activities of the commission. 
Interim report of the League of Nations International Commission on Human Trypanosomiasis’, 12.1926, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.2.11.
628 ‘Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. Commission d’experts de la maladie du sommeil. Procès Verbal 
de la séance tenue à Londres le lundi 18 mai 1925 à 11 heures’, 18.5.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.914.
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6.3 High expectations: establishing Tryparsamide 
effectiveness in the field
The promising results with Bayer 205 and Tryparsamide at the Leopoldville laboratory 
enticed Congolese medical authorities to seek to expand the use of the new 
trypanocides in the colony. They encouraged larger-scale ‘field trials’, notably by 
itinerant doctors, to complement Van den Branden and Van Hoof ’s laboratory work.629 
Given that touring sleeping sickness doctors had even less control over trypanosome 
carriers than their counterparts in lazarets or clinics, the point of such therapeutic 
investigations in the field was not so much to conduct ‘scientific’ experiments 
evaluating the efficacy and safety of new trypanocides.630 Rather, they were meant to 
establish a proven drug’s ‘effectiveness’, i.e. assess how it performed in routine clinical 
practice, and especially whether it could control sleeping sickness in the context of the 
colony’s mass treatment campaign. In this sort of clinical studies, which could take 
many forms, the boundaries between therapeutic research and public health practice in 
fact became extremely blurred.631
Acquiring substantial quantities of Bayer 205 initially remained problematic, 
however. Although the drug constituted an important advance in sleeping sickness 
therapeutics, Rodhain argued in 1923, a delay in commercial release made its use 
premature in his view.632 By 1924, Bayer’s Belgian concessionaire, Pickaert & Grolée, was 
sending out pharmaceutical prospectuses claiming that Germanin would help bring 
about Africa’s ‘general redemption’ by ‘sanit(ising)’ trypanosome-infected regions. It 
offered to hand out quantities to the colonial authorities for large-scale 
experimentation, but claimed it could not do so for free and insisted that the drug was 
not yet commercially available.633 Possibly contributing to Bayer’s persistent reluctance 
to freely distribute Germanin were Kleine’s plans, as revealed during a gathering of the 
LNHO tropical diseases expert committee in 1924, to undertake an LN-backed scientific 
expedition to Katanga to study, among other things, the eradication of sleeping sickness 
by pharmaceutical means.634 
629 ‘Rapport médical annuel du service de l’hygiène 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.605
630 G. Trolli, ‘Le traitement de la trypanose humaine par la tryparsamide; revue générale’, Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale 7 (1927), 319; J. David, ‘Le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine par la 
tryparsamide’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale, 7 (1927), 303-309.
631 On the distinction between ‘efficacy - the effect of an intervention demonstrated in a clinical trial - and 
‘effectiveness, that is, its real-world effect’, see Lock and Nguyen, Anthropology of Biomedicine, 185.
632 J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Suite aux considérations sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 
30.3.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7; J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Considérations pratiques sur la prophylaxie de 
la maladie du sommeil”’, 1923.11.20, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7., p. 1.
633 Letter from Pickaert & Grolée, 1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
634 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Compte rendu sommaire des discussions du Comité Médical réuni à Londres sous les 
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By 1925, Brussels was nevertheless purchasing certain quantities of Germanin, the 
cost of which could be recuperated via war reparation payments.635 Another solution 
soon presented itself, however, thanks to the research efforts of Ernest Fourneau. In 
1924, he had managed to synthesise a compound in Paris that he believed to be identical 
to Bayer 205, naming it Fourneau 309.636 Although at first denying these claims, Bayer 
was soon forced to acknowledge that the French attempt to copy its trypanocide had 
been successful. In 1925, the company ‘came to an understanding with Fourneau’ and 
concluded a ‘marketing agreement’ with Poulenc that allowed the French firm to 
manufacture Bayer 205/Fourneau 309 and commercialise it as ‘Moranyl’.637 Poulenc also 
provided the Belgian colonial administration with free samples for trials in the Congo, 
most of which were sent, following Broden’s suggestion, to the Leopoldville 
laboratory.638 There, Van den Branden found it to be therapeutically equivalent to the 
German-manufactured compound.639 
The larger-scale field experimentation of the Bayer 205 compound in the Belgian 
Congo was initially confined to the Leopoldville laboratory doctors. By 1924, Van den 
Branden and Van Hoof had concluded more definitively that the trypanocide did not 
surpass Atoxyl in curing second-stage patients, but confirmed that its great value lay in 
its ability to effect a very long blood sterilisation with even a single dose, and even in 
advanced cases.640 These results led Van den Branden to further explore the compound’s 
prophylactic potential in 1924. He initiated a chemoprophylaxis field trial in Binzia, a 
auspices de la Société des Nations en Septembre 1924’, 1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.913; ‘League of Nations. 
Health Organisation. Campaign Against Sleeping Sickness in Equatorial Africa. Memorandum by Professor F. K. 
Kleine (Translation)’, 18.7.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.913; E. Van Campenhout to Secrétaire Générale, 
20.8.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.913.
635 Secrétaire Général to A. Broden, 27.10.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Secrétaire Général to Governor General, 
14.9.1925, MAEAA, GG, 16769 (GG). 
636 E. Fourneau to Secrétaire Général, 25.2.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8.
637 Les Etablissements Poulenc Frères, ‘La maladie du sommeil’ (Paris, 1927); Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 
277. Simon Flexner wrote in 1925 to Louise Pearce: ‘(Bayer and Fourneau) have now joined hands and 
henceforth will work together’. S. Flexner to L. Pearce, 13.6.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 430 
P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder (2) 8. ‘Marketing agreements’ with ‘foreign competitors’ were not 
uncommon in the German pharmaceutical industry. Liebenau, ‘Ethical business’, 126.
638 Les Etablissements Poulenc Frères to Director 9e Direction, 4.7.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Secrétaire 
Général to A. Broden, 4.9.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
639 F. Van den Branden to Chief Medical Officer in Boma, 8.9.1926, ITG, Stukken van Algemeen Bestuurlijke Aard, 
1.7.9.2.2.
640 ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1924’, 152-153; F. Van den 
Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Le “Bayer 205” dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale 4 (1924), 205-230; F. Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Conclusions du rapport 
Docteurs Van den Branden et Van Hoof sur “Le Bayer 205”’, 15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302. When Van 
den Branden and Van Hoof learned that Kleine reported better results with Bayer 205 in the treatment of 
advanced cases in Katanga, they objected that the German mission members were not able to keep their 
patients under the ‘strict observation’ that was possible in Leopoldville. F. Van den Branden and L. Van Hoof, 
‘Le Bayer 205 dans le traitement de la Trypanosomiase Humaine’, 15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
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‘chefferie’ in an endemic sleeping sickness area, which he later extended to two other 
indigenous communities. It was an attempt to obtain ‘massive sterilisation’ by 
administering prophylactic Bayer 205 injections to all local inhabitants not yet carrying 
trypanosomes, so as to protect them against infection. Although Van den Branden found 
that this ‘Bayerisation’ would require a yearly renewal of injections (which he 
anticipated would be rather expensive), he suggested that reduced infection rates in his 
trial communities could be attributed to the prophylactic Bayer 205 injections.641 
Later on, further field trials by itinerant doctors involved in sleeping sickness control 
confirmed Van Hoof and Van den Branden’s assessment of the Bayer 205 compound and 
highlighted its drawbacks in practical terms. Doctors Strada and Lopes from the Uele 
sleeping sickness mission, for example, were not impressed with Germanin’s results in 
the treatment of chronic trypanosomiasis victims that were beyond the usual Atoxyl 
and tartar emetic therapy. Given that it was in addition an expensive drug, they could 
not recommend it.642 In 1926, Fourche and Ricklin from Forminière’s sleeping sickness 
mission in Kasai initiated ‘Bayerisation’ trials at Broden’s suggestion. While 
acknowledging that preventive Bayer 205 injections administered indiscriminately to 
whole communities could provide protection against infection, they were not convinced 
of this chemoprophylactic strategy of sleeping sickness control. In their view, simply 
treating trypanosome carriers could suffice to curb the disease, and the drug’s price 
made a general application of preventive injections less feasible anyway.643 
While the enthusiasm for Bayer 205 in the Belgian Congo somewhat dampened, 
Tryparsamide increasingly came to the fore as a highly promising option for 
pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control. In November 1923, Broden had decided to 
organise an extensive Tryparsamide trial in the colony and started negotiating with 
Pearce to obtain the required amount of the experimental drug. With the assurance that 
the resulting reports would be sent to New York before publication, the RIMR sent a first 
shipment of 5kg a few months later.644 In the Congo, chief medical officer Rodhain made 
sure that, as Pearce required, the supplies were distributed to suitable state doctors who 
641 ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1924’, 154-155; Van den 
Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville en 1925’, 297-298; Van den Branden, 
‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville durant l’année 1926’, 207; F. Van den Branden, 
‘Seconde note préliminaire sur les essais d’administration de Bayer 205 prophylactique à des agglomérations 
indigènes’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 7 (1927), 147-149; F. Van den Branden to Chief Medical 
Officer, 27.7.1925, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG).
642 L. Strada et A. J. Lopes, ‘Notes préliminaires sur le traitement de la trypanose humaine par la germanine (205 
Bayer)’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 5 (1925), 186; L. Strada et A. J. Lopes, ‘Notes 
complémentaires sur le traitement de la trypanose humaine par le germanine (205 Bayer)’, Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale 7 (1927), 13.
643 J. A. Fourche et J. Ricklin, ‘Expérimentation du Bayer 205 au point de vue préventif dans la pratique 
itinérante’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 8 (1928), 143, 153-154.
644 E. Van Campenhout to Minister of Colonies, 24.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
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would only use them for treating sleeping sickness.645 Soon afterwards, a large second 
batch of free Tryparsamide arrived, which Rodhain distributed among laboratory and 
hospital doctors, as well as physicians directing special sleeping sickness missions.646 
Still further supplies for the Congo medical service followed in the course of 1924.647 
The RIMR’s free Tryparsamide shipments enabled Broden and Rodhain to initiate 
therapeutic investigations in the ‘real’ world of medical practice, outside of the Leo lab’s 
controlled environment. Their coordination of clinical research in the colony under 
Pearce’s watch to some extent thwarted Van den Branden’s own ambitions.648 He argued 
for the sleeping sickness missions to engage in a constant exchange of ‘observations, 
results, advice, etc.’ with the Leopoldville laboratory, so that the latter could ‘centralise’ 
the information gathered throughout the colony and provide therapeutic guidance.649 
However, when Van den Branden in 1924 expressed the wish to collate the Tryparsamide 
trial results in advanced cases from all over the Congo, on the grounds that he was the 
first researcher to ‘signal the good results with this product’, Rodhain simply informed 
him that it was Broden who was to gather and compare all relevant records.650 Although 
the Leopoldville laboratory was typically the first port of call for clinical trials with new 
trypanocides, it clearly did not have absolute control over therapeutic knowledge 
production pertaining to the Congo. 
As Pearce accumulated more information on Tryparsamide therapy from Africa, she 
started claiming that it was the only drug with a ‘marked therapeutic action in the late 
stages of the affection’, and that sleeping sickness control became a possibility if further 
observations confirmed the results so far achieved and treatment could be implemented 
on a large scale.651 As she asserted herself, the Congo trials in particular were critical in 
shaping Tryparsamide’s therapeutic application as a sleeping sickness drug. The 1923 
reports of its superior efficacy in advanced sleeping sickness cases by the Belgian 
laboratory doctors in Leopoldville as well as C. C. Chesterman, a Baptist missionary in 
the Congo whom Pearce had also provided with samples, did much to revive interest 
645 Louise Pearce to Simon Flexner, 14.12.1923, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce 
papers), Box 1, folder (1) 7; ‘Translations of extracts of the letter from Dr Rodhain (Chief of the Medical Service, 
Belgian Congo) to Dr Pearce’, 26.3.1924, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 210.3 (Business Manager), Box 
35, folder 13.
646 J. Rodhain to Louise Pearce, 7.1924, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG).
647 L. Pearce to J. Rodhain,17.6.1924, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG). 
648 Van den Branden argued that given the Leopoldville laboratory’s role in sleeping sickness research, there 
should be a constant exchange of ‘observations, results, advice, etc.’ with the special sleeping sickness missions 
in the colony, so that the lab can ‘centralise’ the information established by the various missions, and the 
latter can benefit from the lab’s therapeutic research. Van den Branden et Van Hoof, ‘Fonctionnement du 
laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1922’, 161.
649 Van den Branden and Van Hoof, ‘Fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville pendant l’année 1922’, 161.
650 F. Van den Branden to Chief Medical Officer, 18.9.1924, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG); J. Rodhain to A. Broden, 
23.10.1924, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG). 
651 Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide Treatment of African Sleeping Sickness’, 91-92. 
139
elsewhere in colonial Africa.652 According to Pearce, Bayer 205 initially had a much 
greater appeal among most clinical investigators because ‘the claims made for it (…) 
were so much greater than those that had been made for tryparsamide’.653 Tellingly, 
after leaving the Belgian Congo, Pearce had also sent a quantity of Tryparsamide to the 
Pastorians in Brazzaville, but they were not convinced of the compound’s efficacy until 
about 1925, after initiating new trials with samples provided by their Leopoldville 
colleagues.654 By then, Pearce and Brown held that the drug’s ultimate therapeutic value 
lay in its potential ability to eradicate sleeping sickness and concluded that although 
requiring substantial amounts of money and personnel, mass treatment was the only 
viable strategy of disease eradication in the current circumstances.655 
Around the same time, Van den Branden and Van Hoof ’s own observations in 
Leopoldville led them to call for a definitive replacement of Atoxyl with Tryparsamide in 
mass sleeping sickness treatment.656 Rodhain set out to ‘convince the Government that it 
(was) in its interest to obtain all the Tryparsamide that was required’ for the 1926 
budget year.657 Giovanni Trolli, who succeeded Rodhain as chief medical officer in 
November 1925, confirmed that the solution to the trypanosomiasis problem lay in the 
consolidation and expansion of the special-mission model. What was foremost required 
to ‘conquer’ the disease, he argued, was (money for) additional staff and greater 
quantities of the new trypanocides Bayer 205 and, in particular, Tryparsamide.658 Even 
political authorities in the Congo supported a more extensive use of the American 
trypanocide. The Governor General was delighted that African perceptions of its efficacy 
in advanced cases boosted indigenous confidence in the medical service, which he 
652 Dr Brown and Dr Pearce, ‘Report on the Present Status of the Investigations being carried out with 
Tryparsamide, 1.6.1923 - 15.3.1924’, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 (Scientific Reports of the 
Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 12, 1923-1924, pp. 181, 186-187; W. H. Brown and L. 
Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide in paresis and African sleeping sickness’, 10.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 
RG 450 P315 (Louis Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2.
653 ‘Report of director of laboratories to corporation’, 17.10.1924, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 
(Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 12, 1923-1924, p. 247. 
654 Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical medicine’, 1264; L. Pearce to S. Flexner, 24.4.1923, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder (1) 7; L. Pearce to S. Flexner, 
31.3.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louis Pearce papers), Box 1, folder (2) 8.
655 ‘Report of director of laboratories to corporation’, 17.10.1924, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 439 
(Scientific Reports of the Laboratories to the Board of Scientific Directors), vol. 12, 1923-1924, pp. 250-251; W. 
H. Brown and L. Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide in paresis and African sleeping sickness’, 10.1925, RAC, Rockefeller 
University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2.
656 Van den Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville en 1925’, 299-300.
657 J. Rodhain to L. Pearce, 28.9.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 
1, folder 2.
658 Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, p. 11; G. Trolli, ‘Note générale au sujet des prévisions 
budgétaires du Service de l’Hygiène pour l’exercice 1925’, 16.9.1924, MAEAA, GG, 16847 (GG).
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anticipated would greatly facilitate the sleeping sickness campaign.659 Expectations that 
Tryparsamide would exert a ‘civilising’ influence indicate how Europeans, as Laurence 
Monnais has remarked, came to see pharmaceuticals as ‘agents for extending (their) 
sphere of influence’ in colonial territories.660 Crucially, convinced that the new 
trypanocides would get sleeping sickness under control in the course of a few years, 
Governor General Rutten actively endorsed the requests of his medical staff to 
generalise their use in mass treatment.661
6.4 In summary
In the first half of the 1920s, Atoxyl’s downturn coexisted with the first phase of a new 
trypanocide’s career cycle in the Belgian Congo: Tryparsamide. Its rise to prominence 
came about through an interplay between cross-border pharmaceutical circulation and 
locality, as the colony became a crucial testing site for ethical drug developers’ new 
trypanocidal compounds after the First World War. The chemotherapeutic exchanges in 
which the Belgian Congo took part in the 1920s continued to take on an inter-imperial 
shape, but were nevertheless marked by the armed conflict. They involved a greater 
share of synthetic chemicals developed or manufactured outside of Germany in a bid to 
break the country’s pharmaceutical dominance, while the free distribution of German 
experimental drugs, in particular Bayer 205, became more difficult. As the EMT and the 
colonial administration facilitated, supported and instigated clinical research on African 
trypanosome carriers with these new compounds, the Congo became an important 
participant in postwar pharmaceutical innovation and therapeutic knowledge 
production. At the same time, clinical trials in both the laboratory and the field shaped 
local trypanocide trajectories. Most of the competing medicines were rejected, and it 
was eventually Tryparsamide that generated high expectations in the Congo as a tool for 
pharmaceutical disease eradication. It was hailed as a superior drug, fit to replace Atoxyl 
in mass sleeping sickness treatment, by local medical and political authorities impressed 
with the drug’s curative effects and African responses to it. How the American 
invention’s re-appropriation as a Belgian drug dramatically boosted consumption by the 
late 1920s will be discussed in the next chapter. 
659 ‘Translation of the letter from the Governor General of the Belgian Congo to Dr Pearce’, 26.3.1924, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 210.3 (Business Manager), Box 35, folder 13.
660 Monnais, ‘Colonial medicines to global pharmaceuticals’, 261. 
661 Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 3.10.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
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Chapter  7
Belgian medico-pharmaceutical nationalism: from 
Tryparsamide to mass Tryponarsyl treatment
This chapter discusses how in the second half of the 1920s, enthusiasm for Tryparsamide 
in the Congo amounted to a steep increase in the use of the compound, especially when 
a Belgian copy of the drug branded ‘Tryponarsyl’ was developed. This acceleration in the 
new trypanocide’s dissemination coincided and was intertwined with a definitive 
downturn in Atoxyl’s career as a sleeping sickness control pharmaceutical in the Belgian 
colony.
To a large extent, the upsurge in Tryponarsyl consumption was the product of a 
mutually reinforcing alliance between the Belgian pharmaceutical industry, Belgian 
tropical medicine and the Belgian colonial administration in a postwar context of 
commercial, political and medical-scientific competition in the field of human African 
trypanosomiasis. To satisfy its medical service’s growing demand for Tryparsamide, the 
Brussels administration was looking for suitable suppliers, and found a welcome 
opportunity in a Belgian-manufactured drug to obtain cheaper drug supplies and at 
once boost the nation’s emerging synthetic pharmaceuticals industry. As the latter 
sought to obtain a share of the competitive Congolese trypanocide trade, it collaborated 
with the world of Belgian tropical medicine to develop its Tryparsamide production and 
secure a market for it. For the leading figures of tropical medicine in both colony and 
metropole, supporting a ‘Belgian’ trypanocide allowed claiming national ownership of 
and contributions to sleeping sickness therapeutics and control. This was deemed vital 
to the building of a ‘Belgian’ tropical medicine and the defending of its human 
trypanosomiasis record in the Congo against a backdrop of inter-imperial scrutiny and 
comparison. More specifically, it fit within a strategy to neutralise attacks from German 
colonial revisionists and showcase Belgium’s aptitude as a colonial power. Tryponarsyl’s 
upward trajectory thus illustrates how sleeping sickness drugs in the Congo were not 
simply commodities over which pharmaceutical businesses competed, but also 
important political symbols in the postwar entanglement of international exchanges 
and ‘medico-pharmaceutical nationalism’ in the field of human African 
trypanosomiasis.662 
662 On the interwar mix of (new forms of) internationalism and nationalism in tropical medicine and sleeping 
sickness control, see also Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical medicine’, 1262-1269; Neill, 
Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 182-204.
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The first section of this chapter examines how Belgium’s tropical medicine elite 
helped the Meurice company gain entry to the Congolese Tryparsamide market. As he 
sought to advance the reputation of ‘Belgian’ tropical medicine by highlighting national 
contributions to sleeping sickness therapeutics, the EMT director’s support proved 
particularly crucial in this respect. He helped organise preclinical and clinical trials that 
established the Belgian-manufactured drug’s therapeutic equivalence to the RIMR’s 
original, and suggested its purchase in lieu of the American-manufactured product. The 
chapter then explores how Meurice overcame subsequent obstacles to commercialise 
Tryparsamide as it failed to obtain a Rockefeller manufacturing license. In a move that 
entailed a Belgian re-appropriation of an American pharmaceutical invention, the 
company continued Tryparsamide production, but marketed the drug under the trade 
name ‘Tryponarsyl’. This enabled Meurice to proceed with the commercial distribution 
of the Tryparsamide compound and sign long-term supply contracts with a Brussels 
administration looking to satisfy, at the lowest possible cost, growing demands from 
medical and political authorities in the Congo to replace Atoxyl with Tryparsamide in 
the fight against sleeping sickness. Next follows an overview of how Tryponarsyl held 
off competition on the Congolese trypanocide market. Although different brands of 
Tryparsamide and new arsenical compounds continued to circulate to the colony, 
clinical research at the Leopoldville laboratory failed to identify a drug of superior 
safety, efficacy or practicality. The chapter ends with a discussion of how, aside from 
price and pharmacological effects, Tryponarsyl’s ‘cultural status’ as a ‘Belgian’ 
trypanocide was a major factor behind the surge in its consumption in the Congo, as it 
allowed authorities to underscore Belgian capacity in sleeping sickness control at a time 
of intensifying inter-imperial comparisons and, in particular, German criticism.
7.1 A second chance for the Belgian pharmaceutical industry 
As calls from the Congo to replace Atoxyl with Tryparsamide grew louder, the 
administration in Brussels started exploring how it could supply the colony with more 
substantial quantities of the new drug. By the end of 1924, Broden was instructed to 
investigate at what cost the Rockefeller product could be obtained.663 With evidence of 
Tryparsamide’s therapeutic value in neurosyphilis and sleeping sickness steadily 
accumulating, the RIMR was at that time about to release the compound for commercial 
distribution through the granting of manufacturing licenses to carefully selected 
pharmaceutical companies.664 This would enable the Institute to make sure that only 
663 Secrétaire Général to A. Broden, 29.11.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
664 A. Broden to Secrétaire Général, 1.12.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
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drugs of an acceptable quality standard were sold as Tryparsamide, and thus protect 
both public health and its own reputation. By January 1925, the trypanocide was made 
commercially available, and the RIMR’s director felt that ‘the time ha(d) come for the 
Belgians to purchase the drug’.665 When Broden addressed his enquiries to the American 
licensee Powers-Weightman-Rosengarten, an established Philadelphian manufacturer of 
medicinal chemicals, the latter was willing to ‘make a special price’ for the colonial 
government and a certain quantity was purchased. However, the Belgians in the end 
found the cost of the American-manufactured Tryparsamide prohibitive given the huge 
amounts required.666 
A possible solution presented itself in the form of Belgian-manufactured 
Tryparsamide. Since the war, the Meurice company had been trying to gain entry to the 
Congolese trypanocide market. Product quality was key to securing market share, 
however, and the firm’s first attempt with ‘Atoxyl Meurice’ led to serious doubts about 
its capacity to produce a drug that fulfilled the evolving quality standards of the time. 
Unwilling to give up, the company started turning to other arsenic compounds, and by 
1924 succeeded in synthesising a drug with the same chemical formula as the RIMR’s 
Tryparsamide.667 Once again, Meurice relied on the EMT’s assistance for preclinical tests, 
which were followed - behind the RIMR’s back - by therapeutic trials in the Congo in 
1924, the results of which seemed to match those obtained with the American 
Tryparsamide.668 Van den Branden and Van Hoof ’s observations in Leopoldville indeed 
confirmed that Meurice’s compound was therapeutically equivalent.669 
The continued collaboration between the Meurice firm and Belgian tropical medicine 
experts was somewhat remarkable given the problems with the company’s version of 
Atoxyl. The prospect of Belgian-manufactured trypanocides, however, fitted Broden’s 
agenda to put Belgian tropical medicine on the map. Although a participant in inter-
imperial networks of pharmaceutical development, the EMT director was also keen to 
claim Belgian ownership of medical research and practice in the Congo, notably in the 
665 S. Flexner to L. Pearce, 26.4.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), 
Box 1, folder (2) 8; W. H. Brown and L. Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide in paresis and African sleeping sickness’, 10.1925, 
RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2.
666 A. Broden to Secrétaire Général, 1.12.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; L. Pearce to S. Flexner, 31.3.1925, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder (2) 8; F. Rosengarten to A. 
Broden, 9.3.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; W. H. Brown and L. Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide in paresis and African 
sleeping sickness’, 10.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louis Pearce papers), Box 1, 
folder 2; J. Rodhain to L. Pearce, 28.9.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce 
papers), Box 1, folder 2; Liebenau, Medical Science and Medical Industry, pp. 30, 32, 102.
667 Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie belge’, 72-73; Pottier, ‘L’industrie belge des produits 
pharmaceutiques’, 344; Administrateur délégué Meurice to Minister of Colonies, 25.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4404.302; J. Rodhain to L. Pearce, 28.9.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce 
papers), Box 1, folder 2.
668 J. Rodhain and A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 13.10.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; J. Rodhain to A. Broden, 
23.10.1924, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG). 
669 Van den Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville en 1925’, 299-300.
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field of sleeping sickness therapy. His influence on the circulation of experimental 
trypanocides to the colony, for example, gave him a substantial degree of control over 
the therapeutic knowledge that was being produced there. He not only helped 
determine what drugs were subjected to clinical trials, but also frequently collected the 
resulting reports in Brussels with an eye to their publication in the ‘Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale’.670 Modelled on the French ‘Société de Pathologie Exotique’ 
and its bulletin, Broden had founded this scientific journal and its specialised medical 
society in 1920 to strengthen tropical medicine’s institutional basis and advance it as a 
respectable medical specialty in Belgium. With a national forum for the publication and 
dissemination of Congo-related medical research, Broden could be sure that the fruits of 
clinical investigations in the colony were not simply reaped by metropolitan science, 
but by Belgian science in particular.671 Underscoring the ‘Belgian’ character of clinical 
research conducted in the Congo not only enhanced the latter’s ‘cultural power’, but 
also raised the scientific profile of Broden’s tropical medicine, given that the Brussels 
School itself at that point lacked the funding and infrastructure to be a true research 
centre.672 Through the asymmetrical logic of colonialism, interwar drug therapy 
research in the Congo was thus meant to contribute to the building of a metropolitan-
based discipline that could withstand the comparison with its counterparts in 
neighbouring European states.673 
The participation of foreign nationals in sleeping sickness therapy research in the 
Belgian Congo threatened to undermine Broden’s plans to build a ‘Belgian’ tropical 
medicine after the First World War. Before Pearce’s expedition to the Congo, he and Van 
Campenhout opposed the RIMR’s involvement in the colony. They argued that from an 
international perspective it would look like an admission of inferiority, while in the eyes 
of the Belgian public the national scientific record - notably in the field of sleeping 
sickness - justified a certain ‘disapprobation’ of the appeal made to foreign nationals.674 
When the American expedition’s arrival in Leopoldville was imminent, chief medical 
officer Rodhain urged Van den Branden to give its members a warm welcome, although 
he admitted that ‘it would have been much more elegant of the Americans to put the 
new experimental products at (the Leo lab director’s) personal disposal’, and ‘hoped 
(Pearce) (would) recognize (sic) the necessity of taking (him) on as a direct 
670 For example: Secrétaire Général to Minister of Colonies, 8.7.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; Secrétaire 
Général to Minister of Colonies, 11.7.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
671 ‘Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale. Exposé des Motifs’, s.d. , ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.1.
672 Haynes argues that the ‘appeal to the nation enhanced the cultural power of (Ronald) Ross’s research’ in 
Haynes, Imperial Medicine, p. 124.
673 Parts of this paragraph have been published before in Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical 
medicine’. Among the listed reasons for founding the Société belge de médecine tropicale and its journal was a 
desire to ‘prove the existence, the vitality of Belgian colonial medicine’. See ‘Société Belge de Médecine 
Tropicale. Exposé des Motifs’, 1920, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.1. 
674 A. Broden and E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Ministre’, 16.12.1919, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
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collaborator’.675 In recognition of her contribution to sleeping sickness therapy research 
Pearce was eventually elected a corresponding member of the Belgian Tropical Medicine 
Society in 1922, but Broden and Rodhain privately reproached her for not sufficiently 
acknowledging Van den Branden’s assistance with examining Leopoldville patients in 
her first publication on Tryparsamide.676 Apparently ignoring these sensitivities, the 
Minister of Colonies hoped to intensify American involvement in the fight against 
sleeping sickness in the Congo in the years following Pearce’s visit. Plans were made to 
encourage a second scientific expedition in the hope that it would eventually entice the 
Rockefeller Foundation to (financially) support the Belgians’ arduous trypanosomiasis 
campaign after it had earlier declined the invitation on budgetary grounds.677 The 
prospect of a new foreign-led expedition in 1924 - which in the end failed to materialise 
- prompted Broden to point out that Belgian doctors, given the Leopoldville laboratory’s 
fifteen-year track record as ‘one of the arbiters’ of sleeping sickness therapy, did not 
have any lessons in therapeutics to learn, and that sending foreign nationals to the 
Congo to try out new drugs amounted to a ‘humiliation’. Moreover, in the case of Bayer 
205 in particular, he went on, the colonial government’s ‘inconsiderate appeal’ to 
foreigners had caused the Belgians to be ‘truly at the mercy of the manufacturer’. 
Broden concluded: ‘it is good colonial policy to show proof of nationalism’, and this 
sentiment seemed to extend to a wish to see Belgian sleeping sickness drugs in the 
colony - although he admitted that Belgium lacked chemists systematically researching 
trypanocides.678 
Given the scarcity of trypanocidal drug development in their own metropole, it seems 
that Belgium’s tropical medicine elite in the early 1920s repeatedly had to weigh the 
benefits of inter-imperial pharmaceutical exchange against a desire to promote the 
nation’s medical-scientific reputation and in the process advance their own careers. 
When Meurice became involved with Tryparsamide, it provided them with fresh 
opportunities to underscore Belgian contributions to sleeping sickness therapeutics in 
the Congo, and thus compete in this arena with other (ex-)colonial powers on a more 
equal footing. In that sense, the ‘symbolic cost’ of collaborating with the pharmaceutical 
industry, i.e. the risk of being seen to support commercial interests in medicine, was for 
675 J. Rodhain to Leopoldville Laboratory Director, 7.7.1920, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG). 
676 A. Broden, ‘Note concernant le mémoire de Miss L. Pearce’, 1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; J. Rodhain, 
‘Note au sujet du travail de Melle L. Pearce’, 1922, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301; A. Broden to L. Pearce, 20.5.1922, 
RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2.
677 Minister of Colonies to Minister of Foreign Affairs Henri Jaspar, 14.12.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; E. 
Van Campenhout to Minister of Colonies, 24.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; Ambassador Baron de Cartier 
de Marchienne to Robert Silvercruys, 10.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; Ambassador Baron de Cartier de 
Marchienne to Minister of Foreign Affairs Henri Jaspar, 18.1.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; Minister of 
Colonies to S. Flexner, 20.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; Note to Governor General Lippens, 29.9.1924, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; Note to Governor General, 24.11.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
678 Parts of this paragraph have been published before in Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical 
medicine’. A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 22.4.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
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Broden and other Belgian experts probably offset by the chances it offered to keep up in 
field of sleeping sickness therapy and demonstrate the practical successes of Belgian 
tropical medicine in the Congo.679 
When Meurice started manufacturing Tryparsamide on a modest scale in 1924, it 
promised price reductions if the Belgian colonial administration would place significant 
orders.680 After the successful trials in Leopoldville, the latter promptly requested a 
considerable quantity to help meet the colonial medical service’s demand for the 
drug.681 By 1925, the company had definitively given up on trying to get its Atoxyl 
approved for use by the PCA, and offered to replace the Colonial Ministry’s outstanding 
Atoxyl order with a monetarily equivalent quantity of its new trypanocide.682 Although 
the PCA’s director was rather skeptical about this proposal because he was unfamiliar 
with the pricey drug, Broden and Rodhain eventually suggested to the Colonial Minister 
that Meurice’s version could replace the American Tryparsamide.683 At a colonial-
interest conference in Brussels at the end of 1925, Broden even advocated abandoning 
the use of Atoxyl and replacing it with Tryponarsyl, a drug ‘established in Belgium by 
Belgian chemists’.684 
7.2 The fall of Atoxyl and the rise of Tryponarsyl: the national 
re-appropriation and breakthrough of the Tryparsamide 
compound 
Despite their endorsement of Meurice’s Tryparsamide on the basis of preclinical and 
clinical tests, Broden and Rodhain initially expressed some doubts as to whether the 
Belgian firm would actually be able to produce a drug of consistent quality on the scale 
required by the Belgian colonial administration.685 After the Atoxyl debacle, the Meurice 
679 Rasmussen, ‘Moral economy of the drug company’, 175.
680 Administrateur délégué Meurice to Minister of Colonies, 25.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302; 
Administrateur délégué Meurice to Minister of Colonies, 9.10.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
681 Secrétaire Général to A. Broden, 29.11.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
682 Administrateur délégué Meurice to Secrétaire Général Arnold, 28.3.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9.
683 Majeur Pharmacien Vigneron to Secrétaire Général, 30.4.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.9; J. Rodhain and A. 
Broden to Minister of Colonies, 13.10.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; J. Rodhain to Minister of Colonies, 
13.10.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
684 ‘Notes sur la Conférence de M. le Docteur Broden. Union Coloniale 10.12.1925’, 1.1926, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4404.302.
685 J. Rodhain and A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 13.10.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; J. Rodhain to Minister of 
Colonies, 13.10.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
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company appeared to be struggling to deliver large quantities of the new trypanocide.686 
Moreover, its application to obtain a Rockefeller license had been unsuccessful. When 
the RIMR learnt of Meurice’s Tryparsamide-manufacturing efforts in the summer of 
1924 (i.e. before the Institute had released the compound for general sale), it asked the 
firm for drug samples and urged it not to proceed with commercialisation without its 
authorisation. In the course of 1925, multiple samples were tested, but all failed to meet 
the RIMR’s required standards of chemical purity or biological action.687 As a 
consequence, the young Belgian company missed out on a manufacturing license, unlike 
Poulenc Frères in France, which had been building significant chemotherapy expertise 
since before the war, and its British partner May & Baker, which was also acquiring a 
reputation in arsenical drug production through its French contacts.688 
Meurice did not want to lose the Belgian colonial administration’s business to its 
European competitors, however. It therefore proceeded with industrial Tryparsamide 
production without a Rockefeller license, marketing its version of the compound under 
the trade name ‘Tryponarsyl’, something it was allowed to do under Belgian patent 
law.689 Of course this meant that the firm was manufacturing a drug lacking the 
Rockefeller quality label associated with the registered Tryparsamide trademark.690 That 
did not seem to overly bother the Belgian colonial government, with whom Meurice 
reportedly signed a contract for the supply of 1800kg of Tryponarsyl in 1926.691 The 
French and British licensees, on the other hand, were less pleased. May & Baker, for 
example, which was ‘anxious to capture this important market’, complained to the 
RIMR’s Business Manager about what it considered Meurice’s unlawful interference in 
the supply of Tryparsamide to the Belgian Congo.692 Poulenc, which had considered and 
abandoned the idea of setting up its own Tryparsamide-manufacturing factory in 
686 Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 25.4.1925, MAEAA, GG, 16769 (GG); Secrétaire Général to Governor 
General, 30.5.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306.
687 F. S. Howe to S. Flexner, 9.2.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business 
Manager), Box 3, folder 5.
688 ‘Resume of situation regarding patents and trademark registrations on Tryparsamide, and policies under 
consideration. Presented at the meeting of the Board of Scientific Directors on October 28, 1933 by Mr. Flinn’, 
1933, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 210.3 (Business Manager), Box 35, folder 17; Quirke, ‘Foreign 
influences’, 143; Pearce, The Treatment of Human Trypanosomiasis with Tryparsamide, p. 5.
689 ‘Report from Doctor Pearce to Doctor Flexner on the present status of Tryparsamide of sleeping sickness in 
the Congo’, 10.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2.
690 W. H. Brown and L. Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide in paresis and African sleeping sickness’, 10.1925, RAC, Rockefeller 
University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2. Tryparsamide had been registered as a 
trademark in Belgium on March 24, 1924. See ‘License Agreement’, 1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 
RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5.
691 Director May & Baker Ltd. to Business Manager, 23.4.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 
(Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 4; ‘Poulenc-Meurice Controversy’, RAC, Rockefeller University 
Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5.
692 Director May & Baker Ltd. to Business Manager, 23.4.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 
(Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 4.
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Belgium, also expressed frustration with the difficulties to obtain market share because 
of Meurice.693
Much was at stake for the competing pharmaceutical companies, as demand for the 
Tryparsamide compound from the Belgian colonial government was unlikely to 
diminish soon. Since it had started purchasing and supplying its medical staff in the 
Congo with Tryparsamide and Tryponarsyl, more extensive evidence of the 
trypanocide’s therapeutic value and effectiveness was accumulating. Crucially, feedback 
from clinicians on the ground pointed to its ‘strong moral action on the natives’, who 
‘easily presented themselves’ for treatment on account of its curative effects.694 This was 
quite a change from the responses to Atoxyl. In 1927, therapeutic results from several 
hospital practitioners and itinerant sleeping sickness doctors who had conducted ‘essais 
de brousse’ were collated and published in a special issue of the ‘Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale’, which was an important marketing forum for Meurice as 
it influenced prescription practices of physicians in (Belgian) Africa.695 In an 
introductory article Van den Branden offered his ‘definitive’ verdict on Tryparsamide: it 
was the ‘most powerful trypanocide’ known today, he argued, and Tryponarsyl’s 
therapeutic action was in all respects comparable.696 The Leopoldville laboratory 
director further stipulated that for adult patients, a regimen of 20 to 40g in the early 
phase and 50 to over 100g in the advanced stage, administered intravenously in weekly 
doses of 2g, worked best.697 
Van den Branden and his colleagues had certainly convinced the Belgian Congo’s 
chief medical officer Giovanni Trolli, who in the same issue called for a ‘crusade’ to 
693 Assistant Business Manager to Esq. P. Blenkinsop, and Director of May & Baker Ltd., 13.5.1926, RAC, 
Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 4; Etablissements Poulenc 
Frères to Frederic Rosengarten, 7.1.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business 
Manager), Box 3, folder 5; Frederic Rosengarten to F. S. Howe, 22.7.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 
RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 3.
694 Médecin Provincial, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical. Rapport Annuel 1927’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.5; 
G. Trolli, ‘Traitement de la trypanose humaine par la tryparsamide’, 333; J. Rodhain to L. Pearce, 28.9.1925, 
RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2; Governor General to 
Minister of Colonies, 20.9.1927, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302. Pearce later noted regarding the reported effects of 
Tryparsamide treatment that ‘such pronounced clinical amelioration has had a noticeable impression upon 
the native population and several authors point(ed) out that with the introduction of tryparsamide, native 
cooperation in the treatment of both old and new cases is now voluntarily offered’. See Pearce, The Treatment of 
Human Trypanosomiasis with Tryparsamide, p. 223.
695 Trolli, ‘Le traitement de la trypanose humaine par la tryparsamide’, 331-332. That Meurice saw the Annales 
de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale as an important marketing tool is underscored by the fact that it also 
directly promoted its medicines via the periodical’s advertisements.
696 F. Van den Branden, ‘L’emploi de la tryparsamide dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, Annales 
de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 7 (1927), 213-214.
697 Van den Branden, ‘L’emploi de la tryparsamide dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, 212; F. 
Van den Branden, ‘Essais de traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine chronique par la tryparsamide’, Annales 
de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 7 (1927), 249.
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apply such a Tryparsamide treatment everywhere in the colony.698 Based on his staff 
members’ reports, the head of the medical service called for a ‘generalised’ use of the 
trypanocide, and argued for spending all monetary and staff resources available for 
‘indigenous medical assistance’ on a Tryparsamide-based fight against sleeping 
sickness.699 Significantly, by 1927, the colony’s Governor General pleaded to have Atoxyl 
replaced with Tryponarsyl.700 
Meanwhile, the Belgian firm had made ‘structural alterations’ at its plant to increase 
output and meet the colonial administration’s growing demand for the trypanocide, and 
in the hope of improving quality standards and thus ultimately securing a Rockefeller 
license.701 Such a stamp of approval would advance Meurice’s reputation as an ethical 
pharmaceutical company. The company’s efforts were also in the RIMR’s interest if it 
wanted to protect public health and prevent reputation damage from the distribution of 
an inferior product marketed as an equivalent of its own compound. Because of 
indignation over Meurice’s actions a licensing decision was initially delayed, but by 
1927, Louise Pearce confirmed that the Belgian company was ‘manufacturing a 
satisfactory product’, and that she saw ‘no reason why a license should not be given’.702 
The RIMR subsequently started negotiations with the Belgian drug firm. However, the 
parties failed to reach a consensus on the terms of the license agreement because of 
divergent views on Belgian patent law. As the Americans were eventually no longer 
convinced that ‘any useful purpose would be served by licensing Meurice’, i.e. that it 
would allow them to ‘exercis(e) effective control’, they abandoned the idea.703 Just like 
698 Trolli, ‘Le traitement de la trypanose humaine par la tryparsamide’, 333.
699 Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 9. 
700 Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 20.9.1927, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
701 ‘Report from Doctor Pearce to Doctor Flexner on the present status of Tryparsamide of sleeping sickness in 
the Congo’, 10.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2; 
L. Pearce to S. Flexner, 14.10.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), 
Box 1, folder 2 (9).
702 F. S. Howe to Dr Flexner, 2.6.1926, ‘Meurice (Brussels) application for Tryparsamide license’, RAC, Rockefeller 
University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 4; Assistant Business Manager to 
Produits Chimiques & Pharmaceutiques “Meurice”, 22.6.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 
(Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 4; L. Pearce to S. Flexner, 20.6.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University 
Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2 (9).
703 ‘License Agreement’, 1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 
3, folder 5; G. L. Lechien to F. S. Howe, 24.3.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant 
Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5; F. S. Howe to G. L. Lechien, 5.4.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 
RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5; G. L. Lechien to F. S. Howe, 29.9.1927, RAC, Rockefeller 
University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5; F. S. Howe, ‘Note concerning 
Meurice license’, 7.7.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, 
folder 5. In 1933, as Tryparsamide patents had begun to expire and ‘the enforcibility of the original trade-mark 
registrations (….) (would) become doubtful in most of the important countries of the world’, it was decided 
that the Rockefeller Institute would ‘no longer attempt to control the preparation and distribution of 
Tryparsamide’. The firms who had previously been granted a manufacturing license, however, were permitted 
to refer to the Institute’s approval of their Tryparsamide on labels and in advertisements. See ‘Excerpt from 
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the Institute had anticipated, this decision did not appear to inflict much damage on the 
pharmaceutical company’s trade, given that it was able to keep selling the drug as 
‘Tryponarsyl’ to the Belgian colonial administration, with whom it had signed a long-
term contract.704 According to the RIMR’s legal advisor, the Belgian government 
indirectly had interests in Meurice as an important shareholder of the ‘Société Générale 
de Belgique’, which had itself become the drug firm’s main shareholder.705 The ‘Société 
Générale’ was a major financial group established in 1822 and controlling much of the 
Belgian, and increasingly also the Congolese, economy.706 That without a Rockefeller 
license Meurice retained control over the price setting of its product possibly gave the 
firm an even greater competitive advantage on the Congolese market for sleeping 
sickness drugs.707 The Belgian compound was in any case cheaper than American-
manufactured Tryparsamide, and large orders from the Belgian colonial administration 
had the advantage of significantly boosting the national synthetic pharmaceuticals 
industry in which it had a stake.708 
minutes of meeting of the Board of Scientific Directors held October 28, 1933’, 1933, RAC, Rockefeller 
University Archives, RG 210.3 (Business Manager), Box 35, folder 17.
704 F. S. Howe, ‘Note concerning Meurice license’, 7.7.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 
(Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5; G. L. Lechien to F. S. Howe, 29.9.1927, RAC, Rockefeller University 
Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5.
705 Maxwell Barus to Mr. Lupenik, 13.7.1926, ‘Re: “Tryparsamide” in Belgium’, RAC, Rockefeller University 
Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant Business Manager), Box 3, folder 4.
706 F. Buelens, Congo, 1885-1960: een financieel-economische geschiedenis (Berchem, 2007), pp. 213-214, 219-221.
707 Pearce had signalled in 1926 that with a license, Meurice would comply with all the Rockefeller Institute’s 
requirements, including those on price setting. ‘Report from Doctor Pearce to Doctor Flexner on the present 
status of Tryparsamide of sleeping sickness in the Congo’, 10.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 
450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2. The draft of the license agreement stipulated that the price 
Meurice could charge for its Tryparsamide had to ‘conform to such standards as may from time to time be 
approved by the Institute’. ‘License Agreement’, 1927, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 212.2 (Assistant 
Business Manager), Box 3, folder 5.
708 J. Rodhain to L. Pearce, 28.9.1925, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), 
Box 1, folder 2; W. H. Brown and L. Pearce, ‘Tryparsamide in paresis and African sleeping sickness’, 10.1925, 
RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2; ‘Report from Doctor 
Pearce to Doctor Flexner on the present status of Tryparsamide of sleeping sickness in the Congo’, 10.1926, 
RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2; L. Pearce to S. 
Flexner, 14.10.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, RG 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2 
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7.3 Competition for Tryponarsyl? 
Meurice’s position on the Congolese trypanocide market did not go unchallenged. In 
Leopoldville, Van den Branden continued to receive and test samples of various 
compounds and pharmaceutical specialties targeting sleeping sickness in the second 
half of the 1920s.709 One notable group of products experimented by the Belgian 
researcher were Tryparsamide analogues from German chemical manufacturers. In 
1926, for example, the ‘Vereinigte Chemische Werke Charlottenburg’ launched a drug 
with a chemical formula closely similar to that of the American arsenical under the 
trade name ‘Novatoxyl’.710 The Berlin-based producer of Atoxyl presumably feared losing 
its trypanocide trade with the Belgian Congo to the Tryparsamide compound. Hoechst 
tried the same with its pentavalent arsenical ‘Hoechst 2754’.711 A small-scale trial of 
Novatoxyl in Leopoldville suggested therapeutic effects similar to Tryparsamide. 
Hoechst 2754 exerted a certain trypanocidal action, but did not seem to leave a 
particularly favourable impression on Van den Branden.712 
At the Congo’s main medical laboratory, the investigations into useful sleeping 
sickness drugs did not stop with the Tryparsamide compound, however. In the wake of 
the latter’s therapeutic success, several other new arsenicals found their way to 
Leopoldville to have their trypanocidal value established. As a result, Rodhain would 
later declare that it was there that ‘the vastest experimentation of trypanocidal 
products on human(s)’ had taken place.713 This program of new trypanocide 
development was actively endorsed and supported in the context of the LNHO’s African 
trypanosomiasis initiatives. The tropical diseases expert committee, for example, 
repeatedly listed the (comparative) study of the prophylactic and therapeutic value of 
trypanocides among the most pressing issues to be tackled by those investigating 
709 From 1927 onwards, Van den Branden combined the directorship of the Leopoldville laboratory with a 
function as ‘Médecin-Inspecteur’ of the colony’s other medical laboratories, until his ultimate return to Belgium 
in October 1929. Pierquin, Historique du laboratoire médical, p. 24; Dubois, ‘Nécrologie. J.-F.-F. Van den Branden’, 
87.
710 P. Van Buggenhoudt to A. Broden, 6.3.1926, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
711 A. Broden to Governor General, 17.3.1927, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8.
712 ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville-Ouest et des services annexes pendant 
l’année 1928’, 143-144; F. Van den Branden, ‘Essai de traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine chronique par 
le novatoxyl’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique et de sa Filiale de l’Ouest Africain 22 (1929), 431-435; 
‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville et des services annexes pendant l’année 1927’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 8 (1928), 264-266; F. Van den Branden, Clevers et M. Moreels, 
‘Essai de traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine et des infections animales à T. congolense par le “2754” 
Hoechst’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique et de sa Filiale de l’Ouest Africain 20 (1927), 734-736; F. Van den 
Branden, ‘Rapport général sur le fonctionnement des laboratoires du Congo belge. Année 1927’, MAEAA, RA-
CB, 82.8.
713 Rodhain, ‘Les laboratoires de recherches médicales’, p. 173.
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sleeping sickness in Africa’s laboratories.714 This was confirmed at the 1925 sleeping 
sickness conference in London, as well as in the report of the LN’s international sleeping 
sickness expedition based at Entebbe, Uganda. The latter set out a program for future 
trypanosomiasis research that included the study of chemoprophylaxis and the search 
for effective trypanocides that could be administered orally.715 Finally, the conclusions of 
the Paris conference in 1928 contained a section highlighting the ‘primordial 
importance of therapeutic research’ given that ‘chemotherapy (was) currently the most 
secure basis of prophylaxis in tropical Africa’s central regions’.716
Among the most notable new arsenicals looking for a therapeutic match with 
sleeping sickness in the Belgian Congo at that time were synthetic drugs from the Paris 
Pasteur Institute’s Therapeutic Chemistry Lab, such as Fourneau 270 and 417. Van den 
Branden’s Pasteurian connections definitely played a role here: in the second half of the 
1920s, he undertook a series of research visits to the institutes in Paris, Algiers and 
Tunis. This informed him, among other things, about Ernest Fourneau’s new compounds 
and helped him secure free trypanocide samples for experimentation in Leopoldville.717 
When in August 1928 the Colonial Minister urged authorities in the Congo to once again 
accommodate an American researcher who wanted to experiment new arsenic 
compounds in the treatment of human trypanosomiasis cases, Van den Branden 
proposed to let him use the facilities of the ‘specially equipped’ Leopoldville laboratory. 
He offered his full support and cooperation, as long as the visiting scientist would duly 
acknowledge the collaboration with the colony’s own medical staff.718 After all, Van Den 
Branden had ultimately benefitted from Pearce’s visit because of the continued 
Tryparsamide supplies, which allowed him to conduct research and publish on sleeping 
sickness therapy. A month later, Warren K. Stratman-Thomas arrived in Leopoldville 
with new arsenicals from the University of Wisconsin’s Pharmacology Laboratory.719 
Under the direction of Arthur Loevenhart, this lab had become involved in research on 
714 Andrew Balfour, E. Van Campenhout, Gustave Martin and Arthur G. Bagshawe, ‘Société des Nations. 
Organisation d’Hygiène. Commission des experts pour les maladies tropicales’, 12.9.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4461.913; ‘Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. L’Etude de la maladie du sommeil et de la tuberculose 
dans l’Afrique Equatoriale’, 4.5.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.914; ‘Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. 
Rapport de la séance du Comité d’Experts de la Maladie du Sommeil en Afrique Equatoriale, tenu à Londres, le 
15 décembre 1927’, 26.3.1928, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525.
715 ‘Communiqué aux Membres du Conseil (C.291.1925 III C.H. 331). Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. 
Conférence internationale de la maladie du sommeil. Londres, 22 mai 1925’, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 
2934.525; ‘Société des Nations’, 11.6.1928, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525.
716 Société des Nations. Organisation d’Hygiène. Rapport de la Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la 
Maladie du Sommeil, 21.11.1928, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525.
717 F. Vandenbranden to E. van Campenhout, 8.12.1927, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306; E. Van Campenhout to 
Minister of Colonies, 10.2.1928, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
718 Minister to Governor General, 25.8.1928, MAEAA, GG, 15144 (GG); G. Trolli, ‘Note pour Monsieur le 
Gouverneur Général’, 4.9.1928, MAEAA, GG, 15144 (GG). 
719 Dr C. C. Chesterman to Chief Medical Officer Trolli, 17.9.1928, MAEAA, GG, 15144 (GG); Governor General 
Tilkens to Governor of Congo-Kasai Province, 24.9.1928, MAEAA, GG, 15144 (GG). 
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arsenical drugs in neurosyphilis since 1919 and played a role in establishing 
Tryparsamide’s efficacy against the disease.720 
In Leopoldville, Van den Branden tried the new arsenicals on small numbers of 
chronic sleeping sickness cases to see how they compared with what had become the 
standard of care in the Belgian Congo, i.e. the Tryparsamide compound. What he was in 
fact looking for, the lab report for 1928 revealed, was an arsenic-based drug that 
matched the Tryparsamide compound’s therapeutic action, but was less toxic for the 
ocular system in advanced cases, or allowed for a shorter and more practical treatment 
regimen.721 In other words, his research focused on finding a trypanocide ideally suited 
to the conditions of the prophylactic sleeping sickness missions.722 Trials with 
compounds that were (potentially) easy to administer, such as Acetylarsan (a syphilis 
drug manufactured by the French chemical and pharmaceutical company ‘Usines du 
Rhône’), Fourneau’s oral arsenicals number 269 and 417, and several substances supplied 
by Stratman-Thomas (including Etharsenol and Proparsenol) yielded little result, 
however, as none appeared to fulfil the above-mentioned criteria.723 Illustrating how 
much drug evaluations could be locally contingent, Van den Branden even dismissed 
Fourneau 270 (branded ‘Orsanin’) - which his colleagues in Brazzaville considered a 
powerful trypanocide and which was introduced in AEF’s prophylactic sectors in the 
early 1930s - on the grounds that it was ‘equally energetic’ as, but not better than, 
Tryparsamide in the treatment of human trypanosomiasis.724 Therefore, although the 
Leopoldville laboratory director remained very much engaged in cross-border 
pharmaceutical exchanges with the aim of looking for potentially better trypanocides, 
his research ultimately confirmed Tryparsamide (and thus Tryponarsyl) as the best 
available compound for the Belgian colony’s mass treatment campaign. 
In the second half of the 1920s, Belgian colonial authorities’ demand for the 
American-discovered chemical inspired several pharmaceutical companies to attempt to 
obtain a share of the Congolese trypanocide trade with their own arsenical products. 
Targeting this market with different brands of Tryparsamide and with new derivatives, 
they competed on price, product quality and reputation as well as on therapeutic 
720 M. Curti and V. Carstensen, The University of Wisconsin: A History, 1848-1925 (Madison, 1949), p. 489; Greenwood, 
Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 62.
721 ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville-Ouest et des services annexes pendant 
l’année 1928’, 141-142, 144-146.
722 F. Van den Branden to Chief Medical Officer, 27.12.1928, MAEAA, GG, 15144 (GG).
723 Van den Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville durant l’année 1926’, 
204-205; ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville-Ouest et des services annexes pendant 
l’année 1928’, 141-143, 144-146.
724 He admitted, however, to not having sufficient quantities of the drug to ‘thoroughly treat’ his patients. F. 
Van den Branden, ‘Essais comparatifs du traitement des rats blancs infectés de “trypanosoma congolense” par 
l’orsanine sodique (270 Fourneau) et par le Tryponarsyl’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 14 
(1934), 375-376; ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville et des services annexes pendant 
l’année 1927’, 267. Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness, p. 330.
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innovation.725 It was the manufacturer of Tryponarsyl, however, who would ultimately 
benefit most from the pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping sickness control in the Belgian 
Congo, not only because research in Leopoldville did not identify a therapeutically 
superior compound, but especially also because no competitor trypanocide could match 
its ‘cultural status’ as a Belgian sleeping sickness drug.726
7.4 The success of Belgian sleeping sickness medicine(s)
The Tryparsamide compound’s local construction as an effective tool of sleeping 
sickness eradication boosted the further expansion of itinerant medicinal prophylaxis in 
the Belgian Congo in the second half of the 1920s. An indication of the growing support 
for pharmaceutical trypanosomiasis control throughout the first postwar decade can be 
found in the evolution of the Belgian Congo’s medical budget as reported by chief 
medical officer Trolli. Between 1920 and 1929, the overall medical budget increased from 
nearly 4 million to 76 million Belgian francs, and the funds allocated to medical 
equipment and drugs (where trypanocides were among the most frequently prescribed 
medicines) increased from about 1,2 million francs in 1920 to over 28 million francs, or 
38% of the total medical budget, in 1929.727 These budget increases corresponded with a 
marked rise in the number of Congolese screened and treated for sleeping sickness 
(notably in the Congo-Kasai Province in the southwest of the colony).728 By the second 
half of the 1920s, for example, over 2 million people (reportedly one fifth of the 
indigenous population) were examined annually, of which more than 100,000 cases 
received treatment each year.729 These efforts also entailed a significant growth in 
trypanocidal drug consumption. Rodhain estimated in 1924 that 400 kg of trypanocides 
were consumed by the colonial medical service each year. In 1929, the colony’s chief 
pharmacist suggested a trypanocide consumption of 4000 kg.730 
725 On drug price, quality, reputation and innovation as criteria in pharmaceutical competition in interwar 
America, see Liebenau, Medical Science and Medical Industry, p. 126.
726 On the importance of ‘cultural status’ in the ‘selling potential of a remedy’, see Huisman, ‘Struggling for the 
market’, p. 66.
727 Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, p. 79; G. Trolli, Royaume de Belgique. Colonie du Congo Belge. 
Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928 (Bruxelles, 1930), p. 5; Trolli, ‘Le service médical du Congo 
Belge depuis sa création jusqu’en 1925’, 200.
728 G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis. 
729 Médecin en Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2; 
Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, p. 10. 
730 J. Rodhain to L. Pearce, 7.1924, MAEAA, GG, 15716 (GG); Piton, ‘Le ravitaillement de la colonie en produits 
pharmaceutiques’, 498.
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Naturally, it was the Tryparsamide compound, and in particular Tryponarsyl, that 
from the second half of the 1920s became the staple of medicinal prophylaxis in the 
Belgian Congo. The trypanocide initially purchased in large quantities for the postwar 
mass treatment campaign was Atoxyl. According to Trolli, by 1925 a certain amount of 
Bayer 205 was also ordered annually.731 In 1926, Tryparsamide therapy was still reserved 
for only 25% of patients (usually for ‘bad cases’) because it was found too expensive for 
generalised use. But after repeated calls for increased Tryparsamide supplies from the 
colony and Meurice’s efforts to scale up production, the compound completely replaced 
Atoxyl in the routine treatment of sleeping sickness cases by 1928-1929.732 Trolli claimed 
that 3 million francs per year were spent on Tryparsamide in 1929, which represented 
over 10% of the reported annual total budget for drugs and medical equipment.733 By 
virtue of Meurice’s important contracts with the Belgian colonial administration, it was 
the Tryponarsyl brand in particular that came to dominate the Congolese Tryparsamide 
market.734 It prompted the company to claim in 1930 that it was the first to have 
manufactured the trypanocidal compound on a ‘truly industrial scale’.735 
Aside from efficacy and price, Tryponarsyl’s ‘cultural status’ as a ‘Belgian’ drug was a 
particularly significant factor in securing market share in the Congo, because it helped 
underscore Belgium’s capacity to tackle sleeping sickness in a postwar context of 
international scrutiny of its health record in Africa. Inter-imperial comparisons in the 
context of the LN’s London conference in 1925 had already identified pharmaceutical 
sleeping sickness control as a particularly Franco-Belgian approach.736 Meurice-
manufactured Tryponarsyl helped Belgian colonial authorities to go even further in 
constructing a ‘national style(…)’ of trypanosomiasis control. It allowed them to 
731 Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, p. 11. The use of Moranyl was mentioned in reports of the 
colonial medical service, especially since the late 1920s. For example Dr Daco, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. 
Service de l’Hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1929’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 88.1.
732 Médecin en Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2; 
Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, p. 10; G. Trolli, ‘Colonie du Congo Belge. Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1929’, 1931, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.2; Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 
20.9.1927, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
733 G. Trolli, ‘Colonie du Congo Belge. Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1929’, 1931, MAEAA, RA-
CB, 83.2; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, p. 5.
734 ‘Report from Doctor Pearce to Doctor Flexner on the present status of Tryparsamide of sleeping sickness in 
the Congo’, 10.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives, 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, folder 2; L. 
Pearce to S. Flexner, 14.10.1926, RAC, Rockefeller University Archives 450 P315 (Louise Pearce papers), Box 1, 
folder 2 (9). Tellingly, a 1930 brochure from the Colonial Ministry describing the typical equipment of itinerant 
medical staff in the Congo listed ‘Triponarsyl’ (sic) rather than Tryparsamide among trypanocidal drugs, along 
with Atoxyl, tartar emetic and Bayer 205. See: Governor General Tilkens to Secrétaire Général, 25.5.1928, 
MAEAA, GG, 15718 (GG). 
735 Pottier, ‘L’industrie belge des produits pharmaceutiques’, 352; Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie 
belge’, 73.
736 For example: ‘Opening Address to the League of Nations Conference on Sleeping Sickness in Africa. By the 
Chairman, the Honourable W.G. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., F.R.G.S., Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies’, 
19.5.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.914. 
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appropriate medicinal prophylaxis in the Congo as a specifically ‘Belgian’ endeavour, 
and thus provide proof of their nation’s capability in this area.737 Tellingly, at the 1928 
conference in Paris, French delegates emphasised Fourneau’s compounds 309 and 270 in 
discussions of mass treatment, whereas the Belgians hailed the therapeutic progress 
brought by the Tryparsamide compound.738 Furthermore, in his account to the Minister 
of Colonies in Brussels, Rodhain was delighted that ‘the Belgian (conference) delegation 
had the satisfaction of hearing homage being paid to the Belgian drug “Tryponarsyl”’.739 
When reports from the Congo started signalling the promising results of an 
increasingly Tryponarsyl-based effort to eradicate sleeping sickness, they therefore did 
not simply confirm for Belgian authorities the appropriateness of the strategy adopted, 
but in particular also provided evidence of the success of ‘Belgian’ sleeping sickness 
medicine. By the second half of the 1920s, the colony’s medical leaders indeed hailed the 
pharmaceutical campaign as a triumph. In 1926, Trolli and his deputy René Mouchet, 
who had advocated ambulatory treatment since his prewar term at the Leopoldville 
laboratory, reported that the majority of individuals found infected in the Belgian Congo 
received at least a ‘sterilising treatment’. They concluded that the system of periodical 
medical surveys and prophylactic treatment by mobile teams had now proven its value, 
as it amounted to declines in the proportion of infected people in several locations.740 
Moreover, they linked the routine use of the Tryparsamide compound by 1928 to 
marked increases in the number of apparently cured cases.741 Such ‘brilliant therapeutic 
results’ were held responsible for boosting indigenous confidence in Western medicine 
and facilitating case detection.742 
Emphasising Belgium’s achievements in sleeping sickness control was vital in a 
postwar context of inter-imperial comparisons and, in particular, German colonial 
revisionism. Since 1914, German colonial doctors had criticised the Belgian sleeping 
sickness record in the Congo and labelled the colony a source of trypanosome infection 
for neighbouring territories.743 After the First World War, Belgium got increasingly 
caught up in what Neill has described as a ‘propaganda war’ between the Allied Powers - 
737 Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” Tropical Medicine’, 1269.
738 ‘Deuxième conférence internationale de la maladie du sommeil. Deuxième séance plénière, tenue à Paris le 
lundi 5 novembre 1928 à 15 heures’, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525; ‘Société des Nations. Organisation 
d’Hygiène. Deuxième conférence internationale de la maladie du sommeil. Sous-commission des recherches. 
Deuxième séance, tenue à Paris, le mardi 6 novembre 1928, à 15 heures’, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525.
739 J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport de la délégation belge à la 2e Conférence internationale sur la maladie du sommeil au 
sujet des travaux de cette conférence, réuni à Paris en novembre 1928. Rapport à Mr. Jaspar, Premier Ministre, 
Ministre des Colonies’, 24.11.1928, MAEAA, Affaires Etrangères, 2934.525.
740 ‘Rapport médical annuel du service de l’hygiène 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4419.605; Médecin en 
Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2.
741 Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, p. 10; G. Trolli, ‘Colonie du Congo Belge. Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1929’, 1931, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.2.
742 R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique 1931’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.5.
743 Governor General Fuchs to the Vice Governors General of Katanga and Province Orientale, 22.5.1914, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.298; Note from Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16.7.1914, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.298.
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in particular France - and Germany in the wake of (frustrations about) the Versailles 
Treaty arrangements regarding the latter’s African territories. With the general upsurge 
in sleeping sickness on the continent, the disease figured centrally in bitter disputes 
about who had the right and capability to manage African colonies. This reflected a 
significant change from the ‘prewar atmosphere of cooperation’ in the world of tropical 
medicine, and played a vital role in postwar outbursts of Belgian medico-pharmaceutical 
nationalism pertaining to the Congo.744 Although the harshest attacks were exchanged 
between Germany and France, Belgium - as caretaker government of the LN mandate 
territories Ruanda and Urundi - was not spared German criticisms regarding its aptitude 
as a colonial power, a reproach to which it was very sensitive.745 
To a significant extent, the exchanges in the context of the LNHO’s trypanosomiasis 
initiatives reflected and fuelled growing tensions. In a review of the tropical diseases 
expert committee’s interim report in 1924, for example, Emil Steudel criticised Van 
Campenhout’s account of sleeping sickness in Belgian Africa for wrongly claiming that 
the disease did not occur in Urundi. Steudel, a former senior medical officer in the 
German colonial army, was keen on proving Germany’s superior record in sleeping 
sickness control and to that effect initiated a campaign highlighting French and also 
Belgian ‘alleged failings’ in this domain.746 In 1925, Van Campenhout called on his British 
colleague Andrew Balfour to remove Steudel’s article from the expert committee’s final 
report, as it condemned the sleeping sickness situation in the mandate territories 
including Ruanda-Urundi.747 In addition, when the idea of an autonomous Kleine 
expedition to Katanga under LNHO auspices was presented to the members of that same 
committee, Van Campenhout opposed it, arguing that AEF and the Belgian Congo had 
their own laboratories for sleeping sickness therapy research and were already 
undertaking their own attempts at disease eradication by organising prophylactic 
sectors or missions.748 In doing this, he appeared to be heeding Broden’s advice that the 
Belgians could not afford to leave the impression that they were not capable of fighting 
sleeping sickness themselves.749 
German attacks on the Belgian sleeping sickness campaign further intensified by the 
end of the 1920s. In a continued bid to restore Germany’s role in Africa, Steudel 
744 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 183, 189, 193-201.
745 The ‘administrating powers’ of the LN mandate territories had to present annual reports for examination at 
the Permanent Mandate Commission, which facilitated ‘direct comparisons’ of their medical records. Mertens 
and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical medicine’, 1266. On Belgian fears of foreign criticisms of its 
capacities as a colonial power, see G. Vanthemsche, Congo. De impact van een kolonie op België (Tielt, 2007), pp. 
97-100.
746 Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, pp. 199-200.
747 E. Van Campenhout to A. Balfour, 14.2.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.914; ‘Draft of Further Report on 
Tuberculosis and Sleeping Sickness in Equatorial Africa’, 1.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.913.
748 E. Van Campenhout to Secrétaire Générale, 20.8.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.913; ‘Société des Nations. 
Rapport du Dr Em. Van Campenhout concernant le Memorandum présenté par M. le Professeur Kleine à la 
Société des Nations le 18 juillet 1924’, 3.9.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4461.913.
749 A. Broden to Minister of Colonies, 22.4.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4404.302.
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published an article on the ‘current state of the fight against sleeping sickness’ in a 1929 
issue of the ‘Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene’, which severely discredited the 
French and especially the Belgian record. He repeated earlier claims that the Congo was 
a source of infection - arguing, for example, that it was at the heart of the Rhodesiense 
problem in the former German East Africa - and criticised the chronic staff shortages as 
well as the lack of a systematic sleeping sickness campaign in the Belgian colony in 
comparison with Cameroon and AEF.750 
The Belgian colony’s medical authorities were very sensitive to such criticisms, and 
their annual reports reflected a constant concern to highlight how much public health 
efforts in the Congo could withstand inter-imperial comparison. In his report for 1929, 
chief medical officer Trolli denounced the ‘little serious and often self-interested 
attacks’ on the sleeping sickness campaign.751 Mouchet complained to the Governor 
General about Steudel’s ‘veritable pamphlet against the Belgian Congo’, which was all 
the more ‘dangerous’ given that it was published in one of the most prominent tropical 
medicine journals and thus would most likely come to the attention of the LN’s 
supervising Permanent Mandate Commission. He feared that unlike the French, the 
Belgians were not doing enough to publicise their medical achievements in Africa, while 
they had been the first to organise ambulatory treatment and generalise the use of 
effective trypanocides such as the Tryparsamide compound. Mouchet suggested asking 
Rodhain, who had by then become director of the EMT in Brussels, to draft a historical 
overview of the Belgian efforts to control sleeping sickness to prove Steudel wrong.752 
The medical department in Brussels concurred and urged the Colonial Minister to let 
Rodhain handle the matter via a reply in the ‘Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie 
Exotique’.753 The EMT director’s advice was indeed sought, and after discussing the 
matter with French colleagues, he concluded that Steudel’s criticisms were part of a 
strategy to find employment for German doctors in a League of Nations sleeping 
sickness intervention. Rodhain proposed a two-pronged written response: one for the 
colonial-interest press highlighting the victories of the sleeping sickness campaign in 
regions such as Kwango and Kasai, and another for the French ‘Bulletin’ challenging, on 
scientific grounds, that the Belgian Congo was at the origin of the Rhodesiense problem 
in East Africa.754 
Against this backdrop of hostilities, Belgian-manufactured pharmaceuticals became 
increasingly important political symbols of the Belgians’ efforts to tackle epidemic 
disease and their ownership of the sleeping sickness campaign in the Congo. Mass 
treatment in the form of special prophylactic missions conveyed the message that they 
750 E. Steudel, ‘L’état actuel de la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil en Afrique (traduction)’, 1929, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.3.9; R. Mouchet to Governor General, 2.4.1930, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.9.
751 G. Trolli, ‘Colonie du Congo Belge. Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1929’, 1931, MAEAA, RA-
CB, 83.2.
752 R. Mouchet to Governor General, 2.4.1930, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.9.
753 Director General a.i. (7e DG) to Minister of Colonies, 29.4.1930, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306.
754 J. Rodhain to Minister of Colonies, 24.11.1930, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306.
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were providing health and fighting depopulation in the colony on their own terms, and 
the arrival of the ‘national’ drug Tryponarsyl helped to underscore even more that they 
were capable colonisers. In that sense, inter-imperial interactions played a significant 
role in the support for and spread of mass Tryponarsyl treatment in the Belgian Congo 
and its construction as a ‘national’ public health strategy.755 
7.5 In summary
By the late 1920s, enthusiasm for the Tryparsamide compound translated into a starkly 
increasing consumption that marked a definitive erosion in the use of Atoxyl as a 
sleeping sickness control drug in the Belgian Congo. It was not so much the 
Tryparsamide manufactured by Rockefeller-licensed pharmaceutical companies that 
was administered on a massive scale in the colony, however, but a Belgian firm’s copy 
marketed as ‘Tryponarsyl’. The latter constituted a Belgian re-appropriation of an 
American laboratory discovery that clinical trials in the Congo had shaped into a highly 
effective sleeping sickness drug. Moreover, Tryponarsyl’s success on the Congolese 
trypanocide market was largely the result of a certain complicity between the Belgian 
manufacturer, the Belgian tropical medicine community and the Belgian colonial 
administration to support a ‘national’ sleeping sickness drug at a time when 
trypanocides became the subject of intensifying commercial, medical and political 
competition between (former) colonial powers. For its Belgian champions, Tryponarsyl 
presented an opportunity to at once break into the Congo’s prescription drug trade, 
reduce the cost of trypanocide supplies, boost Belgium’s young synthetic 
pharmaceuticals industry, and showcase Belgian capability in sleeping sickness 
therapeutics and control. Its upward trajectory above all reflected how much postwar 
inter-imperial exchanges in the field of human African trypanosomiasis had become 
intertwined with medico-pharmaceutical nationalism. How Tryponarsyl entered the 
next stages of its career will be discussed in the following chapter.
755 On the role of cross-border exchanges in the construction of ‘national styles’ in interwar tropical medicine, 
see also Mertens and Lachenal, ‘History of “Belgian” tropical medicine’, 1262-1270.
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PART III. 
THE GRADUAL DOWNTURN OF MASS 
TRYPONARSYL TREATMENT IN THE 1930s
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Chapter  8
Growing disappointment and the decline of 
Tryponarsyl-based eradication 
As Tryponarsyl consumption in the Belgian Congo soared by the late 1920s, it became 
increasingly clear that the high expectations regarding the drug’s effectiveness had 
been too optimistic. This chapter investigates how, overlapping with the extensive 
spread of Tryponarsyl, a second stage in the trypanocide’s career cycle took off: one of 
growing ‘criticism and disappointment’. Although Tryponarsyl initially remained in use 
on a large scale, by the second half of the 1930s, its trajectory reached a final phase of 
‘contracting use’ as a tool of sleeping sickness eradication.756
Tryponarsyl’s career from the late 1920s onwards once again proceeded through an 
interplay between different social and geographic spheres, notably those of local 
doctors and central medical authorities, state and private health providers, metropole 
and colony, Congo and other African territories, tropical medicine and drug industry. 
Itinerant sleeping sickness doctors from the public and private sector played a key role 
in initiating a phase of more negative assessments of the drug in the Congo, as they 
reported problems with toxicity and resistance, and some expressed doubts about the 
effectiveness of mass Tryponarsyl treatment. In the 1930s, such concerns reverberated 
in the metropolitan public sphere, as for example Belgian politicians and the German 
press raised questions about the ‘value’ of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control in 
the Congo.757 Leading figures in the colonial medical service, however, defended and 
sustained a large-scale use of Tryponarsyl, to some extent with the collaboration of the 
Belgian pharmaceutical industry, and credited it with significant reductions in sleeping 
sickness incidence and prevalence. They nevertheless came to share a certain 
disappointment with the drug and its ability to fully eradicate sleeping sickness. 
Moreover, they encouraged a more economical use of trypanocides to reduce the costs 
of mass treatment, and through exchanges with neighbouring colonies and with the 
help of a new, autonomous health body came to increasingly promote alternative 
complementary measures to control the disease and improve African health more 
generally. In that way, both the subsiding of human trypanosomiasis and the recognised 
limitations of Tryponarsyl eventually contributed to a diminishing use in the 1930s. 
Ultimately, developments in the 1930s reflected and contributed to a more complicated 
756 Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 97.
757 Tousignant notes how sleeping sickness control in early twentieth-century French Africa also was the object 
of a ‘long(…) history of contests over (its) powers, ethics and value’. Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 635.
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relationship between laboratory science, ethical pharmaceutical industry and collective 
medicine in the Congo. There was a continued involvement of the colony’s medical elite 
in trypanocide development and promotion in collaboration with the industry, a 
reinforcing of rational drug policies in the interest of both public health and ethical 
drug manufacturing, but also a reduced focus on pharmaceutical sleeping sickness 
control as drug research and the purely microbiological view of infectious disease 
became less prominent. 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the ways in which the Congo’s medical 
leaders maintained a large-scale use of Tryponarsyl in the wake of local accounts of drug 
toxicity and resistance emerging by the late 1920s. As the Belgian colony’s medical 
service had identified itself so much with mass Tryponarsyl treatment, such reports 
threatened to undermine its position and prompt questions about its cosy relationship 
with the Belgian pharmaceutical industry. To secure continued support for the 
pharmaceutical sleeping sickness campaign and by extension their health service, 
medical authorities sought to prevent and neutralise the political impact of such 
unintended drug effects by ‘perfecting’ the practice and methods of medicinal 
prophylaxis in the Congo. To a large extent, and similar to the strategies employed by 
directors of the French West African trypanosomiasis service in the early 1940s to 
overcome (potential) opposition to pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control, this 
entailed what Noémi Tousignant has identified as a redefining of toxicity and resistance 
as ‘issues of power and control’.758
The first section explores how the leading Belgian Tryponarsyl researcher responded 
to adverse drug reactions by stepping up pharmaceutical regulation to prevent toxicity 
incidents rather than questioning mass treatment. He first did so by issuing therapeutic 
guidelines to control the clinical use of the drug as director of the Leopoldville 
laboratory. When he later became head of the Belgian Interior Ministry’s quality control 
laboratory for arsenicals, he collaborated with Tryponarsyl’s Belgian manufacturer to 
establish national quality standards. This not only regulated the Congolese 
Tryparsamide market, but also helped to define drug toxicity as a problem of biomedical 
irrationality rather than product deficiency. The following section shows how, as the 
reality of in particular arsenic resistance struck home by the 1930s, medical authorities 
grew increasingly disillusioned with Tryponarsyl treatment, and its overly standardised 
application by local sleeping sickness doctors. Although laboratory doctors continued to 
participate in new drug development through the intervention of the EMT, notably in 
collaboration with the Belgian pharmaceutical industry, trials in the Congo did not yield 
a new trypanocide that could form the basis of mass therapy. In consequence, medical 
authorities resorted to promoting a more diversified therapeutic strategy, guided by 
systematic lumbar punctures, to rationalise clinical practice. Treatment remained 
largely Tryponarsyl-based, but it involved combination therapy and larger-dose 
regimens to deal with the growing problem of arsenic resistance. Another way in which 
758 Ibid., 630.
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Tryponarsyl use was initially sustained, as described next, was by medical authorities’ 
insistence on organisational reform as a way to improve mass treatment effectiveness 
and avoid drug resistance. Chief medical officer Trolli in particular sought to ensure a 
more comprehensive and regular screening and trypanocide treatment in rural areas 
through a better coordination and closer integration of the state’s prophylactic sleeping 
sickness missions and private sector AMI providers. Thus could be organised a dense 
‘medical occupation’, powerful enough to effectively purge entire regions from sleeping 
sickness. 
The chapter then proceeds with a discussion of some of the factors contributing to a 
decline in Tryponarsyl consumption in the 1930s. As doubts about the value of mass 
Tryponarsyl-based treatment in the Congo were vented more publicly in metropolitan 
circles, the Congo’s medical authorities countered that their approach was resulting in a 
marked decline of sleeping sickness. Nevertheless, in a climate of budgetary constraints, 
they instructed clinicians to adopt a more economical use of trypanocides to curb 
spiralling costs. Moreover, a growing awareness and understanding of the complexities 
of sleeping sickness epidemiology at the same time pointed them to the limits and 
unfeasibility of pharmaceutical disease eradication. As a result, mass trypanocide 
treatment was increasingly complemented with alternative control measures 
emphasising ‘rural hygiene’, and the sleeping sickness campaign gradually became 
much more locally diversified in the 1930s. The embracing of a more ecological stance 
on human trypanosomiasis also fit in with the development of a broader approach to 
public health in the Congo, which eventually came to replace mass Tryponarsyl 
treatment as the linchpin of ‘Belgian’ indigenous health provision. These shifting views 
were much inspired by both local observations and inter-imperial exchanges. Taken 
together, the developments of the 1930s contributed to a downturn in Tryponarsyl’s 
career as a tool of sleeping sickness eradication. 
8.1 ‘Misbehaving medicines’ and Van den Branden’s 
pharmaceutical regulation759 
As the use of Tryponarsyl expanded significantly from the late 1920s onwards, there was 
a concomitant rise in reports from local sleeping sickness doctors highlighting the 
downsides of mass treatment with the trypanocide. For instance, there were worrying 
accounts of unintended drug effects. It had been known since Pearce’s therapeutic 
experiments in 1920 that Tryparsamide treatment could cause ‘visual impairment(s)’, 
759 Ibid., 625.
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especially in advanced cases, but such ocular complications were thought to be quite 
rare.760 By the end of the decade, however, greater concerns about Tryponarsyl toxicity 
started to emerge among some itinerant medical staff, who apparently attributed the 
problem to poor product quality (e.g. its instability in the tropical climate).761 Although 
there seemed to be no incidents on the scale of French Cameroon’s ‘Bafia affair’, where 
Tryparsamide-induced blindness in hundreds of Africans led to the sanctioning of the 
head of the special sleeping sickness service Jamot, Governor General Tilkens 
nevertheless mentioned ‘deplorable accidents’ occurring in different parts of the Congo 
in the wake of the routine use of Tryponarsyl.762 Another reported drawback was the 
apparent failure to ‘sterilise’ some sleeping sickness victims with routine Tryponarsyl 
therapy, a phenomenon that resonated with Paul Ehrlich’s discovery of ‘arsenic-
resistant’ trypanosomes in the laboratory at the beginning of the twentieth century.763 It 
was first flagged in the Belgian Congo in 1929 by A. Barlovatz, a private doctor from the 
‘Société de Colonisation Agricole’ who collaborated with the official sleeping sickness 
mission in Mayumbe in the Bas-Congo district, where he noticed that certain 
trypanosome carriers did not respond to Tryponarsyl treatment.764 
Such local reports of drug toxicity and resistance had the potential to raise serious 
doubts about the safety and effectiveness of mass trypanocide treatment in the Belgian 
Congo. However, in the eyes of the main architects of the colony’s Tryponarsyl 
campaign, these unintended drug effects (initially) did little to invalidate the 
pharmaceutical strategy of sleeping sickness control. In fact, sleeping sickness therapy 
expert Van den Branden simply dismissed Barlovatz’s claims by arguing in 1930 that the 
clinician had mistaken relapses caused by a failure to follow treatment guidelines or 
even reinfections for arsenic-resistant cases, which in his view were only a seldom 
occurrence.765 
760 Pearce, ‘Studies on the treatment of human trypanosomiasis with tryparsamide’, 102-103; Trolli, ‘Le 
traitement de la trypanose humaine par la tryparsamide’, 335-336.
761 F. Van den Branden et P. Dumont, ‘Contribution à l’étude de la stabilité de la glyphénarsine (Tryparsamide)’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 13 (1933), 451, 454. 
762 Governor General Tilkens to Governor of Equateur Province, 30.12.1931, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); 
Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 629; Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 202.
763 On Ehrlich and drug-resistant trypanosomes, see C. Gradmann, ‘Exploring the “therapeutic biology of the 
parasite”. Antibiotic resistance and experimental pharmacology 1900-1940’ in A. Romero, C. Gradmann and M. 
Santemases (eds.), ESF Networking Program Drugs. Preprint No. 1. Papers presented at the Conference Circulation of 
Antibiotics: Journeys of Drug Standards, 1930-1970. Madrid, 16th-18th June (Madrid; Oslo, 2010), pp. 5-22.
764 J. Rodhain to Director General du Service de l’Hygiène Dr Duren, 6.1.1930, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306; Dr 
Armani to Chief Medical Officer, 26.2.1930, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306; Dr Carotenuto, ‘Rapport annuel sur le 
travail exécuté par la mission médicale du Mayumbe pendant l’année 1926’, 5.1.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.3; A. 
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As far as toxicity was concerned, medical authorities recognised that the use of the 
Tryparsamide compound inevitably posed a certain inherent risk. In his annual report 
for 1928, for example, chief medical officer Trolli signalled how ‘interesting’ it would be 
to have an arsenical drug with a similar therapeutic value, but without the 
‘inconvenience’ of ‘ocular accidents’.766 Nevertheless, as had been the case with Atoxyl, 
(abnormal) Tryponarsyl toxicity incidents were primarily linked to irrational 
therapeutic behaviour and thus became a matter of ‘self-regulation’ for the Belgian 
colony’s medical service rather than a cue to question pharmaceutical sleeping sickness 
control.767 In 1929, Van den Branden issued a circular in his capacity as Leopoldville 
laboratory director outlining the principles of sleeping sickness therapy in response to 
reports of adverse drug reactions and an alleged neglect of the clinical research 
literature (notably the relevant publications in the ‘Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale’) among practitioners.768 In an attempt to control the clinical use of 
trypanocides and bring it in line with the tenets of a scientific, ‘rational’ sleeping 
sickness therapeutics, he insisted on a repeated analysis of the cerebrospinal fluid, 
extracted via lumbar punctures, so that appropriate therapeutic protocols could be 
selected and their effects monitored. A proper course of treatment, he explained, 
entailed a regimen of Atoxyl and tartar emetic, broadly in accordance with the one 
described by Rodhain in 1923, or a Tryparsamide/Tryponarsyl cure involving weekly 
doses of 2g, up to 30g in total for early-stage patients, and 80 to 100g (or if necessary up 
to 200g) for advanced cases, depending on the state of their cerebrospinal fluid. ‘Any 
other view (on the matter) is empirical’, Van den Branden concluded.769 
Efforts to prevent Tryponarsyl toxicity in the Belgian Congo were not confined to 
targeting (perceived) biomedical irrationality, however, but also drew on the quality 
control measures that had previously regulated the colony’s Atoxyl market. Van den 
Branden played a crucial role in this area as well. Upon retiring from Africa for good in 
1929, he was appointed professor of ‘colonial hygiene’ at the EMT, but also director of 
the ‘Central Laboratory of the Hygiene Administration’ within the Belgian Interior 
Ministry. Established in 1904, this institution functioned as a quality control laboratory 
for biologicals (sera and vaccines) and synthetic arsenic compounds (notably 
arsphenamine). After Van den Branden’s arrival, it also tested trypanocide samples at 
the Colonial Ministry’s request.770 
766 Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, p. 60.
767 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 638.
768 F. Van den Branden, ‘Circulaire relative au traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine’, ITG, Stukken van 
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Algemeen Bestuurlijke Aard, 1.6.1.2.1.3.
770 A. Broden to 9e Direction, 21.2.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; P. De Schouwer, ‘L’institut d’hygiène et 
d’épidémiologie: ses origines, son évolution, ses missions passées et nouvelles’, Annali dell’Istituto Superiori di 
Sanità 21 (1985), 507-508; Dubois, ‘Nécrologie. J.-F.-F. Van den Branden’, 87-88; Dr Paul Brutsaert to Provincial 
168
For Tryponarsyl’s Belgian manufacturer, drug quality was of course a highly sensitive 
issue. As described earlier, the failure to achieve the required quality standards for 
Atoxyl had forced the Meurice company to withdraw its version of the drug from the 
Congolese market in the early 1920s. Moreover, the initial struggle to produce a 
Tryparsamide that passed the RIMR’s tests of chemical purity and biological action cost 
the firm its manufacturing license, and led it to market its product as Tryponarsyl 
instead. Although Pearce by 1927 found its quality acceptable, Meurice continued to 
operate without a license from the Institute. This implied that in theory, the Belgian 
company’s drug was not bound to comply with Rockefeller standards, and this all the 
more so since the Belgian pharmacopoeia did not contain the same chemical and 
biological prescriptions for ‘glyphénarsines’ (the name under which the Tryparsamide 
formulation was listed there).771 This in turn left Tryponarsyl vulnerable to attacks from 
those who suspected inherent product deficiencies as the cause of toxicity incidents in 
the Congo. 
Providing evidence of Tryponarsyl quality thus became increasingly important for 
the Belgian pharmaceutical enterprise if it wanted to secure its lion’s share of the 
Congolese Tryparsamide market, and more broadly, its reputation as a manufacturer of 
quality prescription drugs. The firm’s incorporation into the ‘Union Chimique 
Belge’ (UCB) in 1929, the result of a ‘merger operation in the Belgian chemical industry’, 
and its connections with Belgium’s tropical medicine elite helped it to achieve just 
that.772 As the UCB’s pharmaceutical division, Meurice was able to perfect industrial 
production methods and improve its own chemical and biological quality control 
mechanisms.773 Moreover, its scientific director Richard Pottier collaborated with Van 
den Branden to establish national quality standards for the Tryparsamide compound, 
and in the process demonstrate that Tryponarsyl complied with these. 
In his capacity as director of the Interior Ministry’s quality control laboratory, Van 
den Branden emphasised the need for biological, in addition to chemical, checks of 
drugs, and called for the Belgian pharmacopoeia to adopt toxicity prescriptions for 
Doctor in West Leopoldville, 20.10.1936, MAEAA, GG, 18304 (Léopoldville, Léopoldville); K. Velle, ‘De centrale 
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Resources, http://www.bestor.be/wiki/index.php/BESTOR (Last accessed 23 March 2014).
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trypanocides.774 He was instrumental in developing national toxicity tests for 
trypanocidal compounds, notably Tryparsamide, and co-authored several scientific 
papers on the subject with Pottier.775 Tellingly, their work amounted to dismissals of 
colonial practitioners’ concerns about the inherent abnormal toxicity of certain 
Tryparsamide phials or batches. More specifically, it confirmed Tryponarsyl’s toxic 
equivalence to other brands of Tryparsamide as well as its stability in tropical 
conditions, and attributed incidents to external factors such as patient abnormalities, 
suboptimal storage conditions, and medical practitioners’ failure to comply with 
guidelines for clinical use.776 To a significant extent, the cooperation between the 
company scientist and the laboratory doctor cum pharmaceutical regulator thus 
resulted in a removal of responsibility for adverse drug reactions from the ‘creators’ of 
the Tryponarsyl campaign in the Belgian Congo, and assigned it to clinicians instead. 
The colony’s official sleeping sickness doctors themselves admitted to a degree of 
non-compliance with ‘scientific’ treatment protocols. They were not unresponsive to 
the notion of therapeutic standardisation in a context of mass practice that involved few 
physicians and large numbers of medical auxiliaries. Prophylactic sleeping sickness 
missions, therefore, tended to employ standardised procedures for screening and 
treating trypanosome carriers. However, these did not always follow the laboratory-
based guidelines of central medical authorities, as mission directors sought to adapt 
protocols to local circumstances. For example, as will be described in more detail in 
chapter 10, conditions in the Kwango mission, notably staff and equipment shortages, 
delayed the adoption of microscopic diagnostic methods, especially cerebrospinal fluid 
exams, and led to shorter and simplified treatment regimens. The result was that 
trypanocide treatment there remained rather indiscriminate, at first including even 
merely suspected and apparently cured cases (for whom the respective presence or 
disappearance of trypanosomes had not been microscopically confirmed) in addition to 
‘true’ trypanosome carriers, and not necessarily distinguishing between early and 
774 Pottier et Van den Branden, ‘Note au sujet du tryparsamide ou tryponarsyl (Glyphénarsine de la P.B.IV)’, 188, 
196. 
775 Pottier et Van den Branden, ‘Note au sujet du tryparsamide ou tryponarsyl (Glyphénarsine de la P.B.IV)’, 
187-197; F. Van den Branden et R. Pottier, ‘Note au sujet des propriétés chimiques et biologiques de la 
trystibine - Dn 18’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 17 (1937), 247-248; F. Van den Branden, ‘Over 
de biologische proef van Bayer 205 of Germanine en gelijksoortige produkten: 309 Fourneau of Moranyl en 
Belganyl’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 18 (1938), 685-692.
776 F. Van den Branden et R. Pottier, ‘Essais de perfectionnement du contrôle biologique des glyphénarsines 
(tryparsamide, tryponarsyl, novatoxyl, trypothane)’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 18 (1938), 
299-311; Van den Branden et Dumont, ‘Contribution à l’étude de la stabilité de la glyphénarsine 
(Tryparsamide)’; F. Van den Branden et R. Pottier, ‘L’hexaméthylène tétramine associée à la tryparsamine (sic) 
dans le traitement de la trypanosomiase. Contrôle biologique du tryponurile’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 14 (1934), 499-502; Dr L. Van Hoof to Provincial Doctor in Léopoldville, 28.9.1937, MAEAA, GG, 
20406 (Léopoldville); F. Van den Branden et R. Pottier, ‘Au sujet d’accidents dus à la tryparsamide et produits 
similaires’, Bulletin de la Société de pathologie Exotique et de ses Filiales 26 (1933), 1026.
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advanced patients. In the 1930s, however, the practice of lumbar punctures to extract 
cerebrospinal fluid was was gradually increased.
8.2 The growing threat of arsenic resistance and the 
‘perfecting’ of therapeutic methods
In the early 1930s, the Belgian Congo’s medical leaders were coming to terms with the 
fact that Tryponarsyl did not entirely meet their high expectations after all. It 
eventually emerged, for example, that toxicity was a more common occurrence during a 
normal course of treatment than initially suspected, notably in advanced cases. And 
while iatrogenic ocular damage appeared to be reversible, it required an immediate stop 
to Tryponarsyl injections, which of course implied doctors having to turn to other, less 
effective drugs like tartar emetic and Bayer 205 to kill off a (secondary) patient’s 
trypanosomes and attempt to cure him.777 Moreover, after Barlovatz’s first reports of 
drug resistance in 1929, the director of the Mayumbe sleeping sickness mission signalled 
a hundred and five similar cases the following year. By 1932, Congolese medical 
authorities believed that the problem had spread to almost the entire colony and was 
steadily increasing, just like in AEF.778 Even the previously skeptical Van den Branden 
came to accept the reality of arsenic resistance.779 The colony’s chief medical officer 
René Mouchet, who had succeeded Trolli in 1932, and his deputy Lucien Van Hoof 
suspected that the phenomenon was linked to the routine practice of weekly injections 
of 2g Tryponarsyl doses and feared the creation of foci of ‘practically untreatable 
trypanosomes’, which would of course seriously hamper the pharmaceutical attempts at 
777 F. Van den Branden et M. Appelmans, ‘Les troubles visuels dans la trypanosomiase humaine’, Annales de la 
Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 14 (1934), 91-92, 105; R. Mouchet to Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 
17.6.1933, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur).
778 G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis; R. Mouchet, 
‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1932’, s.d. MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.6; President of 
the Conseil Supérieur d’Hygiène Coloniale to Minister of Colonies, 4.7.1932, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306.
779 Although he seemed to mainly attribute it to irregular and insufficient courses of treatment before the 
institution of a proper course of Tryponarsyl therapy. F. Van den Branden, ‘Influence défavorable d’un 
traitement insuffisant et irrégulier sur les résultats obtenus avec le tryponarsyl dans le traitement de la 
trypanosomiase humaine chronique’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 12 (1932), 375, 378.
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sleeping sickness eradication.780 Tellingly, Van Hoof in 1933 referred to Tryponarsyl 
resistance as ‘un point noir’ in the medicinal prophylaxis campaign.781 
Thus at the start of the new decade, the issues with drug resistance and toxicity in 
the wake of large-scale Tryponarsyl use symbolised, as Van Hoof put it, the ‘bitter 
disappointments of our whole current therapeutics’.782 This time, however, no seemingly 
better alternative was immediately at hand, as the Leopoldville laboratory’s research 
had not yielded any significant additions to the Congo’s trypanocidal arsenal since the 
Bayer 205 and Tryparsamide formulas. The 1930s would in that respect bring only little 
relief. Compared to the previous decade, markedly fewer new compounds then reached 
the Belgian Congo for testing in human trypanosome infections. To verify and fully 
grasp this (temporary) slowing down in trypanocidal drug discovery would require a 
more in-depth study of pharmaceutical R&D in Europe and North America that is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. It was possibly linked to the fact that arsenicals 
became a less promising avenue in the wake of drug-resistant trypanosomes and to the 
lure of antibacterial chemotherapy in the latter half of the 1930s.783 
What definitely also played a role is that the evolution of the Leopoldville medical 
laboratory itself made new trypanocide development less of a focus. When Van den 
Branden left the laboratory in 1929, his successor Luigi Fornara lacked a similar 
extensive expertise in sleeping sickness therapy research. In charge of the West 
Leopoldville ‘native’ hospital, Fornara had been frequenting the laboratory since 1925 to 
pursue anatomical pathology investigations, but apparently did not get involved much 
in tropical chemotherapy.784 As director of the laboratory, it seems that he was primarily 
occupied with its expanding public health tasks rather than with science, let alone 
trypanosomiasis drug research. Tellingly, his colleague at the Brazzaville Pasteur 
Institute, Adolphe Sicé, remarked in 1930 that he had less contact with Fornara than 
with Van den Branden.785 The pattern more or less repeated itself with Fornara’s 
successor Paul Brutsaert, who took up the position in 1935 and presided over the 
medical laboratory’s move from its location in West Leopoldville to the newly built 
780 R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1932’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.6; 
L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/
MED-1.
781 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/
MED-1.
782 L. Van Hoof, ‘Essai de deux nouveaux antimoniaux, le Dn 7 et le Dn 9, dans la trypanosomiase humaine’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 12 (1932), 198.
783 In late 1930s Britain, the Medical Research Council and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine’s collaborative 
efforts in tropical chemotherapy nevertheless produced new trypanocidal compounds, including Neocryl and 
the diamidines, but these were apparently not tested on a large scale in Leopoldville, or not before the Second 
World War. Quirke, ‘Foreign influences’, 144; Greenwood, Antimicrobial Drugs, p. 280; Power, Tropical Medicine in 
the Twentieth Century, pp. 79-104.
784 Van den Branden, ‘Rapport sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville en 1925’, 238; ‘Rapport sur 
le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville-Ouest et des services annexes pendant l’année 1929’, 231.
785 A. Sicé to Félix Mesnil, 12.4.1930, AIP, Fonds F. Mesnil, MES.7, Sicé. 
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Princess Astrid Institute in East Leopoldville in 1937.786 Brutsaert had arrived in the 
Congo in 1927 to set up a bacteriology and serology laboratory in Elisabethville for the 
Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, and shared a history of Louvain bacteriology training 
with the Leopoldville laboratory’s foremost sleeping sickness therapy experts Broden, 
Rodhain, and Van den Branden.787 Nevertheless, as far as sleeping sickness research was 
concerned, it appears that Brutsaert did not follow in the footsteps of his Louvain-
trained predecessors either. 
What in fact happened at the Leopoldville laboratory and Princess Astrid Institute in 
the 1930s was a steady increase in routine diagnostic and analysis work for most 
laboratory personnel, with research becoming the privilege of a happy few who were 
much less involved in the labs’ other activities.788 It was actually Lucien Van Hoof who 
returned to trypanosomiasis therapy research in Leopoldville after his former 
collaborator Van den Branden’s departure, albeit on a more modest scale and not in a 
full-time capacity. In 1930, he had been appointed ‘Médecin-Inspecteur’ of the colony’s 
medical laboratories, and as this position was based at the Leopoldville lab outside of the 
required inspection trips, Van Hoof could pursue his research there.789 
Most notable among the new trypanocidal compounds tried by Van Hoof in 
Leopoldville were those of the UCB’s pharmaceutical department. The former Meurice 
firm was becoming an even more science-based enterprise since its incorporation in the 
Belgian chemical conglomerate in 1929. An expanded research capacity stimulated 
further investigations into specific chemotherapy in the 1930s, and amounted to more 
pharmaceutical innovation.790 Although the research proved a difficult undertaking 
requiring a huge amount of patience according to scientific director Pottier, it yielded a 
number of new compounds and pharmaceutical specialties targeting the Congolese 
market for sleeping sickness and other endemic tropical disease drugs.791 
Crucial to the UCB’s trypanocide development in the 1930s was the maintaining of 
close ties with the world of Belgian tropical medicine. After Broden’s death in 1929, 
Rodhain had succeeded him as director of the EMT and later the ‘Institut de Médecine 
Tropicale Prince Léopold’ (IMT) in Antwerp, created in 1931 to replace the Brussels 
786 P. Brutsaert, ‘Rapport annuel sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Bactériologie de Léopoldville-Ouest en 
1935’, 12.6.1936, MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.6; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, 
p. 84. Official plans to move Leopoldville’s hospital and scientific infrastructure to East Leopoldville, including 
the building of a new medical research institute, had been made by 1929, but were delayed because of the 
subsequent economic crisis. Minister of Colonies Jaspar to Governor General, 28.1.1929, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4418.564; Pierquin, Historique du laboratoire médical, p. 31.
787 Pierquin, Historique du laboratoire médical, p. 28; Rodhain, ‘Les laboratoires de recherches médicales’, p. 172. 
Brutsaert trained in bacteriology in the laboratory of Richard Bruynoghe. See A. Dubois, ‘In memoriam P. 
Brutsaert (1898-1960)’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 40 (1960), 27.
788 Pierquin, Historique du laboratoire médical, pp. 27, 29, 53.
789 Dubois et Duren, ‘Soixante ans d’organisation médicale’, 16.
790 Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie belge’, 74; ‘In memoriam Albert Meurice’, 1812-1813.
791 Pottier, ‘L’industrie belge des produits pharmaceutiques’, 351; Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie 
belge’, 74.
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School because of its more convenient location in a port city. The IMT also had greater 
clinical and scientific facilities to complement its educational tasks, and thus more 
closely resembled its counterparts abroad, such as the schools of Liverpool and 
Hamburg.792 Under Rodhain, the EMT and IMT (which officially started operations in 
1933) intensified scientific activities, including sleeping sickness therapy research.793 
Together with other staff members including in particular Van den Branden, the 
director was responsible for in vitro and in vivo studies of topics like drug-resistant 
trypanosomes and the mode of action of trypanocidal drugs.794 Unlike for example the 
Paris Pasteur Institute, the IMT never set up its own chemical laboratory for the 
synthesis of new compounds, given that Rodhain found it too expensive and reasoned 
that his institution could rely on existing industrial and academic laboratories. But it did 
remain involved in the preclinical testing of therapeutic agents, notably the UCB’s 
products.795 
It seems that Rodhain was particularly invested in the UCB’s development of tropical 
disease drugs, not in the least trypanocides. Not only was he an expert in 
trypanosomiasis therapy from his days at the Leopoldville laboratory, but as former 
chief medical officer of the Congo he had played an important role in promoting a 
pharmaceutical strategy of sleeping sickness control there after the First World War. 
Moreover, Richard Pottier was his brother-in-law, giving the UCB’s pharmaceutical 
division even more privileged access to Belgium’s foremost tropical medicine authority 
at the time, while allowing the latter to pursue his interests in chemotherapy and 
pharmaceutical disease control.796 
It also seems that from his first days at the EMT Rodhain had been channelling 
clinical feedback from the mass treatment campaign in the Congo to the Belgian 
pharmaceutical company, which shaped the development of new trypanocidal 
compounds. In 1925, shortly after his final term in the colony as chief medical officer, he 
had already encouraged the Meurice firm to manufacture Tryponarsyl in tablet form, 
because that would make it easier for Congolese medical auxiliaries to administer the 
drug.797 The process turned out to be more complicated than expected, but by 1932 the 
UCB’s pharmaceutical arm finally managed to compress Tryponarsyl into tablets by 
792 Director General a.i. (7e DG) Duren, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Ministre sur l’Institut de Médecine Tropicale 
Prince Léopold’, 27.12.1931, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4447.777; ‘Note au sujet de l’Ecole de Médecine Tropicale’, 
22.8.1933, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4441. The IMT was not only financed from the colonial budget, but also received 
annual subsidies from the Commission for Relief in Belgium. Note concerning the Prince Leopold Institute for 
Tropical Medicine, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4441.
793 The EMT and IMT coexisted for a while. ‘Note au sujet de l’Ecole de Médecine Tropicale’, 22.8.1933, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4441; Director General a.i. (7e DG) Duren to Minister, 11.9.1931, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4441.713.
794 A. Duren, ‘Note sur l’Ecole de Médecine Tropicale’, 12.1.1931, ITG, FD11.
795 J. Rodhain, ‘Première Note au sujet de l’organisation de l’Ecole de Médecine Tropicale “Institut Prince 
Léopold”’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4448.778; Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie belge’, 74; Union Chimique 
Belge - Division Produits Pharmaceutiques “Meurice” to J. Rodhain, 29.11.1932, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.3bis. 
796 J. Rodhain to R. Van Saceghem, s.d., ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.13. 
797 J. Rodhain to Minister of Colonies, 13.10.1925, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10.
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adding the compound hexamethylenetetramine. Branded as ‘Tryponurile’, the drug was 
marketed as an easier to dose and therefore more economical solution to administering 
Tryponarsyl.798 In the early 1930s, developments in the Congo also contributed to the 
UCB’s synthesising of a series of new antimony compounds (Dn1 to Dn24). More 
specifically, a major incentive behind the effort was the emergence of a category of 
sleeping sickness victims in the colony whose trypanosomes no longer responded to 
arsenic (i.e. Tryponarsyl) treatment.799 
As Broden had done before him, Rodhain played a critical intermediary role between 
the UCB’s pharmaceutical department and clinical investigators in tropical territories. 
For example, his intervention with clinicians in the Congo and elsewhere was vital in 
shaping drug profiles for the Dn series of antimonials. Most relevant in the context of 
this dissertation is that he stimulated and supported Van Hoof to try out several 
experimental Dn compounds in the treatment of advanced sleeping sickness cases.800 In 
his position as laboratory inspector, Van Hoof had developed a mutual understanding 
with Rodhain, with whom he shared a vision for the future of the Congolese medical 
laboratories involving a closer collaboration with the Antwerp tropical medicine 
institute.801 Not surprisingly, therefore, it was with him that the EMT/IMT director 
liaised to have the UCB’s new chemicals experimented in the Congo.802 
The investigations into sleeping sickness drug therapy in the Belgian colony did not 
produce a new trypanocide to replace Tryponarsyl as the basis of pharmaceutical 
disease control in the 1930s, however. Instead, clinical research mostly amounted to a 
refining and diversification of therapeutic strategies so as to overcome the problems 
encountered with the standard Tryponarsyl regimen. The UCB’s Tryponurile, tested in 
the Congo in 1933 and subsequently introduced to clinical practice, was essentially 
Tryponarsyl in tablet form.803 Among the novel antimony compounds Van Hoof had a 
chance to study in Leopoldville, he identified one that could be usefully included in 
combination sleeping sickness therapy. 
798 Union Chimique Belge - Division Produits Pharmaceutiques “Meurice” to J. Rodhain, 29.11.1932, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.3.3bis.
799 Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie belge’, 74.
800 Union Chimique Belge to J. Rodhain, 9.9.1932, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.13; J. Rodhain to L. Van Hoof, 12.9.1932, 
ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.13; Van Hoof, ‘Essai de deux nouveaux antimoniaux’, 181-198; L. Van Hoof, ‘Un nouveau 
dérivé antimonié organique, le Dn 18, dans la trypanosomiase humaine’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine 
Tropicale 13 (1933), 479-493. 
801 Director General a.i. (7e DG) Duren to Minister of Colonies, 25.9.1931, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4448.778; J. Rodhain 
to Governor General, 29.6.1933, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.3.
802 J. Rodhain to L. Van Hoof, 12.9.1932, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.13.
803 Union Chimique Belge - Division Produits Pharmaceutiques “Meurice” to J. Rodhain, 29.11.1932, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.3.3bis; F. Van den Branden et M. Appelmans, ‘Au sujet du Tryponurile’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 15 (1935), 107; G. Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale aux indigènes en milieu 
rural appliquée au Congo Belge; Fonds Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance Médicale aux Indigènes (FOREAMI)’, 
Bruxelles Médical 20 (1939), 223.
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Several clinicians had already reverted to combinations of existing trypanocides, 
notably Tryponarsyl, Bayer 205 and/or tartar emetic, for patients who had been 
undergoing treatment for a long time to little avail.804 In 1932, Van Hoof started trials 
with the UCB’s antimonials and found they showed promise, in terms of trypanocidal 
and clinical effects, in sleeping sickness cases where the usual trypanocides had ‘lost all 
efficacy’ or had become ‘contraindicated’.805 The organic antimony derivatives also 
seemed to work well, Van Hoof noted, when associated with Tryponarsyl and Bayer 205, 
as they boosted the latter drugs’ action.806 Eventually, he settled on the compound Dn18 
as a ‘médicament d’entretien’ for problematic, ‘incurable’ cases, who remained a public 
health hazard. He welcomed the fact that the drug was easy to administer for 
indigenous nurses, and went on to recommend mixed cures consisting of either 
Germanin/Moranyl and Dn18, or Tryponarsyl and Dn18.807 The new antimonial was 
eventually marketed by the UCB under the brand name ‘Trystibine’, for tropical 
conditions where ‘stibiothérapie’ (i.e. antimony therapy) was indicated.808 
For routine treatment in areas not yet affected by arsenic-resistant trypanosomes, 
Van Hoof tried and by 1933 recommended Tryponarsyl regimens comprising large 
initial doses, also called ‘traitements massifs’.809 Tellingly, to objections that this method 
might provoke toxicity incidents Van Hoof replied that it served a collective goal rather 
than individual patients’ interests. It was specifically aimed, he explained, at dealing 
with the ‘social calamity’ of arsenic resistance by preventing the creation of drug-
804 For example: J. Schwetz, ‘Sur un cas de trypanosomiase (humaine) arsénico-résistante’, Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale 13 (1933), 212; R. Laurent, ‘Remarques à propos de l’action du traitement par la 
tryparsamide, sur la lymphocytose du liquide céphalorachidien, au cours de la trypanosomiase’, Annales de la 
Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 12 (1932), 543.
805 Van Hoof, ‘Essai de deux nouveaux antimoniaux’, 197-198.
806 L. Van Hoof, ‘Essai d’un nouveau dérivé antimoine organique, Dn 12, dans la trypanosomiase humaine’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 13 (1933), 366.
807 Van Hoof, ‘Un nouveau dérivé antimonié organique, le Dn 18’, 491-493. Later comparisons with a series of 
antimonials developed by Bayer (S.d.t. 386, 471 and 411) confirmed Dn18’s superior efficacy in Van Hoof ’s eyes. 
F. Van den Branden et L. Van Hoof, ‘Le S.d.t. 411, nouvel antimonial trivalent, dans le traitement des rats 
“variété albinos de mus decumanus”, infectés de Trypanosoma congolense; action synergique du Bayer 205 
(Germanine); essais de traitement de quelques indigènes trypanosés’, Bulletin des Séances de l’Institut Royal 
Colonial Belge 6 (1935), 680, 693.
808 ‘Les spécialités “Meurice”’, Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice” (1936), s.p. The clinical trials of Dn18 Rodhain 
had encouraged elsewhere contributed to the creation of a second therapeutic identity for the compound, 
namely as a treatment for bilharzia (or schistosomiasis), another parasitic disease endemic in parts of Africa 
and South America. See for example: J. Rodhain to Dr E. Gobert, 27.9.1933, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.13; F. G. Cawston, 
‘A consideration of the antimony content in drugs used for the destruction of schistosomes’, Revue de 
Thérapeutique “Meurice”, (1936), 63-65; R. Van Nitsen, ‘Le stibilase (Dn7) et la trystibine (Dn18) en thérapeutique 
coloniale’, Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice”, (1936), 301; De specialiteiten Meurice (Brussel, s.d.), p. 94. 
809 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 222.
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resistant trypanosome strains.810 A field trial by a doctor published in the ‘Annales de la 
Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale’ in 1933 confirmed that immediately administering 
large doses of Tryponarsyl appeared to reduce the number of arsenic-resistant cases, 
although it did not completely ‘suppress’ them.811 
Clinical research in the early 1930s led medical authorities to ‘perfect (the) rules of 
therapeutics’ and adopt new guidelines that were more context- and case-specific.812 
Sleeping sickness treatment, in other words, was to become more complex than Van den 
Branden’s longer or shorter regimens of weekly 2g Tryponarsyl injections for early and 
advanced cases, but especially also less standardised than the practices of local sleeping 
doctors who administered the same course of Tryponarsyl treatment to all infected 
individuals. Therapy nevertheless remained largely based on that same trypanocide. 
Stronger start doses were promoted to avert arsenic resistance in pristine areas, and 
combinations with Bayer 205 and/or antimonials such as tartar emetic or Dn18 were 
proposed for the treatment of patients already carrying resistant trypanosomes. 
Crucially, regular screenings of cerebrospinal fluid - for diagnostic and prognostic 
guidance - were to underpin this diversification of therapeutic strategies.813
8.3 From prophylactic missions to ‘medical occupation’
For the Congolese medical authorities, the pitfalls of excessive therapeutic 
standardisation were not the only reason why Tryponarsyl appeared to be failing to 
deliver on its promise of a swift eradication of sleeping sickness by the early 1930s. To a 
large extent, they had also come to blame the emergence of drug-resistant 
810 L. Van Hoof to Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 25.10.1935, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); Dr G. Schwers to 
Chef de la M.M.I. du Congo-Ubangi Médecin Principal, 18.11.1935, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); R. Mouchet to 
Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 14.2.1933, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur). 
811 S. Spyrou, ‘Trypanosés-arsénorésistants et fortes doses de tryponarsyl’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine 
Tropicale 13 (1933), 446.
812 L. Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, p. 31.
813 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/
MED-1; R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1932’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-
CB, 83.6; R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport du Service de L’Hygiène. Année 1932’, 5.1933, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.6; R. Mouchet to 
Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 14.2.1933, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); President of the Conseil Supérieur 
d’Hygiène Coloniale to Minister of Colonies, 4.7.1932, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306; L. Van Hoof to Provincial 
Doctor in Coquilhatville, 25.10.1935, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); A. Thomas to Provincial Doctor in 
Coquilhatville, 5.8.1936, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); L. Van Hoof to Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 
17.6.1936, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur); Service de l’Hygiène, ‘Quelques statistiques et quelques notes 
thérapeutiques’, 1937, MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.8bis; L. Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant 
l’année 1936, p. 35; Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 223-224.
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trypanosomes on difficulties to ensure regular trypanocide treatment in a context of 
faltering administrative support and private sector collaboration.814 Echoing sleeping 
sickness doctors’ reports of obstacles encountered in the local implementation of mass 
treatment, Trolli in particular emphasised how a lack of resources and coordination 
caused the pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control efforts to remain too superficial 
and haphazard. What was required, he argued, was comprehensive screening as well as 
regular and sufficient treatment and follow-up of all trypanosome carriers, but despite 
itinerant doctors’ devotion to this enormous and arduous task, a lack of European 
personnel, quick transport modes and microscopes led to sleeping sickness missions - of 
which there were too few in the first place - overstretching themselves. Unless staff 
numbers and budgets increased to enable ‘un travail de fonds’, which also required 
adequate supervision of European and African auxiliaries, the missions would have to 
reduce their sphere of action, Trolli suggested.815 Another reason why eradication 
proved more elusive than anticipated, according to the head of the medical service, was 
that territorial authorities often neglected the mechanical prophylaxis and 
administrative measures (e.g. the enforcement of mandatory sleeping sickness 
screening and treatment among the Congolese population) required to facilitate 
medicinal prophylaxis and consolidate its results.816 
As far as private AMI providers and especially missionaries collaborating with the 
sleeping sickness campaign were concerned, Trolli repeated local state doctors’ 
complaints that they failed to comply with official methods and instructions. They 
hampered coordinated attempts at thorough medicinal prophylaxis, for example, by 
omitting systematic case detection and only treating trypanosomiasis patients who 
voluntarily presented themselves to them, by favouring the provision of general medical 
care in dispensaries over the specialisation of sleeping sickness control, or by impinging 
on official medical staff ’s areas of activity (cf. also chapter 10).817 
Ultimately, Trolli’s criticisms regarding the colony’s administrators and private 
sector were about securing continued support for the sort of collective medicine 
pioneered by Schwetz’s sleeping sickness mission, predicated on the systematic 
surveying, screening and treatment of populations and ‘governed entirely by the 
814 R. Mouchet to Provincial Doctor in Coquilhatville, 28.9.1932, MAEAA, GG, 8824 (Equateur). In the early 1940s, 
directors of the AOF’s sleeping sickness service also blamed drug resistance on a lack of administrative 
collaboration. See Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 640-641.
815 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 149; G. Trolli, ‘Maladie du sommeil. Considérations 
Générales’, 22.6.1931, MAEAA, GG, 16825 (Congo-Kasai); G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant 
l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis.
816 G. Trolli, ‘Note du médecin en chef ’, 10/17.1930, MAEAA, GG, 16819 (Congo-Kasai); G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis.
817 G. Trolli, ‘Maladie du sommeil. Considérations Générales’, 22.6.1931, MAEAA, GG, 16825 (Congo-Kasai); Trolli, 
Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 9; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, 
pp. 5, 10; G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis; Médecin en 
Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2.
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imperatives of demographic growth and the control of epidemics’ rather than by other 
interests.818 To make sleeping sickness control more effective, however, the chief medical 
officer proposed a reorganisation of the colony’s ‘indigenous medical assistance’, so that 
it would better meet the needs of pharmaceutical disease eradication. The program was 
labelled ‘Service de l’Assistance Médicale aux Indigènes’ (SAMI) and aimed to integrate 
prophylactic missions and private AMI providers in a single organisational framework, 
which came to be seen as a perfected version of the sleeping sickness missions.819 It 
entailed a ‘systematic and methodical medical crusade’, a form of social medicine 
targeting the indigenous population in its entirety through comprehensive censuses and 
medical screening by itinerant staff, and a tight network of fixed treatment facilities 
serviced by state and private doctors and auxiliaries. It thus combined the mobile 
elements of the sleeping sickness missions with the hospital-based care of the AMI 
network.820 
To guarantee an effective and rational prophylaxis, SAMI required uniform 
administrative procedures and a better coordination between state and private sector 
providers and between doctors and auxiliaries. This was to be achieved through a clear 
division of labour and a hierarchical organisation under the control of state doctors. 
Medical assistance was organised at the level of territorial zones, which were divided 
into sectors, each consisting of sub-sectors that were themselves made up of ‘circles’ 
containing several treatment centres. Each territorial unit had its own medical director 
with responsibility for overseeing the activities within his sphere of action, collating 
paperwork such as census reports and drug requests from the level below, and 
transmitting the resulting information one step up the hierarchical chain of 
communication. In this rather bureaucratic system, African staff was to be supervised at 
all times by European auxiliaries, who were themselves under the surveillance of 
doctors, and private providers were ultimately placed under the control of state doctors, 
at least as far as indigenous medical assistance was concerned. Moreover, only doctors 
could be responsible for conducting population and medical surveys.821 
818 G. Lachenal, ‘Le médecin qui voulut être roi. Médecine coloniale et utopie au Cameroun’, Annales. Histoire, 
Science sociales 65 (2010), 133 quoted in Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 643.
819 Dubois and Duren, ‘Soixante ans d’organisation médicale’, 9. Schwetz wrote in 1946 that ‘l’idée de la 
médecine sociale est née de et dans la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil’, and that ‘nouvelles méthodes de 
lutte contre cette maladie furent le point de départ de la médecine sociale pratiquée actuellement sur une 
vaste échelle’. Schwetz, L’évolution de la médecine au Congo Belge, pp. 13-14, 21.
820 Schwetz, L’évolution de la médecine au Congo Belge, p. 29; G. Trolli, ‘Circulaire concernant le Service de 
l’Assistance Médicale Indigène (S.A.M.I.)’, 10.12.1931, MAEAA, GG, 18847 (Léopoldville, Banningville); 
‘Instructions relatives aux documents à tenir et à fournir par les Missions contre la maladie du sommeil et 
toute mission médicale chargée du Service de l’Assistance Médicale Indigène (SAMI) pour la lutte contre les 
endémies les plus répandues’ dans Congo Belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des circulaires, instructions 
et ordres de service (Boma, 1929), pp. 90-91. 
821 G. Trolli, ‘Circulaire concernant le Service de l’Assistance Médicale Indigène (S.A.M.I.)’, 10.12.1931, MAEAA, 
GG, 18847 (Léopoldville, Banningville); ‘Instructions relatives aux documents à tenir et à fournir’, p. 90.
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Trolli quickly realised, however, that his rural public health scheme for the Congo 
required such vast amounts of staff and monetary resources that it would be difficult to 
implement, especially if applied to the whole colony at once. He therefore suggested a 
more phased execution by an organisation with greater budgetary and administrative 
autonomy. The latter was to ‘occupy’ a smaller region and submit it to ‘intensive 
(medical) action’ up to the point of disease eradication. Once ‘sanitised’, the region 
could be entrusted to the government’s medical service again, and the independent 
organisation could move on to the next territory.822 
Backed by the Belgian Colonial Minister Henri Jaspar and the monarchy, Trolli’s plans 
materialised in 1930 with the creation of the ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance 
Médicale aux Indigènes’ (FOREAMI). It was set up as an autonomous organisation, 
independent from the colonial administration, to provide it with the flexibility deemed 
necessary to swiftly implement the SAMI program in Belgian Africa. FOREAMI had its 
own budget - funded initially by a donation from the Belgian parliament, a contribution 
from the ‘extraordinary’ colonial budget and a personal gift from queen Elisabeth, and 
later an annual subsidy from the colonial budget - and its own administration, 
consisting of a board of directors in Brussels and an ‘executive committee’ in the colony. 
Coordination and cooperation with the colonial medical service and private medical 
providers in the Congo was sought via their representation in FOREAMI’s 
administration. For example, doctor Albert Duren, director of the Colonial Ministry’s 
medical department since 1929, was a member of the Brussels board together with 
representatives from mission societies and other philanthropic organisations, and the 
Congo’s chief medical officer - Trolli himself until 1932 - was a member of the executive 
committee in the colony. Moreover, FOREAMI doctors and auxiliaries were recruited by 
the Colonial Ministry and employed as state staff placed at the organisation’s disposal.823 
FOREAMI chose Bas-Congo, where a fairly substantial medical and road infrastructure 
was already in place, as its first target zone, and in 1931 embarked upon a ‘permanent 
medical and demographic control’ of the district that would last until the end of 1934. 
By 1934, the ‘Fonds’ also started operating in the Kwango district.824 In the 1930s, 
therefore, sleeping sickness control in the Congo fell within the remit of both FOREAMI 
and the prophylactic missions that had been established in the 1920s. The latter 
however, more and more adopted the SAMI principles and thus gradually evolved into 
the governmental equivalents of FOREAMI, which were simply called SAMI.825 Both types 
822 M. Kivits, ‘Le Fonds Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance Médicale au Congo (F.O.R.E.A.M.I.) 1930-1960’, Annales 
de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 51 (1971), 390.
823 Ibid., 390-392; M. Kivits, ‘Albert Nicolas DUREN’ dans Académie Royale des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, Biographie 
Belge d’Outre-Mer (Brussels, 1989), t. VII-C , col. 136. After 1932, Trolli became Foreami’s director in Belgium.
824 Kivits, ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth’, 394-395, 397-398.
825 L. Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, p. 13; Schwetz, Evolution de la 
médecine, pp. 26, 29; G. Trolli, ‘Circulaire concernant le Service de l’Assistance Médicale Indigène (S.A.M.I.)’, 
10.12.1931, MAEAA, GG, 18847 (Léopoldville, Banningville).
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of rural health service de facto fell under the supervision of the colony’s chief medical 
officer, but retained their own, separate budgets.826 
8.4 Disputing the value of mass Tryponarsyl treatment 
Despite a challenging budgetary context in the wake of the financial crash of 1929, the 
1930s saw a gradual expansion of the ‘medical occupation’ at the heart of Trolli’s rural 
health program in the Belgian Congo.827 However, it did little to quickly abate criticisms 
of the ‘Belgian’ fight agains sleeping sickness that were particularly annoying in a 
context where the issue of drug resistance raised real concerns about the effectiveness 
of pharmaceutical strategies of disease eradication. Similar to the contested ‘value’ of 
mass treatment in French colonial Africa, the Congo’s largely Tryponarsyl-based 
campaign came to be increasingly scrutinised and questioned in this decade, both 
externally and internally.828 For one thing, serious attacks in the German press along the 
lines of Emil Steudel’s charges persisted, with for instance the ‘Berliner Tageblatt’ in 
1934 once again condemning the scarcity of medical practitioners in Belgian Africa, 
accusing the Congo of putting neighbouring territories at risk of trypanosome infection, 
and now also denouncing the poor therapeutic value of Tryponarsyl while extolling the 
virtues of Germanin.829 
In addition, around the same time questions were asked in the Belgian parliament 
about the perceived lack of progress in tackling the Congo’s demographic crisis given 
the significant level of expenditure on the colonial medical service, notably on medical 
drugs. The debate was instigated by Robert Dumont, a former Belgian private company 
doctor who had participated in the official efforts at pharmaceutical sleeping sickness 
control in the Kwango district. As will be described in more detail in chapter 10, the 
experience of itinerant medicinal prophylaxis under state coordination left him rather 
critical of a public health campaign that in his view was too reductionistic in its focus on 
human trypanosomiasis and pharmaceutical means of eradication, as well as too 
collectivist and ‘dictatorial’ in its imposition of therapeutic and diagnostic procedures. 
Lucien Van Hoof, who had succeeded Mouchet as chief medical officer in 1934, 
defended the Congo’s medical service against such attacks by highlighting in his annual 
826 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 154. FOREAMI existed independently from the state 
medical service, but was ‘under the direct control of the Government’. See Trolli, Vanhove et Marquet, ‘Exposé 
de la législation sanitaire’, p. 582.
827 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1934’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.3.
828 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 635.
829 Director Service de l’Hygiène, ‘Le service médical du Congo Belge’, 1931, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4405.306; Minister 
of Colonies to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30.4.1934, ITG, FD26. 
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medical reports the progress made in the fight against human trypanosomiasis through 
mass Tryponarsyl treatment. The population and medical survey requirements of SAMI 
and FOREAMI entailed a significant amount of (paper)work for itinerant medical staff, 
but also provided a wealth of demographic and epidemiological information that helped 
medical authorities develop and evaluate policy.830 By the mid-1930s, annual medical 
reports triumphantly claimed that millions of Congolese were examined annually (over 
5 million or reportedly more than 50% of the population by 1936) and that sleeping 
sickness incidence rates (the rate of new infections among the at-risk population) had 
been declining significantly since 1930. Moreover, prevalence (the proportion of 
trypanosome-infected people in the Congolese population) and the total number of 
cases in treatment had fallen to well below the levels encountered in the 1920s, and 
some endemic foci were believed to be ‘completely sanitised’. The disease, Van Hoof 
concluded, was clearly in ‘retreat’. This proved that the ‘chemical’ approach to sleeping 
sickness control adopted in the Belgian Congo was the right one overall, especially now 
that therapeutic and diagnostic methods had been ‘perfect(ed)’, not through the 
introduction of new trypanocides, but via a ‘more judicious use’ of existing drugs.831
The latter also entailed a more economical usage of trypanocides. As mass 
Tryponarsyl treatment was scaled up by the late 1920s, medical authorities had held 
itinerant sleeping sickness doctors’ ‘unscientific’ treatment practices responsible for the 
ensuing ocular accidents and emergence of drug-resistant trypanosomes. But they also 
increasingly linked biomedical irrationality to unnecessarily high levels of drug 
consumption that risked unduly straining the health service’s limited resources, which 
was particularly unwelcome at a time of economic crisis. Pharmaceutical regulation, in 
this case via central diagnostic guidelines and directives, consequently also came to be 
regarded as a remedy for the spiralling financial costs of pharmaceutical sleeping 
sickness eradication. Trolli, for example, repeatedly urged those involved in medicinal 
prophylaxis to avoid wastefulness by expanding the microscopic analysis of bodily 
fluids, and in particular eliminate cured cases from treatment by generalising the 
performance of lumbar punctures.832 In 1930, he issued instructions to standardise 
830 ‘Instructions relatives aux documents à tenir et à fournir’, p. 90; L. Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au 
Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, p. 13; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1936, 
p. 13.
831 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, pp. 28-29; Van Hoof, Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1936, pp. 29-30; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo 
belge pendant l’année 1937, pp. 30-31. Lyons has challenged the idea that the 1930s decline in sleeping sickness 
can be ‘solely, or even primarily’ attributed to the medicinal prophylaxis campaign, and points to the 
importance of improved conditions for the Congo’s populations. Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 228-230.
832 G. Trolli, ‘Note au sujet de l’intervention du Gouvernement de la Colonie dans la lutte antitrypanosomique 
dans le Kasai’, s.d., MAEAA, GG, 15144 (GG, Congo-Kasai); Governor of Congo Kasai to Governor General, 
28.6.1926, MAEAA, GG, 16835 (Congo-Kasai); G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, 
s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis; R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique 1931’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.5.
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cerebrospinal fluid tests so that practitioners would use the same criteria to determine 
whether a sleeping sickness victim’s condition had fully normalised.833 
A concern to limit trypanocide expenditure also contributed to a further 
rationalisation of pharmaceutical distribution. In 1932, for example, it was decided to 
end direct drug dispatches to medical posts, and instead centralise all supplies in 
provincial pharmacies in order to avoid the buildup of dispersed stocks that were 
difficult to monitor and often went to waste.834 From 1933 onwards, trypanocides were 
even to an increasing extent managed and distributed from the colonial government’s 
central pharmaceutical depot in Leopoldville by the head pharmacist.835 This was the 
result of a reorganisation accompanying the partial privatisation of the colony’s 
pharmaceutical service in a bid to reduce costs in the 1930s.836
Therefore, while medical authorities continued to support an extensive use of 
Tryponarsyl in the colony, by the early 1930s they also took steps to scale back drug 
consumption and reserves given the more challenging budgetary context. At the same 
833 In 1930, Chief Medical Officer Trolli also gave instructions to standardise cerebrospinal fluid tests, so that 
practitioners would use the same criteria to determine whether a normalisation had occurred. G. Trolli, 
‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis.
834 R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport du Service de L’Hygiène. Année 1932’, 5.1933, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.6.
835 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/
MED-1; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-
CB, 85.1; ‘Convention entre la Colonie du Congo Belge et la Compagnie Générale de Produits Chimiques et 
Pharmaceutiques du Congo Belge (“Cophaco”)’, 20.4.1937, MAEAA, GG, 7024 (Léopoldville); L. Van Hoof, 
‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1934’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.3; L. Van Hoof, 
Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, p. 84. Trypanocides stocked in Leopoldville in 
1937 were: Moranyl, Tryponarsyl, Tryponurile and Trystibine. Inspecteur Général (2e DG, 3e Direction) to 
Director of EMT, 29.11.1929, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.8.
836 A major overhaul of the pharmaceutical service took place in 1933. Besides distributing all drugs needed by 
the state health service, provincial pharmacies had also been retailing medicines to private agents in the 
provincial capitals. However, as it was felt that running a comprehensive pharmaceutical service was 
becoming a costly affair (which in some respects fell outside the state’s remit), the colonial administration 
concluded a temporary agreement with pharmaceutical retail companies Cophaco (Compagnie Générale de 
Produits Chimiques et Pharmaceutiques du Congo) and Socophar (Société Commerciale Pharmaceutique), which had 
been operating a network of private pharmacies in the colony’s main urban centres since the late 1920s. Thus 
in July 1933, the private sector provisionally took over the official pharmacies of Leopoldville, Coquilhatville 
and Lusambo Province to dispense drugs to private individuals as well as official health services and those 
entitled to free medicinal provision by the state. By 1938, this situation had become permanent, with all 
provincial pharmacies transferred to these private ‘concessionnaires’. Excluded from this arrangement at the 
outset, however, were the biologicals and chemicals used in large quantities for epidemic and endemic disease 
control, which stayed within the ambit of a drastically reduced pharmaceutical service operating at the top of 
the official medical hierarchy (and until 1938 also in the remaining provinces). See Trolli, ‘Le service médical 
du Congo Belge’, 200; Francotte, ‘Le voyage d’un pharmacien au Congo belge en 1930’, Congo. Revue générale de la 
colonie belge 12 (1931), 76-77, 81; Piton, ‘Le ravitaillement de la colonie en produits pharmaceutiques, 503; L. 
Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/
MED-1; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-
CB, 85.1.
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time, the failure to completely eradicate human trypanosomiasis pointed to 
epidemiological complexities of which the Congo’s medical leaders became increasingly 
aware in the course of the decade, inducing them to somewhat put the effectiveness of 
mass Tryponarsyl-based treatment into perspective. There were epidemiological 
‘enigmas’ that, among other things, mystified the link between medicinal prophylaxis 
and sleeping sickness incidence.837 Trolli himself had already signalled some ‘troubling 
observations’ in this respect in 1930, including, for example, that the sleeping sickness 
situation remained static in some areas despite a lack of systematic control efforts, and 
that in certain other locations the epidemic disappeared without any intervention.838 By 
1935, Van Hoof expressed frustration at the ‘persistence’ of certain ‘active foci’ of 
sleeping sickness ‘despite all efforts’, which meant that constant vigilance was required 
to prevent epidemic flare-ups.839 
8.5 Alternative approaches 
Although the Congo’s medical directors in the 1930s maintained that medicinal 
prophylaxis remained the basis of sleeping sickness control in the Belgian Congo, they 
also increasingly contemplated alternative strategies to complement the mass 
treatment approach. Mouchet and in particular Van Hoof were more emphatic than 
their predecessors in the 1920s in suggesting that the fight against the trypanosome and 
its transmission could not be limited to the pharmaceutical targeting of human carriers 
on a mass scale. They insisted that although difficult to implement, ‘mechanical’ 
measures to minimise human-fly contact should not be neglected given that the 
‘therapeutic method alone’ was in many places not sufficient.840 Mechanical prophylaxis 
could entail the regulation of African mobility and settlement patterns to prevent 
people from frequenting tsetse-infested areas, as well as vector control.841 The latter 
837 J. Burke, ‘Historique de la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil au Congo, 1885-1964’, Annales de la Société belge 
de Médecine Tropicale 51 (1971), 473.
838 G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis.
839 L. Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, p. 29; Van Hoof, Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, pp. 30-31, 35; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au 
Congo belge pendant l’année 1936, p. 30; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1940, 
p. 26.
840 R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique 1931’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.5; R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1932’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.6; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur 
l’hygiène publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1934’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.3; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 85.1.
841 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1934’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.3.
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could be attempted by the indirect means of habitat destruction (brush clearing), or 
directly via the capture of tsetse flies with the Harris trap, a patented device developed 
by a South African entomologist and trialled in the Belgian Congo in the 1930s. Crucially, 
however, Van Hoof emphasised that there were no ‘dogmatic principles’ that could be 
applied everywhere, so that the fight against sleeping sickness would have to be adapted 
to local circumstances.842 
For example, brush clearing became a feasible strategy, he argued, in as far as it 
targeted a limited number of sites identified by epidemiologists as dangerous foci of 
infection for humans.843 For Van Hoof, sleeping sickness control clearly had to be 
informed by epidemiology, but his understanding of epidemic disease differed from the 
microbiological view introduced by tropical medicine experts at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Whereas Liverpool scientists and others had mainly conceived of 
sleeping sickness epidemics as a problem of infection spread by the movements of 
human trypanosome carriers, Van Hoof was developing a more complex and more 
‘ecological’ understanding of sleeping sickness epidemiology.844 For example, he became 
increasingly aware of the disease’s ‘focal nature’, i.e. its ‘occurr(ence) at or around 
specific geographic locations’ (calling them ‘specialised breeding grounds’). Moreover, 
he noticed that it was not so much an area’s fly density as local socio-economic factors 
underlying African mobility, such as famine and individuals’ occupation, that influenced 
endemicity and incidence.845 It seems that Van Hoof increasingly adopted the view that 
one had to look at the complex local interrelations between trypanosomes, tsetse flies, 
humans and animals to account for sleeping sickness epidemiology, and not merely at 
the spread of trypanosomes by moving human reservoirs. 
What undoubtedly played a role in the development of Van Hoof ’s more 
comprehensive stance on human African trypanosomiasis was his involvement in the LN 
international sleeping sickness expedition in 1926-1927, which was based at the Entebbe 
trypanosomiasis laboratory and directed by its head H. Lyndhurst Duke. There, the 
Belgian researcher came into contact with British efforts to understand and control 
African trypanosomiasis, which reflected and contributed to the development of a more 
842 L. Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, p. 29; L. Van Hoof, C. Henrard en 
E. Peel, ‘Mekanische prophylaxie der slaapziekte; strijd tegen de glossinen in Belgisch Congo’ in Acta 
Conventus Tertii de Tropicis Atque Malariae Morbis (Amsterdam, 1938), pp. 641-649; R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1932’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.6; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport 
sur l’hygiène publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1934’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.3; L. Van Hoof, Rapport 
sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, p. 29; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au 
Congo belge pendant l’année 1936, p. 30; K. Brown, ‘From Ubombo to Mkhuzi: Disease, Colonial Science, and 
the Control of Nagana (Livestock Trypanosomiasis) in Zululand, South Africa, c. 1894-1953’, Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 63 (2008), 310.
843 Van Hoof, Henrard en Peel, ‘Mekanische prophylaxie der slaapziekte’, pp. 644-645.
844 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 40-42; Neill, Networks in Tropical Medicine, p. 115.
845 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 41-42, 47; Van Hoof, Henrard en Peel, ‘Mekanische prophylaxie der slaapziekte’, p. 
645; L. Van Hoof, ‘Société des Nations. Enquête Epidémiologique sur la maladie du sommeil dans le disctrict du 
Budama et le Kavirondo’, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.11, pp. 108-110.
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ecological perspective on infectious disease in Britain in the interwar period.846 
Moreover, as part of the international expedition’s ‘Epidemiological Studies’ program, 
Van Hoof undertook a six-month epidemiological survey in the Ugandan district of 
Budama and neighbouring territories, where endemic foci of the Gambiense variety of 
sleeping sickness existed.847 His research there focused on the ‘nature of virus reservoirs, 
the modalities of trypanosome transmission, and all geographic, biological, economic 
and other conditions’ shaping the persistence and spread of human trypanosomiasis, 
and thus reflected how he was adopting a less narrow, more intricate view of sleeping 
sickness epidemiology.848 
When Van Hoof returned to the Leopoldville laboratory in 1930 as Inspector, he 
continued to support a more multifaceted approach to sleeping sickness. He was 
involved in experimenting new sleeping sickness drugs, but under his watch, practical 
training in epidemiology and tsetse fly biology was also introduced at the laboratory in 
the early 1930s.849 When he became chief medical officer in 1934 on Rodhain’s 
recommendation, he continued to coordinate trypanosomiasis studies at the 
laboratory.850 Research was again not confined to clinical trials, but also entailed 
experimental studies with parasites and vectors to enhance the understanding of 
sleeping sickness epidemiology in the Belgian Congo. For example, Van Hoof and his 
collaborators examined and compared the drug resistance and cyclical transmission 
within tsetse flies of Congolese trypanosome strains of diverse provenance.851 
846 H. Tilley, ‘Ecologies of complexity: tropical environments, African trypanosomiasis, and the disease control 
strategies in British colonial Africa, 1900-1940’, Osiris 19 (2004), 21-38; Mendelsohn,‘From eradication to 
equilibrium’, pp. 308-319.
847 L. Duke, ‘League of Nations. Paper No I. General review of the activities of the Commission. Interim report of 
the League of Nations International Commission on Human Trypanosomiasis’, 12.1926, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.11; 
L. Van Hoof, ‘Société des Nations. Enquête Epidémiologique sur la maladie du sommeil dans le disctrict du 
Budama et le Kavirondo’, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.11, pp. 1, 108.
848 L. Van Hoof, ‘Société des Nations. Enquête Epidémiologique sur la maladie du sommeil dans le disctrict du 
Budama et le Kavirondo’, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.11, p. 1.
849 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
RA/MED-1.
850 ‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel. 1936’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 135.9; J. Rodhain, ‘Nécrologie. L. Van 
Hoof ’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 28 (1948), 382; J. Rodhain to Governor General, 29.6.1933, 
ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.3.
851 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1934’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.3; 
P. Brutsaert, ‘Rapport annuel sur le fonctionnement du laboratoire de Bactériologie de Léopoldville-Ouest en 
1935’, 12.6.1936, MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.6; J. Rodhain, ‘Nécrologie. L. Van Hoof ’, 383. For examples of studies, see L. 
Van Hoof et C. Henrard, ‘La transmission cyclique de races résistantes de Trypanosoma gambiense par Glossina 
palpalis’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 13 (1933), 219-244; L. Van Hoof, C. Henrard et E. Peel, 
‘Influence de repas préliminaires indifférents sur l’évolution de Trypanosoma cazalboui chez Glossina 
palpalis’, Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances et Mémoires de la Société de Biologie 126 (1937), 1249-1252; L. 
Van Hoof, C. Henrard et E. Peel, ‘Action de repas médicamenteux sur l’évolution des trypanosomes pathogènes 
chez la Glossina palpalis’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 17 (1937), 385-440; L. Van Hoof, C. 
Henrard et E. Peel, ‘Influences modificatrices de la transmissibilité cyclique du Trypanosoma gambiense par 
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That sleeping sickness control was integrated in the SAMI/FOREAMI framework in 
the 1930s further strengthened the role of alternative approaches to complement 
medicinal prophylaxis. Trolli’s social medicine scheme had its origins in the 
prophylactic sleeping sickness missions established in the 1920s, but it also signalled a 
crucial shift from a specialised, ‘vertical’ health campaign to a more ‘horizontal’ medical 
program.852 As he argued that the mobile teams could not remain ‘indifferent’ to other 
illnesses, Trolli’s ambition was to undertake a ‘medical crusade’ that was no longer 
limited to eradicating sleeping sickness: it was to target other endemic diseases as well, 
and actively promote rural health more generally so as to stimulate the quantitative and 
qualitative growth of the African ‘race’.853 In a further sign of a more environmental 
approach to medicine developing in the Belgian Congo in the 1930s, FOREAMI’s aim in 
particular was to launch a ‘geographical’ rather than a ‘nosological’ campaign, i.e. to 
focus on all aspects of public health in a circumscribed region rather than on fighting 
one or more specific diseases in as large an area as possible.854 This notably included 
maternal and child care, but also hygiene, sanitation and nutrition.855 While 
specialisation could be justified in certain circumstances, the sleeping sickness missions 
were to adapt to providing ‘as complete as possible medical assistance’.856 
Although there were significant obstacles to the local implementation of this more 
holistic approach to public health (cf. also chapter 10), the SAMI/FOREAMI program was 
gradually rolled out in the colony and sleeping sickness missions were transforming into 
‘missions d’assistance intégrale et polyvalente’.857 It meant that as far as sleeping 
sickness control was concerned, the mass treatment of trypanosome carriers was 
increasingly combined with (and in some areas even superseded by) other forms of 
preventive action, especially by the latter half of the 1930s. Medical authorities in fact 
relied on a more locally diversified approach to keep the disease in check. In areas with 
remaining high levels of infection, the reduction of human trypanosome reservoirs via 
comprehensive periodical screening and treatment of infected individuals remained a 
Glossina palpalis’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 17 (1937), 249-272; L. Van Hoof, C. Henrard and 
E. Peel, ‘The stability of Bayer 205 resistance in Trypanosoma gambiense’, Transactions of the Royal Society of 
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 32 (1938), 197-208.
852 Schwetz, Evolution de la médecine au Congo Belge, pp. 13-14, 21. Lyons contrasts the ‘vertical’ sleeping sickness 
campaign with ‘horizontal’ health care programs, ‘expressing concern in a broad range of health-related 
issues’. Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 226.
853 G. Trolli, ‘Circulaire concernant le Service de l’Assistance Médicale Indigène (S.A.M.I.)’, 10.12.1931, MAEAA, 
GG, 18847 (Léopoldville, Banningville); Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 148, 151; Kivits, ‘Fonds 
Reine Elisabeth’, 392-393.
854 Kivits, ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth’, 391. 
855 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 264-298. On FOREAMI and maternal care see also Hunt, 
Colonial Lexicon, p. 252.
856 R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique 1931’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.5; Kivits, ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth’, 
391.
857 L. Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’Année 1939, pp. 1, 4.
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priority.858 It was seen as a form of medical ‘surveillance’ to prevent the resurgence of 
epidemics.859 Where incidence rates were low enough, surveillance could be limited to 
the locations and occupational groups most at risk, e.g. riverine communities and 
fishermen, and to travelling Africans.860 In ‘sufficiently sanitised’ regions, however, 
systematic case detection and treatment by mobile teams could be gradually abandoned: 
as the network of hospitals, rural dispensaries etc. expanded, finding trypanosome 
carriers could increasingly rely on the ‘natives’ spontaneously presenting themselves 
with their illnesses to these health centres. This would help overcome some of the major 
drawbacks of the prophylactic sleeping sickness missions, highlighted by Van Hoof: not 
only the significant staff requirements, but also the lack of enthusiasm among many 
clinicians for ‘exaggerated specialisation in a limited domain of tropical pathology’ and 
constant touring.861 
In addition, pharmaceutical treatment of infected individuals was increasingly 
complemented with other prophylactic strategies, especially the promotion of ‘rural 
hygiene’. The latter was part of the SAMI/FOREAMI program and included measures to 
improve general sanitation (which facilitated vector control), health education, and 
nutrition, aimed at boosting African resistance to disease.862 It reflected a more 
environmental approach to health in that it took local conditions and factors 
predisposing indigenous people to sleeping sickness (as well as other diseases) into 
account, but the promoting of more ‘hygienic’ lifestyles at the same time amounted to 
social engineering and in that sense was no less authoritarian and invasive than 
compulsory trypanocide treatment. As Van Hoof explained, staff implementing rural 
hygiene were not only involved in the fight against insect vectors, but also in the 
‘eradication of deep-rooted prejudices regarding housing, nutrition, pregnancy and 
personal hygiene etc.’.863 As it was increasingly implemented throughout the colony, 
‘rural hygiene’ had a positive effect on the ‘regression of trypanosomiasis’, according to 
the colony’s chief medical officer.864 Especially where medicinal prophylaxis could not 
further reduce incidence rates, or in ‘sanitised’ regions where other factors of the 
aetiological chain remained in place, protecting the indigenous population against 
858 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, p. 30.
859 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, pp. 30-31; Van Hoof, Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’Année 1939, p. 27. 
860 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, pp. 30-31.
861 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, p. 75; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 85.1; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène 
Publique au Congo belge pendant l’Année 1939, p. 4.
862 Kivits, ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth’, 397; Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 162, 294-297; Schwetz, 
Evolution de la médecine au Congo Belge, pp. 71, 105.
863 Van Hoof, Henrard en Peel, ‘Mekanische prophylaxie der slaapziekte’, pp. 642-643.
864 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 85.1.
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infection via a ‘mechanical defence’ and the strengthening of ‘biological resistance’ was 
deemed crucial.865 
To this was added another form of prophylaxis, which entailed administering 
preventive injections of the Bayer 205 compound to all healthy individuals in endemic 
areas. As previously mentioned, a few doctors had tried out preventive ‘Bayerisation’ in 
the field since the 1920s, but it had never been sanctioned as an official strategy by 
medical authorities because it wasn’t considered very practical.866 The difficulties 
experienced in curbing sleeping sickness via the treatment of trypanosome carriers, 
however, prompted a renewed interest in this form of disease control in the 1930s. Some 
itinerant doctors proceeded with field trials of Moranyl-based chemoprophylaxis and 
published studies confirming its effectiveness in the eradication of endemic sleeping 
sickness foci.867 The strategy appeared to gain even greater prominence when the UCB 
added Belganyl to its list of trypanocidal drugs in the second half of the 1930s in what 
seemed like a direct response to medical developments in the Congo.868 Samples were 
tested in 1937 by Van Hoof in Leopoldville, who found it equivalent to the German 
original, thus approving a new brand for the colony’s chemoprophylactic arsenal.869 By 
the end of the decade, based on his review of the clinical research literature and his own 
laboratory studies, Van Hoof judged that ‘“bayerisation” (would) render services there 
where other methods (of sleeping sickness control) (were) failing, when having recourse 
to mechanical prophylaxis was too costly or compromised indigenous people’s 
economies, and especially when despite the means deployed one observe(d) at once the 
persistence of an irreducible infection index and the abundance of arsenic-resistant 
cases in a region’.870 At the outbreak of the Second World War, the method was applied to 
865 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, pp. 31, 40; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 85.1; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène 
Publique au Congo belge pendant l’Année 1939, p. 27; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant 
l’année 1940, p. 29.
866 Trolli found preventive bayerisation unpractical, among other things because it required a regular repeating 
of injections at short intervals and with expensive medicines. G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique 
pendant l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 
11.
867 Province du Congo-Kasai, ‘Rapport annuel du service de l’hygiène. 1930’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 88.2; P. De 
Brauwere et J. Lisfranc, ‘Un essai de prophylaxie antitrypanosomique au Bayer 205 et au tryponarsyl Meurice’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 11 (1931), 387-393; A. Orlovitch, ‘Sur les résultats de l’action 
préventive du Bayer 205 ou moranyl dans une région à forte endémie de maladie du sommeil’, Annales de la 
Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 17 (1937), 353-359.
868 ‘Les spécialités “Meurice”’, Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice” (1937), s.p.
869 F. Van den Branden, ‘Contrôle biologique du Bayer 205 ou Germanine, et des produits similaires, du 309 
Fourneau ou Moranyl et du Belganyl’, Bulletin des Séances de l’Institut Royal Colonial Belge 9 (1938), 355, 358-360; De 
specialiteiten Meurice (Brussel, s.d.), pp. 24-25.
870 L. Van Hoof, C. Henrard et E. Peel, ‘Observations sur l’efficacité du Bayer 205 contre le Trypanosoma 
gambiense. I. Durée de la protection conférée par une dose moyenne. Effets secondaires du Bayer 205 sur le 
pouvoir pathogène des trypanosomes’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 20 (1940), 105-116; L. Van 
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‘active foci’ as staff shortages made comprehensive medical screening increasingly 
difficult.871 
In a rather unsubtle way, ‘Belganyl’ of course provided new opportunities to counter 
German attacks on sleeping sickness control in the Congo and the colonial revanchism 
associated with Germanin. Another way of defending the Belgian colonial medical 
record in the wake of criticisms on prophylactic sleeping sickness missions predicated 
on mass Tryponarsyl treatment was the promotion and national appropriation of the 
broader public health scheme at the heart of SAMI/FOREAMI. Trolli presented his 
FOREAMI program as a unique and ‘uniquely Belgian’ approach to indigenous medical 
assistance. In a historical overview of published in 1939, for example, he argued that no 
equivalent existed in other colonies in terms of the means and methods deployed, and 
that it was Belgium that should be awarded the honour of having applied FOREAMI’s 
singular principles.872 
As Samuel Coghe has suggested, however, it is likely that Trolli was significantly 
influenced by the African health program set up in neighbouring Portuguese Angola in 
the 1920s, which was itself the product of a process of ‘inter-imperial learning’ about 
AMI (notably from French colonies) that started with the international tropical 
medicine conference held in Luanda in 1923. Coghe argues that in 1927, when Trolli was 
chief medical officer, a sanitary agreement was concluded between the Belgian Congo 
and Angola that involved exchanges of information and interactions between high-level 
health staff. Moreover, after a tour in northern Angola in 1928, Trolli reported very 
positively on the Angolan system for indigenous medical assistance in the Belgian 
medical press.873 
A potentially important factor in Trolli’s construction of a ‘national style’ of public 
health provision that in reality had much more ‘mixed origins’, Coghe suggests, was the 
fact that Portugal ranked low on the ‘hierarchical ladder of prestige’ among imperial 
powers, so that explicitly acknowledging it as a source of inspiration could do FOREAMI 
and its founder’s reputation more harm than good.874 Yet Trolli remained equally silent 
about possible French influences, despite significant initiatives in African health care, 
for example in French West Africa, that shaped reforms in Angola.875 In fact, in his 1939 
overview article he quoted a French colonial official claiming that ‘the French (were) not 
sufficiently familiar with the magnificent efforts made by the Belgians in their Congo’, 
more specifically with the ‘very original institution created by them for indigenous 
Hoof, C. Henrard et E. Peel, ‘Observations sur l’efficacité du Bayer 205 contre le Trypanosoma gambiense . IV. 
Modifications de l’évolution de la trypanosomiase provoquées par le Bayer 205’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 20 (1940), 134-135.
871 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1940, p. 26.
872 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 152, 159.
873 Coghe, ‘Inter-imperial learning’, pp. 2, 8, 10.
874 Coghe, ‘Inter-imperial learning’, pp. 10-11.
875 Ibid., p. 8.
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medical assistance’.876 On the eve of the Second World War, medical nationalism had 
clearly far from subsided and appeared to give a further rationale to the shift from 
Tryponarsyl-based sleeping sickness eradication to new approaches to public health. 
8.6 Reductions in Tryponarsyl consumption 
In any case, Belganyl and FOREAMI’s gradual rise to prominence symbolised the 
concomitant decline of mass Tryponarsyl treatment as the embodiment of ‘Belgian’ 
indigenous health provision in the Congo. Moreover, through a number of intertwined 
developments, the 1930s in fact saw a significant reduction in the drug’s consumption 
compared to the previous decade. First of all, there was a decline in sleeping sickness 
incidence and prevalence, which was paradoxically accompanied by a growing 
recognition of the limits of (arsenic-based) medicinal prophylaxis and an associated 
shift to a more diversified (i.e. less exclusively pharmaceutical) approach to sleeping 
sickness control and a more comprehensive view of public health more generally. In 
addition, budgetary constraints affecting both the colonial medical service and 
FOREAMI prompted a ‘more economical management’ of pharmaceutical stocks and the 
promotion of diagnostic procedures aimed at reducing levels of trypanocide 
consumption.877 In 1934, Van Hoof reported that a ‘more rational use’ of drugs in the 
Congo brought down ‘glyphénarsine’ (i.e. Tryparsamide or Tryponarsyl) consumption to 
800kg.878 Levels oscillated between 1170kg in 1937, 650kg in 1938 and 692kg in 1939, but 
overall consumption and expenditure in the second half of the 1930s kept well below 
those reported in the late 1920s.879 
In view of this, one could argue that the late 1930s heralded an end to the ‘career’ of 
Tryparsamide/Tryponarsyl as a sleeping sickness eradication drug in the Belgian Congo. 
By 1939, preventive Belganyl injections were increasingly used to protect the public 
against infection in active foci.880 In the 1940s, a whole new category of drugs called 
‘diamidines’ took over as the basis of pharmaceutical strategies of sleeping sickness 
control when mass chemoprophylaxis campaigns with Pentamidine and Lomidine were 
876 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 156-157.
877 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, p. 6; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène 
Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1936, pp. 5-6.
878 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1934’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 84.3.
879 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, p. 84; L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 85.1; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène 
Publique au Congo belge pendant l’Année 1939, p. 80.
880 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’Année 1939, p. 27; Van Hoof, Rapport sur 
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set up between 1945 and 1955.881 According to Guillaume Lachenal, these campaigns, 
initiated in the Belgian Congo as well as in French colonies, were (wrongly) imagined as 
a short ‘burst of policing’ that would eradicate sleeping sickness and end the ‘lifelong 
treatment of trypanosome carriers and costly screening campaigns’.882 Finally, after the 
Second World War, serious problems with drug resistance led to Tryparsamide’s 
replacement with Melarsoprol, an arsenic compound discovered in 1949, as a curative 
treatment for late-stage trypanosomiasis.883 
To some extent, the downturn in Tryponarsyl’s career in the Congo by the Second 
World War also prefigured a retreat from tropical disease therapeutics on the part of the 
Belgian pharmaceutical industry. Although the latter’s history remains to be written, it 
seems fair to say that the Congolese market for trypanocides and Belgian tropical 
medicine experts in colony and metropole were key to the development of Meurice and 
later the UCB as a manufacturer of synthetic prescription pharmaceuticals in the 
interwar period, and for that reason probably even to the emergence of a science-based 
drug industry in Belgium tout court.884 Looking back on the company’s involvement in 
interwar tropical chemotherapy, a Belgian colonial-interest journal stated in 1946: ‘the 
national industry succeeded in supplying our colony with all the specifics the Congo’s 
medical service resorts to in order to successfully fight the murderous endemic diseases, 
whose influence it manages to push back little by little. Our industry can feel a certain 
pride in having accomplished this effort and in having improved, by its own research, 
the treatment of this scourge, human trypanosomiasis’.885 
By the 1950s, however, the colonial prescription drug market no longer appeared to 
have the same appeal to the Belgian pharmaceutical industry. In a 1958 study on the 
country’s metropolitan and overseas drug market, for example, economist Robert Poivre 
listed the Congo’s ‘strongly centralised’ medical organisation as a major drawback.886 
Demand for prescription pharmaceuticals for indigenous consumption was indeed not 
so much driven by patients and individual prescribers as by the colonial state, and while 
the latter’s public health interventions at one point created a mass market for endemic 
tropical disease drugs, the other side of the coin was that the administration at the same 
time sought to limit its drug expenditure and also controlled the import of 
881 Burke, ‘Historique de la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil’, 474.
882 Lachenal, ‘Chemoprophylaxis against sleeping sickness’, 4. 
883 Burke, ‘Historique de la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil’, 475.
884 Robert Poivre draws a clear link between the Belgian Congo, tropical chemotherapy, and the ‘boom’ of the 
Belgian pharmaceutical industry in the interwar period. R. Poivre, Le marché belge et en particulier celui des 
produits pharmaceutiques, y compris au Congo belge et Ruanda-Urundi (Bruxelles, 1958), p. 17. On Meurice and the 
UCB’s involvement in drug development for tropical diseases before World War II, see also V. Bienfet, H. Van 
den Bossche et P. Crooy, ‘Contribution de l’industrie pharmaceutique belge’ dans P. G. Janssens, M. Kivits et J. 
Vuylsteke (dir.), Médecine et hygiène en Afrique Centrale de 1885 à nos jours (Bruxelles, 1992), pp. 243-245.
885 Darmstadter, ‘La contribution de l’industrie belge’, 74. Belgian-manufactured drugs were cheaper for the 
colonial government. See Poivre, Marché belge, p. 17.
886 Poivre, Marché belge, p. 41.
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pharmaceutical specialties in the colony.887 Moreover, state demand could collapse when 
medical priorities and strategies changed, as was the case with sleeping sickness control. 
In the 1930s, the UCB itself seemed to diversify its range of pharmaceutical specialties 
by gradually moving beyond tropical chemotherapy. The firm’s attention increasingly 
turned to novel fields such as hormone therapy and the sulfonamides, the new group of 
synthetic chemical drugs effective against the bacterial infections of temperate climates 
and hailed as ‘the first miracle drugs’.888 In other words, it seems that by the end of the 
interwar period, the UCB was starting to orient itself more and more to metropolitan 
rather than tropical drug markets, an evolution that only intensified after the Second 
World War.889 
8.7 In summary
Used on a vast scale since the late 1920s, Tryponarsyl next entered a phase of 
disenchantment when it failed to meet earlier high expectations, in particular those of a 
swift and easy eradication of sleeping sickness. This posed certain challenges to the 
close ties between laboratory science, ethical pharmaceutical industry and collective 
medicine in the Belgian Congo. While the tropical medicine elite continued 
collaborating with the pharmaceutical industry and kept rational drug policies and 
regulation firmly in place, pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control itself became less 
self-evident. Local reports of toxicity and in particular arsenic-resistant trypanosomes 
threatened to undermine a medicinal prophylaxis campaign that represented a 
substantial medical expenditure and was not always embraced by private sector health 
providers. An extensive use of Tryponarsyl was nevertheless initially sustained through 
a certain complicity between Belgian tropical medicine and pharmaceutical industry to 
define toxicity as an issue of biomedical irrationality rather than poor product quality, a 
dearth of new replacement trypanocides and an associated recourse to largely 
Tryponarsyl-based, if more diversified, therapeutic strategies to deal with drug 
887 Ibid., p. 41-44. An authorisation from the Colonial Ministry’s medical department or from the colony’s 
central medical or pharmaceutical authorities was required to import medical drugs in the Congo. See M. 
Kivits et W. Vanderijst, Code de législation sanitaire du Congo-Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (Bruxelles, 1958), p. 14.
888 Poivre, Marché belge, p. 17; Lesch, First Miracle Drugs; ‘In memoriam Albert Meurice’, 1813; Union Chimique 
Belge. Division Produits Pharmaceutiques “Meurice”, ‘A nos lecteurs’, 3; ‘Les spécialités “Meurice”’, Revue de 
Thérapeutique “Meurice” (1937), s.p.; R. Pottier, ‘L’emploi du sulfanilamide dans diverses affections 
bactériennes: strepto, staphylo et méningococcies, gonorrhée, colibacillose, etc.’, Revue de Thérapeutique 
“Meurice” (1937), 1087-1092.
889 According to Bienfet and colleagues, the post-World War II period saw an end to the UCB’s research on 
tropical diseases. Bienfet, Van den Bossche et Crooy, ‘Contribution de l’industrie pharmaceutique belge’, p. 245.
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resistance, and organisational reforms that densified medical ‘occupation’ and thus 
increased the coverage of regular sleeping sickness screening and therapy in the colony. 
While doubts were raised about the value of mass Tryponarsyl treatment in 
metropolitan circles, colonial medical authorities hailed its contribution to significant 
reductions in sleeping sickness incidence and prevalence. Nevertheless, they also 
encouraged a more economical use of trypanocides, and in 1930s increasingly shifted to 
a more ecological, locally diversified approach to sleeping sickness epidemiology and a 
more holistic view of public health that challenged the primacy of a Tryponarsyl-based 
eradication of sleeping sickness. The (second half of the) 1930s saw a gradual decline in 
the drug’s consumption and eventually heralded an end to its career as a tool for 
stamping out human trypanosomiasis in the Belgian Congo.
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PART IV. 
LOCAL MEDICINAL PROPHYLAXIS: THE CASE OF 
THE KWANGO DISTRICT
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Chapter  9
Mass Atoxyl treatment: the Schwetz mission 
controversy
This chapter takes a closer look at some of the local factors that helped shape Atoxyl’s 
postwar career cycle in the Belgian Congo. Focusing on the southwestern Kwango 
district, it examines the origins and beginnings of the first prophylactic sleeping 
sickness mission, directed by state doctor Jacques Schwetz, which played an important 
role in the prioritisation of itinerant medicinal prophylaxis in the colony and therefore 
in the large-scale spread of Atoxyl after the war. It also explores the many obstacles 
Schwetz faced in the implementation of his program of comprehensive screening and 
treatment, how these informed his methods and fuelled local tensions that eventually 
even reached political circles in the metropole. It is this context of opposition to mass 
treatment in Kwango, and the potential threat it posed to the future of the sleeping 
sickness missions, that fed into colonial doctors’ disappointment with (the quality of 
Belgian-manufactured) Atoxyl. In the end, it also contributed to a tightening of 
pharmaceutical regulation as a way of sustaining support for pharmaceutical sleeping 
sickness control, resulting in a decline of French and Belgian Atoxyl brands while 
maintaining the large-scale consumption of the German original.
Noémi Tousignant has recently noted how English-language historians have generally 
ignored the frictions engendered by pharmaceutical strategies of sleeping sickness 
control in colonial Africa, even when studying territories where drug treatment was 
used - including the Belgian Congo -, as they tend to focus on the politics of social and 
environmental engineering. This is in stark contrast to their French-speaking 
counterparts, she argues, who have done much to uncover the ‘long history of political 
tensions’ over mass treatment and Eugène Jamot’s model of special, autonomous 
sleeping sickness services in French Africa.890 Building further on Tousignant’s 
observation, this chapter pays particular attention to the clash arising in the early 1920s 
between Schwetz’s official sleeping sickness mission and Kwango’s Jesuit missionaries, 
and its role in generating political conflicts about mass trypanocide treatment in the 
Belgian Congo .
Before the arrival of the Schwetz mission, Jesuits were responsible for the district’s 
most substantial efforts to curb sleeping sickness, and had received significant support 
from the colonial state in this endeavour. As epidemic disease control proved largely 
compatible with the interests of evangelisation, Kikwit missionary Yvan de Pierpont in 
890 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 627.
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particular became engaged in prophylactic treatment and the implementation of 
mechanical prophylaxis measures disrupting African lifestyles. Although not using 
direct coercion, he did not hesitate to capitalise on indigenous fears of state violence to 
encourage compliance with public health regulations that served to extend the Jesuit 
mission’s ‘civilising’ influence. In that sense, missionary medical work in Kwango was 
not necessarily the ‘soft’ variant of a harder state version of colonial medicine.891 
However, the arrival of an official sleeping sickness mission, guided exclusively by the 
imperatives of mass screening and treatment and equipped with significant coercive 
powers, soon generated considerable tensions. Not dissimilar to the French case, 
quarrels about Jesuit obstructions of mass treatment and a(n anticlerical) state doctor’s 
undue interference in the missionary sphere of influence soon turned into ‘broader 
debates’ about the ‘powers’ and ‘ethics’ of prophylactic sleeping sickness missions as 
exemplified by the one under Schwetz’s direction.892 Catholic opposition to what were 
deemed excessive coercive powers and unethical diagnostic procedures, forcing Africans 
merely suspected of sleeping sickness to undergo treatment with dangerous medicines, 
eventually even amounted to discussions in the Belgian parliament. Such external 
criticisms tested central political authorities’ support for the special sleeping sickness 
missions, and contributed to pharmaceutical regulation efforts by a colonial medical 
service seeking to minimise the risks of mass treatment and protect its doctors’ hard-
won independence from administrative interference (cf. chapter 5). Yet ultimately they 
did not succeed in challenging the model of official special missions, tasked with mass-
scale mandatory screening and treatment, as a legitimate and appropriate strategy of 
sleeping sickness control in the Belgian Congo in the 1920s.
9.1 Jesuit control efforts before 1919
The Kwango district was an administrative unit south of the Kasai river in the southwest 
of the Belgian Congo. Although its precise territorial boundaries fluctuated throughout 
colonial history, the area was roughly made up of the basins of the Kwango and Kwilu 
rivers north of the Angolan border.893 The district’s colonial economy was based on 
agricultural industry and trade. This was exemplified in particular by the arrival of the 
Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB), an oil palm plantation company whose British founder 
William Lever (of the Lever Brothers soap business) had been granted an enormous 
891 On the misconception of missionary medicine as the ‘soft side of colonial medicine’, notably in the Belgian 
Congo, see Hunt, Colonial Lexicon, p. 161.
892 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 635.
893 J. Omasombo, Kwango. Le Pays des Bana Lumba (Bruxelles; Kinshasa, 2012), p. 172.
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concession from the Belgian administration in 1911. Operating mainly south of the 
district capital of Bandundu, the HCB harshly recruited thousands of Congolese to 
harvest the fruits of the palm tree.894 According to a Jesuit missionary, Kwilu became 
dominated by the ‘reign’ of the oil palm.895 Kwango’s indigenous inhabitants formed two 
distinct cultural entities, which Jan Vansina has labelled the ‘Bas-Kasai’ and ‘between 
Kwango-Kasai peoples’, each consisting of different but culturally and linguistically 
closely related groups.896 Failing to grasp the ‘rich complexity of interactions among 
peoples’, however, European observers perceived existing diversity in Kwango as 
evidence of ‘ethnic fracture’ in a ‘mosaic of tribes’.897 
Colonial state agents started to firmly associate the district - which apparently had 
not been covered by the Liverpool expedition - with sleeping sickness around 1912, at a 
time of increased European presence in the area.898 The district commissioner reported a 
growing number of cases among Congolese staff in and around the district capital of 
Bandundu during the previous year. Elsewhere in barely-occupied Kwango, the situation 
was less clear, but sporadic information from other locations seemed to indicate that it 
was one of the colony’s ‘sleeping sickness regions’.899 The district doctor Jacques David, 
who embarked on a few medical tours around that time, concluded in 1912 that Kwango 
was ‘entirely contaminated’.900 In particular Moyen-Kwilu increasingly drew attention as 
a (perceived) focus of sleeping sickness. It was the district’s commercial heart, where 
small traders operated in addition to the HCB and the ‘Compagnie du Kasai’, a major 
trading company established in 1901.901 On one of his trips, David ventured to Kikwit, a 
new state post along the Kwilu river, where he found the sleeping sickness situation to 
be particularly serious.902 
894 Van Reybrouck, Congo: een geschiedenis, p. 140; Buelens, Congo, 1885-1960: een financieel-economische geschiedenis, 
p. 156.
895 J. Van Wing, ‘Au Kwilu. Industrie et commerce. Situation sociale - missions’, Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites 
belges 10 (1928), 358.
896 J. Vansina, Introduction à l’ethnographie du Congo (Kinshasa, 1966) pp. 25, 129, 145.
897 Van Wing, ‘Au Kwilu’, 358; Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 163.
898 Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 94. Schwetz attributed the emergence of sleeping sickness in Kwilu to the 
‘penetration of the white man’ in the region since 1911. J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Moyen 
Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG). 
899 Commissaire Général Vanwert, ‘Extrait District du Kwango. Considérations budgétaires pour 1912’, 6.6.1911, 
MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3.
900 Commissaire Général Van Wert to Governor General, 6.4.1912, ‘Rapport annuel médical (district du Kwango)’, 
MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3.
901 Dr Heiberg, ‘Rapport médical pour 1913, 28.5.1914, MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.1. Leverville, established in 1911, was 
HCB’s commercial centre in Kwilu. J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le moyen-Kwilu (district du 
Kwango, Congo belge) en 1918’, Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique 12 (1919), 798-799; Buelens, Congo, 
1885-1960, p. 149.
902 J. David, ‘La Maladie du sommeil au Kwilu’, 18.4.1912, MAEAA, GG, 16782 (GG). 
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Before 1919, however, not much (medicinal) action was undertaken against sleeping 
sickness by Kwango’s colonisers.903 The administration was far too thin on the ground to 
mount a meaningful prophylactic treatment campaign, especially among the indigenous 
population outside of the scarce state posts. The district’s only official doctor was too 
occupied with screening staff and visitors in Bandundu to undertake ambulatory Atoxyl 
treatment in ‘native villages’. Moreover, both the district commissioner and doctor 
David showed little appetite to enforce disease control measures and invasive 
biomedical procedures in a region that had scarcely been ‘occupied’, with a population 
that they felt was not yet very ‘open to persuasion’.904 The big concession companies did 
not offer much in the way of help either: the ‘Compagnie du Kasai’ did not have a 
medical officer, while the HCB doctor was reportedly too tied up in Leverville to deal 
with sleeping sickness in Kwilu.905 
To a significant extent, the vacuum left by the state and concession companies in 
Kwango was filled by missionaries, especially Jesuits, who had a history of early 
involvement in sleeping sickness control efforts in the Congo.906 By 1907, they had 
become increasingly alarmed by sleeping sickness mortality in the Kwango ‘préfecture’, 
the Jesuit sphere of influence in southwest Congo comprising - but extending beyond - 
the administrative Kwango district. In particular Hyacinth Vanderyst, a botanist who 
had arrived in Kisantu (Moyen-Congo district) in 1906, resolved to take action against 
the disease and thus put Jesuit missions on the path of sleeping sickness prophylaxis. He 
had followed a bacteriology course in Louvain in 1902, and in 1907 went to the 
Leopoldville laboratory to study sleeping sickness diagnosis and therapy, which in turn 
inspired laboratory doctors Broden and Rodhain to start organising practical tropical 
medicine training for missionaries. In Kisantu, Vanderyst embarked on a campaign to 
microscopically detect trypanosomiasis cases among mission staff, isolate them and 
provide treatment. To that end, he erected the lazaret of Saint-Jean Berchmans (and 
later that of the Sacré-Coeur de Jésus), which he directed until 1913.907 In the lazaret, 
Atoxyl was administered to infected individuals via injections or, following advice from 
903 J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le moyen-Kwilu’, p. 809-811.
904 Commissaire Général Vanwert, ‘Extrait District du Kwango. Considérations budgétaires pour 1912’, 6.6.1911, 
MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3; Commissaire Général Van Wert to Governor General, 6.4.1912, ‘Rapport annuel médical 
(district du Kwango)’, MAEAA, RA-CB, 80.3. During his visit in 1912, David admitted that in Kikwit he had not 
dared puncture the lymph glands of Africans working for ‘commerçants’ for fear that they would ‘desert’. See 
J. David, ‘La Maladie du sommeil au Kwilu’, 18.4.1912, MAEAA, GG, 16782 (GG).
905 J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le moyen-Kwilu’, p. 809.
906 X. Dusausoit, ‘Planter l’église. Le contrôle du territoire et des populations’ dans A. Deneef, X. Dusausoit, C. 
Evers, M. Pilette et X. Rousseaux, Les Jésuites au Congo - Zaire. Cent ans d’épopée (Bruxelles, 1995), p. 84.
907 H. Vanderyst, ‘Le renouvellement et le relèvement de la population de Kisantu par l’action missionnaire’, 
Aide Médicale aux Missions 1 (1929), 11-12, 22-24, 50, 53, 71-72; H. Vanderyst, Notions élémentaires concernant les 
maladies tropicales (Bruxelles, 1929), pp. ix, xxi, 160.
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Broden and Rodhain, also orally.908 According to Vanderyst, this lazaret regime, even if it 
did not (yet) produce cures, at least improved patients’ conditions considerably and 
reduced the chances of infection by keeping trypanosome carriers in a sanitary, tsetse-
poor environment.909 
For christian missionaries, medical work traditionally constituted a way of extending 
their influence over indigenous peoples and was therefore deeply intertwined with the 
aims of evangelisation. The example of the Jesuits in the Belgian Congo shows that they 
also got involved in infectious disease prevention, most likely because they needed to 
protect their own health within mission posts and safeguard their endeavour’s survival. 
In that way, missionaries were not always less inclined than state doctors to conceive of 
Africans and African settlements as sources of parasites.910 In addition, they also 
contributed to the official sleeping sickness campaign because it was beneficial in terms 
of the financial and material support it entailed. 
In any case, Jesuit efforts to control sleeping sickness did not remain confined to the 
Kisantu lazaret for long. In line with the 1910 sleeping sickness policy reforms, Jesuits 
elsewhere became increasingly involved, and they also adopted Atoxyl treatment as a 
prophylactic strategy in itself, taking place outside of the lazaret context. For example, 
in the mission station of Wombali, where Vanderyst had instituted trypanosomiasis 
screening and treatment in 1910, parasite carriers were not isolated but allowed to 
continue their normal activities while receiving twice-weekly Atoxyl injections to boost 
their health and prevent further infection.911 Some Jesuit missionaries went further and 
incorporated medicinal prophylaxis into their evangelisation rounds. During what they 
called a ‘medical-apostolic tour’ in the Nsele valley, for example, Joseph Greggio and 
Hanquet examined villages in the region to get a sense of the sleeping sickness problem 
there. Many of the people found infected were sent to the lazaret in Kisantu, but those 
who refused (or were too ill) were injected on the spot.912 
In the administrative Kwango district, the practice of itinerant prophylactic 
treatment was taken up by Yvan de Pierpont in particular. After a first term in Kisantu, 
where he had observed Vanderyst’s medical work, de Pierpont arrived at the Jesuit 
908 I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Kwango. Le lazaret de Kisantu’, Missions belges de la Compagnie de Jésus: Congo, 
Bengale, Ceylan (1908), 91. Vanderyst mentioned in 1929 that Atoxyl was the medicine most used by 
missionaries. Vanderyst, Notions élémentaires, p. 159.
909 I. de Pierpont, ‘Lazaret de Kisantu’, 91.
910 On missionary strategies of spatial separation by way of malaria prevention and control see for example C. 
M. Good, The Steamer Parish: The Rise and Fall of Missionary Medicine on an African Frontier (Chicago, 2004), p. 267.
911 J. Hamerlinck, ‘Mission du Kwango. La lutte contre la maladie du sommeil à la mission de Wombali’, Missions 
belges de la Compagnie de Jésus: Congo, Bengale, Ceylan (1912), 381-382; J. Hamerlinck, ‘Rapport sur les résultats 
obtenus dans la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil, à la Mission de Wombali, établi au 1r avril 1913’, 1.4.1913, 
MAEAA, GG, 19645 (GG). 
912 H. Moris, ‘Mission du Kwango. Les missionnaires et la maladie du sommeil’, Missions belges de la Compagnie de 
Jésus: Congo, Bengale, Ceylan (1911), 458-460.
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mission of Kikwit, on the left bank of the Kwilu river, in May 1915.913 At that time, the 
mission had a lazaret where not only African mission staff, but people from indigenous 
villages in the area as well were treated for sleeping sickness.914 De Pierpont noted, 
however, that the latter often only came when they were already in an advanced stage 
of the disease, or that they frequently interrupted treatment to return to their villages, 
for example because of difficulties to provide for themselves in Kikwit.915 In an effort to 
extend the mission’s sphere of prophylactic action, the Jesuit soon agreed with his 
fellow missionaries that he would go on a tour to assess the ‘sanitary state’ of the region 
around the mission post, while they continued running the lazaret.916 Despite a lack of 
formal tropical medicine training (he had not attended the EMT in Brussels nor the 
practical course at the Leopoldville laboratory), de Pierpont in July 1915 embarked on 
the first of a series of journeys through Kikwit territory that involved diagnosing and 
treating people with sleeping sickness.917 As more trypanosome carriers thus received 
ambulatory treatment, de Pierpont asserted, the lazaret in Kikwit gradually became less 
important.918 
For de Pierpont, sleeping sickness control was very much linked to, and went hand in 
hand with, the mission’s evangelisation goals. His tours through Kikwit, which de 
Pierpont described as ‘à la fois médical et apostolique’, were to a large extent also about 
getting to know the territory’s indigenous population and recruiting new 
catechumens.919 What is more, de Pierpont considered medical work an important 
‘civilising’ tool in itself. The most important obstacle to extending the influence of 
Christianity, he argued, were the so-called ‘féticheurs’, the local healers: ‘in almost all 
villages, the Féticheur is the pernicious man who in the background is the immovable 
913 de Pierpont, ‘Lazaret de Kisantu’, 86; I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, 
Documentation and Research centre for Religion, Culture and Society (KADOC), Archief van de Belgische en 
van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, p. 2.
914 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG). 
915 Y. de Pierpont to doctor, 24.11.1915, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit).
916 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG).
917 Y. de Pierpont to doctor, 24.11.1915, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); ‘Mission du Kwango. Journal 
de Voyage du Père Ivan de Pierpont, S. J.’, 7.7.-10.8.1915, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse 
provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 1; I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur 
de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 
4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, p. 3-4. During the First World War, de Pierpont had nevertheless received 
some basic medical training in Louvain. L. Wilmet, Un broussard héroïque. Le P. Ivan de Pierpont, S.J. (Charleroi; 
Paris, 1939), p. 68.
918 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG). 
919 ‘Mission du Kwango. Journal de Voyage du Père Ivan de Pierpont, S. J.’, 7.7.-10.8.1915, KADOC, Archief van de 
Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 1, pp. 1, 6-7; 
I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de 
Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, pp. 3, 10, 16, 22.
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core of resistance against every of the white man’s actions’.920 If Africans had recourse to 
western medicine, this would in his eyes help draw them away from the influence of 
local healers.921 Consequently, de Pierpont usually approached the villages he visited by 
presenting himself as ‘Mompa (mon père)’ who tends to the ill in Kikwit and who has 
come to treat sleeping sickness victims.922 By May 1916, and with the help of ‘sanitary 
brigades’ of young catechumens, de Pierpont also started to include brush clearing on 
his tours as a way to aid his prophylactic efforts. The Jesuit missionary felt that 
mechanical prophylaxis as well was quite compatible with his evangelical work: not only 
could he take the opportunity to educate the youngsters who joined him as part of his 
brigade, but bringing African settlements in line with the state’s sanitary requirements 
disrupted indigenous lifestyles, which in his opinion was not a bad thing as it amounted 
to civilisation.923 
Because of his prophylaxis efforts in a district where European attempts at human 
trypanosomiasis control in indigenous communities were otherwise virtually 
nonexistent, de Pierpont enjoyed significant support from the colonial government. At a 
time when Jesuit missions generally lacked the resources to buy much medical 
equipment and the First World War seriously disrupted the supply of (German) drugs to 
the Congo, the Kikwit mission enjoyed something of a preferential treatment.924 Through 
a ‘personal intervention’ by the Governor General Eugène Henry, for example, de 
Pierpont received a state subsidy to set up his ‘sanitary brigades’.925 Moreover, the 
Governor made an effort to accommodate his emphatic requests for Atoxyl, which had 
been in seriously short supply in Kikwit.926 As a result (and notwithstanding delays, for 
920 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG).
921 de Pierpont connected biomedical treatment with civilisation: ‘Les premiers secourus sont ceux qui font un 
premier pas vers la civilisation en venant à nous’. I. de Pierpont to Governor General, 25.2.1917, ‘Rapport 
Médical (1 semestre 1917) sur la question de la trypanose dans la région de Kikwit’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
922 ‘Mission du Kwango. Journal de Voyage du Père Ivan de Pierpont, S. J.’, 7.7.-10.8.1915, KADOC, Archief van de 
Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 1, p. 8.
923 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG); I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 
10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. 
Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, pp. 18-19. 
924 F. Allard to District Commissioner of Kwango, 13.2.1913, ‘Rapport sur l’état sanitaire des populations 
habitant la régions voisine de Yungu St Ernest’, MAEAA, GG, 19645 (GG). According to de Pierpont, the Jesuit 
mission at Kikwit was the Governor General’s ‘enfant de prédilection’. Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 
8.12.1916, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit).
925 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 8.12.1916, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); I. de Pierpont, 
‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie 
van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, pp. 18, 24.
926 Governor General to Y. de Pierpont, 28.3.1917, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); Y. de Pierpont to 
doctor, 24.11.1915, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit).
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example because of drugs going bad), de Pierpont was provided with French-
manufactured Atoxyl and Soamin during the war.927 
While the administration conveniently found in de Pierpont the ‘first promotor of the 
fight against sleeping sickness in Kwango’, the missionary himself to a significant extent 
tried to capitalise on this position and use state support for his own agenda, namely to 
expand his and the Jesuit mission’s (civilising) influence in Kikwit.928 For example, in a 
sign that he was not merely guided by the imperatives of epidemic disease control, de 
Pierpont did not want to confine the mission to treating sleeping sickness cases. Back in 
1907, he had learnt in Kisantu that Africans were often reluctant to have their glands 
punctured for diagnostic purposes, and that Atoxyl was not a magic-bullet cure and 
therefore not an ideal civilising tool.929 If the Jesuit was to break the hold of ‘féticheurs’ 
on indigenous communities by beating them on their own terrain, he would have to do 
more to gain trust as a medical provider. Therefore, when the Pierpont asked the 
government for trypanocides, he included requests for other drugs as well, so that the 
Kikwit missionaries could ‘cure the natives of their other miseries’ and become what 
fellow Jesuit Fernand Allard had called ‘praticiens d’occasion’.930 de Pierpont was 
especially eager to obtain (Neo)salvarsan, which produced spectacular, quick cures in 
syphilis and yaws sufferers of which there were significant numbers. Arguing that 
providing (Salvarsan) treatment for other illnesses boosted indigenous confidence in 
European remedies and thus encouraged Africans to undergo screening and treatment 
for sleeping sickness, de Pierpont succeeded in winning government support to run a 
dispensary at the Kikwit mission.931 
The apparent popularity of the dispensary - in 1917 de Pierpont quite incredibly 
reported more than 26 000 medical consultations in the course of a year - suggests that 
the observable therapeutic efficacy of (Neo)Salvarsan considerably warmed Kikwit’s 
inhabitants to European medicines, which the Jesuit linked to civilisation.932 A similar 
927 Dr Cammermeyer to Governor General, 26.2.1917, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); Y. de Pierpont to 
Governor General, 8.12.1916, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit).
928 Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 28.4.1921, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.333.
929 de Pierpont, ‘Lazaret de Kisantu’, 85-87, 91.
930 Y. de Pierpont to Doctor, 24.11.1915, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); F. Allard to District 
Commissioner of Kwango, 13.2.1913, ‘Rapport sur l’état sanitaire des populations habitant la régions voisine de 
Yungu St Ernest’, MAEAA, GG, 19645 (GG).
931 Y. de Pierpont to Doctor, 24.11.1915, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); Y. de Pierpont to Governor 
General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit durant le second semestre de 
1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG); I. de Pierpont to Governor General, 25.2.1917, ‘Rapport Médical (1 semestre 
1917) sur la question de la trypanose dans la région de Kikwit’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
932 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG); I. de Pierpont to Governor General, 25.2.1917, 
‘Rapport Médical (1 semestre 1917) sur la question de la trypanose dans la région de Kikwit’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4406.332.
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popularity has been observed in other colonies.933 However, the indigenous responses to 
the medical procedures involved in European sleeping sickness control were much more 
mixed. This indicated that Africans were ‘selective’ in their ‘recourse’ to biomedical 
drugs, but also pointed to a variety of African responses to sleeping sickness medicine 
that can be hard to ‘disentangl(e)’.934 On his tours in Kikwit territory, de Pierpont was 
certainly not able to examine and treat everyone. Cooperation appeared easier to 
achieve in communities already familiar with the Kikwit Jesuits and their medical 
activities.935 Yet not all villages or villagers he encountered were equally willing to 
undergo physical examinations and (regular) trypanocide treatment. Sometimes de 
Pierpont found that inhabitants had fled upon his arrival, or that they concealed their 
sleeping sickness victims from him.936 In addition, he sometimes struggled to administer 
a regular course of treatment, as identified trypanosomiasis victims failed to 
systematically present themselves for injections on agreed dates and only came ‘when it 
sprang to mind’.937 
Instances of avoidance and rejection most probably had multiple determinants, some 
of an explicitly medical nature and others not.938 For example, de Pierpont himself often 
linked non-compliance to a lack of authority among European-appointed African ‘chiefs’ 
supposed to ensure indigenous cooperation with colonial policies, or to active 
opposition to christian influences from traditional authority figures, including local 
healers.939 The unfamiliarity and unpleasantness of the medical practices involved 
naturally also contributed to evasions. Local populations might not have identified 
early-stage human trypanosomiasis, with its multiplicity of possible symptoms, as 
sleeping sickness or even as a single disease, and held very different ideas about disease 
933 See for example, L. White, ‘“They Could Make Their Victims Dull”: Genres and Genres, Fantasies and Cures in 
Colonial Southern Uganda’, American Historical Review 100 (1995), 1394-1395; M. H. Dawson, ‘The 1920s Anti-
Yaws Campaigns and Colonial Medical Policy in Kenya’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 20 (1987), 
417-435.
934 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 183, 195; L. Monnais and N. Tousignant, ‘The Colonial Life of Pharmaceuticals: 
Accessibility to Health Care, Consumption of Medicines and Medical Pluralism in French Vietnam, 1905-1945’, 
Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1 (2006), 145.
935 ‘Mission du Kwango. Journal de Voyage du Père Ivan de Pierpont, S. J.’, 7.7.-10.8.1915, KADOC, Archief van de 
Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 1, p. 2.
936 ‘Mission du Kwango. Journal de Voyage du Père Ivan de Pierpont, S. J.’, 7.7.-10.8.1915, KADOC, Archief van de 
Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 1, p. 6; I. de 
Pierpont to Governor General, 16.7.1917, ‘Rapport sur le travail fourni au Lazaret de la mission pendant le 
premier semestre 1917’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
937 I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de 
Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, p. 5.
938 Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 185.
939 ‘Mission du Kwango. Journal de Voyage du Père Ivan de Pierpont, S. J.’, 7.7.-10.8.1915, KADOC, Archief van de 
Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 1, p. 6; I. de 
Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse 
provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, pp. 4, 10, 12. According to de Pierpont, 
some Africans feared reprisals from ‘féticheurs’ if they came for medical exams or treatment.
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causation and appropriate therapies.940 According to some Jesuits, there was a stigma 
attached to sleeping sickness that Africans sought to avoid at all costs by resisting 
medical exams.941 Moreover, as Lyons has argued, there was a widespread fear among the 
Congo’s peoples of the invasive procedures used by Europeans, notably the painful 
extraction of bodily fluids via punctures for diagnostic purposes. This was often 
expressed in the form of ‘rumours’, as de Pierpont also noted, about needles spreading 
sleeping sickness and causing death.942 In addition, the fact that Atoxyl injections did not 
produce quick and clearly visible results, and often even proved toxic, must have left 
many local inhabitants unimpressed and fearful.943 And even those patients who did let 
themselves be injected, did not necessarily easily persist with treatment. A Jesuit 
missionary in Yungu St. Ernest observed, for example, that it was perhaps possible to 
persuade a trypanosome-infected individual to seek treatment at ‘moments of crisis’, 
but much more difficult to have him ‘continue a treatment that appear(ed) particularly 
disagreeable to him, and the salutary powers of which (didn’t) seem immediately 
tangible to him’.944 
It seems that on his tours de Pierpont focused prophylactic sleeping sickness 
treatment on ‘indigènes de bonne volonté’.945 Imposing unpopular biomedical 
procedures on reluctant villagers would do little to win them over and lure them away 
from indigenous healers’ influence. As far as mechanical prophylaxis was concerned, 
however, de Pierpont appeared to shy away much less from insisting on measures which 
he knew were unpopular among Kikwit’s populace. He reasoned that ‘the doctor cannot 
let himself be stopped by the idea that his patient will cry’.946 Improving sanitation, 
relocating and re-grouping indigenous communities amounted to social engineering in 
the name of hygiene, which was of course much more immediately compatible with his 
civilising aims. To potential objections that re-siting villages disrupted indigenous 
940 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 166-168, 180-190.
941 F. Allard to District Commissioner of Kwango, 13.2.1913, ‘Rapport sur l’état sanitaire des populations 
habitant la régions voisine de Yungu St Ernest’, MAEAA, GG, 19645 (GG); Vanderyst, ‘Renouvellement et le 
relèvement de la population de Kisantu’, 50.
942 I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de 
Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, pp. 6, 7, 8; Y. de Pierpont to 
doctor, 24.11.1915, MAEAA, GG, 16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 188-189. On the ‘genre’ 
of rumours as African ‘commentaries’ on the unequal power relations of biomedicine rather than 
manifestations of ignorance, see P. W. Geissler and R. Pool, ‘Popular concerns about medical research projects 
in Sub-Saharan Africa - a critical voice in debates about research ethics’, Tropical Medicine and International 
Health 11 (2006), 975-982.
943 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 197-198.
944 F. Allard to District Commissioner of Kwango, 13.2.1913, ‘Rapport sur l’état sanitaire des populations 
habitant la régions voisine de Yungu St Ernest’, MAEAA, GG, 19645 (GG).
945 I de Pierpont to Governor General, 16.7.1917, ‘Rapport sur le travail fourni au Lazaret de la mission pendant 
le premier semestre 1917’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
946 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG).
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lifestyles, de Pierpont replied: ‘if one wants to observe all indigenous customs, one 
should renounce civilising, because many (…) are the antipode of all civilisation’.947 
But de Pierpont did and could not directly use force to get local villagers to observe 
sleeping sickness prescriptions. Instead, the missionary sought to position himself as an 
‘intermediary’ between the colonial state and its African subjects to ensure compliance 
with public health regulations and at the same time secure the mission’s influence in 
the area.948 For example, when Kikwit’s administrator wanted to implement mechanical 
prophylaxis in the territory, de Pierpont, capitalising on indigenous fears of state 
violence, offered to help re-site and sanitise the villages that preferred not to have a 
state agent do it ‘manu militari’.949 The administrator, who was short on staff to enforce 
all brush clearing and relocating, naturally agreed that the Jesuit could oversee the 
sanitation work in the mission’s sphere of action.950 Another indication of de Pierpont’s 
mediating role is that he got to screen people for sleeping sickness because they wanted 
a medical passport in case the state asked them for it.951 
De Pierpont’s comfortable relationship with the state and its agents continued when 
Kwango’s district doctor arrived in Kikwit territory in March 1918. The administration 
had been much alarmed about the sleeping sickness situation in the district, a state of 
affairs to which the missionary’s reports to the government in no small measure 
contributed. The colony’s own annual medical report for 1917 counted the Kwilu basin 
and Kikwit among the regions ‘particularly affected by trypanosomiasis’.952 As de 
Pierpont himself conceded, his means were ‘modest’ and so was his action radius; he was 
therefore happy to see the district’s doctor operate in Kikwit territory.953 He had even 
sent ‘directives’ to guide Dr Seegers’ ‘mission’ to assess and fight sleeping sickness in the 
region.954 Both ended up working in the same area in a rather complementary and 
indeed cooperative manner. For example, Seegers and the territorial agent who 
accompanied him often left de Pierpont to screen and administer trypanocidal 
treatment in the villages they had ‘arrange(d)’, i.e. re-sited and brush cleared. Moreover, 
947 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG).
948 I. de Pierpont, ‘Second journal du Père Ivan de Pierpont S. J., Missionnaire au Congo Belge’, 12.1919, KADOC, 
Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 
10702, 3, p. 5.
949 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 15.11.1917, ‘Rapport médical sur le travail fourni à la Mission de Kikwit 
durant le second semestre de 1917’, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG).
950 I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de 
Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, pp. 18-19.
951 I. de Pierpont, ‘Mission du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus’, 10.12.1918, KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de 
Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 2, pp. 20-21; I. de Pierpont, 
‘Second journal du Père Ivan de Pierpont S. J., Missionnaire au Congo Belge’, 12.1919, KADOC, Archief van de 
Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10702, 3, p. 12.
952 ‘Rapport annuel 1917. Service de l’Hygiène’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.6.
953 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 28.4.1918, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4408.335.
954 District Commissioner to District Doctor, 11.3.1918, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
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de Pierpont benefited from the pair’s sometimes heavy-handed approach (they had 
been authorised to destroy the homes of those unwilling to relocate): he received 
indigenous requests to re-arrange and screen villages where he had previously never 
been admitted.955 
Seegers’ six-week stay in Kikwit, however, did little to dispel the fears about 
trypanosomiasis in Kwango. In fact, reporting high levels of mortality, the district 
doctor shared much of de Pierpont’s pessimism. The problem was compounded, he felt, 
by an indigenous population that was beyond ‘persuasion’ and hence did not willingly 
comply with sleeping sickness policy. He estimated that ‘energetic measures’ by the 
government were indicated to prepare the ground for medical work, which itself 
required regular visits by a doctor or ‘agent sanitaire’.956 Shortly after Seegers had made 
his recommendations known to the district commissioner, the veteran sleeping sickness 
doctor Jacques Schwetz was called to Kwango. In Bandundu he learned that the 
Governor General was appointing him to direct the campaign against human 
trypanosomiasis in Kwilu and Kikwit. The Russian-born doctor accepted, albeit 
reluctantly, as he was about to go on furlough and did not feel up to what he felt would 
be a long and arduous task.957
9.2 Proposals for an official special mission 
Being unfamiliar with the region, Schwetz’s first feat was an exploratory tour of the 
Moyen-Kwilu basin that took place between October 1918 and January 1919.958 The result 
of his inspection was a very critical assessment of the sleeping sickness situation and the 
(Jesuit-dominated) attempts at controlling the disease in Kwilu so far. The veteran state 
doctor considered sleeping sickness prophylaxis in Kwango a failure, for which he held 
its ‘sporadic’ nature and focus on measures that were not feasible locally (such as brush 
955 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 28.4.1918, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4408.335; Y. de Pierpont to Governor 
General, 28.4.1918, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); Dr Seegers to District Commissioner in Bandundu, 
15.5.1918, ‘Rapport médical sur la mission accomplie du 12 mars 1918 au 20 avril 1918 en région Sud de Kikwit 
pour la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil’, MAEAA, GG, 15150 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit); District Commissioner to 
District Doctor, 11.3.1918, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
956 Dr Seegers to District Commissioner in Bandundu, 15.5.1918, ‘Rapport médical sur la mission accomplie du 
12 mars 1918 au 20 avril 1918 en région Sud de Kikwit pour la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil’, MAEAA, GG, 
15150 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit).
957 J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); J. 
Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Moyen Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, 
MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG); J. Schwetz to District Commissioner, 6.9.1918, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
958 J. Schwetz to District Commissioner, 6.9.1918, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332; J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil 
dans le Moyen Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG). 
209
clearing) responsible.959 To a significant extent, Schwetz argued, the colonial 
administration was to blame: its scant presence in the Kwango district prevented serious 
trypanosomiasis control.960 Yet he reserved his most stinging criticisms for de Pierpont. 
The Jesuit’s medical incompetence, Schwetz believed, led to errors and misguided 
strategies, and precluded any systematic, methodical work. Being a missionary, he 
confined himself to treating infected individuals within the Catholic orbit, or wherever 
his ‘tournée(s) d’évangélisation’ happened to lead him. Moreover, as he gave 
instructions to the district doctor rather than the other way around, de Pierpont clearly 
had too much power in Schwetz’s view.961 In short, the latter decried that sleeping 
sickness control in Kwilu was in the hands of ‘amateurs or auxiliaries’ rather than 
medical experts.962 
What Schwetz proposed as an alternative was a ‘commission of doctors and Congolese 
nurses’ that would focus exclusively on instituting ‘systematic and regular ambulatory 
treatment’ in the Kwilu basin. He felt that sending a medical mission to 
comprehensively screen and treat a specified target area for sleeping sickness was the 
least unrealistic out of all prophylactic strategies.963 The mission was to be directed by an 
experienced medical professional and evaluated after two years. Crucially, it had to be 
an official body, so that it would have state authority and could ‘direct and coordinate’ 
assistance from private medical providers such as missionaries and company doctors.964 
Autonomy was another important requirement. The special mission would need the 
territorial service’s cooperation to execute its program of pharmaceutical disease 
control, but had to be able to operate independently from local authorities. Moreover, 
Schwetz sought independence from the Congo’s chief medical officer so as to avoid 
mission members being bombarded with ‘contradictory orders’ or summoned to 
perform other tasks.965 
959 J. Schwetz, Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale, p. 12; J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness 
situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le 
Moyen Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG).
960 J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
961 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 12; J. Schwetz, ‘La 
maladie du sommeil dans le Moyen Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, MAEAA, GG, 
15712 (GG); J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-
Kasai).
962 J. Schwetz to District Commissioner, 18.2.1919, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
963 J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Moyen Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, 
MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG); J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 
16795 (Congo-Kasai).
964 J. Schwetz, ‘La maladie du sommeil dans le Moyen Kwilu (District du Kwango, Congo belge), en 1918’, 11.1919, 
MAEAA, GG, 15712 (GG); J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 
16795 (Congo-Kasai).
965 J. Schwetz, Report on the sleeping sickness situation in Kwilu, 25.5.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); J. 
Schwetz to District Commissioner, 18.2.1919, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
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The colonial medical department in Brussels approved the proposals for an 
autonomous special mission in Kwilu, the annual cost of which was estimated at 200.000 
francs, on the grounds that it fit in well with the department’s own plans for 
trypanosomiasis control in the colony.966 However, while the start of the mission was 
delayed until staff and funds became available, sleeping sickness prophylaxis resumed 
its usual course in Kwilu. The completion of Schwetz’s prospecting tour in the region 
had marked an end to his third term in the Congo.967 This left room for de Pierpont to 
continue his prophylactic activities in Kikwit with the support of the local government. 
Accompanied by his ‘sanitary brigades’ and African medical auxiliaries, armed with 
Atoxyl/Soamin and tartar emetic, and with the help of a territorial agent, the Jesuit 
missionary carried on touring, brush clearing and injecting trypanosome carriers in 
1919. He had even been authorised, in the absence of a state doctor, to decide on the re-
siting of badly situated villages.968 His medical work was seen by the vice-Governor 
General as an example of what could be achieved by government-subsidised 
missionaries.969 
By the end of 1919, however, the situation in Kikwit was about to change as the 
Minister of Colonies Louis Franck appointed a medical mission to Kwilu under the 
directorship of Schwetz. The latter had not intended to take on this role - he wanted to 
go elsewhere and do ‘another sort of work’ for his fourth term - , but he was granted 
significant support and powers to implement the public health program of his design.970 
The newly appointed director was promised two colleagues familiar with the Kwango 
district, the doctors David and Seegers, as well as three ‘agents sanitaires’ and twenty-
three African nurses and auxiliaries. Funds would be put at the mission’s disposal by the 
local authorities as needed. Territorial service staff were expected to help mission 
members in their travels and dealings with the ‘natives’ and see to the execution of the 
preventive measures prescribed, while Schwetz retained the freedom to organise 
prophylaxis in Kwango as he saw fit.971 
966 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil au Kwilu. Rapport du Dr Schwetz’, 10.6.1919, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332.
967 J. Schwetz, Autobiographical note, 7.1950, ITG, FD7.
968 I. de Pierpont, ‘Second journal du Père Ivan de Pierpont S. J. Missionnaire au Congo Belge’, 12.1919, KADOC, 
Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 
10702, 3, pp. 2-3; Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 23.11.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
969 Vice-Governor General to Governor General, 11.1.1920, MAEAA, GG, 16844 (GG). 
970 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai). 
971 Minister of Colonies Louis Franck to Governor General, 9.12.1919, MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai). 
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9.3 Many obstacles to comprehensive screening and 
treatment 
In February 1920, Schwetz arrived in Kikwit territory from Leopoldville with three 
(prospective) male African nurses and a plan of action for comprehensive sleeping 
sickness screening and treatment in Kwilu. He had chosen the state post of Kikwit as the 
centre of the medical mission because of the sleeping sickness problem in the area, but 
also because it was the end point of the navigable part of the Kwilu river and the only 
post with appropriate buildings.972 The plan was to simultaneously start work in the 
Kikwit, Bulungu and Niadi/Kandale territories, with a doctor, an ‘agent sanitaire’ and a 
group of African nurses assigned to each. Doctors were to screen indigenous villages, 
draw up a list of sleeping sickness cases and initiate drug treatment. Nurses would then 
complete the course of treatment that consisted of ten injections in total (administered 
at a rate of one injection every ten days) and was conceived as at once curative and 
prophylactic. The sanitary agents had to visit the same villages and with the patient lists 
in hand check up on, and where necessary complement, the nurses’ work. Once the 
trypanosome carriers of a region had received a series of ten injections, doctors were to 
re-examine it to assess the prophylactic and curative effects of the first course of 
treatment (i.e. establish the proportion of new cases and the condition of those who had 
received treatment), and start injecting old and newly detected cases.973 
The diagnostic and therapeutic procedures adopted by Schwetz were adapted as 
much as possible to local realities and circumstances. Treatment was to be based on 
intramuscular or intravenous injections with Soamin or Atoxyl, in doses of 1g for adults 
and 0,5 for children. It did not include tartar emetic because its difficult posology made 
it dangerous in the hands of African nurses in Schwetz’s view. Schwetz also encouraged 
his staff to experiment with simplified treatment schemes, such as orally administered 
Atoxyl, if they found the time. People in the advanced, ‘sleeping’ stage of the disease 
were not treated for the time being, because it was felt that this was not ‘opportune’.974 
Chances of obtaining a cure in advanced cases were slim, and if they died despite 
receiving treatment this would not boost indigenous confidence in trypanocidal 
treatment. 
972 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
973 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 10-11; J. Schwetz, 
‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, en 1920 (février 1920-
février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu). 
974 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 10-11; J. Schwetz, 
‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, en 1920 (février 1920-
février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu). 
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Indigenous sensitivities and local circumstances also played a role in Schwetz’s choice 
of diagnostic methods. Case detection in the Schwetz mission was to based on a simple 
clinical rather than a more complex microscopic diagnosis, i.e. on palpation of the 
cervical lymph nodes rather than on searching trypanosomes in blood and lymph juice 
samples. Those with swollen nodes would receive treatment. In this way, the population 
to be screened would not have to be punctured, which Schwetz found more convenient, 
as he had noticed an indigenous aversion to needles - although he apparently saw less 
problems with therapeutic injections.975 Moreover, in the context of mass screening and 
treatment by mobile teams in Kwilu’s rural interior, Schwetz found the simple method 
of palpation more practical and ‘expeditious’. He admitted that it was less ‘scientific’ 
than the microscopic exam of blood an lymph juice, and that there was a risk that non-
infected individuals would be wrongly identified as sleeping sickness cases (and thus 
receive drug treatment). But given the practical rather than scientific character of the 
mission, the requirements of comprehensive screening and treatment, and the urgency 
of sleeping sickness control in Kwilu, he thought it less dangerous to treat a few non-
infected people than to overlook infected people.976 
While waiting for additional medical staff, trypanocides (Atoxyl) and syringes to 
arrive in Kikwit, Schwetz decided to focus on preparatory work for the mission. 
Together with doctor David, he started touring the area to examine the population, but 
the work did not go as smoothly as hoped.977 Schwetz was surprised that de Pierpont’s 
sleeping sickness work had received so much praise from the administration: after 
examining the villages where the missionary had been active, Schwetz concluded that 
the sleeping sickness problem in Kikwit was worse than the latter had suggested in his 
latest reports. De Pierpont had not worked systematically but confounded 
‘evangelisation’ with ‘la politique indigène’ and medicine, according to Schwetz.978 
Moreover, the many empty villages encountered on their tour signalled that the local 
population had a habit of fleeing despite advance warnings that the doctors simple came 
to see them and not to ask for ‘prestations’, as they had probably come to expect from 
state agents. It prevented Schwetz and David from proceeding with medical screening, 
975 J. Schwetz, ‘A propos du diagnostic le plus expéditif de la maladie du sommeil dans la pratique ambulatoire 
de la brousse’, 11.1919, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
976 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 5-6. The exigencies of 
collective medicine in rural areas made a simple reliance on gland palpation acceptable in Schwetz’s view, as 
he argued ‘la besogne de la brousse est rarement scientifique’. See J. Schwetz, ‘A propos du diagnostic le plus 
expéditif de la maladie du sommeil dans la pratique ambulatoire de la brousse’, 11.1919, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4403.301.
977 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
978 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
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and suggested to the medical mission’s director that much of Kikwit territory still 
awaited ‘occupation’ by the territorial service.979 
With the arrival of a dozen certified and prospective nurses, and two sanitary agents 
to assist Schwetz, David and Seegers, the mission finally took off. Soon enough, however, 
more and new difficulties emerged. The ‘rudimentary occupation’ of Kwilu continued to 
hamper screening and treatment, in that it was difficult to get the ‘natives’ to present 
themselves. In addition, Schwetz was not impressed with the quantity and quality of 
African nurses that had been sent to him. A lack of medical schools made it difficult to 
train and recruit sufficient numbers of African medical auxiliaries, especially for AMI 
work in rural areas. Moreover, many of the mission’s nurses were unsuitable, according 
to Schwetz, for example because they were used to the comforts of larger urban centres 
and thus hated the itinerant life of the mission, or because they disdained and were 
harsh to the local population.980 Some of the European staff disappointed him as well, 
because the work turned out to be rather incompatible with married life. Dr Seegers, for 
example, prematurely quit the mission for that reason.981 Schwetz also concluded that 
not much help was to be expected from the private sector either: de Pierpont did not 
want to work under the medical mission’s direction, he claimed, so in order to avoid 
conflicts a deal was made stipulating that the treatment of a number of villages near 
Kikwit would be ‘reserved’ for the missionary. The HCB had a lazaret in Leverville where 
some fifty to a hundred sleeping sickness victims were in treatment, but this was 
insignificant in light of the thousands of cases in the area. And there was no ambulatory 
doctor to tour interior villages and riverine posts.982 
A major setback for the mission identified by Schwetz were the problems with the 
supply of quality trypanocidal drugs. The mission had been supplied with 80kg of Atoxyl 
manufactured by the Meurice company, but injections with the drug appeared to give 
rise to some serious side-effects and even a few deaths. This left the mission in disarray, 
Schwetz claimed, and caused African people to flee. Schwetz blamed the toxicity 
incidents on the poor quality of the drugs he had been given, and criticised the 
979 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
980 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 
1920-1923, pp. 109-110.
981 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
982 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale 
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(Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu). 
214
government for accepting a product from a non-reputable brand. Despite urgent request 
however, replacement Atoxyl did not arrive soon.983 
The obstacles and difficulties encountered during the mission’s first months led 
Schwetz to modify certain aspects of his plan of action. First of all, he decided to in the 
first instance restrict the medical mission’s activities to Kikwit territory. Once the first 
injection series was completed, the mission could then gradually expand into 
neighbouring territories, like an ‘oil stain’.984 Focusing on comprehensive screening and 
treatment in a compact area was more viable and better than trying to target a few 
isolated ‘islands’ at once. The territory was divided into different spheres of action that 
were assigned to the three remaining European staff, doctor David and two ‘agents 
sanitaires’, while Schwetz himself often remained in the state post of Kikwit to manage 
the medical mission’s administration.985 While waiting for new supplies of Atoxyl - which 
did not arrive until January 1921 -, the use of the incriminated batch of Meurice-
manufactured drugs was resumed, but the solution and posology were altered so as to 
render the drugs less dangerous (although this in turn prolonged the course of 
treatment).986 To administer injections, the mission relied more on its European staff 
members as well as on locally recruited and trained African injectors than on certified 
nurses from Boma or Leopoldville.987 According to Schwetz, Africans quickly mastered 
injection techniques. He felt that local injectors were better suited to ‘brousse’ practice, 
which required independent work in indigenous villages, than nurses, who were used to 
working in hospitals and laboratories under permanent European supervision. Local 
injectors would inspire more trust in Kikwit’s population, Schwetz believed: they 
showed less contempt for the local communities from whence they originated 
themselves, and being ‘less civilised’, they would be less exacting and less likely to ‘act 
as conquerors in the villages’ than the nurses from Boma or Leopoldville. Suitable pupils 
could be recruited among local youngsters with basic literacy skills. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Schwetz found candidates among the people in the missionaries’ sphere of 
influence, especially orphans and ‘liberated slaves’.988 
983 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
984 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 
1920-1923, p. 49.
985 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 
1920-1923, p. 11; J. Schwetz, ‘Compte-rendu succinct des travaux de la mission médicale du Kwango Kasai en 
1920-1923’, Revista Médica dé Angola 4 (1923), 152.
986 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
987 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 11.
988 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 
1920-1923, pp. 109-110.
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Another important modification was that given the lack of ‘occupation’ and proper 
administrative organisation of Kikwit territory, the medical mission became a ‘mixed’, 
‘medical-administrative’ mission. Its members’ became involved in preliminary 
administrative work without which they could not proceed with medical screening and 
treatment, such as grouping dispersed hamlets together, drawing up maps, and 
conducting population censuses. For this work, and for ensuring compliance with 
mandatory sleeping sickness treatment, the mission members closely collaborated with 
Kikwit’s territorial administrator Marcel François and his assistant Mr. Téchy, who at the 
mission’s request went to give a ‘coup de main’ where necessary. As Schwetz observed, 
‘his tour more closely resembled that of a small conqueror-warrior than that of a 
doctor’.989 
Despite modifications to Schwetz’s plan of action in an attempt to better cope with 
the realities of medicinal prophylaxis in Moyen-Kwilu, progress during the mission’s 
first year was not as smooth as Schwetz had anticipated. Finishing the first series of ten 
injections in Kikwit territory alone took much longer than the expected six months, and 
this in turn delayed the mission’s expansion into the neighbouring territories of 
Bulungu and Kandale until the spring of 1921.990 It also completely thwarted plans to 
spill pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control over to the Kasai district as well, 
something that was deemed important in light of the district’s close economic links with 
the commercial hub of Kikwit.991 
The explanations offered by mission staff for these delays sounded rather familiar. 
Schwetz and his team had to work in difficult terrain, characterised by a very 
rudimentary road network and a general lack of ‘occupation’ and administrative 
‘organisation’. Kikwit territory, for example, was considered particularly ‘backward’ in 
this respect: there were few ‘chefferies’, no true villages, and mostly extremely scattered 
‘hamlets’ the size of small ‘family units’. Large parts were only exposed to the colonial 
state during its annual, swift tax collection tours.992 The situation in Bulungu was 
somewhat better, but the Lutshima river area in Kandale once again presented 
significant challenges in the form of a hostile, ‘insoumis’ population.993 
On top of the obstacles associated with the terrain came what Schwetz labelled an 
ever more pressing ‘atoxyl-syringe crisis’. Reserves were low, and by the end of 1920 
mission members reported having almost completely run out of trypanocides and 
989 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 1-2; J. Schwetz, 
‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, en 1920 (février 1920-
février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
990 J. Schwetz, ‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, 1920-1921’, 
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 1 (1921), 341; Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale 
antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 49, 61.
991 Schwetz, ‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale’, 365; J. Schwetz, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Médecin en 
Chef (réponse à la note du 15 avril 1921)’, 17.4.1921, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.333.
992 Schwetz, ‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale’, 342, 358. 
993 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 50, 61. 
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syringes. With a new shipment of Atoxyl, Soamin and injection equipment only arriving 
in January 1921, the Schwetz mission had almost been forced to interrupt its activities 
for want of medical supplies.994 
Problems regarding the quantity and quality of medical staff continued to be another 
major issue. First of all, the mission suffered a shortage of European medical personnel. 
With the departure of doctor Seegers, only four European team members remained in 
July 1920, and it was only by the end of 1921 that the projected numbers of three doctors 
and three sanitary agents were complete.995 Newly arriving staff, moreover, could not 
immediately be deployed, but - for the sake of uniformity - had to familiarise themselves 
first with the mission’s particular diagnostic and therapeutic procedures.996 In addition, 
doctors and sanitary agents claimed having to spend much time making up for the 
inadequacy of African injectors. Despite earlier expectations, and although locally 
recruited auxiliaries were apparently skilled at administering trypanocides, Schwetz 
and David argued that, just like the certified nurses, they lacked integrity and required 
constant supervision.997 Schwetz reportedly even handed over some individuals to the 
judicial authorities because of their ‘méfaits’, ‘exactions’ and ‘agissements’ in indigenous 
communities.998 According to David, African nurses and injectors could not really be 
trusted with the local indigenous population. He noted, for example, how they accepted 
gifts from sleeping sickness victims who wanted to ‘avoid the needle’, thus jeopardising 
the regular course of treatment.999 Tellingly, in a ‘vademecum’ that outlined the 
expected standards of behaviour for African medical auxiliaries, David included the 
stipulations that the latter had to be caring towards their patients and trustworthy, and 
could not ask them for payment or sell medicines.1000 Schwetz explained African 
misbehaviour as the result of a propensity to ‘abuse’ the authority they had been 
given.1001 It seems that injectors at least sometimes used the drugs and syringes that 
came with the job for their own purposes, including as an instrument of power.
In these circumstances, and despite his ambitions of a comprehensive approach, 
Schwetz had to admit that it was ‘totally utopian’ to expect to screen the whole 
indigenous population in the targeted areas and administer a complete and regular 
course of treatment to all individuals found infected. Medicinal prophylaxis by mobile 
994 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, en 1920 
(février 1920-février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
995 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la Mission médicale du Kwilu’, 7.1920, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); Schwetz, ‘Compte-rendu succinct des travaux de la mission médicale’, 151.
996 Dr Hector De Wolf, ‘Rapport sur le traitement des malades de sommeil à l’Ouest du Bas-Kwengo’, 2.1921, 
MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
997 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 111-112; Schwetz, 
‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale’, 342, 360. 
998 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 111. 
999 Schwetz, ‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale’, 360-361. 
1000 J. David, Vade-mecum à l’usage des infirmiers et des assistants médicaux indigènes (Bruxelles, 1922), pp. 7-9.
1001 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 110.
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medical teams, although reaching significantly greater numbers of people than before, 
clearly had its limits, and the ‘consumers’ of trypanocides also played a role in that. 
Indigenous non-compliance, however, was not confined to the hardly occupied areas, 
where African ‘nonchalance’ and the absence of authoritative ‘chefs’ accounted for 
people’s absence from medical exams and injections sessions (cf. the empty villages) in 
the European mission members’ view.1002 This sort of ‘collective’ non-compliance, David 
argued, simply required ‘European tenacity’ to make clear that there was no point in 
trying to escape the unavoidable.1003 Non-compliance (termed ‘la mauvaise volonté 
indigène’) also occurred in areas that were considered more ‘civilis(ed)’ and where 
people had been ‘submitted’, they reported, albeit on a more ‘individual’ scale, in a 
greater variety of forms and in less transparent ways.1004 
Some people tried to escape the administrative aspects of the mission, i.e. the 
population census, because this listing of African subjects was used for tax collection 
purposes. According to David, others wanted to hide their slaves from state agents who 
might wish to liberate them.1005 Kwango’s inhabitants also actively avoided the mission’s 
medical activities. Schwetz stated that many ‘natives’ did not understand the 
‘humanitarian goal’ of his mission.1006 This might be because, as David claimed, they did 
not recognise the early stage of sleeping sickness, so often refused to believe they were 
ill during this phase.1007 Perhaps avoiding medical exams was a way of avoiding what was 
perceived as being wrongfully labelled a diseased person, and the consequences such a 
label carried. Mission members also reported Africans fearing or rejecting injections 
with trypanocidal drugs. This was attributed to indigenous ‘superstition’ or the 
painfulness of the procedure, but also to the occurrence of serious side-effects and 
occasionally even death, in other words, drug toxicity.1008 Others were more accepting of 
trypanocides, but in a rather selective way. For example, mission staff reported how 
some sleeping sickness victims decided that three injections were enough and 
‘categorically refuse(d)’ further injections.1009 It seems that they had other expectations 
of biomedical drugs and different ideas about what constituted a cure. In his guidelines 
for African medical auxiliaries, David insisted that they warn trypanosome carriers that 
treatment would take a long time and require repeated medical exams, even if they 
1002 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 13-14.
1003 Schwetz, ‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale’, 361. 
1004 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 13-14; Schwetz, 
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1005 Schwetz, ‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale’, 361. 
1006 J. Schwetz, ‘Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango, en 1920 
(février 1920-février 1921)’, 10.3.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
1007 David, Vade-mecum à l’usage des infirmiers, p. 181.
1008 Schwetz, ‘Extrait du rapport de la mission médicale’, 361; Dr Hector De Wolf, ‘Rapport sur le traitement des 
malades de sommeil à l’Ouest du Bas-Kwengo’, 2.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
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thought they were cured.1010 Acceptance could also depend on the drug provider. The 
sanitary agent Bauman, for example, observed that locals in the Lutshima basin refused 
treatment from the African ‘infirmier’ he had left behind, meaning that he had to return 
there to oversee the injection sessions. David noted a similar refusal of treatment by 
African auxiliaries.1011 This sort of response was possibly linked to the type of behaviour 
- the use of trypanocides to make demands on local communities - ascribed to nurses 
and injectors by European mission members. 
Besides active avoidance strategies, local inhabitants were sometimes involuntarily 
non-compliant.1012 For example, attributing absences during injections sessions to 
conflicts between different indigenous communities, the existence of slavery or the 
kidnapping of women, Baumann seemed to suggest that local social relations and power 
structures sometimes contravened medicinal prophylaxis without necessarily involving 
a deliberate act of indigenous resistance to the medical mission.1013 However, it was the 
private sector, whose interests were not always compatible with the requirements of 
mass screening and treatment, that was seen as an especially disruptive factor.1014 
Schwetz complained that ‘everyone approve(d) the fight against sleeping sickness, but 
on the condition that it (did) not, not even temporarily, harm his particular interests’.1015 
In his view, the presence of commercial enterprises like the HCB and Catholic (i.e. Jesuit) 
missionaries in particular constituted an obstacle to mass treatment in Moyen-Kwilu. 
Under their influence, Schwetz argued, ‘capitas-acheteurs’, charged with buying oil 
palm fruits, and catechists in indigenous villages ignored orders from state agents and 
overruled the ‘chefs’ appointed by the colonial administration. They made inhabitants 
miss sleeping sickness sessions by recruiting them for porterage and the oil palm trade, 
or sending them to a Catholic mission post respectively.1016 Doctor De Wolf confirmed 
that he had difficulties treating trypanosome carriers working for the HCB west of the 
lower Kwenge river because they were constantly on the move.1017 In sum, the Schwetz 
1010 David, Vade-mecum à l’usage des infirmiers, p. 183.
1011 Agent sanitaire Baumann, ‘Rapport sur la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil dans la région de la Lutshima 
(territoire de Kikwit)’, 1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu). 
1012 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 13. 
1013 Agent sanitaire Baumann, ‘Rapport sur la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil dans la région de la Lutshima 
(territoire de Kikwit)’, 1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu). 
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mission members felt that companies and missionaries were not only of little assistance 
in, but also obstructed, the mass treatment campaign. 
9.4 Contested powers
Despite Schwetz’s criticisms, the HCB itself seemed rather favourably disposed towards 
the special governmental mission, and in particular appreciated its ‘administrative’ 
work and considerable powers. The company’s local director, for example, personally 
thanked Schwetz for his ‘excellent work’ in HCB’s important Lusanga concession in the 
Kwango territorial district. He particularly appreciated the medical mission’s efforts to 
get a dispersed indigenous population under control, as it facilitated labour 
recruitment: ‘the native, grouped and subjected, has started work’.1018 Since 1918, the 
HCB had begun organising a medical service for its European and African staff, 
comprising a principal doctor in Kinshasa and medical staff in its concession territories 
in the Congo basin.1019 Although the service suffered from serious shortages of medical 
personnel, it employed an itinerant doctor between May 1920 and May 1921 to take up 
medicinal prophylaxis in Lusanga. In agreement with Schwetz, HCB’s medical officer 
Neville Williams visited villages on the right bank of the river Kwilu. Both agreed, 
however, that the results of this work were not great. Williams had found it difficult to 
deal with indigenous people who lived in scattered settlements and opposed treatment. 
Moreover, he was unsure about what ‘power’ or ‘legal authority’ he had to enforce 
sleeping sickness screening and treatment, a task that was difficult enough for the 
Schwetz mission, which could even count on ‘soldiers and considerable power’.1020 Not 
surprisingly perhaps, the HCB, which for economic reasons was unwilling to increase 
medical staff in Kwilu anyway, seemed rather happy to leave sleeping sickness control in 
its Kwango concession as much as possible to the Schwetz mission.1021 
Initially, during Schwetz’s exploratory tour, de Pierpont had also seemed to accept 
the state doctor’s criticisms. The missionary agreed that his reports had painted too 
rosy a picture of the situation in Kikwit, and admitted that his lack of medical and 
entomological knowledge had caused him to make mistakes in his prophylactic 
activities. Just like Neville Williams, de Pierpont invoked his own lack of coercive powers 
1018 Director General of S.A. des Huileries du Congo Belge (Lusanga area) to J. Schwetz, 3.1.1921, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4406.333.
1019 H. Seidelin, ‘Une année de fonctionnement d’un service médical au Congo’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 6 (1926), 57-58.
1020 Dr Neville Williams, ‘Summary report of sleeping sickness work. May 1920-May 1921’, 3.6.1921, MAEAA, GG, 
16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
1021 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 50.
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to account for some of the shortcomings of his sleeping sickness work. He argued that 
‘as a private person, (he) lack(ed) the right to force the natives to group together and 
depend(ed) on their goodwill’.1022 
However, as the Schwetz mission in 1920 decided to focus on Kikwit territory and 
increasingly encroached on the Jesuit’s sphere of influence, the relationship quickly 
turned sour. de Pierpont was under the impression that Schwetz wanted to restrict the 
scope of his medical actions as much as possible.1023 Moreover, during the medical 
mission’s first year a series of incidents occurred that saw Congolese people within the 
Catholic orbit being charged with, arrested and detained for failing to comply with 
sleeping sickness legislation and its requirements of compulsory screening and 
trypanocide treatment.1024 It resulted in de Pierpont filing complaints against Schwetz 
and territorial administrator François for violence against and arbitrary arrests of 
catechists and school children.1025 What he considered as the continual ‘pestering’ by 
Schwetz and the local administration also led de Pierpont to stop his efforts at medicinal 
prophylaxis in indigenous villages and confine himself to sleeping sickness cases coming 
to the Kikwit Catholic mission for treatment.1026 Soon enough de Pierpont’s Jesuit 
superiors, seemingly spurred on by Schwetz’s reputation as a jewish ‘friend of Lenin’, a 
‘protégé of Mr. Vandervelde’ (the Belgian socialist minister) and an ‘enraged anti-
Catholic’, looked to raise the issue of his ‘abuse of power’ with the colonial 
authorities.1027 
1022 Y. de Pierpont to Governor General, 30.11.1918, ‘Rapport médical pour la région de Kikwit-2e semestre 1918’, 
MAEAA, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai).
1023 I. de Pierpont, Report on sleeping sickness and J. Schwetz, 23.3.1921, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge 
Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 
04-08.
1024 The ordinance of 8 July 1920 stipulated that Africans were obliged to present themselves for medical exams 
when summoned by medical or territorial staff, and undergo treatment if found infected. Moreover, they could 
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(Boma, 1920), pp. 694-697.
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Faced with these accusations, Schwetz retorted that the problem lay with the Kikwit 
missionaries, who obstructed his medical mission with their ‘independent attitude’.1028 
From the very beginning the state doctor had anticipated, or so he informed the 
Governor General, that de Pierpont would never ‘resign himself to the simple role of 
collaborator’, given his attempts to ‘command everything and everyone’.1029 The only 
reason why, according to Schwetz, the Jesuit had instigated enquiries into the actions of 
medical staff and local administrators was that they refused to be his ‘instruments’ and 
dance to his tune. Maybe it was time, he suggested, to ‘definitively sanitise (…) Kikwit of 
the unhealthy mentality Father de Pierpont ha(d) introduced’.1030 By September 1921, 
however, Schwetz had grown tired of the struggles and accusations in Kikwit, and 
offered to resign as director of the Kwango medical mission.1031 
Colonial authorities responded to the conflict in a manner that was broadly 
supportive of Schwetz and his medical mission. Public prosecutors, for example, 
eventually dropped the cases against the director and his collaborators. They felt that 
the whole affair revolved around a ‘vulgar personal grudge’ in which they wished to 
play no part. Pursuing de Pierpont’s complaints was not in the public interest, and 
would only fuel animosity between the main protagonists, it was argued.1032 Leading 
doctors in the colony found Schwetz’s criticisms of de Pierpont - along with his other 
attacks on the practice and policy of sleeping sickness control in the Congo - not very 
courteous, and did not entirely agree with his choice of diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures.1033 Nevertheless, chief medical officer Rodhain insisted that the Schwetz 
mission was accomplishing important work in particularly tough circumstances.1034 
The Governor General for his part ascribed the difficulties between Schwetz and de 
Pierpont to a clash of personalities, and the latter’s waning influence in the face of a 
well-resourced, official medical body. He agreed with Rodhain’s endorsement and 
proposed to extend the Schwetz mission eastwards to curb the progression of sleeping 
sickness into the Kasai district.1035 When the conflict in Kikwit persisted and Schwetz 
threatened to resign, however, Governor Lippens, in line with his ‘anti-missionaries 
1028 ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde I’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b.
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1.9.1920, GG, 16795 (Congo-Kasai); J. Rodhain to J. Schwetz, 21.4.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-
Congo, Kwilu). 
1034 J. Rodhain to J. Schwetz, 21.4.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu).
1035 Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 26.4.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16803 (Congo-Kasai, Kwango, Kwilu). 
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policy’, hardened his stance towards the Jesuits.1036 While ‘Préfet Apostolique’ De Vos 
was urged to make his missionaries comply with the requirements of mass treatment, a 
government doctor was sent to inspect the situation in Kikwit. The anticlerical Lippens, 
however, did not wait for the latter’s report to proclaim his local government’s support 
for Schwetz. Moreover, when doctor Polledro judged that Schwetz’s prophylactic 
measures in Kikwit, which the missionaries perceived as a nuisance, were justified, the 
Governor put de Pierpont in the wrong.1037 He felt that the powers granted to Schwetz 
should not be obstructed and that all Europeans, including missionaries, had to respect 
the authority of the State. Finally, he proposed to simply forget about the incidents in 
Kikwit.1038 
De Pierpont’s rebuke by Lippens outraged the colony’s Jesuit community. They felt he 
had done his best to assist, rather than hamper, the medical mission, for example by 
treating sleeping sickness victims in the villages entrusted to his care, or by sending 
literate youngsters to retrain as indigenous medical auxiliaries.1039 The only thing the 
Kikwit missionary was guilty of was questioning instructions that he rightly regarded as 
‘arbitrary’. It was Schwetz who was in the wrong, they argued, adding that Polledro had 
merely wanted to ‘sav(e) his colleague’s professional honour’. Moreover, unlike what the 
colonial authorities in their view seemed to suggest, the conflict between Schwetz and 
de Pierpont was not ‘une simple palabre congolaise’ about some minor incidents; it was 
about a state agent’s abuse of power, which in the Congo apparently could go 
unpunished.1040 With Schwetz enjoying such high-level support, de Pierpont refused to 
take any further part in the sleeping sickness campaign, and together with his Jesuit 
superiors he felt that the only option left was to go public about the events in Kikwit 
and expose the sort of ‘abuses’ that were taking place in the Congolese ‘brousse’.1041 
1036 G. Vanthemsche, Congo. De impact van de kolonie op België (Tielt, 2007), p. 65.
1037 Vice-Governor General Bureau to Préfet Apostolique (16.9.1921) in ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde IV’, 
MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde I’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; ‘Résumé. Dossier 
Missions. Farde II’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde III’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; 
Summary of the Schwetz affair, 3.1.1922, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg 
de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 20-21.
1038 ‘Note sur les incidents de Kikwit (Mission Schwetz/Missionnaires)’ (14.12.1921) in ‘Résumé. Dossier 
Missions. Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; ‘Rapport de Pierpont. Note du Gouverneur Général’ in ‘Résumé. 
Dossier Missions. Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde I’, MAEAA, Missions, 
628.4b; Summary of the Schwetz affair, 3.1.1922, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du 
Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 20-21.
1039 ‘Note concernant les difficultés survenues entre M. Le Docteur Schwetz et les Missionnaires à Kikwit’ in 
‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b.
1040 ‘Note concernant les difficultés survenues entre M. Le Docteur Schwetz et les Missionnaires à Kikwit’ in 
‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; Father Le Grand to Minister of Colonies, 
5.2.1922, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII 
Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 23-31.
1041 ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde I’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; de Pierpont to Governor General (28.10.1921) 
in ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; Préfet Apostolique Devos to Governor 
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9.5 The Schwetz mission continued
Schwetz, on the other hand, seemed convinced by the colonial administration’s support, 
as he stayed on as director of the Kwango medical mission. With a strengthening of staff 
numbers in 1922 (taking the total to five doctors, five ‘agents sanitaires’ and between 
forty and fifty Congolese nurses-injectors), the team started re-examining its Kwilu 
territories and at the government’s request also gradually widened its territorial 
scope.1042 By mid-1923, it was covering eight administrative territories: Kikwit, Bulungu, 
Kandale, Niadi, Idiofa (or Kamtsha-Lubue), Bas-Kwilu, Bapende and Lukula. These were 
not all worked at once, but rather screened and re-visited in succession. As the mission’s 
sphere of action expanded in several directions from its Kikwit centre, including 
eastwards to the Kasai district, it became known as the Kwango-Kasai medical mission. 
Except for Kandale, however, the south(west) of the Kwango district was not included 
because Schwetz had established that sleeping sickness was not so much of a problem 
there.1043 
Embarking on this new phase in the mission’s existence, Schwetz introduced a few 
modifications to its modus operandi. Population censuses, for example, were conducted 
in a more comprehensive manner so that it would be easier during re-examinations to 
distinguish between newly infected cases and trypanosome carriers that were simply 
overlooked the first time. Although this surveying was, in the words of doctor De Wolf, 
‘tiring and demoralising work’, it led to an increase in the number of people screened 
for sleeping sickness.1044 In response to comments made by chief medical officer 
Rodhain, Africans in the advanced stage of the disease were now also given a 
prophylactic treatment (although without any expectation of a cure), and a cheaper, 
quicker and allegedly more effective drug regimen was adopted.1045 It entailed 
intravenous injections of Atoxyl and tartar emetic, the pace and order of which could be 
freely determined by the mission members to suit local conditions, as long as infected 
individuals received five injections of each drug within a month and a half.1046 
General (22.11.1921) in ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; ‘Note concernant les 
difficultés survenues entre M. Le Docteur Schwetz et les Missionnaires à Kikwit’ in ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. 
Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; Father Le Grand to Minister of Colonies, 5.2.1922, KADOC, Archives de la 
Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, 
Enveloppe B, 23-31.
1042 Schwetz, ‘Compte-rendu succinct des travaux de la mission médicale’, 151; Schwetz, Travaux de la mission 
médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 2; Minister of Colonies, ‘Note au Roi’, 7.7.1921, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4406.333.
1043 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 2, 80, 113, 130. 
1044 Ibid., p. 35; J. Schwetz, ‘Note sur les tableaux’, 5.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II). 
1045 J. Rodhain to J. Schwetz, 21.4.1921, MAEAA, GG, 16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo, Kwilu); Schwetz, Travaux 
de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 31, 37, 59.
1046 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 31, 37.
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What did not change, however, was the reliance on palpation of the cervical lymph 
nodes as a diagnostic tool, not only for the first medical screening of a territory but also 
its subsequent re-examinations. When previously treated cases no longer showed 
swollen lymph nodes, they were considered ‘bien portant’ rather than actually ‘cured’ - 
as there was no microscopic exam to definitively establish the absence of trypanosomes 
-, and continued to receive trypanocide injections.1047 Therefore, together with the 
medical mission’s expansion, the more thorough screening and the inclusion of victims 
in the advanced stage of the disease, the continued use of palpation contributed to an 
increase in Africans receiving trypanocidal drug treatment in Kwango. 
The results of medicinal prophylaxis seemed promising, especially from a 
prophylactic point of view, which was ultimately deemed the most important in the 
fight against a ‘social scourge’.1048 By june 1923, for example, Kikwit territory had been 
reviewed three times and was thus taken as a crucial ‘touchstone’ of the effectiveness of 
mass sleeping sickness treatment as devised by Schwetz. The latter was satisfied to 
report a marked reduction in the proportion of new sleeping sickness cases there since 
1920. Naturally, the curative results were much more difficult to gauge, because no 
elaborate microscopic exams were conducted. All that could be said, Schwetz argued, 
was that some previously identified trypanosome carriers were in a clinically good 
condition.1049 Doctor David was a bit more optimistic in this respect: he estimated that 
‘cures’ were more common in early cases than suspected.1050 
However encouraging, Schwetz at the same time admitted that the results of his 
disease control program so far could not possibly be ‘perfect’. Not every member of the 
targeted population was being examined or given a complete course of treatment, and 
once again progress was sometimes slower or less durable than he found desirable. In 
short, while the medical mission broadened and deepened its scope, it also continued to 
encounter, he felt, significant obstacles limiting its reach.1051 
Some difficulties were related to the choice of trypanocidal drugs. The new 
therapeutic regimen of Atoxyl and tartar emetic required intravenous injections, and 
since most African medical auxiliaries were not yet familiar with this procedure, it 
(initially) slowed down treatment.1052 Moreover, the problem of drug toxicity recurred in 
1923, resulting in ‘strong reactions’ and even a number of new fatalities, which were 
1047 Ibid., pp. 32-34.
1048 Ibid., p. 63.
1049 Ibid., pp. 40-43.
1050 J. David, ‘Rapport sur le 2e réexamen du territoire de Kikwit. Région Babunda-Kwilu rive droite - S.’, 
14.6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.304 (II).
1051 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 32, 45, 59, 79.
1052 Ibid., p. 31.
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again mainly attributed to Meurice-manufactured atoxyl.1053 This time, however, such 
incidents seemed to cause less consternation in territories like Kikwit, where mission 
members had been active for a while. For example, after an instance of Atoxyl-related 
mortality there sanitary agent Demaret expressed relief that the accident had happened 
at a time when the locals, he claimed, had got to know and trust him, so that it did not 
cause too much damage to his reputation.1054 
Demaret’s colleagues confirmed that Kikwit’s inhabitants showed an ever-greater 
confidence in and understanding of the medical mission’s benefits, to the extent that 
they generally no longer sought to avoid medical exams and injections, and Europeans 
expected sleeping sickness prophylaxis to become part of the local ‘mores’.1055 It seems 
that African experiences of therapeutic efficacy played a part in this: clinical 
improvements, a decrease in mortality, but above all women proving fecund after a 
course of treatment - indicating that locals had their own notion of pharmaceutical 
efficacy - reportedly generated indigenous excitement.1056 This is not to say that there 
were no indigenous attempts to escape (repeated) trypanocide treatment in the 
territories being revisited in 1922 and 1923: for example, there were accounts of 
avoidance strategies that entailed old cases being falsely reported as dead, and of 
patients refusing to undergo further series of injections because they were feeling 
well.1057 
A more serious obstacle in Schwetz’s view, however, was that progress made in the 
administrative organisation of Kwilu since 1920 often proved difficult to maintain 
because of a dearth of territorial staff. Each time mission members revisited Kikwit, for 
example, villages they had ‘created’ had disintegrated and time had to be spent ‘re-
occupying’ certain regions.1058 On top of that came the continued interference of private 
interests with the practice of mass treatment in Kikwit and Bulungu. For example, 
1053 Agent sanitaire Demaret, ‘Rapport sur le troisième examen des deux rives du Kwengo (Sud-Ouest du 
territoire de Kikwit). Décembre 1922 - Mai 1923’, 10.6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II); A. Broden to 9e 
Direction, 20.9.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.10; Governor General to Secrétaire Général, 25.1.1924, ITG, Onderzoek, 
5.2.10.
1054 Agent sanitaire Demaret, ‘Rapport sur le troisième examen des deux rives du Kwengo (Sud-Ouest du 
territoire de Kikwit). Décembre 1922 - Mai 1923’, 10.6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II).
1055 J. David, ‘Rapport sur le 2e réexamen du territoire de Kikwit. Région Babunda-Kwilu rive droite - S.’, 
14.6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.304 (II); Agent sanitaire Depoorter, ‘Rapport sur le deuxième réexamen de la 
rive droite du Kwilu (Région dite Babunda Sud) Territoire de Kikwit, en avril-mai 1923’, 13.6.1923, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4407.334 (II); J. Schwetz, ‘Note sur les tableaux’, 5.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II). 
1056 J. David, ‘Rapport sur le 2e réexamen du territoire de Kikwit. Région Babunda-Kwilu rive droite - S.’, 
14.6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.304 (II); Agent sanitaire Depoorter, ‘Rapport sur le deuxième réexamen de la 
rive droite du Kwilu (Région dite Babunda Sud) Territoire de Kikwit, en avril-mai 1923’, 13.6.1923, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4407.334 (II).
1057 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 30; Agent sanitaire 
Baumann, ‘Rapport sur le réexamen de la population du territoire de Kandale’, 31.1.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4407.334 (I).
1058 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 29, 44-45.
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medical staff experienced difficulties to find previously treated trypanosome carriers 
who had been recruited by the HCB or as porters, or had gone to a Catholic mission 
post.1059 According to Schwetz, some private employers cared only for their ‘immediate 
material interests’ and showed hostility towards the medical mission. In such a large-
scale operation it was simply impossible, he concluded, not to hurt someone’s 
interests.1060 
Similar stories about the need to balance mass screening and treatment with 
economic activities emerged from the mission’s new territories. In Bapende territory, 
for example, the indigenous population depended economically on providing porterage 
services, which David did not want to hamper for the sake of sleeping sickness control. 
At the same time he did suspend HCB’s recruitment of workers in the region for its oil 
palm plantations in Kwilu.1061 Besides the influence of the private sector, the lack of state 
‘occupation’ was once again identified as a major obstacle to mass treatment in the 
territories visited by the mission for the first time.1062 This absence of state authority 
was held responsible for indigenous hostility and non-compliance with the 
requirements of pharmaceutical disease control. In little-known parts of Niadi, Bapende 
and Lukula, for example, medical mission members met with (armed) resistance from 
populations who reportedly opposed the presence of ‘Bula Matari’, seen as an invader 
bringing harm and making ‘painful’ and ‘vexatious’ demands.1063 The response, in Lukula 
in particular, was a concerted effort by medical staff and territorial agents to 
‘simultaneously exercise a strong pressure on the natives’ and coerce them into 
‘submission’.1064 Schwetz commented that they were thus involved in a ‘travail 
incombant au service territorial’.1065 Nevertheless, ‘indigenous tenacity’ forced the 
1059 Ibid., p. 30; J. Schwetz, ‘Note sur les tableaux’, 5.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II).
1060 J. Schwetz, ‘Troisième rapport annuel sur les travaux de la Mission Médical du Kwango-Kasai. Premier 
Semestre: Juillet-Décembre 1922: Le réexamen du territoire de Bulungu’, 5.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (I). 
1061 J. David, ‘Note sur le territoire des Bapende, régions examinées par le Dr David, de la Mission médicale du 
Kwango-Kasai’, 1.6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II).
1062 J. Schwetz, Troisième rapport annuel sur les travaux de la Mission Médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Deuxième 
semestre: Janvier-Juin 1923. Première partie: Le territoire des Bapende (Kilembe) (District du Kasai), 1923.6, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407, 334 (II); Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 
1920-1923, p. 76.
1063 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 66, 88-89, 97-99.
1064 J. Schwetz, ‘Troisième rapport annuel sur les travaux de la Mission Médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Deuxième 
semestre: Janvier-Juin 1923. Deuxième partie: le Territoire de la Lukula (District du Kwango)’, 6.1923, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4407.334 (II); Agent sanitaire Darrouzain, ‘Rapport sur le travail dans l’entre Kafi-Luula, Territoire de 
la Lukula. District du Kwango de Février à mai 1923’, 6.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II); Schwetz, Travaux de 
la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 66, 71.
1065 J. Schwetz, ‘Troisième rapport annuel sur les travaux de la Mission Médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Deuxième 
semestre: Janvier-Juin 1923. Deuxième partie: le Territoire de la Lukula (District du Kwango)’, 6.1923, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4407.334 (II).
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medical mission to suspend its activities in or withdraw from certain areas, such as the 
northeast of Bapende and the south of Lukula.1066 
9.6 Political conflicts resumed
By the spring of 1923, the Kwango-Kasai medical mission came at a crossroads. Schwetz 
was nearing the end of his term in the colony and would leave for Europe soon, thus 
prompting questions about the future of the mission. Although it had been conceived as 
a temporary undertaking and had already cost close to 1,5 million francs in its first three 
years, Schwetz wanted it to continue after his departure.1067 To his dismay, the local 
government - where Martin Rutten had replaced Maurice Lippens - had suggested 
entrusting the screening and treatment of Bulungu, Kikwit and Niadi to the HCB and 
Jesuit missionaries.1068 The colonial medical service joined Schwetz in disagreeing, 
however, and called for state medical staff to proceed with pharmaceutical sleeping 
sickness control in Kwango. Emile Lejeune, who headed the medical service of Congo-
Kasai Province, argued that the HCB would do nothing in the way of trypanosomiasis 
control, while the missionaries’ sphere of action was and had to be fairly restricted if 
prophylactic work was to be done properly and an inadmissible ‘emprise d’autorité’ was 
to be avoided.1069 Rodhain was not in favour of giving an active role to private company 
doctors in itinerant sleeping sickness control either: in his view, they lacked ‘real 
authority’ over the local population, and it would be impossible for the state service to 
exert ‘effective control’ over their work.1070 The medical department in Brussels echoed 
the sentiments of its doctors in the Congo, and decided that the fight against sleeping 
sickness in Kwilu should continue under direct government control and with state 
medical staff, at least for another few years.1071 Consequently, when Schwetz left the 
mission in June 1923, his loyal collaborator David took over as director and carried on 
with mass sleeping sickness treatment in Kwango and part of Kasai.1072 
1066 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 88-89; 97-99.
1067 Schwetz, ‘Compte-rendu succinct des travaux de la mission médicale’, 152; ‘Maladie du Sommeil au Congo - 
Missions médicales’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.333; Dr E. Lejeune, ‘Maladie du sommeil dans le Kwango et le 
Kasai’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (I).
1068 J. Schwetz, ‘Troisième rapport annuel sur les travaux de la Mission Médical du Kwango-Kasai. Premier 
Semestre: Juillet-Décembre 1922: Le réexamen du territoire de Bulungu’, 5.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (I). 
1069 Dr E. Lejeune, ‘Maladie du sommeil dans le Kwango et le Kasai’, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (I).
1070 ‘Maladie du Sommeil au Congo - Missions médicales’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.333.
1071 E. Van Campenhout, ‘Note pour Monsieur le Ministre’, 6.4.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.333.
1072 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet Décembre 1923’, 
15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III). 
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However, after Schwetz’s departure the Jesuits stepped up their campaign against 
him and his mass treatment scheme. After de Pierpont’s rebuke by Governor General 
Lippens in 1921, the relationship between the Kikwit missionaries and the Schwetz 
mission had not improved, and (unsuccessful) complaints about the pestering and 
mistreatment of christians in the name of sleeping sickness control persisted.1073 
Moreover, the medical mission had expanded geographically at a time when the Jesuits 
themselves, apparently spurred on by Protestant competitors, sought to spread their 
influence more widely in Kwango.1074 According to Schwetz, the medical mission’s arrival 
amounted, in the missionaries’ view, to a form of state occupation that hampered the 
recruitment of ‘free labour’ for Catholic mission posts.1075 In turn, the Jesuit expansion in 
Kwango proved controversial with Schwetz’s supporter Lippens, who accused 
missionaries in Ipamu, for example, of illegally occupying land and undermining the 
administration’s policies on the governance of indigenous people.1076 When Schwetz’s 
forceful intervention in Lukula led to a formal complaint by the Jesuit superior of 
Gingungi about mass arrests, the case was once again dropped.1077 Therefore, when the 
state doctor’s term in Kwango expired, it seems that the Jesuits were anxious for him 
never to return so as to avoid finding themselves again at the mercy of what they 
perceived as an anticlerical doctor with excessive powers.1078 
1073 Note ‘Vexations dénoncées par les Jésuites’, s.d., MAEAA, Missions, 628.4a; ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde 
I’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b; Excerpts of a letter by Louis Gillet, 13.3.1922, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge 
Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 32; 
Préfêt Apostolique Stanislas De Vos to Père Provincial, 24.4.1922, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge 
Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 
33-34; Father Willaert to Governor General, 25.5.1922, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du 
Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 38; de Pierpont, ‘3e 
Journal de voyage du Père Ivan de Pierpont, S. J. Missionaire à Kikwit (par Bandundu), Congo Belge’, 4.1923, 
KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie 
Kongo, 10702, 5, p. 3; de Pierpont to Père Provincial, 25.10.1922, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge 
Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 40.
1074 Y. Struyf, ‘Ma première visite aux Badinga’, Missions belges de la Compagnie de Jésus: Congo, Bengale, Ceylan 
(1922), 132-134; J. Beckers, ‘Que Dieu protège la tribu des Bapende’, Missions belges de la Compagnie de Jésus: 
Congo, Bengale, Ceylan (1922), 136; J. Beckers, ‘Retour du P. de Pierpont’, Missions belges de la Compagnie de Jésus: 
Congo, Bengale, Ceylan (1922), 50-51.
1075 Schwetz to vice-Governor General , 8.6.1922, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4a.
1076 ‘Résumé. Dossier Missions. Farde IV’, MAEAA, Missions, 628.4b.
1077 Father Legrand to unnamed Father, 15.2.1924, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du 
Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 49-50.
1078 The Governor General informed Father Le Grand that Schwetz and Téchy would not return to Kikwit when 
their term expired. Note ‘Vexations dénoncées par les Jésuites’, s.d., MAEAA, Missions, 628.4a. Kwango’s 
Vicaire Apostolique De Vos stated in 1924 that ‘les missionnaires ne demandent pas mieux que d’être aidés, 
encouragés, enseignés par des médecins belges qui partagent leurs croyances religieuses, qui pratiquent leur 
religion’. Quoted in Société Médicale Belge de Saint-Luc, ‘Une Oeuvre de Salut. L’Aide médicale aux Missions du 
Congo’, s.d., KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 
4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10511, 4, p. 19.
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Given that attempts to have Schwetz condemned by authorities in the colony were 
unsuccessful, Jesuit efforts now especially focused on discrediting the state doctor and 
his prophylactic mission in the Belgian metropole. Hyacinth Vanderyst, for example, 
who had been involved in sleeping sickness control in Ipamu, capitalised on scientific 
criticisms of Schwetz’s methods to question the powers and ethics of mass sleeping 
sickness treatment, especially as implemented by ‘foreign’ (meaning non-Catholic) 
doctors.1079 Several (French) medical experts were critical of Schwetz’s error-prone 
palpation-based system of case detection, or his use of the unwieldy tartar emetic in 
combination with Atoxyl. Such criticisms came to the fore in scientific publications, for 
example, but also during the international medical conference in Luanda in July 1923, 
where Vanderyst was one of the speakers at a session on sleeping sickness control.1080 
There the missionary undoubtedly witnessed a discussion about itinerant medicinal 
prophylaxis methods that saw French specialists like Jamot and Blanchard oppose an 
exclusively palpation-based, non-microscopic diagnosis.1081 Eventually the sleeping 
sickness experts in Luanda, who also included Rodhain, Lejeune and Schwetz, came to 
agree that palpation alone was not the most scientific approach, but could in 
exceptional circumstances be accepted to some extent for the sake of protecting public 
health.1082 Vanderyst, however, took the Schwetz mission’s particular diagnostic 
procedures as proof of its questionable ethics. 
In a lecture in November 1923 for the ‘Société médicale belge de Saint-Luc’, an 
organisation established in Brussels in 1922 with the aim of promoting christian values 
in medical practice, the Jesuit reiterated the experts’ view that lymph node palpation 
was an ‘incomplete’ method of screening in itinerant practice, which needed to be 
complemented by microscopic exams of blood or lymph juice.1083 This was not a mere 
scientific point for Vanderyst, however, but one that carried important ethical 
implications. The use of palpation in a medical mission easily led to diagnostic mistakes, 
he argued, which were aggravated by the massive scale of screening in such a mission. In 
the Jesuit’s view, the use of palpation in medical missions also pointed to a distinct 
medical ethics for Africans and Europeans, and violated the former’s rights because it 
endorsed ‘empirical’ rather than scientifically sanctioned practice in the name of 
protecting public health. He felt that public health practice should be science-based, and 
1079 H. Vanderyst, ‘Les grandes missions prophylactiques contre la trypanosomiase en Afrique centrale. Leurs 
rapports avec la morale médicale’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III).
1080 Blanchard et Laigret, ‘Sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil’, 485-490, 491-492; Walravens, ‘Compte-
rendu du Congrès de médecine tropicale’, 196.
1081 Walravens, ‘Compte-rendu du Congrès de médecine tropicale’, 196; ‘Acta da sexta sessao do 1.° congresso de 
medicina tropical da Africa ocidental’, Revista Médica dé Angola 4 (1923), 42. 
1082 Walravens, ‘Compte-rendu du Congrès de médecine tropicale’, 196; ‘Acta da sexta sessao do 1.° congresso de 
medicina tropical’, 45; Blanchard et Laigret, ‘Sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil’, 485-490; Schwetz, 
Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, p. 9.
1083 H. Vanderyst, ‘Les grandes missions prophylactiques contre la trypanosomiase en Afrique centrale. Leurs 
rapports avec la morale médicale’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III). 
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all the more so since Africans had no choice but to undergo mandatory sleeping sickness 
screening and treatment and the medical missions had extensive, even ‘excessive’, 
coercive powers’. The use of palpation, which was bound to lead to errors, also posed 
ethical questions because labelling people as trypanosome carriers had serious 
implications, Vanderyst argued. It entailed a loss of freedom (e.g. it restricted mobility 
and required attendance at exam and injection sessions), could lead to dismissal by 
European employers, and to rejection or worse by victims’ own families and 
communities because of the social stigma attached to sleeping sickness, which in turn 
could affect mental health. Moreover, it exposed people to dangerous medical 
treatments. In Vanderyst’s view, the state had no right to force people merely suspected 
of sleeping sickness to undergo treatment, especially not with dangerous medicines 
such as intravenous emetic injections administered by unsupervised African 
injectors.1084 
After hearing this lecture, the Saint-Luc medical society appointed a commission to 
study the matter. It proved very receptive to Vanderyst’s criticisms, and ended up 
confirming his condemnation of the Kwango mission’s methods as ‘antiscientific’ and 
immoral. In February 1924, the commission transmitted Vanderyst’s objections to the 
Minister of Colonies in the hope that the government would take action. The Catholic 
medical society called for a revision of the diagnostic and therapeutic methods applied 
by sleeping sickness missions in the Congo. Moreover, it repeated Vanderyst’s insistence 
that only Belgian nationals should be entrusted with such important undertakings.1085 
The colonial medical department in Brussels quickly dismissed the Catholics’ 
criticisms. While Schwetz had his critics within the colonial medical service, it seems 
that it wanted to protect him and by extension itself against external attacks. The 
department retorted that microscopic diagnosis was difficult to apply in the ‘brousse’, so 
Schwetz had adopted palpation as the most expeditious method given the circumstances 
in Kwango and given that the aim of the medical mission was to sterilise the blood of all 
trypanosome carriers as quickly and thoroughly as possible. Moreover, chief medical 
officer Rodhain approved and even endorsed it in regions with conditions similar to 
Kwango’s. He had also recommended the mixed Atoxyl and tartar emetic treatment, as 
African auxiliaries were skilful injectors, even more so than the missionaries who 
administered dangerous drugs themselves. Finally, Schwetz had acted within the law of 
1920, it was argued, and Vanderyst exaggerated the stigma suffered by people identified 
as sleeping sickness victims. The department did agree that it was preferable to have 
1084 H. Vanderyst, ‘Les grandes missions prophylactiques contre la trypanosomiase en Afrique centrale. Leurs 
rapports avec la morale médicale’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III). 
1085 Dr R. Warlomont, ‘Les méthodes pratiquées par certaines missions prophylactiques contre la 
trypanosomiase, en Afrique centrale’, 1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4406.332; H. Vanderyst, ‘Les grandes missions 
prophylactiques contre la trypanosomiase en Afrique centrale. Leurs rapports avec la morale médicale’, s.d., 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III).
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prophylactic sleeping sickness missions directed by Belgian doctors, but claimed that 
simply none had been available for the one in Kwango.1086 
Another strategy adopted by the Jesuits was to seek help from Catholic political 
circles in Belgium to get Schwetz punished for what had happened in Lukula. Faced with 
indigenous non-compliance, the medical mission had ordered ‘mass arrests’, and the 
forceful ‘déplacement’ of prisoners had apparently resulted in a number of deaths along 
the route. The superior of Gingungi had signalled this to the authorities and a judicial 
enquiry was opened. When prosecutors in the Congo eventually dropped the case, 
Father Legrand, with the support of Catholic senator Leyniers, appealed in February 
1924 to the Colonial Minister to re-open the enquiry. They were not very successful: 
Minister Franck, a Liberal party politician, wanted to avoid a scandal - an ‘affaire’ - and 
seemed reluctant to grant their request unless new elements came to light. Legrand and 
Leyniers suspected that the Minister had no intention whatsoever to punish those 
involved in the incident, and accused him of ‘parti-pris’.1087 
A few months later, an article appeared in the Catholic newspaper ‘La Libre Belgique’ 
denouncing the Schwetz mission for its denial of ‘principes d’humanité’. Although they 
denied having anything to do with the publication itself, it is clear that the Jesuits were 
intent on exposing what they saw as Schwetz’s use of ‘illegal and arbitrary means of 
constraint, applied in barbaric fashion’ and were manoeuvring Belgian Catholic circles 
to get it done.1088 The article prompted questions about the Schwetz mission (and about 
what was true about the allegations in the ‘Libre Belgique’ article) in parliament on June 
6th and 10th 1924. Louis Franck, who was by then no longer Minister of Colonies, insisted 
that authorities in the colony had established that, while deaths had occurred in Lukula, 
the medical mission was not guilty of any crime, and had merely exercised its right to 
coerce people into treatment for the sake of public health, which was all the more 
justified given the hostility of Lukula’s indigenous people. Franck claimed that the affair 
was nothing more than the echo of a longstanding conflict between (Jesuit) missionaries 
and the Kwango medical mission, which he did not want to transport to Belgium.1089 The 
new Minister of Colonies Carton de Wiart, who by virtue of his membership of the 
1086 Ministère des Colonies (7e Direction, 2e Section), ‘Note concernant la communication du R. Père Vanderyst 
à la Société Médicale de St-Luc. Objet; Prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil en Afrique Centrale’, 28.2.1924, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III).
1087 Letter from Father Legrand, 15.2.1924, KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg 
de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 49-50.
1088 Letter to Minister of Colonies concerning an article in the ‘Libre Belgique’ on the ‘Schwetz affair’, 11.6.1924, 
KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission 
Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 54.
1089 ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du vendredi 6 juin 1924’, pp. 1431-1432, 
Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary sessions, https://
sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1924/k00342144/k00342144_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014); 
‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du mardi 10 juin 1924’, pp. 1438-1439, 
Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary sessions, https://
sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1924/k00342162/k00342162_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
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Catholic party was more sympathetic to anti-Schwetz sentiments, acknowledged the 
criticisms on the methods of the Schwetz mission. While he found the palpation 
controversy a purely medical discussion, he agreed that the allegations about coercion 
needed looking into, so as to establish whether the methods used had indeed not been 
excessively coercive. He claimed that even when working in difficult circumstances, 
certain limits could not be transgressed, and that Belgium had the right to check what 
was going on in the Congo. Therefore, he had asked the Governor General for the 
relevant documents and in the mean time asked to stop the polemic.1090 
On furlough in Europe, Schwetz expected - in the aftermath of the discussion in 
parliament - that his colonial career was over when the Minister suggested to him 
delaying his return to the Congo. The state doctor even asked Broden to look out for a 
position in a private ‘Société’.1091 Meanwhile, the authorities in the Congo sent the file on 
the Lukula incidents to the Minister of Colonies with the message that while the ‘mass 
arrests’ and the lack of prudence in their execution were regrettable, the medical 
mission and the territorial administrator had acted within the law. Moreover, there were 
mitigating circumstances in that there had been much indigenous hostility and 
territorial agents and medical mission members had been attacked. Also, the excellent 
results achieved attenuated the mistakes made by state agents. This echoed the 
assessment of the colonial medical service: while accidents were regrettable, it were the 
results that counted.1092 Subsequently, the Minister apparently told the anti-Schwetz 
campaigners that the enquiry would not amount to much. However, faced with 
persistent Catholic opposition to Schwetz’s return to the Congo, he sought a 
compromise. He did not want to risk an anticlerical attack on the Congo’s Catholic 
mission societies by prohibiting the state doctor from returning, but proposed to send 
him to a region without missionaries, more specifically to the Stanleyville medical 
laboratory - which came down, he claimed, to a ‘rétrogradation’.1093 In 1927, Schwetz 
indeed became laboratory director in Stanleyville, after first being sent to Katanga and 
South Africa for two years to study tsetse fly control.1094 His career as an itinerant 
sleeping sickness doctor had clearly ended in 1923, but the same could not be said of 
1090 ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du mardi 10 juin 1924’, pp. 1448, Plenum.be, 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary sessions, https://sites.google.com/site/
bplenum/proceedings/1924/k00342162/k00342162_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
1091 J. Schwetz to E. Van Campenhout, 18.6.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); J. Schwetz to Secrétaire 
Général, 29.12.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4403.301.
1092 Secrétaire Général Postiaux to Minister of Colonies, 20.6.1924, MAEAA, GG, 16461 (GG).
1093 Handwritten notes about Father Legrand’s meeting with Minister, 12.11.1924, KADOC, Archives de la 
Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, 
Enveloppe B, 56; Handwritten notes about a meeting with the Minister of Colonies, 20.11.1924, KADOC, 
Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission Congo, XII 
M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 62; Excerpt from La Libre Belgique: ‘Après les cruautés du Kwango’, 5.12.1924, 
KADOC, Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus, XII Mission 
Congo, XII M-60, Boîte 1, Enveloppe B, 63.
1094 J. Schwetz, Autobiographical note, 7.1950, ITG, FD7.
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Kwango’s special medical mission (as will be discussed in chapter 10), and mass 
trypanocide therapy in the Belgian Congo more generally. 
9.7 In summary
Taking a closer look at the origins and implementation of mass Atoxyl treatment in 
Kwango in the early 1920s sheds additional light on the local factors that helped shape 
the trypanocide’s career cycle in the Belgian Congo. It points to the circumstances 
leading Schwetz to advocate comprehensive sleeping sickness screening and treatment 
by mobile teams headed by state doctors, a strategy that was subsequently endorsed, 
promoted and supported by central medical and political authorities, resulting in 
Atoxyl’s wider dissemination throughout the colony. It also shows how Schwetz initiated 
a phase of growing criticism of Belgian-manufactured Atoxyl, by reporting cases of 
(deadly) intoxication that did little to improve negative African perceptions and 
experiences of sleeping sickness medicine. Crucially, by attributing toxicity incidents 
with ‘Atoxyl Meurice’ to poor product quality, he pointed authorities to pharmaceutical 
regulation as a way of dealing with the risks of arsenic therapy, rather than to a 
questioning of his drastic methods. Finally, this chapter uncovers how the Schwetz 
team’s actions fuelled conflicts with local Jesuit missionaries that spilled over into 
(metropolitan) political debates about the powers and ethics of prophylactic sleeping 
sickness missions. Events in Kwango thus contributed to a climate of significant 
European opposition to pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control, which colonial 
medical authorities would eventually largely seek to overcome by imposing more 
stringent quality criteria on manufacturers and via efforts to control lower-ranking 
staff ’s clinical use of the trypanocide. Political tensions about mass treatment in the 
early 1920s took on a particular shape in the Belgian Congo, in the sense that they 
entailed an important public vs. private, Catholic vs. anticlerical dimension and less of a 
rift between colonial medical service and sleeping sickness missions. But to deflect 
external attacks, the medicinal prophylaxis campaign’s proponents used 
(self-)regulatory strategies that were not dissimilar to those of their French 
counterparts.1095 This ultimately helped to sustain the mass-scale use of Atoxyl in the 
Congo, albeit of the German rather than the Belgian and French brands.
1095 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 630, 638.
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Chapter  10
Tryponarsyl and social medicine in Kwango
Following on chapter 9, this section charts the further evolution of pharmaceutical 
sleeping sickness control in the Kwango district after Schwetz’s departure in 1923. It 
examines the implementation of mass treatment, especially with Tryponarsyl, to 
illustrate some of the local developments that played a role in the evolution of the 
trypanocide’s career cycle in the Belgian Congo. It highlights, for example, how local 
circumstances led itinerant sleeping sickness staff to adopt diagnostic procedures 
amounting to high levels of trypanocide consumption, and standardised treatments that 
central medical authorities eventually held responsible for the emergence of drug-
resistant trypanosomes. It also notably points out how the elusiveness of 
pharmaceutical sleeping sickness eradication in Kwango contributed to tensions 
between state and private health providers about the ‘value’ and ‘expediency’ of mass 
Tryponarsyl-based treatment.1096 These frictions played a role in the 1930s 
reorganisation of indigenous health provision that aimed to unite public and private 
sector in the practice of regular and comprehensive surveying, screening and treatment. 
Yet such locally originating debates about the effectiveness and appropriateness of a 
specialised pharmaceutical campaign were also linked to medical authorities’ insistence 
on a rational and economical use of trypanocides, and their adoption of a more holistic 
perspective on sleeping sickness control and public health in the 1930s, which 
ultimately contributed to a generally contracting use of Tryponarsyl. 
After Schwetz, mass treatment in Kwango expanded as the official sleeping sickness 
mission continued its operations and private sector health providers also became 
increasingly involved in the campaign. This soon translated into an increased use of 
Tryponarsyl, as the medical mission’s field trials confirmed the compound’s 
effectiveness and especially its positive effects on indigenous compliance with 
trypanocide therapy, thus boosting local demand for the drug. Tryponarsyl 
consumption also reached high levels because of the official mission’s simplified 
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Despite increased hierarchical oversight, chronic 
staff shortages hampered a swift adoption of the full range of microscopic methods 
decreed and required to identify trypanosomiasis victims, establish the stage of the 
disease and monitor treatment outcomes, resulting in patients receiving needlessly 
long, or even unnecessary, standardised regimens. 
By the late 1920s, medical mission doctors started expressing some doubts about the 
effectiveness of mass treatment, remarking how, after years of extensive efforts and 
1096 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 629, 635.
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despite high numbers of Africans receiving trypanocide therapy, the complete 
eradication of sleeping sickness in Kwango proved continually elusive. They did not so 
much question the validity of the pharmaceutical approach, however, but largely 
attributed disappointing progress to a lack of administrative support and especially to 
private sector health providers’ failure to adhere to the principles of comprehensive and 
systematic screening and treatment. Missionaries and company medical staff for their 
part questioned the primacy of a specialised, coercive and itinerant campaign, finding 
the provision of general health care in clinics and dispensaries more compatible with 
their interests or views. 
The Congo’s medical authorities on the one hand responded to Kwango’s official 
sleeping sickness staff with instructions to rationalise the clinical use of trypanocides, 
and reduce consumption and associated costs. On the other hand, the local tensions 
between public and private sector inspired organisational reforms in the early 1930s 
that sought to better integrate the official medical mission and the district’s private AMI 
network in the fight against sleeping sickness. However, the attempts to more closely 
align public and private sector efforts in endemic disease control under state 
coordination eventually led a (former) private company doctor to seriously question the 
value of mass Tryponarsyl treatment. In the wake of professional frustrations during a 
stint as an itinerant sleeping sickness doctor, he started campaigning in the metropole 
against the Belgian Congo’s ‘illiberal’ medical regime, in which he saw the cause of an 
undue medical reductionism and collectivism contributing to demographic decline. It 
instigated a discussion in the Belgian parliament about the colony’s medical record and 
organisation, which coincided with fears about a resurgence of sleeping sickness in 
Kwango and calls for a FOREAMI ‘occupation’ of the district. The latter, while strongly 
advocating an expansion of social medicine with a vital mobile component, confirmed 
the need to embed mass trypanocide therapy in the district in a much broader public 
health strategy that also addressed (certain) socio-economic determinants of disease, 
notably malnutrition. Its efforts to fully implement a more horizontal program before 
the Second World War nevertheless remained largely unsuccessful due to practical 
constraints. In Kwango, therefore, the colonial medical service’s plans to adopt a more 
locally diversified approach to sleeping sickness control in the 1930s largely translated 
into a continuation of mass treatment. 
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10.1 Mass treatment after Schwetz: new procedures and 
increased private sector participation 
After Schwetz’s departure in June 1923, the program of mass sleeping sickness 
treatment in Kwango was continued by Jacques David.1097 By 1925, the latter found 
himself directing what was considered the most important of the colony’s five sleeping 
sickness missions.1098 His Kwango-Kasai mission, however, was no longer an autonomous 
body. In the wake of the establishment of the colonial medical service in 1922 and the 
questions surrounding Schwetz’s medical procedures, it was fully incorporated in the 
colonial medical hierarchy after June 1923. This meant that staff members now fell 
under the direct authority and supervision of Congo-Kasai’s provincial doctor, who 
himself received orders from the colony’s chief medical officer.1099 Unlike Schwetz, 
therefore, David had to balance guidelines and instructions from higher-ranked medical 
officials more carefully with local realities and a desire to ‘realis(e) his personal views’ as 
to the most appropriate methods of mass treatment.1100 
For example, there were increasing pressures on David and his successors to abandon 
Schwetz’s screening methods and proceed with microscopic examinations of bodily 
fluids to identify sleeping sickness victims and evaluate treatment outcomes. At the end 
of 1923, chief medical officer Rodhain issued a circular aimed at colonial doctors 
outlining best practices regarding sleeping sickness diagnosis and treatment. Because it 
was an unscientific and error-prone method, he only endorsed relying exclusively on 
lymph node palpation for case detection in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, 
Rodhain advocated performing lumbar punctures on individuals undergoing treatment, 
so that an analysis of the extracted cerebrospinal fluid could establish whether a cure 
had been produced.1101 His successor Trolli explicitly instructed Kwango-Kasai mission 
1097 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet Décembre 1923’, 
15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); ‘Rapport annuel 1923. Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical’, 
s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 112.1.
1098 J. Rodhain, ‘Rapport général sur le fonctionnement du service de l’Hygiène durant l’exercice 1924’, 2.9.1925, 
MAEAA, RA-CB, 81.12.
1099 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet-Décembre 1923’, 
15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); ‘Rapport annuel 1923. Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical’, 
s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 112.1.
1100 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet-Décembre 1923’, 
15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III).
1101 J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Considérations pratiques sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 
20.11.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7, pp. 5-6.
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staff to abandon the single palpation method - a mere temporary solution to overcome 
difficult working conditions - as soon as possible.1102 
David was not impervious to such directives. Even as a member of the Schwetz 
mission he had always been more nuanced about the diagnostic value of palpation than 
his director. He conceded, for example, that people with atypical swollen lymph nodes 
could not be ‘categorically’ declared ill without a microscopic exam of the lymph 
juice.1103 Nevertheless, he insisted that while the ‘true microscopic method’ was 
preferable, its implementation in the Kwango-Kasai medical mission could not be 
‘decreed’ and depended on local circumstances of ‘place, time and means’. Using the 
microscope was a more time-consuming procedure that hampered the execution of 
comprehensive screening and treatment in Kwango.1104 It also risked overstretching a 
medical staff that was already in very short supply because few European doctors, David 
warned, aspired to an itinerant career and the mission’s African auxiliaries were being 
lured away by private sector employers in the region offering higher salaries.1105 
Moreover, microscopic procedures specifically required a sufficient amount of trained 
African microscopists and microscopes, both of which the medical mission lacked.1106 
Therefore, after Schwetz’s departure, the use of the microscope in the Kwango-Kasai 
mission increased only gradually and in as far as the staff and equipment available 
allowed it. By 1927, microscopic diagnosis was integrally adopted for the detection of 
new trypanosome carriers, a task that was becoming less enormous as territories within 
the mission’s sphere of action saw successive medical visits.1107 It meant that new cases 
of swollen lymph nodes were punctured so that the presence of trypanosomes in the 
lymph juice could be microscopically confirmed. This did not yet constitute a ‘travail 
scientifique complet’, however. Previously treated sleeping sickness victims were not 
punctured, and other components of the full microscopic method, i.e. blood and 
cerebrospinal fluid exams, were even less of an option.1108 In 1928, David’s successor 
1102 Médecin en Chef adjoint, ‘Congo Belge. Rapport du service médical 1926’, 24.8.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 82.2; G. 
Trolli, ‘Note au sujet de l’intervention du Gouvernement de la Colonie dans la lutte antitrypanosomique dans 
le Kasai’, s.d., MAEAA, GG, 15144 (GG, Congo-Kasai). 
1103 Schwetz, Travaux de la mission médicale antitrypanosomique du Kwango-Kasaï 1920-1923, pp. 21-22; J. David, 
‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet-Décembre 1923’, 15.2.1924, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III).
1104 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Premier Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.335.
1105 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet-Décembre 1923’, 
15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième 
Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.4.
1106 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Premier Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.335.
1107 Médecin Provincial, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical. Rapport Annuel 1927’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
87.5.
1108 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.335.
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Sulsenti repeated that systematic lumbar punctures were not possible in the medical 
practice of the ‘brousse’.1109 
A corollary of the incomplete microscopic methods adopted by the Kwango-Kasai 
mission was that trypanocide treatment remained somewhat indiscriminate and 
entailed high levels of drug consumption. Suspected trypanosome carriers, i.e. Africans 
with swollen lymph nodes but negative lymph juice exam results, received an ‘injection 
de sûreté’.1110 In addition, sleeping sickness victims who found themselves in a clinically 
good condition after a treatment regimen nevertheless continued to be injected with a 
‘cure d’entretien’, because without the microscopic analysis of bodily fluids it could not 
be confirmed whether they had indeed been definitively cured.1111 
Therapeutic protocols were adapted to local circumstances and the arrival of new 
trypanocides. Initially, treatment remained based on a combination of Atoxyl and tartar 
emetic, with a normal course consisting of ten injections.1112 This was shorter than the 
regimen recommended by Rodhain’s 1923 guidelines, and can be explained by David’s 
intentions to simplify or shorten trypanocidal cures to avert the medical mission’s staff 
crisis.1113 By 1925, the director had started field trials of Tryparsamide, and the ‘excellent 
results’ observed prompted him to request quantities of the compound for his medical 
mission.1114 Acknowledging that it was too expensive to administer to all trypanosome 
carriers in his care, he initially reserved Tryparsamide treatment for advanced cases1115. 
It amounted to reports of ‘dormeurs’ voluntarily presenting themselves to former 
lazarets for treatment.1116 When in late 1926 he was provided with a large quantity of the 
new trypanocide, however, David devised a new treatment regimen that favoured 
intensive, as short as possible Tryponarsyl cures for itinerant practice.1117 While 
suspected trypanosome carriers were given an Atoxyl-based ‘cure de sûreté’, confirmed 
1109 Dr Sulsenti, ‘Mission médicale Kwango Kasai. Rapport annuel. Exercice 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.8.
1110 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Premier Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.335.
1111 ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.4; E. Van 
Campenhout, Summary of and comments on the Report of the Mission médicale de prophylaxie du Kwango 
from the 2nd semester 1926, 26.10.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.2.
1112 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet-Décembre 1923’, 
15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III).
1113 J. Rodhain, ‘Lettre-circulaire “Considérations pratiques sur la prophylaxie de la maladie du sommeil”’, 
20.11.1923, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.2.7, pp. 9-10; ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième 
Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.4; Governor General Rutten to Minister of Colonies, 25.3.1924, MAEAA, 
Hygiène, 4407.334 (III).
1114 J. David to G. Van Campenhout, 2.9.1925, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); J. David, ‘Mission Médicale du 
Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Premier semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 4408.337.
1115 J. David, ‘Mission Médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Premier semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.337.
1116 ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.4.
1117 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.335; David, ‘Traitement de la trypanosomiase humaine par la tryparsamide’, 309.
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cases received a three-year course of Tryponarsyl treatment consisting of six injections 
of 2g (administered in the space of a few weeks) each year, after which a ‘cure 
d’entretien’ was instituted comprising a total of three to six grammes, depending on 
patients’ clinical condition. The significant ‘moral’ effect of Tryponarsyl on Congolese 
patients, who reportedly willingly complied with treatment, was confirmed by the 
provincial doctor.1118 Small children, for whom intravenous injections were more 
problematic, were given intramuscular injections of the Bayer 205 compound.1119 By 
1928, the latter was also administered to sleeping sickness victims who did not tolerate 
arsenicals well, and preventively, to people not yet infected but living in heavily afflicted 
villages.1120 
Besides modifications in diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, what also changed 
after Schwetz’s departure was an increased participation of Kwango’s private sector in 
pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control. Jesuit missionaries in particular collaborated 
more closely with the official medical mission. New director David appeared to be on 
better terms with the Kikwit Jesuits.1121 Moreover, the Catholic order in general wanted 
to step up its role in the provision of rural medical care in the district to curb not only 
depopulation, but also the growing influence over indigenous populations of Protestant 
missionary doctors and (potentially anticlerical) state physicians.1122 As AMIB members, 
Jesuits and other missionaries - the former often with the help of medically trained 
nuns - set up and began to run more medical centres and dispensaries in Kwango.1123 To 
further assist them with the provision of indigenous medical assistance, Jesuits also 
successfully called for a new category of state-subsidised doctors to be attached to 
Catholic mission posts, and in 1925 inspired the ‘Société médicale belge de Saint-Luc’ to 
create an organisation called ‘Aide médicale aux Missions’ to help them recruit such 
1118 Médecin Provincial, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical. Rapport Annuel 1927’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
87.5.
1119 ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.4; E. Van 
Campenhout, Summary of and comments on the Report of the Mission médicale de prophylaxie du Kwango 
from the 2nd semester 1926, 26.10.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.2; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant 
l’année 1927, p. 10; Médecin Provincial, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical. Rapport Annuel 1927’, s.d., 
MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.5. 
1120 Dr Sulsenti, ‘Mission médicale Kwango Kasai. Rapport annuel. Exercice 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.8.
1121 Governor General Rutten to Minister of Colonies, 25.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); J. David, 
‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet-Décembre 1923’, 15.2.1924, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III). 
1122 G. Greggio, ‘Yasa après deux ans’, Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 1 (1927), 6-9; R. Devisé, ‘Une mission 
prospère: Yasa’, Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 12 (1930), 448-449; Société Médicale Belge de Saint-Luc, 
‘Une Oeuvre de Salut. L’Aide médicale aux Missions du Congo’, s.d., KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de 
Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie Kongo, 10511, 4, pp. 5-7, 25-27.
1123 See for example: Greggio, ‘Yasa après deux ans’, 7; J. De Decker, ‘Kikwit. Moretus van de Werve’, Revue 
Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 4 (1928), 160-161; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, pp. 10, 
26; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, p. 19.
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doctors.1124 AMIB members in Kwango contributed to sleeping sickness control in their 
evangelical spheres of action by treating trypanosome carriers - sometimes those 
detected by official medical mission members - in their medical centres, or by touring 
themselves to screen and treat victims.1125 By 1926-1927, Jesuit missionaries in Yasa, 
Djuma and Bas-Kwilu in particular actively collaborated with the Kwango-Kasai sleeping 
sickness mission as ‘examinateurs’ of their zones of influence.1126 
In addition, private companies, and notably the HCB, were pressured by the colonial 
government to contribute to sleeping sickness control in their concession territories 
given their perceived role in the spread of the epidemic and their immediate interest in 
a large and healthy labour force.1127 Consequently, the HCB’s medical service in the 
Lusanga concession, and especially the clinical infrastructure in Leverville, became 
more involved in medical assistance to indigenous people. This first of all included the 
treatment of sleeping sickness cases in the Leverville lazaret.1128 From about 1925 
onwards and in as far as resources allowed, the HCB also employed an itinerant doctor 
and sanitary agent to proceed with sleeping sickness screening and treatment in 
Lusanga.1129
10.2 Obstacles, frictions and SAMI reforms
Despite the continued expansion of mass treatment in Kwango throughout the 1920s, 
medical mission doctors eventually came to realise that the complete eradication of 
sleeping sickness would be a much more difficult task than anticipated. In 1927, for 
example, David reported that certain trypanosomiasis foci persisted despite the long-
1124 Société Médicale Belge de Saint-Luc, ‘Une Oeuvre de Salut. L’Aide médicale aux Missions du Congo’, s.d., 
KADOC, Archief van de Belgische en van de Vlaamse provincie van de Sociëteit van Jezus, 4.2.1.14.5. Missie 
Kongo, 10511, 4, pp. 8-10, 26-27; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 26.
1125 Greggio, ‘Yasa après deux ans’, 9; De Decker, ‘Kikwit’, 161; G. Greggio, ‘Les missionnaires-médecins’, Revue 
Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 2 (1929), 73-75; G. Dumont, ‘Les missionnaires médecins. Tournée médicale sur la 
rive droite du Kwango (Popokabaka- Kingashi), Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 4 (1929), 163-165; Rapport 
sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’Année 1925, pp. 3, 21-22.
1126 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Premier Semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.335; Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 10.
1127 Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 7.9.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II); Governor General to 
Administrateur-Délégué des Huileries du Congo Belge à Kinshasa, 7.9.1923, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (II); 
Governor General Rutten to Minister of Colonies, 25.3.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); Trolli, Rapport sur 
l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, pp. 9-10.
1128 Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1928, pp. 5, 18; Seidelin, ‘Une année de fonctionnement’, 
68-69.
1129 Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 9; Seidelin, ‘Une année de fonctionnement’, 70-71.
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standing campaign in the district, and that ten years would not suffice to stamp out the 
disease there.1130 By 1929, Kikwit territory was no longer the sleeping sickness centre it 
had previously been, but its surveillance was still deemed necessary and the problem 
seemed to be shifting, moreover, to new zones east- and westwards.1131 
With the Kwango-Kasai mission treating among the highest numbers of Congolese 
without the eradication of human trypanosomiasis in sight after ten years of activity, 
higher-ranking medical officers increased pressures on local staff to perform lumbar 
punctures and stick to therapeutic guidelines so as to rationalise mass treatment. 
Examining patients’ cerebrospinal fluid was the only way, the head of Congo-Kasai 
Province’s medical service argued, to distinguish true sleeping sickness cases from 
merely suspected and cured ones, and exclude the latter categories from long and costly 
treatments that were unnecessary.1132 Moreover, as stipulated by Van den Branden’s 1929 
guidelines, pre-treatment lumbar punctures were required to select the most 
appropriate therapeutic protocols, with early cases requiring fifteen weekly injections 
of two grammes of the Tryparsamide compound and advanced patients needing much 
longer courses. By 1930, the Kwango-Kasai mission had finally introduced lumbar 
punctures to eliminate suspected and cured cases from treatment, which eventually 
resulted in time savings and reduced levels of trypanocide consumption.1133 But 
treatment nevertheless remained standardised across different stages of the disease, 
with shorter regimens of twelve weekly Tryponarsyl injections administered to all 
confirmed cases.1134 Provincial doctor Victor Daco judged that such a ‘strongly 
standardised treatment’, ill-adapted to different sorts of cases, was not ideal, but argued 
that it was difficult to ask more from itinerant medical staff than it was already doing.1135 
Local sleeping sickness doctors themselves to some extent blamed slower than 
expected progress on insufficient administrative support. David highlighted critical staff 
shortages and the dangers of having to cover too large a geographic area in those 
circumstances, for example.1136 Sulsenti complained about the territorial service’s 
inactivity as far as mechanical prophylaxis was concerned, which made it difficult to 
obtain ‘durable’ results with medicines. Moreover, although by 1927 Tryponarsyl 
1130 Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 11.
1131 Dr Sulsenti, ‘Congo Belge. Mission médicale Kwango Kasai. Rapport premier semestre 1929’, 31.7.1929, 
MAEAA, GG, 16849 (Congo-Kasai).
1132 Médecin Provincial, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical. Rapport annuel 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
87.8.
1133 G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis; L. Van Hoof, 
‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/MED-1; Dr 
Zannetti, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango. Rapport annuel 1933’, 27.1.1934, MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/MED 18. 
1134 G. Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis.
1135 Dr Daco, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service de l’Hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1929’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 88.1.
1136 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. 4ième Rapport Annuel. 2e semestre Juillet-Décembre 1923’, 
s.d., 15.2.1924, MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); Governor General Rutten to Minister of Colonies, 25.3.1924, 
MAEAA, Hygiène, 4407.334 (III); ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième Semestre’, s.d., 
MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.4.
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treatment had replaced the routine use of Atoxyl and tartar emetic in Kwango, delayed 
trypanocide supplies sometimes forced mission members to temporarily use Atoxyl 
again on a larger scale, Sulsenti reported in 1928. Given the latter’s therapeutic 
inferiority and the ensuing impracticalities (the drug required longer courses of 
treatment and risked deterring an indigenous population grown used to the more 
potent Tryponarsyl) this was considered an unwelcome setback.1137 
Sharp criticisms were notably also aimed at private AMI providers. David complained 
that some (Catholic) AMIB collaborators acted like ‘quacks’, practicing ‘la médecine 
d’occasion’ by handing out expensive and not always useful medicines to Africans for 
free.1138 Sulsenti, moreover, appreciated but did not seem overly impressed with Jesuit 
efforts to survey parts of the district on behalf of his medical mission, stating that their 
contribution was only voluntary, but ‘at least something’.1139 Such observations were 
part of a broader commentary on AMIB members’ contribution to sleeping sickness 
control among state doctors in the Congo-Kasai Province. Provincial doctor Emile 
Lejeune, for example, expressed significant doubts as to whether missionaries, including 
those in Kwango, offered the desired results in return for the state subsidies granted. He 
claimed that most did not like taking part in the systematic screening and treatment of 
trypanosome carriers, but instead preferred to practice ‘la polyclinique’ - often without 
proper expertise - because it was much more popular among the ‘natives’ and thus more 
favourable to their evangelical interests.1140 His successors Romolo Repetto and Daco 
shared the view that AMIB members rarely performed systematic census and case 
detection work (properly), and had a tendency to ‘play doctor’ in their dispensaries 
without necessarily adhering to rational therapeutic principles, especially where they 
were not supervised by a medical professional.1141 
For their part Jesuit missionaries involved in itinerant sleeping sickness control in 
Kwango sometimes conceded that they omitted properly reporting on their activities, or 
that indigenous non-compliance could make medicinal sleeping sickness prophylaxis a 
difficult task for them.1142 Moreover, Jesuits did not hide that distributing free medicines 
1137 Médecin Provincial, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical. Rapport Annuel 1927’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
87.5; Dr Sulsenti, ‘Mission médicale Kwango Kasai. Rapport annuel. Exercice 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.8.
1138 J. David, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango-Kasai. Exercice 1926. Deuxième semestre’, s.d., MAEAA, Hygiène, 
4408.337; E. Van Campenhout, Summary of and comments on the Report of the Mission médicale de 
prophylaxie du Kwango from the 2nd semester 1926, 26.10.1927, MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.2.
1139 Dr Sulsenti, ‘Mission médicale Kwango Kasai. Rapport annuel. Exercice 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.8.
1140 ‘Rapport annuel 1923. Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 112.1.
1141 Médecin Provincial, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service Médical. Rapport annuel 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
87.8; Dr Daco, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service de l’Hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1929’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 88.1; 
A. Dubois, ‘R. Repetto (1878-1960)’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 40 (1960), 712; A. Dubois, 
‘Victor Joseph DACO’ dans Académie Royale des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, Biographie Belge d’Outre-Mer (Bruxelles, 
1973), t. VII-A, col. 153.
1142 Dumont, ‘Tournée médicale sur la rive droite du Kwango’, 165; G. Dumont, ‘Les missionnaires-médecins 
(Popokabaka-Kingashi). Suite du rapport du P. Dumont’, Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 5 (1929), 209-211; 
Greggio, ‘Les missionnaires-médecins’, 73.
244
for a whole range of conditions was part of a strategy to ‘save the (black) race’ and at the 
same time win indigenous ‘sympathies’, and the reported popularity of their 
dispensaries only further encouraged this approach.1143 It appears, therefore, that 
missionaries were not always willing to yield to the imperatives of a vertical sleeping 
sickness campaign when this conflicted or was not entirely compatible with their own 
interests. 
Kwango’s Jesuits were not alone, however, in tailoring their medical interventions to 
the reality of Africans’ broader health needs and selective acceptance of biomedicine as 
well as to their own preferences. To state doctors’ frustration, private company doctors 
were not always too keen on the specialised, coercive sleeping sickness campaign either. 
Harald Seidelin, the head of the HCB’s medical service, for example, argued for an AMI 
based on ‘resident doctors’ tending to Africans who came of their own accord for help 
with certain medical conditions, i.e. ailments for which they valued biomedicine’s 
superior efficacy, rather than on a system of ambulatory and obligatory screening and 
treatment. Seidelin found the latter too costly, too time-consuming, and in particular 
too coercive: ‘if one wants to practice medicine, one should avoid compulsion, except in 
very rare cases of public benefit, he explained.1144 Moreover, while the HCB’s itinerant 
doctor in Lusanga was involved in medicinal prophylaxis, his activities were not 
confined to sleeping sickness control, and Seidelin asserted that providing general 
medical care and improving hygiene were ‘among the most effective means of 
combatting sleeping sickness because of their favourable influence on individuals’ 
general resistance’.1145 
HCB’s stance on sleeping sickness control in any case left Sulsenti rather 
unimpressed. Companies like the HCB had a ‘moral duty’ to intervene, the medical 
mission director complained, but they lacked the necessary authority over the 
indigenous population and escaped state supervision.1146 Sulsenti and other state 
doctors’ reports about the obstacles to sleeping sickness control in Kwango contributed 
considerably to the development of Trolli’s SAMI program at the end of the decade. 
Efforts to implement the latter in the early 1930s introduced important modifications to 
the district’s sleeping sickness mission as conceived and initiated by Schwetz ten years 
earlier. First of all, steps were taken to improve the coordination of itinerant state 
doctors and private AMI providers’ activities through a closer integration of both 
spheres and a better division of labour. The territory covered by the Kwango-Kasai 
medical mission was divided in a Kwango and a Kasai sector, each comprising several 
sub-sectors to be surveyed and screened for sleeping sickness, and assigned to either 
1143 Greggio, ‘Yasa après deux ans’, 8.
1144 H. Seidelin, ‘Le travail médical des Huileries du Congo Belge pendant cinq ans’, Annales de la Société Belge de 
Médecine Tropicale 9 (1929), 286-287.
1145 Seidelin, ‘Une année de fonctionnement’, 70-71.
1146 Dr Sulsenti, ‘Mission médicale Kwango Kasai. Rapport annuel. Exercice 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.8.
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official medical staff or the private sector.1147 In Kwango, for example, one such region 
was entrusted in 1930 to Father René Devisé, a doctor in natural sciences from the Jesuit 
Yasa mission specifically charged with ‘medical surveillance’.1148 Moreover, an agreement 
on trypanosomiasis control between the HCB and the colonial state saw the company set 
up a dedicated itinerant sleeping sickness service within its Lusanga concession in 1931 
under the supervision of the official Kwango-Kasai medical mission.1149 
In addition, the SAMI agenda stimulated the integration of mobile medicine and fixed 
health centres, and gradually transformed the specialised Kwango-Kasai mission into a 
broader endemic disease control operation, although human trypanosomiasis continued 
to be the overall priority. While itinerant practice remained vital to comprehensive 
population surveying and screening, therapy itself increasingly took place within 
private AMI centres, but also in official medical posts. The latter were originally 
established in Kwango for the inpatient treatment of advanced trypanosomiasis cases, 
who were more difficult to tend to ambulatorily, an issue that became more pressing 
with the generalised use of the Tryparsamide compound.1150 By the early 1930s, and 
echoing the popularity of private AMI facilities, the state posts had evolved into ‘true 
brousse dispensaries’, providing medical assistance not only to trypanosome carriers 
but also to victims of other endemic infections like yaws and syphilis voluntarily 
presenting themselves. According to the head of Congo-Kasai’s provincial medical 
service, the Kwango-Kasai sleeping sickness mission had in that sense become more like 
a SAMI service, although it continued to be referred to as a medical mission.1151 
1147 Trolli, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1930’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.3bis.
1148 G. Greggio, ‘Missionnaires-médecins, région de Yasa’, Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 4 (1930), 165-166; 
Devisé, ‘Une mission prospère: Yasa’, 449; R. Devisé, ‘Maladie du sommeil. Collaboration des missionnaires à la 
lutte contre la maladie du sommeil dans la Mission du Kwango’, Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites belges (1934), 61.
1149 R. Dumont to Senator Leyniers, 3.3.1934, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 
194; General Manager Barella (Lusanga area) to R. Dumont, 13.6.1931, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal 
archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194; R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un 
médecin qui y a rempli les fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-
SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 16, 18.
1150 Dr Tavernari, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Rapport annuel du service de l’Hygiène 1931’, 19.4.1932, MAEAA, 
RA-CB, 88.3; R. Mouchet, ‘Maladie du sommeil au Kasai. Note pour Monsieur le Médecin en Chef ’, 5.11.1928, 
MAEAA, GG, 16849 (Congo-Kasai); Trolli, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1927, p. 14; Dr Sulsenti, 
‘Mission médicale Kwango Kasai. Rapport annuel. Exercice 1928’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 87.8.
1151 Dr Tavernari, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Rapport annuel du service de l’Hygiène 1931’, 19.4.1932, MAEAA, 
RA-CB, 88.3; R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1932’, s.d., MAEAA, 
RA-CB, 83.6; Dr Tavernari, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Service de l’Hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1932’, 15.4.1933, 
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10.3 Contesting mass treatment effectiveness and social 
medicine
Despite efforts to rationalise and better coordinate the mass treatment campaign, 
eradicating sleeping sickness in Kwango proved no less challenging in the 1930s. To the 
familiar obstacles deriving from the need to cover large areas with relatively small staff 
numbers were added a number of particularly disrupting events at the beginning of the 
decade. In 1931, the Kwango-Kasai medical mission’s activities were severely hampered 
by an epidemic of bacterial dysentery, diverting medical attention from trypanosomiasis 
control, as well as an African uprising known as the ‘(Ba)pende revolt’, the worst 
rebellion in the Belgian Congo before the struggle for independence in 1960.1152 At the 
heart of the troubles was ‘socio-economic unrest’ among the Pende people, many of 
whom had been forcibly recruited to work for the HCB. The lowly paid work was hard, 
and when the 1929 economic crash led the company to reduce payment while the 
colonial administration increased taxes, African frustrations reached a boiling point. 
Protest took the form of a ‘popular religion’, and when its leader’s refusal to pay tax 
resulted in the murder of a state official, violent Belgian reprisals followed to break the 
insurrection.1153 Although not so much an act of resistance against the sleeping sickness 
campaign per se, the political unrest made mass screening and treatment in the affected 
area impossible for months. 
In addition, the economic crisis of the 1930s also prompted private companies, 
including the HCB, to withdraw from sleeping sickness prophylaxis in Kwango, forcing 
the state to take over the sectors previously under private medical ‘surveillance’ by 
1932-1933.1154 The Kwango medical mission lost its sphere of action in the Kasai district 
due to a redrawing of the colony’s provincial borders in 1933, but now had to take over 
the prophylactic zones of almost all AMIB posts, except that of the Jesuit mission at 
Yasa, where Devisé continued surveying.1155 Around the same time, medical officials 
1152 Dr Tavernari, ‘Province du Congo-Kasai. Rapport annuel du service de l’Hygiène 1931’, 19.4.1932, MAEAA, 
RA-CB, 88.3; R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’hygiène publique 1931’, s.d. MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.5; Van Reybrouck, Congo: 
een geschiedenis, p. 175
1153 Van Reybrouck, Congo: een geschiedenis, pp. 175-178; L.-F. On the events in 1931, see also Vanderstraeten, La 
répression de la révolte des Pende du Kwango en 1931 (Bruxelles, 2001).
1154 R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport du Service de L’Hygiène. Année 1932’, 5.1933, MAEAA, RA-CB, 83.6; ‘Province de 
Léopoldvile. Services de l’Hygiène et du Laboratoire de Bactériologie. Rapport Annuel 1933’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-
CB, 252.7.
1155 Dr Tavernari, ‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel du service de l’Hygiène 1933’, 3.4.1934, MAEAA, RA-
CB, 135.3; Dr Zannetti, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango. Rapport annuel 1933’, 27.1.1934, MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/MED 
18; ‘Province de Léopoldvile. Services de l’Hygiène et du Laboratoire de Bactériologie. Rapport Annuel 1933’, 
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were suspecting that the problem of arsenic resistance was spreading in the Province, 
and reports started to emerge about increases in the number of new sleeping sickness 
cases in Kwango - especially in sectors where ‘political or other vicissitudes’ had 
disrupted medical action - and the appearance of new foci in southern parts of the 
district previously deemed unaffected.1156 
The epidemic, political and economic crises and reported setbacks led some to 
question the effectiveness of mass sleeping sickness treatment. More specifically, in 1934 
a metropolitan campaign condemning the organisation of sleeping sickness control in 
the Belgian Congo was once again instigated by a (former) member of the colony’s 
private AMI providers. This time, the ‘culprit’ was Robert Dumont, a former HCB doctor 
who had been involved in the company’s itinerant medical service in Kwango in the 
early 1930s. In 1931, Dumont was charged with human trypanosomiasis control in the 
Lusanga concession’s Haut-Kwilu sector under the direction of the HCB’s new sleeping 
sickness service, which itself operated under the supervision of the Kwango-Kasai 
medical mission. During the dysentery epidemic in Kwango, Dumont became ‘titulaire’ 
of a ‘mixed’ sector, comprising state as well as company territory, where he had to help 
get the disease under control. He stayed on as an HCB doctor until his contract was 
terminated in June 1932.1157 
Dumont’s experiences as a company sleeping sickness doctor in Kwango made him 
very skeptical of the mass Tryponarsyl treatment campaign. A lack of medical and road 
infrastructure first of all created difficult working circumstances. More importantly, 
Dumont did not understand why he had to focus on pharmaceutical sleeping sickness 
control when in his sector the disease was clearly in regression, and the root cause of 
African ill health appeared to be malnutrition above all else. Dumont especially 
emphasised the role of mineral deficiencies in lowering individuals’ resistance to 
infectious disease in Kwango, and argued that medical drugs needed to act on properly 
boosted bodily ‘terrain(s)’ to be truly effective.1158 This reflected his adherence to a long-
standing ‘French clinical tradition’ that emphasised the importance of the ‘terrain - the 
physiological makeup of the individual patient’.1159 Dumont also felt that his position as a 
company employee who received directives from his immediate superior at the HCB, but 
1156 R. Mouchet, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1932’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
83.6; ‘Province de Léopoldvile. Services de l’Hygiène et du Laboratoire de Bactériologie. Rapport Annuel 1933’, 
s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 252.7; Dr Tavernari, ‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel du service de l’Hygiène 
1933’, 3.4.1934, MAEAA, RA-CB, 135.3; Dr Zannetti, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango. Rapport annuel 1933’, 
27.1.1934, MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/MED 18.
1157 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 35-37.
1158 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 6-7, 12, 22.
1159 I. Löwy, ‘“The terrain is all”: Metchnikoff ’s heritage at the Pasteur Institute, from Besredka’s “antivirus” to 
Bardach’s “orthobiotic serum”’ in Lawrence and Weisz (eds.), Greater than the Parts, p. 257.
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also had to take those of the state medical service into account, led to the imposition of 
a ‘standard medicine’ with uniform procedures that hampered his clinical autonomy 
and reduced him to little more than an ‘agent sanitaire’.1160 The result on the ground was 
a neglect of local circumstances and Africans’ bodily ‘terrain’, amounting to an 
unwarranted focus on sleeping sickness control by means of ineffective, standardised 
drug treatments.1161 
In Dumont’s view, the outbreak of the dysentery epidemic in 1931, which he 
considered a more dangerous demographic threat than human trypanosomiasis, proved 
that the prioritisation of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control in Kwango had been 
the wrong approach.1162 Moreover, the HCB doctor’s experiences in charge of a ‘secteur 
antidysentérique’ strengthened his conviction that the hierarchical organisation of the 
colony’s medical service produced poor results.1163 For example, Dumont was supplied 
with vaccines by the official medical service, but an incident where local state staff 
insisted on obeying the misguided instructions of higher-ranking medical officers led to 
the HCB doctor’s drugs being sent to the wrong place. The apparent inability of lower-
level medical personnel to defy nonsensical orders underscored the need for 
organisational reform, Dumont argued.1164 Moreover, the company doctor had developed 
his own dysentery treatment, combining serum therapy with a ‘traitement calcique’, 
and claimed it resulted in much better mortality figures than the methods employed by 
the Kwango-Kasai mission’s state staff.1165 When he was informed in May 1932 that the 
state would take over his dysentery sector following a new agreement with the HCB and 
that he was to revert to sleeping sickness control in Haut-Kwilu, Dumont refused to 
comply with what he considered an absurd demand. Shortly afterwards, he was 
dismissed by the ‘Huileries’, which was probably glad to get rid of an employee who had 
1160 R. Dumont to Senator Leyniers, 3.3.1934, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 
194.
1161 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 15-18.
1162 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 18, 27.
1163 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, p. 26.
1164 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 47-50.
1165 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 33-34; Robert Dumont, ‘Considérations 
diverses au sujet de l’épidémie de dysenterie bacillaire, 1931-1932, dans le Kwango (Huileries du Congo belge) 
et modalités de traitements’, Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 13 (1933), 261-266.
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occasionally criticised its pursuit of economic above public health interests.1166 Dumont’s 
pride was in any case hurt, and he felt that his reputation had been damaged by both 
the HCB and the state medical service. The latter failed to acknowledge his superior 
results against dysentery, he speculated, out of fear that it would make state doctors 
look bad.1167 
Back in Belgium, the former company doctor began to openly criticise the Congo’s 
medical service and its public health record. Seemingly out of frustration, he started 
sending letters to Ghent university rector Albert Bessemans, for example, to highlight 
the lack of clinical freedom in Africa and thus dissuade medical graduates from 
embarking upon a colonial career.1168 Moreover, he drafted reports and wrote to Catholic 
politician Daniel Leyniers, member of the Belgian Senate’s colonial commission, to 
expose the colony’s demographic decline despite high levels of medical expenditure.1169 
The problem, Dumont argued, was that millions were spent on special missions and 
pharmaceuticals, while the indigenous population’s nutritional needs were neglected. 
As well-nourished bodies were a precondition for therapeutic success, this situation 
amounted to a waste of national resources.1170 
What exacerbating the sad state of affairs, Dumont argued in a published report, was 
the ‘statist’, ‘mass’ character of medicine in the Belgian Congo, exemplified in particular 
by the sleeping sickness missions. The mass or ‘social medicine’ promoted by the 
colonial state, was aimed at collectives rather than individual patients, and amounted to 
a centralisation and standardisation that threatened the medical individualism 
associated with medical professionals’ clinical freedom and patients’ specificity.1171 In the 
Belgian Congo, clinical practitioners in the field had become mere ‘passive instruments’, 
forced to implement the pre-fixed (therapeutic) procedures decreed by official medical 
1166 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 16-17, 53-54.
1167 R. Dumont, ‘Dans la Lusanga area et le secteur du Haut-Kwilu. Récit d’un médecin qui y a rempli les 
fonctions de Médecin itinérant et y fut plus tard Médecin d’un secteur Mixte ETAT-SOCIETE’, 23.3.1933, Archief 
Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194, pp. 58-61.
1168 R. Dumont to Rector Bessemans, 20.7.1934, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, 
map 194; R. Dumont to Rector Bessemans, 12.9.1934, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 
242, map 194.
1169 R. Dumont to Senator Leyniers, 3.3.1934, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 
194; R. Dumont, ‘Cause de la mauvaise situation sanitaire de la colonie’, s.d., Archief Universiteit Gent, 
Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194. In 1934, Leyniers was responsible for a parliamentary report 
criticising the influence of ‘financial holdings’ in the Belgian Congo, in a context of metropolitan debates 
about the plight of Congolese labourers. See Vanthemsche, Impact van een kolonie, p. 64.
1170 R. Dumont to Senator Leyniers, 3.3.1934, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 
194; R. Dumont, ‘Cause de la mauvaise situation sanitaire de la colonie’, s.d., Archief Universiteit Gent, 
Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194; R. Dumont, ‘Quelques idées maitresses de mon mémoire du 25 
mars 1933. Résumé succinct’, 20.1.1934, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.1.
1171 R. Dumont, ‘Le conflit des conceptions médicales au Congo. Conséquences néfastes pour notre Colonie de la 
“Médecine Sociale” à tendances étatistes’, 10.10.1934, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.1.
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authorities on the basis of laboratory research, and without the autonomy to adapt 
them to local circumstances and individual cases.1172 
Capitalising on the Schwetz mission controversy, Dumont used the reliance on lymph 
node palpation in the Belgian Congo as an example of how its hierarchically organised 
system of sleeping sickness control could lead whole medical teams astray. A more 
liberal regime would have prevented local staff from repeating its chiefs’ diagnostic 
mistakes. It was the ‘dictatorial’ nature of social medicine, therefore, that prevented 
individual doctors from defying bad practices, and this to the detriment of the 
Congolese population.1173 In Dumont’s view, the same mechanism was behind the 
continued, yet unjustified focus on sleeping sickness and its purely pharmaceutical 
control, and the neglect of nutrition in the colony, as he had experienced himself.1174 
Importantly, Dumont’s criticisms quickly became the object of discussion in the 
Belgian parliament. During the Chamber of Representative’s plenary session on 2 May 
1934, the medical doctor and Liberal party politician Charles De Jaegher raised the issue 
of the Congo’s less than brilliant demographic situation.1175 He talked of a ‘progressive 
depopulation’ despite an intensification of medical efforts and monetary ‘sacrifices’ over 
the last years, and echoed Dumont in attributing the problem to a failure to address 
Africans’ nutritional deficiencies and the colonial medical service’s organisational 
shortcomings, notably the lack of autonomy for medical practitioners.1176 Another 
member of the Chamber, the Flemish nationalist Emile Butaye, joined in questioning the 
colony’s medical record based on Dumont’s reports.1177 The next day, Paul Tschoffen, 
Catholic Minister of Colonies in a Catholic-Liberal government, acknowledged that a 
large part of the colonial budget was spent on public health and that the usually routine 
character of ‘brousse’ doctors’ work was indeed a thorny issue that hampered medical 
1172 R. Dumont, ‘Quelques idées maitresses de mon mémoire du 25 mars 1933. Résumé succinct’, 20.1.1934, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.3.1; R. Dumont, ‘Le conflit des conceptions médicales au Congo. Conséquences néfastes pour 
notre Colonie de la “Médecine Sociale” à tendances étatistes’, 10.10.1934, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.1. 
1173 R. Dumont, ‘Le conflit des conceptions médicales au Congo. Conséquences néfastes pour notre Colonie de la 
“Médecine Sociale” à tendances étatistes’, 10.10.1934, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.1; R. Dumont, ‘A propos d’un 
interview récent’, 6.7.1934, Archief Universiteit Gent, Rectoraal archief, 4A2/4, doos 242, map 194.
1174 R. Dumont, ‘Le conflit des conceptions médicales au Congo. Conséquences néfastes pour notre Colonie de la 
“Médecine Sociale” à tendances étatistes’, 10.10.1934, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.1.
1175 ‘De Jaegher, Charles Amand Paul Maria’, Liberaal Archief, De Blauwe Wie is Wie, http://
www.liberaalarchief.be/D.html (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
1176 ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du mercredi 2 mai 1934’, pp. 1369-1372, 
Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary sessions, https://
sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1934/k00411740/k00411740_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
1177 ‘Emil Butaye (1881-1953)’, ODIS - Database Intermediary Structures Flanders (online), Record no. 6904, 
http://www.odis.be (Last accessed 27 March 2014); ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. 
Séance du mercredi 2 mai 1934’, p. 1372, Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the 
plenary sessions, https://sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1934/k00411740/k00411740_00 (Last 
accessed 27 March 2014).
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recruitment.1178 He denied the depopulation claim, however, arguing that sleeping 
sickness was largely under control, and citing demographic growth in the Bas-Congo 
district through a concerted effort of the state, private companies and FOREAMI and the 
development of an agricultural policy. With time and sufficient resources, he concluded, 
there was no reason that what was happing in Bas-Congo could not be emulated 
elsewhere.1179 The suggested solution, therefore, did not so much seem to lie in 
abandoning ‘social medicine’ as in extending FOREAMI’s particular version of it. 
10.4 FOREAMI in Kwango 
In the Congo itself, the medical service in the early 1930s also pinned its hopes on 
FOREAMI expanding its influence into the Kwango district, so that mission staff would 
be availably to move to newly affected territories without leaving older sectors 
empty.1180 By 1934, the colonial government insisted on a swift FOREAMI occupation of 
the district because of the claims of a violent upsurge of sleeping sickness there.1181 The 
organisation agreed to speed up the transfer of its activities from Bas-Congo to Kwango, 
and from July 1935 onwards, it took over an increasing number of sub-sectors from the 
Kwango medical mission, gradually expanding its ‘zone of occupation’ eastwards, until it 
covered all territories west of the Kwilu river.1182 In the new FOREAMI sub-sectors, a 
significant part of the medical mission’s personnel and equipment was put at the 
organisation’s disposal, and it also received free supplies of the ‘grands produits 
spécifiques’ (i.e. drugs for the specific treatment of the most important endemic 
diseases, including sleeping sickness) from the colonial administration.1183 Like the 
official medical mission, FOREAMI’s state staff also closely collaborated with private AMI 
doctors and medical auxiliaries.1184 
1178 ‘Paul Tschoffen (1878-1961)’, ODIS - Database Intermediary Structures Flanders (online), Record no. 8267, 
http://www.odis.be (Last accessed 27 March 2014). 
1179 ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du jeudi 3 mai 1934’, p. 1393, Plenum.be, 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary sessions, https://sites.google.com/site/
bplenum/proceedings/1934/k00411758/k00411758_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
1180 Dr Tavernari, ‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel du service de l’Hygiène 1933’, 3.4.1934, MAEAA, RA-
CB, 135.3.
1181 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 155.
1182 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 174; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge 
pendant l’année 1935, pp. 7, 30, 56-57; ‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel. 1936’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
135.9; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1936, pp. 32, 59.
1183 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, pp. 31-32.
1184 Ibid., p. 57; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1936, p. 59.
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Although a detailed history of FOREAMI in the Belgian Congo is yet to be written, 
what is clear is that the organisation encountered great difficulties to implement its 
program of ‘integral medical assistance’ in Kwango before the Second World War.1185 
Pressures from the local government to extend its sphere of action as quickly as 
possible, combined with incomplete staff cadres and budgetary difficulties caused by the 
economic crisis, as well as a much less developed road network and missionary clinical 
infrastructure in comparison with the Bas-Congo district led to a reluctant ‘retour pur et 
simple à la formule de la mission médicale’.1186 Moreover, by 1937 FOREAMI saw itself 
forced to hand four of its Kwango sub-sectors back to the official medical service, a 
transfer that took effect in January 1939.1187 The result was that attempts to carry out the 
SAMI scheme in both FOREAMI and the official medical mission’s zone of occupation to a 
significant extent remained confined to sleeping sickness control, especially mass 
screening and treatment. 
In the wake of concerns about arsenic resistance, overly standardised treatments and 
trypanocide overconsumption, however, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in 
Kwango continued to evolve throughout the 1930s. Facilitated by a growing confidence 
in biomedicine among local inhabitants and a greater reliance on fixed health centres, 
both medical mission and FOREAMI staff members stepped up the use of lumbar 
punctures at different stages in the trypanosomiasis screening and treatment process.1188 
As mission director Zanetti explained in 1933, the ‘systematic practice of lumbar 
punctures’ allowed evaluating treatment outcomes and adapting therapeutic regimens 
to the state of patients’ cerebrospinal fluid, in other words, it allowed breaking away 
from an expensive ‘therapeutic standardisation’.1189 Trypanocide therapy in the medical 
mission remained largely based on weekly injections of two grammes of Tryponarsyl, 
but clinicians could adopt varying regimens (e.g. longer or shorter treatment courses, 
1185 Kivits, ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance Médicale’, 398-399; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au 
Congo belge pendant l’année 1935, p. 57.
1186 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 153-155; Kivits, ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance 
Médicale’, 398; ‘Procès-verbal de la séance tenue par le conseil d’administration le 26 septembre 1935’, s.d., 
ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.18.2.1. As a member of Foreami’s Administrative Council, it was the Governor General who 
proposed a plan of action, determining priorities, to the Minister of Colonies who in turn consulted the 
Council about it. Once approved, it was the Executive Bureau who had to ensure its execution by Foreami’s 
staff in Africa. See ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance médicale aux Indigènes. Statut organique’, 
17.3.1937, ITG, Onderzoek, 5.3.18.2.1, pp. 3, 5-6.
1187 L. Van Hoof, ‘Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo Belge pendant l’année 1938’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 
85.1; Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, p. 64; ‘Province de Léopoldville. 
Service de l’Hygiène. Rapport Annuel 1939’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 252.10; Kivits, ‘Fonds Reine Elisabeth pour 
l’Assistance Médicale’, 398-399.
1188 Dr Zannetti, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango. Rapport annuel 1933’, 27.1.1934, MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/MED 18; 
‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel 1936’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 135.9; L. Dupuy, ‘Etat de la maladie du 
sommeil en 1935, dans les régions du Bas-Congo et du Kwango, occupées par le Foreami’, Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale 17 (1937), 177-182, 206-217; Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 221.
1189 Dr Zannetti, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango. Rapport annuel 1933’, 27.1.1934, MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/MED 18
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larger initial doses, or combinations with Bayer 205 and/or tartar emetic injections) 
depending on cerebrospinal fluid results and the presence of arsenic-resistant 
trypanosomes.1190 Sleeping sickness treatment also became much more context- and 
case-specific in FOREAMI’s sphere of action. Depending on individual lumbar puncture 
results as well as a territory’s stage of medical occupation and degree of arsenic 
resistance, FOREAMI clinicians practiced a ‘therapeutic eclecticism’ to obtain the best 
prophylactic and curative results possible.1191 Different typical regimens were adopted in 
different situations, and comprised various courses and combinations of Tryponarsyl 
(which remained the basis of therapy), Moranyl and/or tartar emetic injections. 
Guidelines from the Leopoldville laboratory were taken into account to prevent toxicity, 
and although doctors were given considerable therapeutic autonomy, prompting some 
to experiment, most reportedly adhered to these ‘classic techniques’.1192 
Despite FOREAMI’s heavy involvement in mass screening and treatment, its founder 
and metropolitan director, Giovanni Trolli, was not very happy about the circumstances 
in Kwango forcing the organisation to limit its objectives and ‘specialise’ in 
(pharmaceutical) sleeping sickness control over a considerable area. Governmental 
pressures to expand in terms of surface rather than depth were misguided, according to 
Trolli. By 1936, local FOREAMI staff had concluded that the sleeping sickness situation in 
Kwango was not as grave as reported by the colony’s medical service, and that it was in 
particular the ‘population’s undernourishment that required urgent intervention’.1193 
The causes of Kwango’s demographic problems, moreover, were foremost of a political-
economic rather than a medical nature, he argued.1194 Tackling the district’s chronic 
poverty and malnutrition through economic and agricultural policies was a necessary 
precondition for any successful medical assistance, including sleeping sickness control, 
in Trolli’s view.1195 
Although such policies naturally fell outside FOREAMI’s remit, its presence in Kwango 
helped highlight the problem of malnutrition and to some extent spurred local 
administrators into agricultural action.1196 Moreover, FOREAMI attempted to embed mass 
sleeping sickness screening and treatment in a somewhat broader public health 
strategy, aimed at improving rural ‘hygiene’ via education and implementing sanitary 
1190 Dr Zannetti, ‘Mission médicale du Kwango. Rapport annuel 1933’, 27.1.1934, MAEAA, RA-CB, RA/MED 18; Dr 
Tavernari, ‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel du Service de l’Hygiène’, 6.4.1935, MAEAA, RA-CB, 135.5; 
‘Province de Léopoldville. Rapport Annuel 1936’, s.d., MAEAA, RA-CB, 135.9.
1191 Dupuy, ‘Etat de la maladie du sommeil en 1935’, 188; Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 223.
1192 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 222-223; Dupuy, ‘Etat de la maladie du sommeil en 1935’, 
185-188; J. Rodhain, ‘Pourquoi les médecins Belges appréhendent de faire carrière dans la Colonie’, 1937, ITG, 
Onderzoek, 5.3.1.
1193 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 239; FOREAMI. Rapport Annuel 1936 (Bruxelles, s.d.), pp. 5-6. 
1194 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 155.
1195 Ibid., 165-167, 239-240.
1196 Van Hoof, Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1937, p. 64; Trolli, ‘Méthode originale 
d’assistance médicale’, 297.
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legislation (in the case of sleeping sickness also designated as ‘prophylaxie 
administrative et agronomique’ and involving brush clearing, for example), as well as 
promoting better nutrition from a quantitative and qualitative point of view.1197 Thus the 
organisation in some respects presented an answer to Robert Dumont’s criticisms of 
mass treatment reductionism, although progress in these areas was slow and FOREAMI’s 
bureaucratic nature and focus on social medicine were a far cry from what the former 
HCB doctor had in mind.1198 In 1939, Trolli concluded that despite shortcomings, 
FOREAMI’s ‘nosological’ campaign in Kwango was not without result, and that the 
situation was ‘en définitive favorable’ considering the overall reductions in sleeping 
sickness incidence and the persistence of only less important foci.1199 
10.5 In summary
Studying the evolution of pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control in Kwango after 
Schwetz’s departure highlights how local developments were intertwined with higher-
level medical policies and helped shape Tryponarsyl’s general trajectory in the Belgian 
Congo, in particular the overlapping phases of large-scale use and growing doubts about 
effectiveness. Local evaluations of the Tryparsamide compound in Kwango spurred 
optimism and helped boost demand for the drug by the second half of the 1920s. In 
addition, the special medical mission’s particular diagnostic and therapeutic practices, 
for which field conditions and chronic staff shortages were invoked as a justification, 
amounted to high levels of trypanocide consumption and highly standardised 
treatments. Reports signalling the elusiveness of a pharmaceutical eradication of 
sleeping sickness in the district therefore met with instructions to comply with central 
clinical guidelines so as to reduce the quantities of Tryponarsyl used and increase 
treatment effectiveness. As Kwango’s sleeping sickness doctors largely attributed 
limited progress to private sector failures in infectious disease control, they also 
contributed significantly to chief medical officer Trolli’s SAMI reforms. The attempted 
reorganisation of endemic disease control in the district encountered important 
obstacles, however, and did not dispel tensions over the sleeping sickness campaign with 
the private sector. In fact, in the early 1930s, a combination of a political, economic and 
epidemic crisis in Kwango and the experiences of a former company doctor helped 
trigger (metropolitan) debates about the value of mass trypanocide treatment, and sped 
up the expansion of an ‘improved’, more horizontal version of social medicine in the 
1197 Trolli, ‘Méthode originale d’assistance médicale’, 218, 294-295, 297.
1198 Ibid., 295-296.
1199 Ibid., 240-241.
255
colony. Even if, as in Kwango, the latter’s local implementation proved difficult, it 
reflected and contributed to a growing recognition in the 1930s of the limits of a 
specialised and pharmaceuticalised approach to public health in the Belgian Congo. 
Together with a decline in sleeping sickness incidence, this contributed to Tryponarsyl’s 
dwindling career as a tool of disease eradication by the Second World War.
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Chapter  11
Conclusion
11.1 A ‘new pharmaceutical history’ of sleeping sickness 
control 
This dissertation has aimed to examine to what extent and how sleeping sickness 
control in the Belgian Congo was pharmaceuticalised before the Second World War. 
Placing pharmaceuticals at the heart of an inquiry into the colonial history of human 
African trypanosomiasis, it has sought to add an extra-European dimension to the 
historiography of twentieth-century therapeutics. At the same time, it has aimed to 
contribute to the historical literature on sleeping sickness by expanding our 
understanding of how trypanosome-killing chemical compounds or trypanocides came 
to occupy a prominent position in the fight against this infectious disease in the Congo, 
beyond simple references to therapeutic efficacy and Belgian colonial rule. This 
approach has been largely inspired by the emergence of a ‘new pharmaceutical history’. 
Informed by a biographical conception of medical drugs, the latter examines the wider 
societal context and processes in and through which pharmaceuticals have become 
prevalent as solutions to medical and even social problems since the twentieth century. 
Conceived as material objects that move - although not linearly - through different life 
stages, such as invention, evaluation, production, distribution, prescription and 
consumption, pharmaceuticals’ rise to prominence involves interactions between a 
range of social groups, including scientists, drug manufacturers, doctors and patients, 
and thus cannot simply be accounted for by their inherent pharmacological properties 
alone. 
As a corollary, new pharmaceutical historians have argued that following medical 
drugs as they ‘circulate between and within the heterogeneous worlds of science, 
industry and medicine’ in the course of their lives can be a useful strategy to study 
pharmaceuticalisation.1200 In this dissertation as well, the question of the 
pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping sickness control has been operationalised by tracing 
(parts of) drug trajectories, not only across social, but also geographic, boundaries. More 
1200 Gaudillière, ‘Introduction: drug trajectories’, 605.
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specifically, it has charted the beginnings and further fates of two arsenicals, Atoxyl and 
Tryparsamide, as sleeping sickness drugs in the Congo in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. These are the compounds most commonly associated with the 
Belgian sleeping sickness campaign before the Second World War, and thus the ones that 
appeared particularly successful as trypanocides.
However, as this study has set out to show, their ‘success’ as sleeping sickness drugs in 
the Congo was not self-evident or straightforward. Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s presence 
and widespread use in the colony was not simply the result of a linear, top-down 
transfer of western industrial-scientific objects to Africa under the influence of 
colonialism, but involved a much more contingent, interactive and fluctuating process. 
This is evident in a number of ways. For example, both Atoxyl and Tryparsamide were 
drugs with ‘parallel’ lives, in the sense that they were not only applied in the specific 
treatment of sleeping sickness in the Congo. Atoxyl had a career as an arsenical remedy 
for a wide range of indications in Europe, while Tryparsamide also gained prominence 
as a treatment for neurosyphilis in the 1920s. Moreover, the arsenicals were part of a 
much broader range of remedies and trypanocidal compounds introduced as sleeping 
sickness drugs in colonial Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century, so their 
careers have to be viewed within a context of competing medicines.1201 Atoxyl and 
Tryparsamide’s trajectories in the Congo, in other words, reflect how trypanocides were 
not simply exported to colonial Africa as ready-made sleeping sickness drugs, but 
involved a process of local ‘grounding’, i.e. a local evaluation and shaping of therapeutic 
application, within a much wider network of pharmaceutical circulation.1202 This point is 
further underscored by the fact that their ‘colonial lives’ were not identical across 
tsetse-belt Africa. 
Another important factor complicating the notion of undeviating drug trajectories 
was the fact that the Atoxyl and Tryparsamide compounds had multiple ‘brand 
identit(ies)’.1203 In a context where pharmaceuticals could not be patented and imitation 
was a crucial part of product development in the European drug industry, several 
companies re-appropriated existing trypanocides that were in demand on colonial drug 
markets by copying them and marketing them under their own trade name. In this way, 
the originally German-manufactured Atoxyl vied with ‘Trypoxyl’ and ‘Atoxyl Meurice’, 
for example, while Tryparsamide was commercialised alongside ‘Tryponarsyl’ and 
‘Novatoxyl’. Significantly, different brands of the same trypanocides were not all equally 
salient as sleeping sickness drugs in the Congo. Moreover, their fortunes changed over 
time, highlighting how transformations in original brand identity (and associated 
1201 On the need to understand drug careers within the context of ‘existing and changing armories of available 
drugs’, see Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On Cannabis’, 98, 113.
1202 Raj, Relocating Modern Science, p. 21.
1203 J. Greene, ‘Pharmaceutical brands and drug standardisation in the twentieth century’ in Bonah, Masutti, 
Rasmussen and Simon (eds.), Harmonizing Drugs, p. 101. 
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‘cultural status’) characterised the trajectories of Atoxyl and Tryparsamide in the 
colony.1204 
Above all, this dissertation has sought to challenge a too linear understanding of 
pharmaceuticalisation by pointing to the cyclical nature of Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s 
career paths in the Congo. As highlighted by a number of Dutch historians in particular, 
the successes (and failures) of medical drugs since the nineteenth century tend to follow 
cyclical patterns, where highs alternate with lows in their appreciation and use. These 
drug career cycles typically consist of three main phases: a first phase of ‘initial 
enthusiasm’ and ‘expanding use’, a second stage characterised by ‘rising criticism and 
disappointment’, and finally a period of ‘contracting use’. Importantly, these phases 
‘need not be sequential’, but can ‘overlap’ and thus temporarily coexist.1205 Moreover, 
this ‘common cycle of events’ is not a ‘universal law’, but a historically contingent 
pattern, in the sense that specific cycle ‘dynamics’ can vary between different drugs and 
across contexts.1206 Also, drugs can make a comeback and ‘start a new career cycle’ with a 
different application for their use.1207 
As far as Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s Congolese careers as sleeping sickness drugs are 
concerned, this dissertation has suggested that we can distinguish three successive, but 
partially overlapping cycles roughly between 1905 and 1939. The first two cycles 
involved Atoxyl and the other one Tryparsamide. Atoxyl first lived through a short cycle 
as a sleeping sickness cure in the Congo Free State. After the German-manufactured 
medicinal chemical’s introduction and initial dissemination as an experimental sleeping 
sickness drug in 1905, its use quickly expanded as it became a compulsory treatment for 
African lazaret patients at the instigation of a metropolitan administration with high 
expectations regarding its healing powers. Almost immediately, however, the 
trypanocide entered a phase of more critical assessments, as clinicians started reporting 
limited therapeutic efficacy, especially in advanced cases of trypanosomiasis, and 
serious adverse reactions including blindness, which also made it unpopular among 
African trypanosome carriers. As a result, Atoxyl disappeared from the spotlight as a 
true cure for sleeping sickness (although it remained in use by lazaret doctors) and 
attention shifted to finding alternative remedies in the Congo. 
However, the drug soon made a centre stage reappearance - and thus started a new 
career cycle - when laboratory doctors reinvented it as a locally useful tool of disease 
prevention rather than a curative agent. Enthusiasm about its potential and suitability 
as an instrument of sleeping sickness control grew steadily after the Belgian takeover of 
the Free State, and became even stronger after the interruption of the First World War. 
This optimism was translated into large-scale use, in particular of the new French and 
Belgian brands, by itinerant medical staff screening and administering prophylactic 
1204 Huisman, ‘Struggling for the market’, p. 66.
1205 Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 95, 97.
1206 Pieters, Interferon, p. xviii; Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 97, 113-114. 
1207 Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 97.
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treatment to African trypanosome carriers in rural areas. Yet once again, the phase of 
Atoxyl’s dramatic expansion as a sleeping sickness control drug soon overlapped with a 
wave of disenchantment. There were reports of ‘abnormal’ drug toxicity, which, 
together with the trypanocide’s limited curative power, diminished medical 
professionals’ expectations of its effectiveness in the everyday practice of an itinerant 
medicinal prophylaxis that encountered significant African and European opposition. 
Toxic incidents eventually resulted, through more stringent quality controls, in an 
erosion of the use of French- and Belgian-manufactured Atoxyl and a concomitant 
return to the superior German original. The sustaining of high levels of Atoxyl 
consumption, albeit of the German brand, was nevertheless temporary, as the arrival of 
the alternative and more powerful trypanocide Tryparsamide ultimately ended its 
career. 
Tryparsamide had been introduced in the Congo in 1920, and by 1925 evoked 
enormous optimism as a sleeping sickness drug in the colony. By virtue of its superior 
therapeutic efficacy, it was hailed as a medicine that could potentially not just control, 
but even eradicate sleeping sickness. The use of the compound, and especially of the 
Belgian brand ‘Tryponarsyl’, subsequently started to surge, until it completely replaced 
Atoxyl in routine treatment by the end of the 1920s. Administered on an even more vast 
scale, the second, overlapping career phase of the trypanocide soon took off, however, 
when evidence started accumulating that it failed to meet high expectations. Reports of 
drug toxicity and especially of drug resistance notably undermined initial enthusiasm 
about Tryponarsyl’s effectiveness in stamping out human African trypanosomiasis. 
Although its mass deployment was initially sustained (and credited with significant 
reductions in sleeping sickness incidence and prevalence), by the second half of the 
1930s Tryponarsyl and more generally Tryparsamide’s career in the Congo entered a 
final phase of decline as a tool of sleeping sickness eradication.
If we compare the three successive cycles of the Atoxyl and Tryparsamide compound, 
they show general similarities in the alternation of promise and disappointment, but 
also differences. For example, the duration of the first Atoxyl cycle was of course much 
shorter than that of the other two. Moreover, the scale of enthusiasm and the level of 
consumption at the height of the trypanocide careers dramatically increased between 
the first and the third cycles. Atoxyl’s career as a tool of sleeping sickness control ended 
most abruptly given its replacement with a new drug, while Tryparsamide’s downturn 
was more gradual - but also of greater ‘magnitude’ as it descended from a higher ‘peak’. 
In any case, such variations in the three career cycles point to changes over time in the 
way trypanocides were ‘regarded’ and used in the Congo.1208 Together with the 
observation that Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s fates in the Belgian colony were not linear 
but characterised by reversals and transformations (for example, in the drugs’ original 
use and brand identities) this makes for a much more dynamic picture of 
pharmaceuticalisation in the early twentieth century.
1208 Snelders, Kaplan and Pieters, ‘On cannabis’, 97, 113.
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Furthermore, the three drug cycles signal that more was at work in pharmaceutical 
sleeping sickness control in the Belgian Congo than a straightforward deployment of 
effective trypanocidal compounds to advance colonial interests. In fact, this dissertation 
indicates that Atoxyl and Tryparsamide’s cyclical careers as sleeping sickness drugs 
were shaped by, and shaped, complex interactions between various groups ‘within and 
beyond (the) colonial administration(…)’, operating in different geographic locations 
and at different levels.1209 They notably united scientific researchers, pharmaceutical 
companies, political and medical authorities, public and private health care providers, 
and patients in a process of fluctuating appreciation and use. For these groups, Atoxyl 
and Tryparsamide took on different and shifting meanings, including as economic 
commodities, beacons of scientific medicine, markers of ‘ethical variability’, signs of 
inter-imperial exchange and national prowess, magic-bullet solutions to depopulation, 
objects of regulation and rationalisation, symptoms of biomedical reductionism, tools of 
civilisation, symbols of colonial oppression and effective western technology. In that 
way, trypanocide cycles clearly entailed an interplay between different interests and 
perspectives. In addition, they linked agents at local and higher levels, and actors in the 
Congo, Belgium, as well as other metropoles and colonies. The pharmaceuticalisation of 
sleeping sickness control, in sum, took shape at the intersection of multiple localities, 
scales and social spheres, and points us to a ‘crossed’ rather than a simply or exclusively 
‘colonial’ history of public health in Belgian Africa. 
11.2 Towards a ‘crossed history’ of public health in colonial 
Africa
This dissertation has indeed sought to study the pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping 
sickness control as a point of departure for a ‘crossed history’ of public health in 
colonial Africa. The various ‘intercrossings’ or ‘intersections’ inherent in Atoxyl and 
Tryparsamide’s careers, as they journeyed from experimental compounds to acclaimed 
and widely used sleeping sickness drugs, objects of criticism and eventual decline 
through multiple interactions, suggest that colonial dimensions were intertwined with 
other social and spatial dynamics in early twentieth-century biomedical interventions 
in the Congo. The focus in this dissertation has in particular been on the evolving 
alliance between laboratory science, pharmaceutical industry and collective medicine in 
the succession of trypanocide cycles as a reflection of how the realities of colonial 
1209 Tousignant, ‘Politics of mass therapy’, 626.
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borders and asymmetries were entangled with other elements in the colony’s sleeping 
sickness campaign. 
The context of colonial domination was of course crucial to the introduction and 
spread of trypanocides in the Congo. This notably spoke to the close ties between 
biomedicine and colonialism in the pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping sickness control. 
The tropical medicine community and colonial administration were complicit in the 
organisation of drug experiments and a public health campaign that put collective 
scientific and political-economic interests before indigenous patients’ individual 
wellbeing, notably by harshly imposing (experimental) treatments of limited or 
uncertain personal benefit. This was largely justified by a racialised medical discourse 
that constructed and singled out Africans as sources of infection rather than patients in 
need of medical care, as was the case for Europeans. In the early twentieth century, the 
violation of individual rights in the name of science and infectious disease control was 
of course a phenomenon not unknown in metropolitan contexts, but the systematic 
‘ethical variability’ along racial lines reveals the particular structural inequalities of 
colonial settings.1210 This asymmetry is further underscored by the fact that 
pharmaceutical experimentation on African trypanosome carriers also very much 
served to advance metropolitan science. Moreover, the medicinal strategies of sleeping 
sickness control these clinical trials inspired reflected the early twentieth-century 
tropical medicine community’s reductionist, microbiological view of epidemiology that, 
as Lyons has demonstrated, allowed the Congo administration to pursue its economic 
aims of securing an African labour force while sidestepping the broader social context of 
disease and in particular the health costs of colonialism.1211 In addition, as 
pharmaceuticals were used to extend influence over local communities and mass 
trypanocide treatment was accompanied by enumeration, documentation and 
agglomeration, medical action very much became another form of colonial 
administration in the Congo.
When considering the spread of trypanocides in the colony, we not only have to 
consider the co-constitution of tropical medicine and colonialism, however, but also 
bring the pharmaceutical industry into the equation. Medicinal prophylaxis in the 
Congo relied on the mass production and commercial distribution of chemical 
compounds. Through the organisation of a collective medicine predicated on treatment 
with European-manufactured medicines, colonial ‘domination’ thus created an 
important export market for an expansionist metropolitan drug trade, and supported its 
‘implantation’ in the Congo.1212 That Europe’s pharmaceutical industry became one of 
the major beneficiaries of sleeping sickness control in the colony at the expense of an 
indigenous population whose very condition deteriorated under colonialism and whose 
1210 Petryna, ‘Ethical variability’.
1211 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 226-230.
1212 Monnais has highlighted the role of colonial ‘domination’ in the ‘implantation’ of the French 
pharmaceutical industry in French Vietnam. See Monnais, ‘Colonial medicines to global pharmaceuticals’, 282.
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broader health needs were ignored further underscores the campaign’s problematic 
nature.
Yet pharmaceutical sleeping control in the Congo was not only or not simply about 
the mutual reinforcing of medicine and Empire, or the ‘pharmaceutical invasion’ of 
Africa via Belgian colonialism. In fact, the trajectories of Atoxyl and Tryparsamide 
cannot be captured entirely by a reference to the ‘colonial’ character of public health 
interventions in the African territory. First of all, biomedical developments in the colony 
did not take place in a self-contained territorial unit but evolved through an interplay of 
local circumstances - including the particular ecology of trypanosomiasis in the Congo 
and the colony’s political-economic outlook - and cross-border exchanges of ideas, 
people and objects. Moreover, trypanocide careers involved a wider spectrum of social 
interactions than the unequal power relations between European colonisers and 
colonised African peoples. This dissertation has focused in particular on exploring 
dynamics at work within the former group to undermine the notion of a coloniser 
monolithically or single-mindedly pursuing the immediate interests of colonialism. 
Perhaps the major theme of this study has been the emergence of a crucial 
interdependence between tropical medicine elite and ethical drug industry in the early 
twentieth century, a process that unfolded in a geographic context transcending the 
colony’s borders and that cannot easily be reduced to the political nature of medicine in 
colonial settings. This medico-industrial relationship is not only remarkable given that 
African trypanosomiasis and other tropical diseases, as political economists point out, 
are typically associated with pharmaceutical neglect due to the ‘limited market’ they 
represent(ed), but also because the medical profession was traditionally suspicious of 
commercial influences in medicine.1213 In the pharmaceuticalisation of sleeping sickness 
control, tropical medicine and drug industry nevertheless found each other in a 
collaboration that fundamentally rested on a mutual interest in scientific medicine and 
reflected pharmaceuticals’ inherently dual nature as commodities and public health 
goods. 
Crucial in this story, this dissertation suggests, was the Belgian tropical medicine 
elite’s involvement in advancing scientific medicine in the Congo via therapeutic 
reform. At the beginning of the twentieth century, various medicines and therapeutic 
approaches vied for cultural or commercial success on what was in fact an unregulated 
Congolese market for sleeping sickness remedies. The significance of this elite’s rise to 
power was not simply that it sustained this market by successfully promoting a 
pharmaceutical strategy of sleeping sickness control, but also structured it in favour of 
‘scientific’ medicines of assured quality and rational treatment regimens. To protect 
public health against undue commercial influences and clinical empiricism, Belgian 
laboratory doctors in colony and metropole became involved in ‘scientific’ clinical trials 
and later also postmarketing toxicity tests of sleeping sickness drugs. These drug 
evaluations constituted ‘regulatory mechanisms’ restricting market access to 
1213 Malowany, ‘Unfinished agendas’, 332; Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 230. 
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trypanocides, such as Atoxyl and Tryparsamide, that were deemed acceptably and 
consistently safe as well as (cost-)effective in the local context of medicinal 
prophylaxis.1214 In addition, experimental drug research yielded therapeutic guidelines, 
issued to bring medical practice in line with laboratory evidence and thus reduce 
clinical autonomy. Therefore, while participating in exploitative human subjects 
research on African trypanosome carriers, Belgian tropical medicine experts at the top 
of the colonial medical hierarchy at the same time helped to develop rational drug 
policies regulating the supply and use of sleeping sickness medicines in the Congo.
Their efforts at therapeutic reform helped exclude unscrupulous firms’ proprietary 
medicines from the Congolese drug market. But the Belgian laboratory doctors’ 
commitment to scientific medicine in the colony at the same time strengthened the 
position and influence of the ‘ethical’ segment of the pharmaceutical industry. Seeking 
to distinguish itself by enhancing its scientific status, the latter sought to increase the 
safety, efficacy and quality standards of its products and increasingly aligned itself with 
medical scientists to achieve this goal. By collaborating with trypanocide developers 
through (pre-)clinical trials and bioassays, sleeping sickness therapy researchers in 
Leopoldville and Brussels did not simply contribute to pharmaceutical innovation and 
the emergence of a more science-based drug industry, but also helped make a market for 
their medicines. In that way, the Belgian tropical medicine elite was vital in forging an 
alliance between laboratory science, ethical drug firms and collective medicine in the 
Congo. Advancing scientific medicines, in other words, did not result in the banning of 
all commercial influences from therapeutic research and practice in the colony. 
The networks of pharmaceutical development, marketing and regulation in which 
the Belgian trypanosomiasis experts took part entailed important interactions between 
metropole and colony. While clearly involving colonial asymmetries, these ties point to 
a two-way traffic rather than a simple pharmaceutical diffusion from the west to the 
‘rest’ and also challenge too stark historiographical distinctions between metropolitan 
and colonial medicine. Touching on issues such as market competition, mass production 
and consumption, therapeutic innovation and reform, the history of sleeping sickness 
control in the Congo was not disconnected from, but an integral part of crucial 
transformations in twentieth-century therapeutics that have primarily been studied 
from a metropolitan perspective so far. The Congo’s contribution to the development of 
specific chemotherapy, the building of a synthetic prescription pharmaceuticals 
industry - notably in Belgium, and the evolution of quality control mechanisms for 
chemical drugs nevertheless point to the need for a less Eurocentric approach to 
pharmaceutical history. 
Importantly, trypanocide cycles in the Congo developed within a broader relational 
geography that not only linked it to Belgium, but also to other colonies and metropoles. 
In different ways, inter-imperial exchanges - reflecting the importance of 
internationalism in early twentieth-century tropical medicine - were vital in shaping 
1214 Gaudillière, ‘Introduction: drug trajectories’, 604.
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the fates of sleeping sickness drugs there. For example, they inserted the colony in 
global networks of pharmaceutical development that introduced new compounds 
subsequently shaped into locally useful trypanocides. They helped establish the Belgian 
laboratory doctors’ authority as trypanosomiasis therapy experts in the eyes of the 
Congo administration, thus cementing their influence on sleeping sickness policy and 
pharmaceutical regulation. Moreover, interactions and comparisons across imperial 
borders informed and reinforced the Congolese authorities’ views on the 
appropriateness of pharmaceutical strategies of sleeping sickness control. After the First 
World War, such exchanges and comparisons became increasingly intertwined with a 
medico-pharmaceutical nationalism that largely manifested itself in a desire to claim 
national success in and ownership of sleeping sickness medicine(s) in the Congo. 
Continued cross-border influences became the subject of national re-appropriations. In 
combination with the development of particularly close ties between Belgium’s tropical 
medicine elite and its nascent synthetic pharmaceuticals industry, this facilitated the 
large-scale spread of Belgian-manufactured trypanocides in the Congo. The structuring 
of the Congolese trypanocide market was thus increasingly shaped in favour of national 
interests. The association between colonialism and nationalism was not a given, 
however, but developed through an interplay with inter-imperial interactions. 
With its scientific medicine agenda, links with international sleeping sickness 
researchers and (Belgian) manufacturers of synthetic prescription pharmaceuticals, as 
well as its considerable influence on the colonial administration, the Belgian tropical 
medicine elite was vital in promoting medicinal prophylaxis and pharmaceutical 
gatekeeping. It thus had a crucial role in shaping the Atoxyl and Tryparsamide 
compounds’ successful careers in the Congo. However, the alliance between laboratory 
science, ethical industry and collective medicine they promoted in the colony was not 
unchallenged, and this in turn also had an impact on trypanocide cycles. Considerable 
African opposition to mass Atoxyl treatment, for example, helped pave the way for 
Tryparsamide with its more favourable ‘moral effects’ on the indigenous population. 
Pharmaceutical sleeping sickness control also generated important discussions and 
tensions among Europeans that influenced the fates of sleeping sickness drugs. After the 
First World War, for instance, the significance of drug toxicity incidents was amplified 
by disagreements, notably between public and private sector, about the ethics of 
collective medicine and in particular the powers of local sleeping sickness doctors. This 
contributed to a strengthening of pharmaceutical regulation that ended the career of 
Belgian- and French-manufactured Atoxyl while sustaining support for mass treatment 
via increased hierarchical oversight and central therapeutic guidelines. From the late 
1920s, itinerant sleeping sickness doctors helped open up debates about the value and 
effectiveness of mass treatment with their ‘unscientific’ treatment practices and 
insistence on clinical autonomy, reports of drug resistance and reluctance to specialise 
in one disease. This not only prompted increased rationalisation and an end to 
Tryponarsyl monotherapy, but eventually also challenged the primacy of 
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pharmaceutical sleeping sickness eradication. As broader public health strategies were 
gradually rolled out and coincided with reductions in human trypanosomiasis incidence 
and prevalence in the 1930s, a substantial downward trend in Tryparsamide use was 
clearly on the way. 
With trypanocide cycles in the Congo significantly shaped by both a strengthening 
and questioning of ties between laboratory science, ethical industry and public health 
through interactions between multiple actors, it is clear that the pharmaceuticalisation 
of sleeping sickness control cannot be fully explained by pointing to a conflation of 
medicine and colonialism. This is even more true when taking into account how Atoxyl 
and Tryparsamide’s careers, moreover, were fed through and reflected an interplay 
between metropole and colony, lower and higher levels in the colonial hierarchy, 
nationalism and internationalism, and the global and the local. Following the non-linear 
fates of trypanocides in the colony therefore points us to an entanglement of ‘colonial’ 
and other social and spatial dynamics, in other words, to a ‘crossed history’ of public 
health in Belgian Africa. 
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(4449) 787: Institut de Médecine Tropicale Prince Léopold. Anvers. Budget
(4450) 788-790: Institut de Médecine Tropicale Prince Léopold. Anvers. Budget
(4450) 791: Institut de Médecine Tropicale Prince Léopold. Anvers. Dossier documentation 
générale
(4450) 796-799: Ecoles coloniales 1915-1930
(4461) 912-917: Société des Nations. Section d’Hygiène. Correspondance générale 1922-1932 
(conférence internationale de la maladie du sommeil, Londres)
(4461) 918: Société des Nations. Section d’Hygiène. Deuxième conférence internationale de la 
maladie du sommeil. Paris 1928. Correspondance, rapports, notes de service 
(4469) 940: Varia. Correspondance du Docteur E. Van Campenhout 1933-1943
Gouvernement Général
5776 (Léopoldville): Laboratoire de bactériologie Léopoldville divers (e.a. requisition 
médicaments) 1936-1942
7024 (Léopoldville): Convention état/colonie - pharmacies privées 1936-1943
7346 (Léopoldville, Kwango): M.M.K. Mission médicale du Kwango divers (e.a. reprise Foréami; 
médicaments) 1938-1945
8824 (Equateur): Maladie du sommeil divers (e.a. études, rapports traitement avec Tryponarsyl, 
accidents avec Tryponurile et Tryparsamide, troubles oculaires, pièges à tsé-tsé Harris) 
1925-1930, 1937, 1948-1949
15113 (GG): Maladie du sommeil. Compte-rendu conférence internationale de Londres 1907
15128 (GG): Maladie du sommeil. Mission au Katanga, organisation villages sanitaires/lazarets, 
instructions, remèdes, rapports, commission maladie du sommeil, missionnaires au 
laboratoire Léopoldville 1910
15144 (GG): Divers (e.a. essais thérapeutiques trypanosomiase) 1926-1929
15144 (GG, Congo-Kasai): Mission maladie du sommeil 1926-1929
15146 (Congo-Kasai, Léopoldville): Réquisitions laboratoire et lazaret Léopoldville 1926
15150 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit): Rapport médical mission région sud Kikwit lutte contre maladie du 
sommeil 1918 
15181 (GG): Instructions personnel indigène et non-indigène pour lazarets/maladie du sommeil 
1910-1911
15221 (GG): Vaccination/vaccins divers (e.a. questionnaire docteur Todd/maladie du sommeil 
mission de la Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine; documentation maladie du 
sommeil 1903-1909
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15335 (GG, Léopoldville): Factures et relevé des marchandises/produits pharmaceutiques 
expédiés au laboratoire de Léopoldville 1927-1929
15253 (GG): Divers (e.a. médicaments Fouadine et Bayer 205 pour maladie du sommeil) 
1936-1937
15712 (GG): Maladie du sommeil. Rapports Schwetz Mission avec cartes 1916-1918
15716 (GG): Maladie du sommeil. Traitement de la trypanose humaine par la Tryparsamide. 
Essais, rapports, envois 1920-1928
15718 (GG): Autorisation importation produits médicamenteux/produits médicinaux/
médicaments. Licence d’importation de médicaments instructions correspondances 
1931-1937
16461 (GG): Divers (e.a. Plainte contre docteur Schwetz) 1921-1932
16752 (GG): Pharmacie provinciale. Fiches inventaire médicaments antitrypanosomiques et 
pansements tous provinces 1927
16754 (GG): Instructions réquisitions/stocks médicaments 1931, 1936-1937
16763 (GG, Katanga, Léopoldville): Maladie du sommeil. Mission d’études Katanga; cours 
missionnaires au laboratoire de Léopoldville 1912
16769 (GG): Lutte contre la maladie du sommeil. Emploi médicament Tryparsamide; achats 
Germanine B205 et Tryponarsyl 1925-1927
16771 (Congo-Kasai, Bas-Congo): Rapport sur les travaux accomplis au Mayumbe par la mission 
médicale pour la lutte contre la maladie du sommeil 1926
16782 (GG): Maladie du sommeil. Rapport, cartes, renseignements divers 1912
16787 (GG): Divers (e.a. Mission contre maladie du sommeil au Kwango-Kasai) 1926-1927
16793 (Congo-Kasai, Kikwit): Produits pharmaceutiques pour mission Kikwit/Pères Jésuites et 
rapport lazaret 1915-1917
16793 (GG): Circulaire/instruction maladie du sommeil certificats et passeports à délivrer aux 
indigènes 1910
16795 (Congo-Kasai): Divers (e.a. rapports et correspondances mission Kikwit et Kisantu; rapport 
sur les travaux préliminaires et préparatoires de la mission médicale du Kwilu/mission 
Schwetz 1917-1920
16796 (GG): Maladie du sommeil divers 1912
16796 (GG): Maladie du sommeil divers (e.a. mission maladie du sommeil au Katanga; cours 
pratique pour missionnaires à Léopoldville) 1911
16789 (Congo-Kasai, Boma): Divers (e.a. réquisitions médicaments, pharmacie de Boma) 1913
16802 (Congo-Kasai, Léopoldville): Connaissements/expéditions des marchandises matériel 
médical pour laboratoire Léopoldville 1927
16803 (Congo-Kasai, Kwango): Rapport mission médicale du Kwango-Kwilu/Kikwit Kwilu) 
docteur Schwetz 1921
16815 (GG): Instructions ventes médicaments aux particuliers 1908-1911
16819 (Congo-Kasai): Lutte contre maladie du sommeil. Quatrième croisière du bateau hôpital 
Belgique 1930
16819 (GG): Service médicale du Gouvernement Général à Boma/Pharmacie centrale de Boma 
divers 1910-1911
16820 (Congo-Kasai, Mayumbe): Maladie du sommeil Mayumbe. Circulaire maladie du sommeil 
1914-1920, 1923
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16829 (Congo-Kasai): Kasai mission autonome de prophylaxie contre la maladie du sommeil 1926
16824 (Léopoldville): Connaissements/factures médicaments et matériel médical (e.a. 
laboratoire Léopoldville) 1936-1938
16825 (Congo-Kasai): Lutte contre la maladie du sommeil dans le Kasai (e.a. rapport d’inspection 
du Kasai-Forminière) 1931
16826 (GG): Lazarets divers (e.a. rapports maladie du sommeil) 1911
16834 (GG): Instructions/circulaires concernant lazarets maladie du sommeil, maladie nagana 
1905-1906, 1910-1912
16835 (Congo-Kasai): Réquisition arsanilate contre maladie du sommeil avec rapport Forminière 
et mission de prophylaxie contre la maladie du sommeil 1926-1927
16841 (Congo-Kasai): Mission autonome de prophylaxie contre la maladie du sommeil au Kasai 
(Forminière) 1923
16841 (Congo-Kasai, Léopoldville): Dépenses effectuées pour lutte contre la trypanosomiase et 
fonds de tiers du lazaret fleur de la reine 1914-1916
16844 (Congo-Kasai): Maladie du sommeil 1918-1921
16844 (GG): A.M.I.B. instructions rapports missions maladie du sommeil 1916-1918
16845 (Congo-Kasai, Kasai): Maladie du sommeil. District Kasai 1914
16845 (GG): Notes subsides aux missions maladie du sommeil 1921
16846 (Congo-Kasai, Matadi): Rapports mission maladie du sommeil Kwango-Kasai 1931
16846 (Congo-Kasai, Léopoldville): Stages médecins agents sanitaires religieuses infirmières au 
laboratoire de bactériologie et hôpital Léopoldville 1933-1940
16847 (GG): Organisation pharmacies provinciales, création laboratoire pharmacologie, 
instructions réquisitions médicaments et matériel médical etc. 1927-1926
16848 (Congo-Kasai, Léopoldville): Réquisitions médicaments; vente médicaments aux 
particuliers 1908-1911
16849 (Congo-Kasai): Lutte contre maladie du sommeil. Mission maladie du sommeil Kwango 
Kasai Mayumbe 1922, 1929-1931
16849 (GG): Maladie du sommeil. Demande atoxyl par Forminière 1926
16852 (Congo-Kasai, Kasai): Etude ‘relation sur le fonctionnement de la mission autonome de 
prophylaxie contre la maladie du sommeil au Kasai 1926-1927’ 1928
16856 (GG): Instructions maladie du sommeil avec carte 1907, 1910-1913
16860 (Congo-Kasai, Moyen-Congo): Rapport lutte contre la maladie du sommeil. District Kwilu) 
moyen-Congo 1916. Rapport sur les travaux de la mission médicale 
antitrypanosomique du Kwilu-Kwango par Schwetz 1920-1921
16862 (GG): Notes du service médical (surtout maladie du sommeil e.a. maladie contagieuses) 
1919-1920
16864 (Congo-Kasai): Maladie du sommeil 1914-1915
17554 (GG): Maladie du sommeil 1913
18304 (Léopoldville, Léopoldville): Laboratoire de bactériologie Léopoldville divers 1938-1951
18229 (Léopoldville): Instructions commerce produits pharmaceutiques 1929-1930
18847 (Léopoldville, Banningville): Divers (e.a. Foréami constructions médicales/dispensaires 
etc. maladie du sommeil) 1935-1942
19645 (GG): Maladie du sommeil. Instructions rapports mission Rodhain Bas-Congo/Moyen-
Congo/Lac Léopold II/Equateur/Lulonga/Bangala/Ubangi/Aruwimi 1913
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20406 (Léopoldville): Recherches scientifiques médicales divers (e.a. médicaments divers) 
1930-1937
20721 (Léopoldville, Léopoldville): Projet construction lazaret maladie du sommeil Boma) 
Boma/Léopoldville 1906
20736 (GG): Révision ordonnance mesures prises pour combattre maladie du sommeil 1917
22222 (Léopoldville, Bandundu): Dossier Justice – Affaires judiciaires correspondances entre 
parquet Léopoldville et parquet Bandundu concernant différend docteur Schwetz – de 
Pierpont, plainte contre catéchiste Kikadi, plainte Bauman contre R.P. Van Tilborg 
1921-1922
22244 (Léopoldville, Kwilu, Kikwit): Dossier Justice – Plainte Préfet Apostolique du Kwango 
contre agents colonie et mission médicale du Kwilu/Kikwit (e.a. docteur Schwetz) 1921
Rapports officiels du Congo Belge
Rapports des Services Administratifs du Gouvernement Général: Services médicaux
(80) 1-4: Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1908-1914
(81) 1: Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1913
(81) 5-9: Rapports annuels Service de l’hygiène 1916-1920
(81) 10-13: Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1921-1925
(149) 2: Rapport annuel hygiène publique 1922
(82) 2-10: Rapports annuels Service de l’hygiène/hygiène publique 1926-1928
(83) 1-6: Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1928-1932
(84) 1-11: Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1933-1937
(85) 1-3: Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1938
(219) 1-2: Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1939-1940
Rapports des Services Administratifs des Gouvernements Provinciaux: 
(Congo-)Kasai: Service médical
(85) 14-15 : Rapports annuels hygiène publique 1920-1922
(112) 1-9: Rapports annuels hygiène publique/hygiène/Service de l’hygiène 1923, 1933-1939
(87) 1-8: Rapports annuels Service médical/Service de l’hygiène 1926-1928
(88) 1-3: Rapports annuels hygiène 1929-1931
(89) 1-1bis: Rapports annuels 1932-1933
Léopoldville: Service médical
(252) 6-10: Rapports annuels Service de l’hygiène/Service médical 1926, 1930-1934, 1939
(135) 3-12: Rapports annuels Service de l’hygiène/Service médical 1933-1940
Rapports officiels périodiques
Médecine et Hygiène
RA/MED-1 – MED-5: Congo belge 1925-1940
RA/MED-16 – MED-18: Province de Léopoldville 1933-1939
RA/MED-20: Mission médicale du Kwango 
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Affaires Etrangères, 1908-1962
(2934) 524-525: Hygiène. Conventions et conférences sanitaires. Maladie du sommeil. 
Conférence internationale de Londres 1925; Conférence internationale de Paris 1928
(3240) 1384: Maladie du sommeil. Démarches auprès du Rockefeller Institute 1923
Missions
(628) 4a: Dossiers d’Afrique. Difficultés entre l’administration et les missions, principalement les 
missions du Jésuites du Kwango
(628) 4b: Dossier établi par le Gouverneur Général et remis au chef de Cabinet par J. Olyff. Divers, 
traitant une série de faits relevés à charge des missions du Kwango, de l’Equateur et de 
l’Uele
Instituut voor Tropische Geneeskunde (Antwerp) 
Stukken van Algemeen Bestuurlijke Aard
1.4.1.7.5: Dossier in verband met de samenwerking met laboratoria in Afrika 1931-1943
1.6.1.2.1.3: Briefwisseling inzake verordeningen van het Ministerie van Koloniën over tropische 
ziekten 1929
1.7.3.1.2: Dossier inzake algemeen personeelsbeleid 1914-1930
1.7.9.2.2: Dossier met allerlei briefwisseling van A. Broden 1926-1927
1.7.9.2.3: Dossier inzake de Conseil supérieur d’hygiène coloniale
1.7.9.3.1(.1, .2, .4): J. Rodhain. Allerlei briefwisseling 1933-1945
Onderzoek
Onder J. E. Van Campenhout (1906-1911)
5.1.1: Briefwisseling van het Ministerie van Koloniën in verband met veterinair onderzoek van 
specimen uit Congo 1908-1910
5.1.2: Stukken betreffende veterinaire conferenties 1909
5.1.11: Dossier inzake het bestrijden van slaapziekte in Katanga 1911
5.1.12: Nota over het behandelen van slaapziekte, z.d. 
Onder A. Broden (1911-1929)
5.2.1: Dossier inzake wetenschappelijk onderzoek in Congo 1912-1913
5.2.2: Dossier inzake onderzoek van Afrikaanse specimen 1912-1913
5.2.3: Dossier inzake onderzoek van Europese specimen 1912-1919
5.2.5: Dossier inzake materiaal in de laboratoria 1919-1926
5.2.7: Dossier inzake slaapziekte 1923
5.2.8: Dossier inzake proeven met geneesmiddelen in Congo en medisch materiaal 1923-1931
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5.2.10: Dossier inzake het testen van geneesmiddelen 1924-1929
5.2.11: Dossier inzake onderzoek in het kader van de Volkenbond 1926-1928
5.2.12: Dossier inzake onderzoek van specimen 1928-1930
5.2.14: Dossier inzake buitenlandse studiereizen 1929-1931
Onder J. Rodhain (1929-1948)
5.3.1: Dossiers met briefwisseling van Rodhain met wetenschappers, personeel en patiënten
5.3.3: Dossiers met briefwisseling met artsen 1929-1943
5.3.3bis: Allerlei documenten over onderzoek in Congo 1929-1946
5.3.9: Dossier inzake slaapziekte in Ruanda-Urundi 1931
5.3.13: Dossiers inzake het testen van geneesmiddelen 1932-1948
5.3.18.2.1: Dossiers met briefwisseling met wetenschappelijke en liefdadige verenigingen. Fonds 
Reine Elisabeth pour l’Assistance Médicale aux Indigènes (FOREAMI) 1933-1947
5.3.18.2.14: Dossiers met briefwisseling met wetenschappelijke en liefdadige verenigingen. 
Union Chimique Belge 1937-1950
5.3.21: Dossier inzake resistentie tegen arsenicum (Dr Dubois) 1934
5.3.28: Verslag van onderzoek naar de toxiciteit van stoffen 1935
5.3.33bis: Documenten van professor Henrard 1935 
Fonds Dubois
FD7: Jacques Schwetz, 1912-1950 
FD10: EMT, Ancien observatoire, 1911
FD11: EMT, Parc Duden. Correspondance Broden – Min. des Colonies (1912-1933) 
FD18: Dr A Dubois. Papiers, notes personnelles, correspondance 1904-1978
FD26: Copies de correspondance de Broden de Léopoldville 1903 à Forest 1926
FD26bis: Correspondances 1900-1930 EMT Bruxelles/Congo MS
FD27: Lettre 1904 ‘Castellani’
FD28: Biographie J. E. Van Campenhout, René Mouchet, Valcke
FD30: Création de la Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine
FD31: Liverpool School & Mission Dutton-Todd-Christy-Heiberg et suivis (1903-1931)
FD32: 1906-1907 publication de Van Campenhout sur l’atoxyl + lettres colonies 8 décembre 1906
FD34: Dubois et Mouchet, 1911-1913: rapports d’inspection des postes fluviaux + du Laboratoire 
de Léopoldville + du lazaret pour trypanosés 
FD37: Rapport manuscrit et travaux de la Conférence de Londres sur la maladie du sommeil, juin 
1907
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KADOC Documentatie- en Onderzoekscentrum voor Religie, Cultuur en 
Samenleving (Leuven)
Archief van de Belgische (1832-1935) en van de Vlaamse provincie (1935-) van de Sociëteit 
van Jezus 
4.2.1.14.5 Missie Kongo
10134: Brieven uit Congo (1906-1910)
10511: ‘L’aide médicale aux missions du Congo’ 
10516: ‘Le rôle du médecin colonial’, nota 
10702: ‘Journal de voyage’. Reisverslag door P. Ivan de Pierpont. (1, 2, 3, 5)
Archives de la Province Belge Méridionale et du Luxembourg de la Compagnie de Jésus
XII Mission Congo 
M-60: Problèmes socio-économiques, heurts avec les autorités
Boîte 1, Enveloppe B (1-63): Le Docteur Schwetz et les agissements inhumains (1921-1924)
Archief Universiteit Gent (Ghent)
Rectoraal archief
4A2/4, doos 242 (1933/1934), Map 194: Belgisch Congo – briefwisseling met geneesheer over de 
situatie in B.C. 
Musée Royale de l’Afrique Centrale, Section Historique (Tervuren)
Archives privées
J. Rodhain papers
Archives de l’Institut Pasteur (Paris)
Fonds Félix Mesnil
MES.2-8: Correspondance française. 
MES.9 -10: Correspondants étrangers. Belgique
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Maladie du sommeil: Correspondance privée
Rockefeller Archive Center (Sleepy Hollow, New York)
Rockefeller University Archives
RG 210.3 Business Manager
Box 33: Tryparsamide 1914-1946
Box 35 (folder 2-22): Patent records. Tryparsamide correspondence, ca. 1919-1936
Box 38 (folder 3): Foreign patents (primarily arsenicals). Belgium
Box 39 (folder 10): Tryparsamide, Certificates of registration of trademark (foreign), A-B 
RG 212.2 Assistant Business Manager
Box 3 (folder 1-5): Produits Chimiques et Pharmaceutiques Meurice 1924-1927
Box 3 (folder 19): Tryparsamide – Belgian Congo, 1937-1938
RG 439 Scientific reports of the laboratories to the board of scientific directors, 
volumes 7 (1919) – 14 (1925-1926) 
RG 450 B815 Wade Brown papers
Box 1 (folder 3): Administrative correspondence , 1911-1929
Box 2: Tryparsamide work, ca. 1914, 1919-1926
RG 450 P315 Louise Pearce papers
Wellcome Library (London)
Archives and Manuscripts: Dutton, Joseph Everett and Todd, John Lancelot Todd papers
Ms. 2262: Expedition Diary, Congo, 1903-1904
Ms. 2263: Native examination Book, 1903-1904
Ms. 2268: Expedition Diary vol. II, 1904-1905
Ms. 4792: Congo Expedition: Case Book, 1903-1908
Ms. 4793: Congo Expedition: Case Book, 1904-1905
Ms. 4794: Congo native and cattle examination book, 1904-1905 
Ms. 4795: Notes and queries on research work on Trypanosomiasis, Tick fever etc., 1904-1906
Ms. 4796: Todd Diary, 1905
Ms. 5691: John L. Todd, 1876-1949. Letters compiled and edited by Bridget Todd Fialkowksi, 1977
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National Library of Medicine (Bethesda, MD)
Profiles in Science. Michael Heidelberg Papers
Letter from Louise Pearce to Michael Heidelberger, 17.7.1920: http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/
retrieve/ResourceMetadata/DHBBNQ (Last accessed 20 April 2014) 
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Government publications, periodicals and journals
Annales de la Société Belge de Médecine Tropicale 1920-1940
Archiv für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene 1906-1939
Bulletin administratif et commercial du Congo belge 1912-1939
Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie Exotique 1908-1939
Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires 1924, 1934 (on Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary sessions)
Colonie du Congo Belge. Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique pendant l’année 1925, 1927, 1928
Congo belge. Gouvernement local. Recueil (bi-)mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres 
de service 1908-1939
Congo. Revue générale de la colonie belge 1920-1940
Etat Indépendant du Congo. Gouvernement local. Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, arrêtés, circulaires, 
instructions et ordres de service 1903 – 1908
Missions belges de la Compagnie de Jésus: Congo, Bengale, Ceylan 1904-1926
Rapport sur l’Hygiène Publique au Congo belge pendant l’année 1935-1940
Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice” 1922-1930, 1935-1940
Revue Missionnaire des Jésuites belges 1927-1937
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Published primary sources 
Anon., ‘Acta da sexta sessao do 1.° congresso de medicina tropical da Africa ocidental’, Revista 
Médica dé Angola 4 (1923), pp. 33-45.
Anon., ‘Arrêté du 1er Décembre 1909, n° 1/1, créant dans le corps médical de la Colonie, cinq 
classes de médecins’ dans Congo belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des 
ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 1910), p. 3. 
Anon., ‘Arrêté du 26 Août, n° 21, rangeant la maladie du sommeil parmi les maladies 
contagieuses épidémiques’ dans Etat Indépendant du Congo. Gouvernement local, 
Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, arrêtés, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 
1903), p. 124.
Anon., ‘Arrêté Royal du 4 Décembre 1922, réorganisant le service de l’Hygiène de la Colonie et 
déterminant ses attributions’ dans Bulletin administratif et commercial du Congo belge 
(Boma, 1923), pp. 55-61. 
Anon., ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du jeudi 3 mai 1934’, pp. 
1377-1408, Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary 
sessions, https://sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1934/k00411758/
k00411758_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
Anon., ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du mardi 10 juin 1924’, pp. 
1433-1472, Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the plenary 
sessions,https://sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1924/k00342162/
k00342162_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
Anon., ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du mercredi 2 mai 1934’, 
pp. 1359-1376, Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the 
plenary sessions,https://sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1934/
k00411740/k00411740_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014). 
Anon., ‘Chambre des Représentants - Annales Parlementaires. Séance du vendredi 6 juin 1924’, 
pp. 1415-1432, Plenum.be, Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Proceedings of the 
plenary sessions,https://sites.google.com/site/bplenum/proceedings/1924/
k00342144/k00342144_00 (Last accessed 27 March 2014).
Anon., ‘Circulaire prescrivant l’exécution rigoureuse des mesures prises pour empêcher la 
propagation de la maladie du sommeil par la circulation des noirs dans la colonie’ dans 
Congo Belge. Gouvernement local. Recueil bi-mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, 
instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 1912), pp. 286-287.
Anon., ‘Circulaire rappelant aux fonctionnaires et agents de la Colonie que la pharmacie de 
Boma n’est pas un dépôt réserve de médicaments’ dans Congo Belge. Gouvernement 
local, Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 
1914), pp. 129-130.
Anon., ‘Circulaire rappelant les instructions relatives à l’hospitalisation et au traitement 
ambulatoire des noirs atteints de la maladie du sommeil’ dans Congo Belge. 
Gouvernement local, Recueil bi-mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de 
service (Boma, 1912), pp. 288-289.
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Anon., ‘Circulaire relative à l’établissement des réquisitions de médicaments, réactifs et 
accessoires de pharmacie et de laboratoire ainsi qu’à l’expédition par le personnel du 
service de santé de l’état modèle 10’ dans Congo Belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil 
mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 1920), pp. 64-66.
Anon., ‘Circulaire relative à la stérilisation des solutions d’atoxyl destinées à l’usage 
hypodermique’ dans Congo Belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, 
circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 1914), p. 230.
Anon., ‘Circulaire relative aux réquisitions de médicaments’ dans Congo belge. Gouvernement 
local, Recueil mensuel des ordonnances, circulaires, instructions et ordres de service (Boma, 
1910), pp. 221-222. 
Anon., De specialiteiten Meurice (Brussel, s.d.).
Anon., ‘Fonctionnement du laboratoire de Léopoldville durant l’année 1920’, Annales de la Société 
Belge de Médecine Tropicale 1 (1921), 271-274.
Anon., ‘In memoriam Albert Meurice’, Revue de Thérapeutique “Meurice” (1939), 1811-1815.
Anon., ‘In memoriam Prof. Dr A. Broden’, Revue de Thérapeutique ‘Meurice’ (1937), iv-x.
Anon., ‘Instructions relatives aux documents à tenir et à fournir par les Missions contre la 
maladie du sommeil et toute mission médicale chargée du Service de l’Assistance 
Médicale Indigène (SAMI) pour la lutte contre les endémies les plus répandues’ dans 
Congo Belge. Gouvernement local, Recueil mensuel des circulaires, instructions et ordres de 
service (Boma, 1929), pp. 90-91. 
Anon., ‘Joint discussion No. 1. Section of Therapeutics and Pharmacology, with the Section of 
Tropical Diseases and Parasitology. November 13, 1928. Discussion on the Special Uses 
of Antimony’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 22 (1929), 559-568.
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